Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
Fundamental Principles of Law of Contract and Allied Laws
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LLM · Group 2 Business Law
2023 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
Fundamental Principles of Law of Contract and Allied Laws
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LLM · Group 2 Business Law
2023 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
First published on munotes.in on 12 August 2026.
This edition revised 6 September 2026.
Published by munotes.in, Mumbai.
Model answers written and edited by the munotes.in editorial desk.
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The University does not publish an official answer key for this paper. The answers in this volume are model answers, written to show how a full-mark answer is built. They are a study aid, not an authority on what an examiner marked.
The question paper reproduced here is the paper as set by the University of Mumbai at the 2023 examination.
The law in these answers is stated as at August 2026, and five changes since these papers were set alter the answers. The Mediation Act, 2023 would substitute sections 61 to 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, but its section 61, which carries that Sixth Schedule, was never commenced, so conciliation is still governed by the 1996 Act. The 2019 scheme for appointing arbitrators through graded arbitral institutions was never brought into force, though Part IA creating the Arbitration Council of India was commenced on 12 October 2023. Gayatri Balasamy, 30 April 2025, gave courts a limited power to modify an award. Central Organisation for Railway Electrification, 8 November 2024, made unilateral appointment clauses impermissible. And the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018 made specific performance enforceable as of right rather than in the court's discretion.
The questions below are the paper as the University of Mumbai set it at the 2023 examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2023 examination, reproduced as the University of Mumbai set them, in the order it set them. Nothing has been reworded, added or left out. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 3 hours · Total marks 100 · 7 questions answered
How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
Form 33479, examination of 27/06/2023. Answer any four questions, all questions carry equal marks, answer in neat and legible hand writing, quote relevant case laws wherever necessary
any four of seven · 100 Marks
Answer
For full marks, cover: the definition in section 2(e) and its place in the chain; then organise the examination as the two-stage inquiry a court actually performs, first whether an agreement exists and second whether it is enforceable; and carry each stage on named authority, since the paper asks for case law in terms.
Section 2(e) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 defines an agreement as every promise and every set of promises forming the consideration for each other. The definition cannot be used without the definitions it depends on. Section 2(a) defines a proposal: when one person signifies to another his willingness to do or abstain from doing anything, with a view to obtaining the assent of that other. Section 2(b) provides that when the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his assent, the proposal is accepted, and a proposal when accepted becomes a promise. Section 2(d) defines consideration. Section 2(h) closes the chain: an agreement enforceable by law is a contract.
The relation between agreement and contract is therefore one of genus and species. Every contract is an agreement; not every agreement is a contract, because an agreement may fail the enforceability test in section 10 or be one that section 2(g) declares void.
A court asked whether a contract exists performs two inquiries in order, and organising the answer that way is what turns a list into an examination. Stage one: was there an agreement at all, that is, a proposal accepted, supported by consideration and made with the intention of creating legal relations? Stage two: is that agreement enforceable, that is, made by competent parties with free consent, for a lawful object and consideration, and not expressly declared void?
Was there a proposal, or only an invitation to make one? Harvey v. Facey, [1893] Appeal Cases 552, is the standard authority. A telegram asked "Will you sell us Bumper Hall Pen? Telegraph lowest cash price". The reply, "Lowest price for Bumper Hall Pen 900 pounds", was held to be a statement of price and not an offer, so the purported acceptance created nothing. Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v. Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd., [1953] 1 Queen's Bench 401, holds that goods on a self service shelf are an invitation to treat and the customer makes the offer at the cash desk. An advertisement, a catalogue, a tender notice and an auctioneer's announcement are ordinarily invitations to offer.
Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] 1 Queen's Bench 256, shows the exception and is the most cited case in the subject. The company advertised a reward of a hundred pounds to anyone who used its smoke ball as directed and still contracted influenza, and stated that it had deposited a thousand pounds with its bankers to show its sincerity. Mrs Carlill used the ball as directed, caught influenza, and sued. The Court of Appeal held that the advertisement was a general offer to the world, capable of acceptance by performance of the condition; that the deposit answered the argument that the advertisement was mere puff; that notification of acceptance was dispensed with by the terms of the offer; and that the inconvenience the plaintiff had undergone was good consideration.
Was there an acceptance, and was it absolute? Section 7 requires the acceptance to be absolute and unqualified and to be expressed in some usual and reasonable manner. A counter-offer is not an acceptance and destroys the original offer: Hyde v. Wrench, (1840) 3 Beavan 334. Section 8 provides that performance of the conditions of a proposal, or acceptance of any consideration for a reciprocal promise, is an acceptance.
Was the acceptance communicated? Section 4 fixes the moments: communication of a proposal is complete when it comes to the knowledge of the person to whom it is made; communication of an acceptance is complete as against the proposer when it is put in a course of transmission to him so as to be out of the power of the acceptor, and as against the acceptor when it comes to the knowledge of the proposer. Section 5 permits revocation of a proposal at any time before the communication of its acceptance is complete as against the proposer.
Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia v. Girdharilal Parshottamdas and Co., AIR 1966 SC 543, applies these sections to instantaneous communication. A contract was negotiated by telephone between Ahmedabad and Khamgaon. The Supreme Court held by a majority that the post rule in section 4 was framed for communication by post or telegram, where there is an interval, and that in the case of instantaneous communication the contract is made where the acceptance is heard, that is, at the place of the offeror. The case matters for jurisdiction and is the Indian starting point for the law on email and electronic acceptance, now supported by section 10A of the Information Technology Act, 2000.
Lalman Shukla v. Gauri Datt, (1913) 11 Allahabad Law Journal 489, closes stage one. A servant sent in search of his master's missing nephew found the boy in ignorance of an announced reward, and could not claim it. There can be no acceptance in ignorance of the proposal, because acceptance is the signification of assent, and a person cannot assent to what he does not know.
Was there consideration? Section 2(d) requires an act, abstinence or promise, at the desire of the promisor, by the promisee or any other person. Durga Prasad v. Baldeo, (1880) Indian Law Reports 3 Allahabad 221, shows the force of the words "at the desire of the promisor". The plaintiff built shops in a market at the order of the Collector; the defendants, who occupied them, promised him a commission on their sales in consideration of his outlay. The Allahabad High Court held there was no consideration, because the expenditure had been made at the desire of the Collector and not of the defendants.
Was there an intention to create legal relations? The Act does not state the requirement and the courts have supplied it. Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 King's Bench 571, holds that a domestic arrangement between spouses living together is not intended to have legal consequences. Merritt v. Merritt, [1970] 1 Weekly Law Reports 1211, holds that the presumption does not survive the breakdown of the relationship.
Were the parties competent? Section 11 requires majority, soundness of mind and the absence of statutory disqualification, and section 12 defines soundness of mind for this purpose. Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose, (1903) 30 Indian Appeals 114, holds that a minor's agreement is void ab initio. A minor mortgaged his house to a lender whose attorney knew of the minority. The Privy Council held that sections 10 and 11 require competence as a condition of a contract coming into existence; that section 64 could not help the lender because it applies to a voidable contract; that section 65 could not help him because it speaks of an agreement "discovered to be void" and nothing was discovered; and that estoppel cannot validate what the statute makes void.
Was the consent free? Section 14 defines free consent as consent not caused by coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. The consequences differ and the difference is examinable: coercion, fraud and misrepresentation make the agreement voidable under section 19, undue influence voidable under section 19A with power in the court to impose terms, and bilateral mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement void under section 20.
Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti, (1889) Indian Law Reports 13 Madras 214, is the classic coercion case: a widow was prevented from removing her husband's corpse for cremation until she consented to adopt a boy, and the consent was held to have been caused by coercion. Lakshmi Amma v. Talengala Narayana Bhatta, AIR 1970 SC 1367, applies section 16: a deed executed by a man in hospital in favour of one son to the exclusion of the others was set aside for undue influence, the relationship and the circumstances placing the burden on the beneficiary.
Derry v. Peek, (1889) 14 Appeal Cases 337, marks the line between fraud and misrepresentation. A company prospectus stated that the company had the right to use steam power, believing a Board of Trade consent to be a formality. The House of Lords held there was no fraud, because fraud requires a false representation made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly careless whether it be true or false. Section 17 of the Indian Act adopts substantially the same test, and section 18 covers the innocent case.
Was the consideration and object lawful? Section 23 voids an agreement where the consideration or object is forbidden by law, would defeat the provisions of any law, is fraudulent, involves injury to person or property, or is regarded by the Court as immoral or opposed to public policy. Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya, AIR 1959 SC 781, is the Supreme Court's leading discussion of public policy under this section, holding that though the heads of public policy are not closed, courts should be slow to invent new heads, and that a wagering agreement, void under section 30, is not for that reason unlawful under section 23, so a partnership formed to enter into wagering transactions was not itself unlawful.
Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, (1986) 3 SCC 156, shows the modern reach of section 23, striking down a service rule permitting termination on three months' notice without reason, as an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract between parties of unequal bargaining power.
Was there consideration at all, and does it matter? Section 25 makes an agreement without consideration void, with three exceptions: a registered promise made on account of natural love and affection between near relations, a promise to compensate past voluntary service, and a written promise to pay a time barred debt. Explanation 2 provides that inadequacy alone does not void the agreement, though it may be evidence on whether consent was free, and Illustration (f) gives the Act's own example of a horse worth a thousand rupees sold for ten.
Is the agreement expressly declared void? Sections 26 to 30 void agreements in restraint of marriage, of trade and of legal proceedings, uncertain agreements and wagers. Section 56, first paragraph, voids an agreement to do an act impossible in itself.
Is a statutory form required? The second paragraph of section 10 preserves any law requiring writing, attestation or registration. In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act 1899, decided 13 December 2023 by seven judges, is the newest authority on the consequence of failing such a requirement, holding that an unstamped instrument is inadmissible in evidence but is not void, and that the defect is curable. It overruled N.N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd.
Conclusion. An agreement, under section 2(e), is every promise and every set of promises forming the consideration for each other, and it becomes a contract under section 2(h) only when the law will enforce it. The examination the question calls for is best conducted as the two-stage inquiry a court performs.
At the first stage the question is whether an agreement came into existence: whether there was a proposal rather than an invitation to offer, on the Harvey v. Facey and Carlill line; whether the acceptance was absolute under section 7 and communicated under section 4, on which Bhagwandas Kedia governs instantaneous communication; whether it was made in knowledge of the proposal, as Lalman Shukla requires; whether consideration moved at the promisor's desire, as Durga Prasad v. Baldeo requires; and whether legal relations were intended, as Balfour v. Balfour and Merritt v. Merritt determine.
At the second stage the question is enforceability under section 10: competence under section 11, on which Mohori Bibee holds a minor's agreement void ab initio; free consent under sections 13 to 22, where the vitiating factors produce voidability under sections 19 and 19A but bilateral mistake of fact produces nullity under section 20; lawful consideration and object under sections 23 to 25, on which Gherulal Parakh counsels caution about new heads of public policy while Brojo Nath Ganguly shows the section reaching unequal standard form bargains; and the absence of an express avoidance under sections 26 to 30. Each stage has its own consequence, and it is the difference between void, voidable and merely unenforceable that a script must get right.
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