Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
Fundamental Principles of Law of Contract and Allied Laws
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LLM · Group 2 Business Law
2024-25 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
Fundamental Principles of Law of Contract and Allied Laws
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LLM · Group 2 Business Law
2024-25 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
First published on munotes.in on 12 August 2026.
This edition revised 6 September 2026.
Published by munotes.in, Mumbai.
Model answers written and edited by the munotes.in editorial desk.
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The University does not publish an official answer key for this paper. The answers in this volume are model answers, written to show how a full-mark answer is built. They are a study aid, not an authority on what an examiner marked.
The question paper reproduced here is the paper as set by the University of Mumbai at the 2024-25 examination.
The law in these answers is stated as at August 2026, and five changes since these papers were set alter the answers. The Mediation Act, 2023 would substitute sections 61 to 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, but its section 61, which carries that Sixth Schedule, was never commenced, so conciliation is still governed by the 1996 Act. The 2019 scheme for appointing arbitrators through graded arbitral institutions was never brought into force, though Part IA creating the Arbitration Council of India was commenced on 12 October 2023. Gayatri Balasamy, 30 April 2025, gave courts a limited power to modify an award. Central Organisation for Railway Electrification, 8 November 2024, made unilateral appointment clauses impermissible. And the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018 made specific performance enforceable as of right rather than in the court's discretion.
The questions below are the paper as the University of Mumbai set it at the 2024-25 examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2024-25 examination, reproduced as the University of Mumbai set them, in the order it set them. Nothing has been reworded, added or left out. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 3 hours · Total marks 100 · 7 questions answered
How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
Form 86812, examination of 28/05/2025, regular and ATKT. Answer any 4 questions, all questions carry equal marks, cite relevant case laws wherever required
any four of seven · 100 Marks
Answer
For full marks, cover: section 2(h) and section 10 as the frame; then each element in turn, but taken by what the Act does when the element is missing, because the consequences differ and the difference is the examinable point; a worked case on each; and a closing statement of the three-way distinction between void, voidable and unenforceable.
Section 2(h) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 defines a contract as an agreement enforceable by law. Section 2(e) defines an agreement as every promise and every set of promises forming the consideration for each other. The definition of a contract therefore contains two ideas: an agreement, and enforceability.
Section 10 supplies the conditions of enforceability: all agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void. The second paragraph preserves any law requiring writing, attestation or registration.
The useful way to discuss these elements is by their failure, and that is how this answer is organised. Every textbook lists the elements; the LLM question is what the law does when one is absent, and the answer is not the same in each case. An agreement may be void from the outset, void only when discovered to be so, voidable at the election of one party, or valid but unenforceable. Knowing which is which decides who can sue, what has to be restored, and whether a third party who has taken an interest is protected.
Sections 3 to 9 govern communication, acceptance and revocation. Section 4 fixes the moments: the communication of a proposal is complete when it comes to the knowledge of the person to whom it is made; the communication of an acceptance is complete as against the proposer when it is put in a course of transmission to him so as to be out of the power of the acceptor, and as against the acceptor when it comes to the knowledge of the proposer. Section 5 allows a proposal to be revoked at any time before the communication of its acceptance is complete as against the proposer, but not afterwards.
Failure here means there is no agreement at all, and therefore nothing to be void or voidable. This is not a defect in a contract; it is the absence of one. Lalman Shukla v. Gauri Datt, (1913) 11 Allahabad Law Journal 489, is the illustration: a servant who found his master's missing nephew without knowing of the announced reward could not claim it, because there can be no acceptance in ignorance of the proposal.
The related failure is uncertainty, and there the Act does declare the agreement void. Section 29 provides that agreements the meaning of which is not certain, or capable of being made certain, are void. Illustration (a) to section 29: A agrees to sell to B "a hundred tons of oil"; there is nothing to show what kind of oil was intended; the agreement is void for uncertainty. But illustration (b) shows the qualification: where A is a dealer in coconut oil only, the nature of his trade makes the meaning certain and the agreement stands.
The Act nowhere states this requirement, and that omission is itself a point. It is imported through section 10's requirement of an agreement and through the courts. Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 King's Bench 571, holds that arrangements between spouses in the ordinary course of domestic life are not intended to have legal consequences: a husband working in Ceylon promised his wife thirty pounds a month while she remained in England, and when the marriage failed she could not sue on it. Merritt v. Merritt, [1970] 1 Weekly Law Reports 1211, shows the limit: an agreement between spouses already separated, reduced to writing, was enforceable, because the domestic presumption does not survive the breakdown of the relationship.
Failure here means there is no contract, and the promise is simply outside the law's reach, neither void nor voidable but unenforceable in the sense that the law never took cognisance of it.
Section 13 requires consensus ad idem and section 14 defines free consent by excluding five vitiating factors. The consequences of the five are not uniform, and that is the heart of this element.
Coercion (section 15), fraud (section 17) and misrepresentation (section 18) make the agreement voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused: section 19. The contract is good until avoided, so a third party who has taken an interest in good faith and for value before avoidance is protected, and the proviso to section 19 says so. Section 64 then requires the party rescinding a voidable contract to restore any benefit received.
Undue influence (section 16) makes the agreement voidable under section 19A, but with an important addition: the Court may set the transaction aside either absolutely or, if the party entitled to avoid it has received any benefit, upon such terms and conditions as to the Court seem just. Section 16(3) shifts the burden: where a person in a position to dominate the will of another enters into a transaction which appears on the face of it or on the evidence to be unconscionable, the burden of proving that it was not induced by undue influence lies on him.
Mistake behaves quite differently. Where both parties are under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement, section 20 makes the agreement void, not voidable. An erroneous opinion as to the value of the thing which forms the subject matter is not, by the Explanation, such a mistake of fact. Section 21 provides that a contract is not voidable because it was caused by a mistake as to any law in force in India, though a mistake as to a foreign law has the same effect as a mistake of fact. Section 22 provides that a contract is not voidable merely because it was caused by one of the parties being under a mistake as to a matter of fact.
The practical difference between void and voidable is the difference between nothing and something. A void agreement never creates rights, so no third party can take under it and restoration is governed by section 65. A voidable contract creates rights until avoided, so a bona fide purchaser for value without notice is protected and restoration is governed by section 64.
Section 11 makes competent to contract every person who is of the age of majority according to the law to which he is subject, of sound mind, and not disqualified from contracting by any law to which he is subject. Section 12 defines soundness of mind as the capacity to understand the contract and to form a rational judgment as to its effect upon one's interests, and provides that a person usually of unsound mind but occasionally of sound mind may contract when he is of sound mind.
Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose, (1903) 30 Indian Appeals 114, decided that failure of this element produces a void agreement and not a voidable one. A minor mortgaged his house to secure a loan; the lender's attorney had written notice of the minority. The Privy Council held the mortgage void ab initio, because sections 10 and 11 make competence a condition of a contract coming into existence at all. It refused relief under section 64, which applies only to a voidable contract, and refused section 65, whose words "discovered to be void" do not fit a case where the lender knew the age throughout. It also rejected an estoppel, holding that estoppel cannot validate what the statute makes void.
Three consequences follow and each earns a mark. A minor's agreement cannot be ratified on attaining majority, because there is nothing to ratify. A minor may nevertheless be a promisee or beneficiary and can enforce a contract made for his benefit, as in Sharafat Ali v. Noor Mohd. and the line of cases treating a minor's mortgage in his favour as good. And section 68 allows a supplier of necessaries to be reimbursed from the minor's property, the liability being on the estate and not personal, which is the Act's way of preventing hardship without contradicting Mohori Bibee.
Sections 2(d), 23, 24 and 25 govern this element, and the failures divide into two.
Absence of consideration: section 25 makes the agreement void, subject to the three exceptions of a registered promise made on account of natural love and affection between near relations, a promise to compensate past voluntary service, and a written and signed promise to pay a time-barred debt. Explanation 2 removes inadequacy from the field altogether: an agreement is not void merely because the consideration is inadequate, though inadequacy may be evidence on the question whether consent was free.
Unlawfulness of consideration or object: section 23 makes the agreement void, and its five heads are that the consideration or object is forbidden by law, or is of such a nature that if permitted it would defeat the provisions of any law, or is fraudulent, or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another, or the Court regards it as immoral or opposed to public policy.
Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, (1986) 3 SCC 156, is the modern Indian use of the public policy head and should be worked. Rule 9(i) of the corporation's service rules allowed termination of a permanent employee on three months' notice or pay in lieu, without any reason. The Supreme Court struck it down as void under section 23 as opposed to public policy, holding that the courts will not enforce an unfair and unreasonable contract, or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract, entered into between parties who are not equal in bargaining power. The Court expressly refused to confine public policy to the recognised heads, holding it to be a principle capable of application to new situations. Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Consumer Education and Research Centre, (1995) 5 SCC 482, extended the reasoning to a term in a life insurance policy.
Section 24 completes the picture on severability: if any part of a single consideration for one or more objects, or any one or any part of any one of several considerations for a single object, is unlawful, the agreement is void. Where, however, the lawful and unlawful parts are genuinely separable, the courts have enforced the lawful part.
This element operates irrespective of consent, capacity and consideration, and the failure is always the same: the agreement is void. Section 26 voids an agreement in restraint of the marriage of any person other than a minor. Section 27 voids an agreement in restraint of trade, saving the sale of goodwill. Section 28 voids an agreement in restraint of legal proceedings, expressly saving a contract to refer disputes to arbitration. Section 29 voids uncertain agreements. Section 30 voids agreements by way of wager, and adds that no suit shall be brought for recovering anything alleged to be won on any wager.
Section 56, first paragraph: an agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void. This is initial impossibility, and it is a distinct element from the doctrine of frustration in the second paragraph, which deals with a contract that becomes impossible or unlawful after it is made and provides that it thereupon becomes void. The third paragraph gives a claim for compensation where the promisor knew, or with reasonable diligence might have known, of an impossibility which the promisee did not know.
Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur and Co., AIR 1954 SC 44, is the leading Indian authority on the second paragraph. Land had been sold for development, and a portion was requisitioned for military purposes during the war. The Supreme Court held the contract not frustrated: the requisition was temporary, no time for performance had been fixed, and the interruption did not strike at the root of the adventure. Mukherjea J. held that section 56 lays down a positive rule of law and that the English theories of an implied term or of a disappearance of the foundation of the contract are not the basis of the Indian rule; the word "impossible" is used in a practical and not a literal sense.
Section 10's second paragraph preserves any law requiring writing, attestation or registration, so the general Indian rule is that a contract need not be in writing. Where another statute requires a form and it is not observed, the usual consequence is that the contract is valid but unenforceable, or in some cases void: a sale of immovable property of a hundred rupees and upwards requires a registered instrument under section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and an arbitration agreement must be in writing under section 7(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The stamping question was settled recently and is worth a line. In In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act 1899, decided 13 December 2023, seven judges held unanimously that an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument is inadmissible in evidence but is not void or void ab initio, and that the defect is curable. That decision overruled N.N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd., and it is the clearest modern statement of the difference between a defect that destroys an agreement and one that merely blocks its proof.
Conclusion. A contract under section 2(h) is an agreement enforceable by law, and section 10 states the conditions of enforceability. The elements are cumulative, but the effect of failure is not uniform, and that is the discussion the question calls for. Absence of offer, acceptance or intention means there was never an agreement. Uncertainty under section 29, absence or unlawfulness of consideration or object under sections 23, 24 and 25, incapacity under section 11 as construed in Mohori Bibee, bilateral mistake of fact under section 20, initial impossibility under the first paragraph of section 56, and an express statutory avoidance under sections 26 to 30 all produce a void agreement, on which no rights can be founded and where restoration is governed by section 65.
Coercion, fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence produce a voidable contract under sections 19 and 19A, which is good until avoided, protects a bona fide third party who has taken for value without notice, and requires restoration under section 64. Want of a statutory form usually produces a contract that is valid but unenforceable, and In Re: Interplay (2023) confirms that inadmissibility for want of stamp belongs to that category and not to the first. A candidate who states the elements without stating which of these three consequences each failure produces has answered only half the question.
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