Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
Law Relating to Customs and Foreign Exchange
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LLM · Group 2 Business Law
2016 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
Law Relating to Customs and Foreign Exchange
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LLM · Group 2 Business Law
2016 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
First published on munotes.in on 12 August 2026.
Published by munotes.in, Mumbai.
Model answers written and edited by the munotes.in editorial desk.
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The University does not publish an official answer key for this paper. The answers in this volume are model answers, written to show how a full-mark answer is built. They are a study aid, not an authority on what an examiner marked.
The question paper reproduced here is the paper as set by the University of Mumbai at the 2016 examination.
The answers in this volume state the law as it stands today, not as it stood when the paper was set, and four changes alter answers here. The Customs and Central Excise Settlement Commission ceased to accept applications after 31 March 2025 and ceased to operate from 1 April 2025 under the Finance Act 2025, its work passing to an Interim Board for Settlement of three revenue officers with no judicial member, so immunity from prosecution under section 127H is no longer obtainable. FEMA has had no Appellate Tribunal of its own since 26 May 2017, the SAFEMA Tribunal serving under a substituted section 18 with sections 20, 22, 24, 25, 26 and 29 to 31 omitted. Section 6(3) was omitted on 15 October 2019, moving non-debt capital account transactions to the Central Government. And from 1 May 2025 section 18(1B) requires a provisional assessment to be finalised in two years and section 18A allows a voluntary post-clearance revision of an entry.
The questions below are the paper as the University of Mumbai set it at the 2016 examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2016 examination, reproduced as the University of Mumbai set them, in the order it set them. Nothing has been reworded, added or left out. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 3 hours · Total marks 100 · 7 questions answered
How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
Q.P. Code 60993. Attempt any four questions, all questions carry 25 marks each, cite case laws wherever necessary
any four of seven · 100 Marks
Answer
For full marks, cover: valuation first and at length, because that is where the litigation and the money are, and the question names it first; section 14 with its conditions, the 2007 Valuation Rules and the sequence they impose; the two decisions that fixed the Indian approach to transaction value; then chargeability, meaning section 12 and the taxable event; then levy, meaning the rate, the date under section 15 and the different duties; and a critical assessment that identifies where the scheme is genuinely open to objection, which is the related-party machinery and the width of Rule 12.
Section 14 was recast in 2007 to bring Indian law into line with Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement, and the change was from a notional to a real price. Before 2007 the section spoke of the price at which such or like goods are ordinarily sold or offered for sale in the course of international trade, which was a deemed or normal value. Since 2007 the value is the transaction value.
The conditions in section 14(1) must be stated together, because each is a gateway. The value of imported goods and export goods is the transaction value, that is the price actually paid or payable for the goods when sold for export to India for delivery at the time and place of importation, or as the case may be for export from India for delivery at the time and place of exportation, where the buyer and seller of the goods are not related and price is the sole consideration for the sale, subject to such other conditions as may be specified in the rules made in this behalf.
The section then requires additions. The transaction value includes, in addition to the price, any amount paid or payable for costs and services, including commissions and brokerage, engineering, design work, royalties and licence fees, costs of transportation to the place of importation, insurance, loading, unloading and handling charges, to the extent and in the manner specified in the rules. The first proviso allows the rules to provide for the manner of determination where there is no sale, or the buyer and seller are related, or price is not the sole consideration. The second proviso allows the Board to fix tariff values for any class of goods by notification, and where a tariff value is fixed it displaces the transaction value.
The rate of exchange is fixed by the third proviso and the Explanation: the conversion rate is that notified by the Board, and it is the rate in force on the date the bill of entry is presented under section 46 or the shipping bill under section 50.
The Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007 supply the machinery, and the sequence is mandatory. Rule 3 makes the transaction value the primary method, subject to Rule 12. Rule 4 provides for the value of identical goods, Rule 5 for similar goods, Rule 7 for the deductive value worked back from the sale price in India, Rule 8 for the computed value built up from cost of production, and Rule 9 for the residual method, applying reasonable means consistent with the principles of the Agreement. Rule 6 allows the importer to request that Rules 7 and 8 be applied in reverse order. The rules must be applied in that order and an officer who jumps to Rule 9 without exhausting the earlier rules acts without jurisdiction.
Rule 12 is where the criticism begins. It permits the proper officer, where he has reason to doubt the truth or accuracy of the declared value, to ask the importer for further information and, if the doubt remains after receiving it or where no response comes, to determine the value under the sequence in Rules 4 to 9. The Explanation says the rule does not provide a method of determination but only a mechanism to reject a declared value, and requires that the officer's doubt be based on certain reasons, which may include a significantly higher value at which identical or similar goods were assessed, an abnormal discount, a sale involving special discounts to exclusive agents, a misdeclaration of parameters, or fraudulent documents.
The critical objection is that Rule 12 gives a general power to disbelieve, which the officer exercises first and justifies afterwards. The Explanation's list is inclusive and its first item, that identical or similar goods were assessed higher elsewhere, effectively permits contemporaneous import data to displace an actual contract. The courts have held repeatedly that the declared transaction value can be rejected only on evidence and after a speaking order, and that a mere comparison with a higher price in another importation, without proof that the goods are identical in quality, quantity, country of origin and commercial level, is not enough. That is the correct position, but it is a position that has to be litigated in every case.
The leading Indian decision on transaction value is Eicher Tractors Ltd v. Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai, (2001) 1 SCC 315. The importer had bought a consignment of bearings at a discounted price because the supplier was closing a stock line, and the department loaded the value on the footing that the ordinary international price was higher. The Supreme Court held that the price actually paid must be accepted unless the case falls within one of the exceptions in the rules, and that a commercially real discount, freely negotiated between unrelated parties, does not take the transaction outside the section. The reasoning is that section 14 fixes the value by reference to the particular transaction and not to a hypothetical market, so the department must bring the case within an exception rather than substitute its own view of the right price.
On related-party imports the machinery is Rule 3(3) read with Rule 2(2). Where the buyer and seller are related, the transaction value is accepted only if the examination of the circumstances of the sale shows that the relationship did not influence the price, or if the importer demonstrates that the value closely approximates a test value, being the transaction value of identical or similar goods in sales to unrelated buyers in India, a deductive value or a computed value.
In practice these cases go to the Special Valuation Branch, and the criticism has always been the time such references take. That criticism now has a statutory answer: since 1 May 2025, section 18(1B) requires a provisional assessment to be finalised within two years, extendable by one year by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, so a Special Valuation Branch reference can no longer be left open indefinitely.
Section 12 is the charging section: duties of customs shall be levied at such rates as may be specified under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, or any other law for the time being in force, on goods imported into, or exported from, India. Section 12(2) applies the section to Government goods as to any other.
The constitutional footing is Article 265 and Entry 83 of List I, which gives Parliament exclusive competence over duties of customs including export duties.
The taxable event has to be stated with care because the definitions invite an error. "India" in section 2(27) includes the territorial waters, and "import" in section 2(23) means bringing into India from a place outside India, so the literal reading is that the charge attaches when a vessel enters territorial waters. That is not the law. The taxable event is the crossing of the customs barrier, the point at which the goods mingle with the mass of goods in the country, which for goods entered for home consumption is their clearance under section 47, and for warehoused goods is their removal from the warehouse under section 68. On the export side the event is the crossing of the customs barrier outwards under a let export order.
The practical consequence of that rule is what makes it worth stating. Goods that enter territorial waters and are then re-exported without clearance attract no duty; and warehoused goods bear the rate in force on the date the bill of entry for home consumption is presented, not the rate on the date they were first imported, which is why the warehousing provisions in Chapter IX are a duty-deferment mechanism and not merely a storage facility.
Section 15 fixes the rate and the date for imports. For goods entered for home consumption under section 46, the rate and valuation are those in force on the date of presentation of the bill of entry; for goods cleared from a warehouse under section 68, on the date of presentation of the bill of entry for home consumption; and in any other case, on the date of payment of duty. Section 16 is the export counterpart, taking the date of the let export order under section 51.
"Customs duties" is a compound expression and its components should be named. The basic customs duty under section 12 read with the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act; the additional duty under section 3 of that Act; since 1 July 2017 the integrated goods and services tax under section 3(7) and the compensation cess under section 3(9), levied on the value determined under section 3(8) which builds duty into the base; safeguard measures under section 8B; countervailing duty on subsidised articles under section 9; anti-dumping duty under section 9A, with refund of the excess over the actual margin under section 9AA; and the social welfare surcharge and, on specified goods, the agriculture infrastructure and development cess.
Exemption is the mirror of levy and belongs in this answer in one paragraph. Section 25(1) permits a general exemption by notification in the public interest and section 25(2) a special exemption by order in circumstances of an exceptional nature to be stated in the order. Since Commissioner of Customs v. Dilip Kumar and Company, (2018) 9 SCC 1, a Constitution Bench decision, an exemption notification is construed strictly and any ambiguity is resolved in favour of the revenue, which reverses the older rule and is the single most important recent change in this part of the law.
Three criticisms are worth making and each should be tied to a provision.
The first is that Rule 12 converts a rule of evidence into a rule of assessment in practice. The declared value is the starting point in law and the disputed point in fact, and an importer whose price is doubted bears the cost of establishing it, through provisional assessment, bond and often a Special Valuation Branch reference. The two-year limit in section 18(1B) from 1 May 2025 addresses the delay but not the underlying allocation of the burden.
The second is that the multiplication of duties has made the effective rate opaque. Basic duty, integrated tax computed on a base that already includes basic duty, compensation cess, surcharge and cess, each with its own exemptions, mean that the rate on a given article is a computation rather than a figure, and the tariff no longer discloses on its face what an importer will pay.
The third is that the interaction between the taxable event and the deferment mechanisms is under-appreciated. Because the rate crystallises on removal from a warehouse and not on importation, the warehousing chapter and the Manufacture and Other Operations in Warehouse Regulations are as much a fiscal planning instrument as a logistics one, and the rules governing the warehousing period, interest under section 61 and the consequences of improper removal under section 72 do more work than their obscurity suggests.
Conclusion. The three ideas the question names run in sequence, and the Act keeps them apart. Chargeability arises under section 12 read with Entry 83 of List I, and it attaches not when a vessel enters territorial waters but when the goods cross the customs barrier, which is clearance for home consumption under section 47 or removal from a warehouse under section 68. Levy fixes what is payable, and section 15 ties the rate and valuation to the date of the bill of entry, with basic duty, integrated tax, compensation cess, anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard duties and the surcharges stacked above it.
Valuation quantifies the base, and since 2007 it does so by the real price rather than a notional one. Section 14 accepts the transaction value where the parties are unrelated and price is the sole consideration, requires the specified additions, and lets the 2007 Rules supply a mandatory sequence of identical goods, similar goods, deductive value, computed value and a residual method. Eicher Tractors holds that a genuine negotiated discount between unrelated parties does not take a transaction out of section 14, which is the strongest protection an importer has.
The criticism that survives is Rule 12. It permits rejection of a declared value on a "reason to doubt" whose illustrative grounds include nothing more than a higher assessment of comparable goods elsewhere, and although the Explanation says the rule supplies no method of valuation and the courts require a speaking order on evidence, the burden in practice falls on the importer to prove his own contract. Section 18(1B), which since 1 May 2025 requires a provisional assessment to be finalised in two years extendable by one, has cured the delay that made that burden intolerable; it has not changed where the burden lies.
Answer
For full marks, cover: the offences chapter section by section, because "expound" means set it out; the sanction requirement and the compounding alternative; the three presumptions that make prosecution workable; then the second limb, effectiveness, which is where the marks are won, and which must be argued from features of the scheme rather than asserted; the abolition of the Settlement Commission on 1 April 2025 and what it did to the criminal side; and Radhika Agarwal of 27 February 2025.
Chapter XVI, headed "Offences and Prosecutions", runs from section 132 to section 140A, and the principal offences should be set out in order.
Section 132: false declaration, false documents. Knowingly or intentionally making, signing or using, or causing to be made, signed or used, any declaration, statement or document which is false or incorrect in any material particular in the transaction of any business relating to customs is punishable with imprisonment up to two years, or fine, or both.
Section 133: obstruction of an officer of customs, punishable with imprisonment up to six months, or fine, or both.
Section 134: refusal to be X-rayed, that is refusal to allow a radiologist to screen the body or to submit to the taking of an X-ray picture under section 103, punishable with imprisonment up to six months, or fine, or both. Note that section 134 is not among the offences for which section 104(1) permits arrest, which is a detail examiners test.
Section 135 is the principal smuggling offence and carries the graded punishment. Knowingly concerning oneself in misdeclaration, or in any fraudulent evasion or attempt at evasion of any duty, or in a prohibition, or acquiring possession of or dealing with goods which one knows or has reason to believe are liable to confiscation under section 111 or section 113, or in the fraudulent availing of drawback or an exemption, is punishable with imprisonment up to seven years and with fine where the goods are those specified in the section, principally goods whose market price exceeds one crore rupees, such categories of prohibited goods as the Central Government may specify by notification, evasion exceeding fifty lakh rupees, fraudulent drawback or exemption exceeding fifty lakh rupees, or fraudulently obtaining an instrument where the duty relatable exceeds fifty lakh rupees.
And up to three years in any other case. Section 135(2) deals with the repeat offender: a person convicted under section 135 or under section 136(1) who is again convicted under section 135 is punishable for the second and for every subsequent offence with imprisonment which may extend to seven years and with fine, and in the absence of special and adequate reasons recorded in the judgment that imprisonment shall not be less than one year.
The section contains a proviso limiting the discretion to award less than one year, requiring special and adequate reasons recorded in the judgment, and excluding from those reasons the fact that the accused was convicted for the first time, that he was not the principal offender, that his age was under eighteen, or that he had been ordered to forfeit property.
Section 135A: preparation to commit an offence under section 135, punishable with imprisonment up to three years, fine, or both. It is an unusual provision, because English criminal law does not ordinarily punish mere preparation, and it exists because in smuggling the preparatory acts are often the only ones capable of interception.
Section 135AA, inserted in 2022: publishing information relating to the value of imported or export goods or the identity of the importer or exporter contrary to section 135AA, punishable with imprisonment up to six months, or fine up to fifty thousand rupees, or both. It protects the confidentiality of import and export data.
Section 136: offences by officers of customs, covering collusion in fraudulent export or evasion, and requiring sanction of the Central Government or of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner depending on the officer's rank.
Section 137: sanction and compounding. No court may take cognizance of an offence under section 132, 133, 134, 135, 135A or 135AA except with the previous sanction of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner of Customs; and by section 137(3) any offence under the chapter may be compounded, either before or after the institution of prosecution, by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner on payment by the accused of such compounding amount and in such manner as may be specified by rules, subject to provisos excluding certain classes of person.
Section 138 makes offences other than those under section 132 and 135 triable summarily; section 138A presumes the culpable mental state; section 138B governs the relevancy of statements made before a gazetted officer; section 138C deals with the admissibility of microfilms, facsimile copies and computer printouts; and section 140 deals with offences by companies, making the person in charge of and responsible to the company liable, with the standard defence of no knowledge or due diligence.
Three provisions carry the prosecution's weight and should be stated together. Section 138A requires the court to presume the culpable mental state, leaving it to the accused to prove that he had none, with sub-section (2) fixing the standard at beyond reasonable doubt. Section 123 places on the possessor the burden of proving that seized gold, watches or other notified goods are not smuggled, provided the seizure was made in the reasonable belief that they were. Section 139 presumes the genuineness of documents produced or seized and the truth of their contents.
Section 108, which empowers a gazetted officer to summon any person to give evidence or produce a document in an inquiry declared to be a judicial proceeding within sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, supplies the material. Statements recorded under it are the backbone of most customs prosecutions, and section 138B controls their use, making such a statement relevant only where the maker is examined as a witness and the court or adjudicating authority forms an opinion, recorded, that it should be admitted in the interests of justice, or where the maker is dead, cannot be found, is incapable of giving evidence, is kept out of the way, or where his presence cannot be obtained without unreasonable delay or expense.
The first point is that the criminal jurisdiction is deliberately residual, and that is a design choice rather than a failure. The Act's primary sanctions are civil: confiscation under sections 111 and 113, penalty under sections 112 and 114, and recovery of duty under section 28, all determined departmentally on preponderance of probabilities. Prosecution is reserved for cases which pass a departmental screen, since section 137(1) requires the Commissioner's sanction, and departmental instructions have long confined it to cases above monetary thresholds with strong evidence.
The second point is that the criminal route is slow and the civil route is not. An adjudication order issues in months; a prosecution under section 135 takes years to reach trial and longer to reach appeal, during which the deterrent value dissipates. Because the two are independent, the department obtains its money and its confiscation long before any conviction, and the marginal deterrent added by a prosecution that may conclude a decade later is small.
The third point is that compounding drains the criminal docket, and that this is both the scheme's efficiency and its weakness. Section 137(3) allows an offence to be compounded before or after prosecution, on payment of the amount fixed by the Customs (Compounding of Offences) Rules. From the department's point of view compounding realises revenue immediately and avoids the risk of acquittal. From the point of view of deterrence, it converts a criminal sanction into a price, and the person who can pay it escapes conviction while the person who cannot faces trial.
The fourth point is the change of 1 April 2025 and it must be included in any answer written now. Until then, a person facing both adjudication and prosecution could apply to the Customs and Central Excise Settlement Commission under section 127B, and under section 127H obtain immunity from prosecution and from penalty and fine on making a full and true disclosure. The Finance Act 2025 discontinued the Commission from 1 April 2025, transferring pending applications to an Interim Board for Settlement of three officers of the rank of Chief Commissioner or above nominated by the Board, with no judicial member. The consequence for the criminal side is direct: immunity from prosecution can no longer be obtained by settlement, and compounding under section 137(3) is the only route, one which the provisos to that sub-section close to defined classes of person.
The fifth point concerns arrest, and here effectiveness has recently been strengthened and disciplined at once. After Om Prakash v. Union of India, (2011) 14 SCC 1, which held customs and excise offences non-cognizable and bailable, Parliament amended section 104 in 2012, 2013 and 2019 to make four categories cognizable: prohibited goods, evasion exceeding fifty lakh rupees, fraudulent drawback or exemption exceeding fifty lakh, and fraudulently obtaining an instrument where the duty relatable exceeds fifty lakh.
Everything else remains non-cognizable under section 104(5). Non-bailability is a separate scheme resting on a different list: section 104(6) makes non-bailable only an offence punishable under section 135 relating to evasion exceeding fifty lakh rupees, to prohibited goods notified under section 11 which are also notified under section 135(1)(i)(C), to undeclared goods whose market price exceeds one crore rupees, to fraudulent drawback or exemption exceeding fifty lakh rupees, or to the fraudulent obtaining of an instrument where the relatable duty exceeds fifty lakh rupees; section 104(7) makes every other offence bailable.
The two lists do not coincide, and treating cognizability and bailability as one test is a common and costly error. Then, in Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 272, decided on 27 February 2025, the Supreme Court, hearing about 279 petitions led by Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 336 of 2018, upheld those arrest powers and the corresponding provisions of the CGST Act, holding Parliament competent under Article 246A, while requiring that an arrest rest on credible material, that the officer's reasons to believe be recorded in writing, and that those reasons be furnished to the arrested person.
The sixth point is that the real deterrent in this field is now elsewhere. Smuggling of the kind section 135 was written for is today prosecuted alongside the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, where attachment of property and the difficulty of obtaining bail bite harder than a customs sentence, and alongside the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, under which preventive detention is available. A candid assessment of the effectiveness of customs prosecution has to concede that it is now one instrument among several and no longer the principal one.
Conclusion. The criminal side of the Customs Act is a complete and carefully graded scheme: section 132 for false documents, section 133 for obstruction, section 134 for refusing an X-ray, section 135 for smuggling and evasion with punishment up to seven years where the goods are prohibited or the amounts exceed the statutory figures and three years otherwise, section 135A for preparation, section 136 for officers, and a proviso to section 135 which restricts the court's freedom to go below one year. It is made workable by three presumptions, in sections 123, 138A and 139, and by the statements taken under section 108 and controlled by section 138B.
Its effectiveness must be judged against the fact that it was never intended to carry the main burden. The Act's primary sanctions are civil and quick; prosecution is screened by the Commissioner's sanction under section 137(1), is slow, and is very often compounded under section 137(3) at a price fixed by rules. Two developments in 2025 changed the balance. Radhika Agarwal on 27 February upheld the arrest power while making its exercise justiciable, requiring credible material, recorded reasons to believe and communication of those reasons. And the abolition of the Settlement Commission on 1 April removed the only forum that could grant immunity from prosecution under section 127H, replacing it with an Interim Board of three revenue officers with no judicial member and leaving compounding as the sole exit.
The honest conclusion is that customs prosecution is effective as a threat and rarely as a punishment, that its practical function is to support settlement rather than to secure convictions, and that the deterrent work in serious smuggling has largely passed to the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act and to preventive detention under COFEPOSA, where the consequences follow faster than a trial under section 135 ever does.
Answer
For full marks, cover: that this question is about goods, not persons, so the organising idea is the journey of a consignment from suspicion to forfeiture, and the personal search provisions belong only in a sentence; search of premises, conveyances and baggage; seizure under section 110 with the six-month rule; the grounds of confiscation in sections 111 and 113 grouped rather than recited; confiscation of conveyances and packages under sections 115 and 118; the section 124 gateway; section 125's mandatory and discretionary option; and vesting under section 126 with sale under section 150.
A consignment moves through four legal stages and each has its own provision. Suspicion authorises a search; a reason to believe that the goods are liable to confiscation authorises seizure, which is possessory and interim; a notice under section 124 followed by adjudication produces confiscation, which is proprietary and final; and confiscation is followed by vesting in the Central Government under section 126 and disposal under section 150. Keeping those four apart is what gives this answer its shape.
Section 105 governs search of premises and is the principal provision for goods. The Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of Customs, or in a border area an officer of lower rank so empowered, may, if he has reason to believe that any goods liable to confiscation, or any documents or things which in his opinion will be useful for or relevant to any proceeding under this Act, are secreted in any place, authorise any officer of customs to search, or himself search, that place. Sub-section (2) applies the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 relating to searches, so far as may be, subject to the modification that the sanction of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner is substituted for that of a Magistrate.
The "reason to believe" must be recorded and it is a jurisdictional fact. It cannot be a suspicion, it must be based on material, and its absence vitiates the search. That said, the modern position is that an irregularity in the search does not by itself make the seized goods inadmissible; it affects the weight of the evidence and may expose the officer, but the goods remain available for adjudication.
Section 106 permits stopping and searching a conveyance. Where the proper officer has reason to believe that any aircraft, vehicle or animal in India, or any vessel in India or within the Indian customs waters, has been, is being or is about to be used in the smuggling of any goods or in the carriage of any smuggled goods, he may stop it, or in the case of a vessel signal it to stop, and search it. If it does not stop, he may use all lawful means to compel it, and if those means fail, the vessel or aircraft may be fired upon, which is one of the very few provisions in Indian fiscal law authorising force of that order.
Section 106A obliges specified persons to furnish information, and section 107 empowers an officer to require production of documents and to examine persons during an enquiry. Section 108 empowers a gazetted officer to summon any person to give evidence or produce documents, and declares the inquiry to be a judicial proceeding within sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code.
Personal search belongs to a different question and needs only a sentence here. Sections 100 to 104 govern search of persons and arrest: section 100 for persons entering or leaving India, section 101 for notified goods anywhere in India on the authorisation of an Assistant Commissioner, section 102 giving the person the right on request to be taken before the nearest gazetted officer or Magistrate, and section 103 requiring a Magistrate's direction before an X-ray or internal examination.
Section 110(1) is the seizure power. Where the proper officer has reason to believe that any goods are liable to confiscation under the Act, he may seize them. Where seizure is not practicable, the proviso allows him to serve an order on the owner not to remove, part with or otherwise deal with the goods except with his previous permission, which is a constructive seizure.
Section 110(1A) to (1C) provide for certified inventory and early disposal. The Central Government may notify goods which, having regard to their perishable or hazardous nature, depreciation in value with passage of time, constraints of storage space or any other relevant consideration, should be disposed of; the proper officer must then prepare an inventory, apply to a Magistrate for certification of the description, quantity and quality, and take photographs and draw samples, and the certified inventory is thereafter admissible in evidence in place of the goods.
Section 110(2) is the safeguard that gives seizure a time limit. Where no notice under section 124 is given within six months of the seizure of the goods, the goods must be returned to the person from whose possession they were seized. The period may be extended by a further six months by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner of Customs, for reasons to be recorded in writing and informed to the person concerned before the expiry of the original period. The requirement that the reasons be communicated, and communicated in time, is what stops the extension being a formality, and a failure on either count entitles the owner to return of the goods.
Section 110(3) extends seizure to documents or things which the proper officer has reason to believe will be useful for or relevant to any proceeding under the Act, and section 110(4) gives the person from whom they were seized the right to make copies or take extracts in the presence of an officer.
Section 110A permits provisional release of goods, documents and things seized or bank accounts provisionally attached, pending the order of the adjudicating authority, to the owner or the bank account holder on taking a bond with such security and conditions as the adjudicating authority may require. In commercial terms this is the most important provision in the chapter, because it releases working capital while the dispute is decided.
Section 111 lists the circumstances in which goods brought from a place outside India are liable to confiscation, in clauses (a) to (o), and they are best grouped.
Group one, place and manner of unloading: goods unloaded or attempted to be unloaded at a place other than a customs port or airport appointed under section 7; goods imported by land or inland water otherwise than by a route specified under section 7(c); dutiable or prohibited goods brought into a bay, gulf, creek or tidal river for the purpose of being landed at a place other than a customs port.
Group two, prohibition and concealment: any goods imported or attempted to be imported or brought within the Indian customs waters contrary to any prohibition imposed by or under this Act or any other law for the time being in force; dutiable or prohibited goods found concealed in any manner in any conveyance; and goods concealed in a package either before or after unloading.
Group three, declaration and documents: goods which do not correspond in respect of value or in any other particular with the entry made under the Act, or in the case of baggage with the declaration made under section 77; goods not included, or in excess of those included, in the manifest or in the bill of entry.
Group four, breach of condition: dutiable or prohibited goods removed or attempted to be removed from a customs area or warehouse without the permission of the proper officer, or contrary to the terms of that permission; and goods exempted subject to a condition, in respect of which the condition is not observed unless the non-observance was sanctioned by the proper officer.
Section 113 is the export counterpart, covering goods attempted to be exported by sea or air from a place other than a customs port or airport, goods attempted to be exported contrary to a prohibition, goods entered for exportation which do not correspond with the entry, and, importantly for a foreign exchange paper, goods in respect of which the value stated in the shipping bill or in the declaration under section 50 differs from the proceeds of the sale or the value which the exporter intends to receive, which is how over- and under-invoiced exports are caught on the customs side.
Sections 115 and 118 extend confiscation beyond the goods themselves. Section 115 makes conveyances liable to confiscation, subject to a proviso protecting a conveyance used as a means of transport for hire where the owner proves that it was used without his knowledge or connivance or that of his agent and the person in charge, and permitting the owner to pay a fine not exceeding the market price of the smuggled goods in lieu. Section 118 makes the package and its other contents liable where goods liable to confiscation are found in it, and section 119 makes goods used for concealing smuggled goods liable, while section 120 deals with smuggled goods that have changed form and section 121 with the sale proceeds of smuggled goods.
Sections 112 and 114 impose penalties on persons, and it is worth insisting that they are separate from confiscation: section 112 for improper importation, calculated by reference to the duty sought to be evaded or the value of the goods, and section 114 for attempted improper exportation. Section 114A provides for a penalty equal to the duty or interest determined where the short levy is by reason of collusion, wilful mis-statement or suppression, and section 114AA for a penalty up to five times the value of the goods for knowingly using a false or incorrect material particular in the transaction of any business.
Section 124 is the condition precedent to any confiscation or penalty. No order confiscating goods or imposing a penalty may be made unless the owner or the person concerned is given a notice in writing with the prior approval of an officer not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner, informing him of the grounds; an opportunity to make a representation in writing within a reasonable time; and a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The first proviso allows the notice and the representation to be oral at his request.
Section 125 is the option to pay a fine in lieu of confiscation, and the distinction it draws is the point of the section. Where the goods confiscated are goods the importation or exportation of which is prohibited, the adjudicating officer may give the owner, or where the owner is not known the person from whose possession the goods were seized, an option to pay a fine in lieu of confiscation. Where the goods are not prohibited, the officer shall give that option. The fine may not exceed the market price of the goods less the duty chargeable, and by section 125(2) the owner remains liable to duty and charges payable in respect of the goods in addition to the fine. Section 125(3), inserted in 2018, requires the fine to be paid within one hundred and twenty days of the option, failing which the option lapses unless an appeal is pending.
Section 126 vests confiscated goods in the Central Government and requires the officer to take and keep possession of them, and section 150 governs the procedure for sale, providing for the application of the sale proceeds first to the expenses of sale, then to freight and other charges, then to duty, then to any charges due to the person having custody, and then to any amount due from the owner, with the balance paid to the owner.
Collector of Customs, Madras v. D. Bhoormull, (1974) 2 SCC 544, decided on 3 April 1974 is the leading decision on where the burden lies and how it is discharged. Acting on information, preventive officers of the Madras Custom House found packages of foreign goods at a shop, about to be despatched to Bangalore. The person in possession gave no account at all of how he had come by them, and the department had no direct evidence of any illicit importation.
The Supreme Court held that where section 123 does not apply, the burden of proving that goods are smuggled lies on the department, that being the ordinary rule in a quasi-criminal proceeding; but that the burden is discharged on the totality of the circumstances, and the department is not required to prove its case with mathematical precision or to establish the actual act of smuggling. The unexplained possession of goods of foreign origin, coupled with the possessor's refusal to disclose his source, may itself supply the proof.
Why it bears on this question. It is the decision that fixes the evidential position behind the whole chapter. A power to seize under section 110 rests on a reason to believe that the goods are liable to confiscation, and at the adjudication that follows, where section 123 does not apply, the department must prove that they are smuggled, though it may do so from unexplained possession and the conduct of the possessor rather than by direct evidence of an importation.
The second authority is Hindustan Steel Ltd v. State of Orissa, (1969) 2 SCC 627, decided on 4 August 1969, and it governs the exercise of every discretionary power to penalise in an Indian fiscal statute. A government undertaking sold bricks, steel and cement, which it had procured for its own construction, to the contractors building its factory, and was assessed to sales tax as a dealer and penalised for failing to register. It was held liable to the tax.
But the penalty was set aside, and the reasoning is general. A penalty is quasi-criminal; the authority is not bound to impose one merely because it is lawful to do so; and a penalty should not be imposed for a technical or venial breach, or where the breach flows from a bona fide belief that the person is not liable. What is required is deliberate defiance of the law, contumacious or dishonest conduct, or a conscious disregard of obligation.
Why it bears on this question. Every one of these provisions ends, if it ends adversely, in a penalty imposed under a discretion expressed as a maximum. This decision states how such a discretion must be exercised: a penalty is quasi-criminal, is not to be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so, and is not for a technical or venial breach or one flowing from a bona fide belief.
Conclusion. The Act deals with goods through four sequential powers and gives each a control proportionate to what it takes. Search is authorised by section 105 for premises and section 106 for conveyances, in each case on a recorded reason to believe, and the Code of Criminal Procedure's search provisions are applied with the Commissioner's sanction substituted for a Magistrate's. Seizure under section 110 requires the same reason to believe and is checked by the six-month rule in section 110(2), which returns the goods if no section 124 notice issues, allows a single six-month extension only for reasons recorded and communicated, and is relieved in practice by provisional release under section 110A.
Confiscation is the only one of the four that changes title, and it is reached through the widest set of grounds in the Act: section 111 in fifteen clauses covering the place of unloading, prohibition, concealment, misdeclaration, unmanifested goods, unauthorised removal and breach of an exemption condition, with section 113 doing the same for exports and catching the mis-stated shipping bill value that is also a foreign exchange contravention. Sections 115, 118, 119, 120 and 121 extend it to the conveyance, the package, the concealing goods, goods that have changed form and the sale proceeds, while sections 112, 114, 114A and 114AA punish the person separately.
The two provisions that keep the scheme lawful are at the end. Section 124 makes a written notice stating the grounds, a representation and a hearing conditions precedent, so that no confiscation is valid without them; and section 125 requires the officer to offer a fine in lieu where the goods are not prohibited and permits it where they are, capping the fine at market price less duty and, since 2018, giving the owner one hundred and twenty days to take it up.
Answer
For full marks, cover: three heads, organised here around a single idea, namely who answers for a contravention, who decides it and what survives the contravener; for (a) section 42 with both sub-sections, the proviso and the Explanation; for (b) the four tiers with their limitation periods, and above all the fact that FEMA's own Appellate Tribunal was abolished in 2017 and that sections 20, 22, 24, 25, 26 and 29 to 31 stand omitted; for (c) section 43 and its anti-abatement effect.
Section 42 answers the first question, who answers for a contravention committed by an entity.
Section 42(1) creates a deemed liability in the person in charge. Where the person committing a contravention of the Act or of any rule, direction or order made under it is a company, then every person who, at the time the contravention was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed guilty of the contravention and liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. The proviso gives the defence: no such person is liable if he proves that the contravention took place without his knowledge, or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent it.
Two features of sub-section (1) are examinable. The phrase "in charge of, and responsible to" is conjunctive, so mere office is not enough and the complaint must aver the person's actual role in the conduct of the business. And the burden of the proviso is on the person claiming it, which means a company defending its directors must be able to point to a compliance system that was in place and working, not merely to an absence of intent.
Section 42(2) creates a fault-based liability in the culpable officer. Notwithstanding sub-section (1), where a contravention has been committed by a company and it is proved that it has taken place with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, that officer is also deemed guilty and liable. There is no proviso here, and none is needed, because the sub-section itself requires the department to prove consent, connivance or neglect. The distribution of the burden between the two sub-sections is the structural point of the section.
The Explanation gives the section a reach well beyond companies. For its purposes "company" means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals, and "director", in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm. A partnership that fails to report an inward remittance therefore exposes its partners under sub-section (1), subject to the same defence, and an unincorporated association exposes those in charge of it.
The practical setting should be given in a line. The commonest FEMA proceeding is a delay in reporting a foreign investment, and the notice in such a case routinely goes to the company and to its directors together under section 42. The standard answer, that a particular director had no part in the day-to-day conduct of the business, is a good defence to sub-section (1) and no defence at all to a properly pleaded case under sub-section (2).
This head answers the second question, who decides, and it must be stated as the law now is rather than as the Act was enacted.
Tier one: the Adjudicating Authority under section 16. For the purpose of adjudication under section 13, the Central Government may, by order published in the Official Gazette, appoint as many of its officers as it thinks fit as Adjudicating Authorities, specifying their jurisdictions in the same order. Four conditions constrain him. He may hold an inquiry only upon a complaint in writing made by an officer authorised by a general or special order of the Central Government, so he cannot act suo motu. He must give the person a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The person may appear in person or through a legal practitioner or a chartered accountant of his choice. And he must endeavour to dispose of the complaint within one year, recording the reasons in writing periodically if he cannot.
His powers are those of a civil court. Section 16(5) gives him the same powers as are conferred on the Appellate Tribunal by section 28(2), namely summoning and enforcing attendance and examining on oath, requiring discovery and production of documents, receiving evidence on affidavit, requisitioning public records subject to sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, issuing commissions, reviewing its decisions, dismissing for default or deciding ex parte and setting such orders aside. His proceedings are judicial proceedings within sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, and he is deemed a civil court for sections 345 and 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The proviso to section 16(1) allows him, where he is of opinion that the person is likely to abscond or evade payment, to direct the furnishing of a bond or guarantee.
Tier two: the Special Director (Appeals) under section 17, whose jurisdiction is narrow and is the detail most often got wrong. He hears appeals only against orders of an Adjudicating Authority who is an Assistant Director of Enforcement or a Deputy Director of Enforcement. The appeal must be filed within forty-five days of receipt of the order, extendable on sufficient cause. He may confirm, modify or set aside the order, and he has the civil court powers of section 28(2). Under section 21, as substituted in 2017, he must have been a member of the Indian Legal Service holding a post in Grade I, or a member of the Indian Revenue Service holding a post equivalent to a Joint Secretary to the Government of India.
Tier three: the Appellate Tribunal under section 18, and this is where the answer must be current. As enacted, FEMA constituted its own Appellate Tribunal for Foreign Exchange. The Finance Act 2017 (Act 7 of 2017), by section 165 with effect from 26 May 2017, substituted section 18 to provide that the Appellate Tribunal constituted under sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 shall, on and from the commencement of Part XIV of Chapter VI of that Finance Act, be the Appellate Tribunal for the purposes of this Act.
The same section omitted sections 20 (composition), 22 (term of office), 24 (vacancies), 25 (resignation and removal), 26 (Member to act as Chairperson), 29 (distribution of business amongst Benches), 30 (power of the Chairperson to transfer cases) and 31 (decision by majority), and substituted sections 21, 23, 27, 32 and 33 so that they now speak only of the Special Director (Appeals).
Section 19 gives the appeal and its terms should be stated exactly. The Central Government or any person aggrieved by an order of an Adjudicating Authority other than those covered by section 17, or of the Special Director (Appeals), may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. The first proviso requires the appellant, while filing the appeal, to deposit the amount of the penalty with such authority as may be notified; the second proviso permits the Tribunal to dispense with the deposit where it would cause undue hardship, on conditions safeguarding realisation.
The limitation is forty-five days from receipt, extendable for sufficient cause. Section 19(5) requires an endeavour to dispose of the appeal within one hundred and eighty days, with reasons recorded if not; and section 19(6) confers a suo motu revisional power to call for the records of any proceeding under section 16 and examine the legality, propriety or correctness of the order.
Tier four: the High Court under section 35. Any person aggrieved by a decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may appeal to the High Court within sixty days of communication, on any question of law arising out of such order, with a further period not exceeding sixty days for sufficient cause. The Explanation identifies the High Court by reference to where the aggrieved party ordinarily resides, carries on business or personally works for gain, and where the Central Government is the aggrieved party, by reference to the respondent.
Section 34 closes the field. No civil court has jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which an Adjudicating Authority, the Appellate Tribunal or the Special Director (Appeals) is empowered to determine, and no injunction may be granted in respect of any action taken or to be taken under the Act.
Two criticisms belong here. The first proviso to section 19(1) requires the whole penalty to be deposited before the appeal is heard, which conditions access to the only independent forum on the appellant's liquidity, the undue-hardship dispensation being discretionary. And section 32, as substituted in 2017, now confers the right to be represented by a legal practitioner or chartered accountant only before the Special Director (Appeals), the words "Appellate Tribunal or the" having been substituted out, so the statutory right to representation before the Tribunal has quietly disappeared and rests on the Tribunal's own procedure and on natural justice under section 28(1).
This head answers the third question, what survives the contravener, and the answer is that the proceeding does.
Section 43, headed "Death or insolvency in certain cases", provides that any right, obligation, liability, proceeding or appeal arising in relation to the provisions of section 13 shall NOT abate by reason of the death or insolvency of the person liable under that section, and that upon such death or insolvency such rights and obligations shall devolve on the legal representative of such person or the official receiver or the official assignee, as the case may be. The proviso confines the exposure: a legal representative of the deceased shall be liable only to the extent of the inheritance or estate of the deceased.
The rule the section displaces is actio personalis moritur cum persona. Left to the common law, a penalty proceeding against a person who died would end and his estate would pass undiminished. Section 43 prevents that by two devices: a declaration that the proceeding does not abate, and a provision for devolution so that there is someone against whom it may continue.
Four features are worth separate mention. The section is confined to section 13, the civil penalty jurisdiction; it cannot and does not carry the criminal liability under section 13(1C) to a legal representative. It covers insolvency as well as death, so an insolvency does not extinguish the penalty and the official assignee takes it with the estate. It expressly covers appeals, so an appeal filed by a person who dies is continued rather than abated. And the proviso is a real protection, capping the heir's liability at the value of what he receives, so his own property is untouched.
The head should close by naming the trap. The word "abatement" appears in several questions in this folder, and section 43 is invariably the provision meant. It is an anti-abatement provision. A candidate who describes the circumstances in which proceedings abate has stated the exact opposite of the law.
The modern authority on the civil character of a FEMA breach is Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi SRL, (2020) 11 SCC 1, and it is worth working out because it decides the point in a commercial setting rather than in an enforcement one. The facts are worth setting out because they are a foreign exchange case in commercial dress.
An Italian cable manufacturer and its Indian joint venture partners fell out; the London Court of International Arbitration made awards directing the Indian shareholders to sell their shares to the foreign party at a discount to fair market value. Enforcement in India was resisted under section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on the ground that a sale to a non-resident at a discounted price offends the exchange control law, then the pricing guidelines and now the Non-debt Instruments Rules, and so is contrary to the public policy of India.
The Supreme Court enforced the awards. It held that a contravention of a provision of an enactment is not synonymous with a contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law, and that a breach of FEMA or of the rules made under it does not reach that threshold. The reason given is the one that matters for this answer: a FEMA contravention is remediable, because permission may be granted after the event and the contravention may be compounded under section 15, so the transaction is not void and the law is not defied by enforcing the award.
Why it bears on this question. It bears on all three heads. It shows that a contravention by a company, in that case in the pricing of a share transfer, is remediable; it illustrates what an adjudication would have had to decide had one been begun; and it demonstrates why the Act treats liability under section 13 as a civil liability capable of devolving under section 43 rather than as a personal criminal liability that would die with the contravener.
A second authority, and one that comes from the statute this Act replaced, is Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440, decided on 31 January 1994. Deepak Mahajan was detained by officers of the Directorate of Enforcement for a contravention of FERA and produced before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, who was asked to authorise judicial remand under section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The question was whether a Magistrate has jurisdiction to remand a person arrested by an officer who is not a police officer and where no First Information Report exists.
The Supreme Court held that he has. Section 35(2) of FERA and section 104(2) of the Customs Act, which require an arrested person to be taken to a Magistrate without unnecessary delay, substantially fulfil the conditions of section 167(1), so the Magistrate may authorise detention and the officer may seek remand.
Why it bears on this question. It supplies the contrast that makes the present position intelligible. Under FERA an officer of Enforcement could arrest and then obtain judicial remand under section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure while the investigation continued; FEMA gives the Directorate the powers of an income-tax authority under section 37 and nothing more, and confines imprisonment to civil imprisonment of a defaulter under section 14.
The decision that settles what kind of wrong a foreign exchange contravention is, is Director of Enforcement v. MCTM Corporation (P) Ltd, (1996) 2 SCC 471. A company had been penalised under section 23(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 for a contravention of section 10 of that Act, and it argued that no penalty could be imposed on it without proof that it had meant to break the law.
The Supreme Court rejected that argument and drew the line that still governs. A proceeding to adjudicate a penalty is a proceeding for the breach of a civil obligation, not a criminal prosecution, and mens rea is therefore not an essential ingredient of it. What has to be shown is blameworthy conduct, and the Court held that the delinquency of the defaulter itself establishes that conduct: once the contravention is proved, the penalty follows without any further proof of a guilty mind. The Court was careful to say that this is not a relaxation of proof but a difference in the nature of the proceeding, so that the two jurisdictions, penalty and prosecution, ask different questions of the same facts.
Why it bears on this question. The nature of a contravention is the whole of this question, and this is the case that answers it. Because section 13 creates a civil liability, the Adjudicating Authority need not find that the person meant to contravene: proof of the contravention is proof of the blameworthy conduct. That explains the features that otherwise look severe, the civil standard of proof, the absence of any presumption of innocence and the availability of a penalty of up to three times the sum involved, and it explains equally why the consequences stop where they do. The corollary an examiner looks for is that the same reasoning bars the Directorate from importing criminal-law advantages into an adjudication: the proceeding is civil, and it must be conducted as a civil proceeding throughout.
On the use of a statement that the maker later takes back, the governing decision is Vinod Solanki v. Union of India, (2008) 16 SCC 537, decided on 18 December 2008. A penalty had been imposed under FERA on the strength of an inculpatory statement which the maker afterwards retracted, saying that it had been obtained from him under threat.
The Supreme Court held that the initial burden of proving that a confession is voluntary lies on the Department and not on the person who made it. An authority or court that proposes to act on a retracted statement as a voluntary one must apply its mind to the retraction and reject it in writing, with reasons; it cannot pass over the retraction in silence. The Court balanced that with a qualification which is as important for the answer: a bald assertion of coercion or duress, unsupported by any material, will not be enough to have the statement discarded, so the person retracting must give the authority something to act on.
Why it bears on this question. Adjudication under section 13 rests very largely on statements recorded in the course of an investigation, and this case is the answer to the objection that a civil standard of proof leaves the person before the authority without protection. It does not. The burden of establishing that a statement was voluntary sits on the Directorate, and a reasoned rejection of the retraction in writing is a condition of using the statement at all. Read with the civil character of the proceeding, the position is that the Directorate has the lighter standard of proof but not a free hand with its evidence.
Conclusion. The three heads answer three successive questions about a single contravention. Section 42 answers who is liable when the contravener is an entity: sub-section (1) deems liable every person who at the relevant time was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business, subject to a defence of no knowledge or due diligence which he must prove; sub-section (2) adds any director, manager, secretary or officer with whose consent or connivance, or by whose neglect, the contravention occurred, and there the department must prove fault. The Explanation carries the whole section into firms and unincorporated associations, making a partner a director.
Adjudication and appeal answer who decides, and the answer must be given as the law stands in 2026. The Adjudicating Authority under section 16 acts only on a written complaint, must hear the party, has civil court powers and must endeavour to decide within a year. An appeal lies to the Special Director (Appeals) under section 17 only from an Assistant or Deputy Director, within forty-five days.
It lies otherwise to the Appellate Tribunal under sections 18 and 19, and that Tribunal is no longer FEMA's own: the Finance Act 2017 substituted section 18 so that the SAFEMA Tribunal serves, omitting sections 20, 22, 24, 25, 26 and 29 to 31 outright. Filing requires deposit of the penalty unless the Tribunal dispenses with it for undue hardship, and section 32 as substituted now gives a statutory right to representation only before the Special Director (Appeals). The final appeal is to the High Court under section 35 within sixty days on a question of law, and section 34 shuts the civil courts out entirely.
Section 43 answers what survives the contravener, and it answers it against him. Proceedings and appeals under section 13 do not abate on death or insolvency; the liability devolves on the legal representative or the official assignee; and the only concession is the proviso limiting the heir to the extent of the estate he actually takes.
Answer
For full marks, cover: the comparison compactly, because the second half of the question is the part most candidates neglect and it carries as many marks; then the Reserve Bank's role built up provision by provision, sections 10, 11, 12, 47, 6(2) and 7(2); and then an evaluation, which means saying honestly that the Bank's position under this Act has been reduced twice since 2019, once by the shift of capital account powers to the Central Government and once by the carve-out of the International Financial Services Centre.
The two Acts answer two different economic questions and the comparison should be built on that. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 was scarcity legislation, passed when reserves were small and the rupee inconvertible, and its instrument was prohibition subject to permission. FEMA, Act 42 of 1999, in force from 1 June 2000, is sufficiency legislation, and its long title speaks of facilitating external trade and payments and promoting the orderly development and maintenance of the foreign exchange market in India.
The differences that matter can be put as six propositions. A breach under FERA was a criminal offence with imprisonment; under FEMA it is a civil contravention attracting a penalty under section 13, with civil imprisonment under section 14 available only against a defaulter who will not pay. FERA presumed guilt by its section 59; FEMA places the burden on the department. FERA prohibited and then permitted; FEMA frees the current account under section 5 and regulates the capital account under section 6. FERA gave the Enforcement Directorate a power of arrest under its section 35; FEMA gives investigation under section 37 with the powers of an income-tax authority and no power of arrest.
FERA had no compounding; section 15 of FEMA permits compounding within one hundred and eighty days, now under the Foreign Exchange (Compounding Proceedings) Rules, 2024 notified on 12 September 2024. And FERA's residence test turned on intention, while section 2(v) of FEMA fixes it primarily at more than one hundred and eighty-two days in the preceding financial year, with purpose-based exclusions.
The figures should be given once and correctly. Section 13(1): penalty up to thrice the sum involved where quantifiable, up to two lakh rupees where not, and up to five thousand rupees a day for a continuing contravention. Section 14(11): civil imprisonment up to three years where the demand exceeds one crore rupees and up to six months otherwise. Section 49 repealed FERA and barred any court from taking cognizance of a FERA offence after two years from the commencement of FEMA, that is after 31 May 2002.
The Reserve Bank is the operational regulator of the foreign exchange market and its powers come from five places.
First, authorisation: section 10. The Reserve Bank may, on application, authorise any person to be known as an authorised person to deal in foreign exchange or in foreign securities, as an authorised dealer, money changer or off-shore banking unit or in any other manner as it deems fit. The authorisation is in writing and subject to conditions. Section 10(3) allows revocation at any time in the public interest, or where the authorised person has failed to comply with a condition or has contravened the Act, and the proviso requires a reasonable opportunity of representation before revocation on the second ground.
Section 10(4) and (5) impose duties that make the authorised person the front line of compliance. He must comply with the Bank's general or special directions and must not, except with previous permission, engage in a transaction not in conformity with his authorisation. Before undertaking any transaction on behalf of a person, he must require that person to make such declaration and give such information as will reasonably satisfy him that the transaction will not involve, and is not designed for the purpose of, any contravention or evasion, and where the person refuses or complies unsatisfactorily, the authorised person shall refuse in writing to undertake the transaction and, if he has reason to believe that a contravention is contemplated, report the matter to the Reserve Bank.
Section 10(6) closes the loop on the customer. A person other than an authorised person who acquires foreign exchange for a declared purpose and does not use it for that purpose, or does not surrender it within the specified period, or uses it for an impermissible purpose, is deemed to have contravened the Act.
Second, direction: section 11. The Reserve Bank may give an authorised person any direction in regard to making of payment or doing or desisting from doing any act relating to foreign exchange or foreign security, and may direct him to furnish information. Section 11(3) gives it a penal power of its own: for contravening a direction or failing to file a return, a penalty up to ten thousand rupees, with a continuing penalty up to two thousand rupees for every day. That is a supervisory penalty, quite separate from the section 13 penalty adjudged by an Adjudicating Authority.
Third, inspection: section 12. The Reserve Bank may at any time cause an inspection of the business of any authorised person, by an officer specially authorised in writing, for verifying the correctness of statements furnished, obtaining information not furnished, or securing compliance. Every authorised person, and where it is a company or firm every director, partner or officer, must produce books, accounts and documents and furnish statements within the time and manner directed.
Fourth, regulation-making: section 47. The Reserve Bank may make regulations to carry out the Act and the rules, and section 47(2) lists the subjects: permissible classes of capital account transactions involving debt instruments and their limits and conditions, the form and manner of the export declaration under section 7(1)(a), the period and manner of repatriation under section 8, the limits in section 9 for possession of foreign currency, foreign currency accounts and exempted acquisitions, and the export, import or holding of currency or currency notes under clause (ga).
Fifth, operational powers scattered through the Act. Under section 6(2) the Bank specifies the permissible classes of capital account transactions involving debt instruments. Under section 7(2) it may direct any exporter to comply with requirements so that the full export value is realised without delay, and it determines any reduced value having regard to prevailing market conditions. Under section 8 it specifies the period and manner of realisation and repatriation. Under section 2(h) it may notify further instruments as "currency", and under section 2(za) further instruments as "security". Under section 15 its authorised officers are among the compounding authorities.
The strongest thing to be said for the Bank's role is that it has made the Act workable through instruments rather than adjudication. The Master Directions, the A.P. (DIR Series) circulars and the Foreign Exchange Management Regulations translate a forty-nine section statute into operating instructions for every authorised dealer, and the Export Data Processing and Monitoring System and the Single Master Form give it real-time visibility of export realisation and of inbound investment. Most compliance under FEMA happens at a bank counter under a Master Direction, not before an Adjudicating Authority.
The second strength is the compounding practice. Because the Reserve Bank compounds the ordinary reporting contraventions and publishes its orders, the trade has a body of guidance on what is treated as venial and what is not, and the Foreign Exchange (Compounding Proceedings) Rules, 2024 have rationalised the monetary competence of the compounding authorities and permitted digital payment. Compounding at the Bank, rather than adjudication at the Directorate, is what keeps the Act from being adversarial in the ordinary case.
The first cut-back came on 15 October 2019, and it is substantial. Section 6(3), which had given the Reserve Bank the power to prohibit, restrict or regulate eleven classes of capital account transaction, was omitted; section 6(2A) was inserted, giving the Central Government power to prescribe permissible classes of capital account transactions not involving debt instruments; and section 6(7) was inserted, leaving the definition of "debt instruments" to the Central Government in consultation with the Bank. The Foreign Exchange Management (Non-debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 were made by the Government under that power, and foreign direct investment thereby passed out of the Bank's regulation-making hands. Section 47(3) saves the Bank's earlier regulations until the Government amends or rescinds them, which is what prevented a vacuum.
The evaluation of that change should be balanced. In its favour, foreign investment policy is announced by the Government and it was anomalous for the legal instrument to be made by the central bank. Against it, the Reserve Bank is insulated from the political cycle in a way a ministry is not, and a regime in which the Bank still administers the transactions but no longer writes the rules divides responsibility from authority.
The second cut-back came on 1 October 2020. Section 44A, inserted by the International Financial Services Centres Authority Act, 2019, provides that the powers exercisable by the Reserve Bank under FEMA shall not extend to an International Financial Services Centre set up under section 18(1) of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005, and shall be exercisable by the International Financial Services Centres Authority. Within the GIFT City IFSC, therefore, the Bank is not the foreign exchange regulator at all.
A third and quieter limitation should be noted. Section 41 requires the Reserve Bank, in the discharge of its functions under this Act, to comply with such general or special directions as the Central Government may give. That subordination existed from 1999, but its practical significance has grown as the Government has taken over the capital account.
The modern authority on the civil character of a FEMA breach is Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi SRL, (2020) 11 SCC 1, and it is worth working out because it decides the point in a commercial setting rather than in an enforcement one. The facts are worth setting out because they are a foreign exchange case in commercial dress.
An Italian cable manufacturer and its Indian joint venture partners fell out; the London Court of International Arbitration made awards directing the Indian shareholders to sell their shares to the foreign party at a discount to fair market value. Enforcement in India was resisted under section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on the ground that a sale to a non-resident at a discounted price offends the exchange control law, then the pricing guidelines and now the Non-debt Instruments Rules, and so is contrary to the public policy of India.
The Supreme Court enforced the awards. It held that a contravention of a provision of an enactment is not synonymous with a contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law, and that a breach of FEMA or of the rules made under it does not reach that threshold. The reason given is the one that matters for this answer: a FEMA contravention is remediable, because permission may be granted after the event and the contravention may be compounded under section 15, so the transaction is not void and the law is not defied by enforcing the award.
Why it bears on this question. It is the clearest judicial statement of what the 1999 reform achieved. A contravention that under FERA would have been an offence with a presumption of guilt is treated by the Supreme Court as a curable irregularity, and it is curable because the Reserve Bank may permit it after the event or compound it, which is the Bank's role the question asks about.
Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440, decided on 31 January 1994 is the decision that fixes what an arrest under this branch of the law actually entails. Deepak Mahajan was detained by officers of the Directorate of Enforcement for a contravention of FERA and produced before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, who was asked to authorise judicial remand under section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The question was whether a Magistrate has jurisdiction to remand a person arrested by an officer who is not a police officer and where no First Information Report exists.
The Supreme Court held that he has. Section 35(2) of FERA and section 104(2) of the Customs Act, which require an arrested person to be taken to a Magistrate without unnecessary delay, substantially fulfil the conditions of section 167(1), so the Magistrate may authorise detention and the officer may seek remand.
Why it bears on this question. It bears on the evaluation of the Reserve Bank's role by showing what the alternative looked like. Under FERA the operative institution in a serious case was the Directorate of Enforcement with a power of arrest and of judicial remand; under FEMA the operative institution in the ordinary case is the Bank, acting through Master Directions, authorised dealers and compounding orders.
The decision that settles what kind of wrong a foreign exchange contravention is, is Director of Enforcement v. MCTM Corporation (P) Ltd, (1996) 2 SCC 471. A company had been penalised under section 23(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 for a contravention of section 10 of that Act, and it argued that no penalty could be imposed on it without proof that it had meant to break the law.
The Supreme Court rejected that argument and drew the line that still governs. A proceeding to adjudicate a penalty is a proceeding for the breach of a civil obligation, not a criminal prosecution, and mens rea is therefore not an essential ingredient of it. What has to be shown is blameworthy conduct, and the Court held that the delinquency of the defaulter itself establishes that conduct: once the contravention is proved, the penalty follows without any further proof of a guilty mind. The Court was careful to say that this is not a relaxation of proof but a difference in the nature of the proceeding, so that the two jurisdictions, penalty and prosecution, ask different questions of the same facts.
Why it bears on this question. This is the authority for saying that the move from FERA to FEMA was a change of kind and not of degree. FERA already knew the distinction between a penalty adjudicated for a civil breach and a prosecution, and MCTM is where the Supreme Court articulated it; FEMA then made that distinction the whole architecture of the statute. Section 13 creates a contravention, not an offence, adjudicated by an Adjudicating Authority on the balance of probabilities; section 14 knows only civil imprisonment, and only for failure to pay a penalty already imposed. An answer that says FEMA "decriminalised" foreign exchange regulation is saying, in the language of this case, that every contravention under FEMA is now a breach of a civil obligation for which no guilty intention need be shown and for which no criminal consequence follows.
Conclusion. FEMA differs from FERA on six axes and the differences all follow from one change of premise: foreign exchange ceased to be a scarce national resource to be conserved and became a commodity in a market to be developed. Hence a civil contravention under section 13 instead of an offence, the burden of proof on the department instead of a presumption of guilt, a free current account under section 5, compounding under section 15, investigation without arrest under section 37, and a residence test measured in days under section 2(v). Section 49 closed the older philosophy by barring cognizance of a FERA offence after 31 May 2002.
The Reserve Bank's role under the present Act is operational and central: it authorises dealers under section 10 and can revoke in the public interest, directs and penalises them under section 11 with its own ten thousand rupee sanction, inspects under section 12, makes regulations under section 47, specifies permissible debt-instrument capital transactions under section 6(2), and enforces export realisation under sections 7(2) and 8. In practice it governs the field through Master Directions and circulars and disposes of most contraventions by compounding.
But the honest evaluation is that its statutory position has narrowed twice in six years. On 15 October 2019 the capital account for non-debt instruments passed to the Central Government with the omission of section 6(3) and the insertion of section 6(2A), so the Bank administers foreign investment under rules it no longer writes. On 1 October 2020 section 44A removed the International Financial Services Centre from its reach altogether in favour of the IFSCA. Read with section 41, which obliges the Bank to comply with the Central Government's directions, the trend is towards a regulator that retains the supervisory machinery while the policy instruments move elsewhere.
Answer
For full marks, cover: the three concepts as a single architecture rather than three unrelated notes, because capital and current are defined against each other and exports are the transaction that generates the foreign exchange both are concerned with; the definitions in sections 2(e) and 2(j), and the fact that section 2(e) now contains a dead cross-reference; section 6 as it stands after 15 October 2019 and section 5 with the Current Account Transactions Rules; sections 7 and 8 with section 2(y); and the practical enforcement point that the same export can be a customs offence and a FEMA contravention at once.
FEMA divides every foreign exchange transaction into two and only two classes, and the division is exhaustive. A current account transaction is defined in section 2(j) as a transaction other than a capital account transaction, and then by an inclusive list. So the definition of the capital account governs, and everything left over is current. That structure is what allows the Act to say, in section 5, that the residue is free, and in section 6, that the defined class is regulated.
Exports are where the foreign exchange enters the system. Sections 7 and 8 are not a third category of transaction but the obligations attaching to the commonest source of inward foreign exchange, and they exist to make sure that what is earned abroad is declared honestly and brought home.
Section 2(e) defines a capital account transaction as a transaction which alters the assets or liabilities, including contingent liabilities, outside India of persons resident in India, or assets or liabilities in India of persons resident outside India, and includes transactions referred to in sub-section (3) of section 6.
The closing words are now a dead letter and saying so shows the section has been read. Section 6(3) was omitted with effect from 15 October 2019 by section 139 of Act 20 of 2015, so the definition incorporates by reference a provision that no longer exists. The substantive test in the first part of the definition is unaffected.
The test itself is the alteration of a cross-border balance sheet position. A resident acquiring shares in a foreign company alters his assets outside India; a non-resident subscribing to shares in an Indian company alters his assets in India; a resident borrowing abroad alters his liabilities outside India; a contingent liability, such as a guarantee given for a foreign subsidiary, is expressly included, which is why corporate guarantees are a FEMA question at all.
Section 6(1) permits any person to sell or draw foreign exchange for a capital account transaction subject to section 6(2), and the machinery of sub-sections (2) and (2A) is what the answer must state correctly for 2026. Section 6(2) empowers the Reserve Bank, in consultation with the Central Government, to specify the permissible classes of capital account transactions involving debt instruments, the limits of admissibility, and the conditions. Section 6(2A), inserted with effect from 15 October 2019, empowers the Central Government, in consultation with the Reserve Bank, to prescribe the permissible classes not involving debt instruments, the limits and the conditions. Section 6(7) provides that "debt instruments" means such instruments as the Central Government may determine in consultation with the Reserve Bank.
The proviso to section 6(2) is a genuine protection and is often forgotten. Neither the Reserve Bank nor the Central Government may impose any restriction on the drawal of foreign exchange for payment due on account of amortisation of loans or for depreciation of direct investments in the ordinary course of business. Those two items are treated as beyond restriction because they are the servicing of capital already lawfully raised.
Sections 6(4) and 6(5) are the grandfathering provisions. A person resident in India may hold, own, transfer or invest in foreign currency, foreign security or immovable property outside India if it was acquired, held or owned when he was resident outside India, or inherited from a person who was resident outside India; and the mirror rule in section 6(5) applies to a person resident outside India holding Indian assets. Those two sub-sections are what permit a returning Indian to keep what he lawfully acquired abroad without contravening section 4.
Section 6(6) empowers the Reserve Bank to prohibit, restrict or regulate by regulation the establishment in India of a branch, office or other place of business by a person resident outside India, which is the source of the liaison, branch and project office regime.
The instruments made under the current scheme should be named: the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 of the Central Government; the Foreign Exchange Management (Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2019 of the Reserve Bank; and the Mode of Payment and Reporting of Non-Debt Instruments Regulations, 2019. Section 47(3) saves regulations made by the Bank before the change until the Government amends or rescinds them.
Section 2(j) defines a current account transaction as a transaction other than a capital account transaction, and then adds, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, four inclusive limbs: (i) payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current business, services, and short-term banking and credit facilities in the ordinary course of business; (ii) payments due as interest on loans and as net income from investments; (iii) remittances for living expenses of parents, spouse and children residing abroad; and (iv) expenses in connection with foreign travel, education and medical care of parents, spouse and children.
The inclusive limbs are not the definition; they are examples. The definition is residual, and a transaction is current simply because it is not capital. The limbs were included because trade payments, interest and investment income, family maintenance and travel, education and medical expenses are the four categories the drafters were most concerned to place beyond doubt, following Article XXX(d) of the IMF Articles of Agreement.
Section 5 is the operative permission and it is short. Any person may sell or draw foreign exchange to or from an authorised person if such sale or drawal is a current account transaction, subject to the proviso that the Central Government may, in the public interest and in consultation with the Reserve Bank, impose such reasonable restrictions for current account transactions as may be prescribed.
The restrictions are contained in the Foreign Exchange Management (Current Account Transactions) Rules, 2000, which classify transactions into three schedules: those prohibited altogether, such as remittance out of lottery winnings, income from racing or riding, purchase of lottery tickets or football pools, and payment of commission on exports towards equity investment in joint ventures abroad; those requiring prior approval of the Central Government, such as cultural tours and remittances of freight on a vessel chartered by a public sector undertaking; and those requiring prior approval of the Reserve Bank above specified limits.
The Liberalised Remittance Scheme is the practical face of section 5 and should be mentioned: a resident individual may remit up to a specified limit in a financial year for any permissible current or capital account transaction, and the scheme is the mechanism through which the freedom in section 5 is actually exercised by individuals.
The relationship with section 6 should be stated as a single sentence of contrast. Current account transactions are free and restricted only by exception; capital account transactions are restricted and free only by permission. Because the current account definition is residual, the boundary is settled by asking whether the transaction alters a cross-border asset or liability position, and if it does not, section 5 applies.
Section 7 imposes the declaration obligation in three limbs. Under section 7(1)(a) every exporter of goods must furnish to the Reserve Bank or such other authority as may be specified a declaration in the specified form containing true and correct material particulars, including the amount representing the full export value, or, where the full export value is not ascertainable at the time of export, the value which the exporter, having regard to the prevailing market conditions, expects to receive on the sale of the goods in a market outside India. Under section 7(1)(b) he must furnish such other information as the Reserve Bank requires for ensuring realisation of the export proceeds. Under section 7(3) every exporter of services must furnish a declaration containing true and correct material particulars in relation to payment for those services.
Section 7(2) gives the Reserve Bank a directive power over the exporter, to ensure that the full export value, or such reduced value as the Reserve Bank determines having regard to prevailing market conditions, is received without delay. The power to accept a reduced value is important in practice: it is how genuine trade disputes, quality claims and distress sales are accommodated without a contravention.
Section 8 supplies the realisation and repatriation duty. Where any amount of foreign exchange is due or has accrued to a person resident in India, he shall take all reasonable steps to realise and repatriate it to India within the period and in the manner specified by the Reserve Bank. The words "due or has accrued" fix the obligation from the moment the debt arises, not from receipt.
Section 2(y) defines "repatriate to India" more richly than "remit". It means bringing into India the realised foreign exchange and either selling it to an authorised person in India in exchange for rupees, or holding the realised amount in an account with an authorised person to the extent notified by the Reserve Bank, and it includes use of the realised amount for discharge of a debt or liability denominated in foreign exchange. That last limb permits set-off against a foreign currency obligation rather than a physical inflow.
Section 9 provides the exemptions from sections 4 and 8, including possession of foreign currency and coins within limits, foreign currency accounts of specified classes of persons, foreign exchange acquired before 8 July 1947, and foreign exchange acquired from employment, business, trade, vocation, services, honorarium, gifts or inheritance within specified limits.
The customs interface is the point that ties this paper's two statutes together. The export declaration required by section 7 is made on the shipping bill filed under section 50 of the Customs Act, so the same document serves both regimes. Section 113 of the Customs Act makes goods liable to confiscation where the value stated in the shipping bill differs from the value the exporter intends to receive, and section 114 imposes a penalty. An over-invoiced or under-invoiced export is therefore simultaneously a customs offence and a FEMA contravention, and the two proceedings run in parallel, which is why the mis-declared shipping bill is the most heavily litigated document in this branch of the law.
The modern authority on the civil character of a FEMA breach is Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi SRL, (2020) 11 SCC 1, and it is worth working out because it decides the point in a commercial setting rather than in an enforcement one. The facts are worth setting out because they are a foreign exchange case in commercial dress.
An Italian cable manufacturer and its Indian joint venture partners fell out; the London Court of International Arbitration made awards directing the Indian shareholders to sell their shares to the foreign party at a discount to fair market value. Enforcement in India was resisted under section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on the ground that a sale to a non-resident at a discounted price offends the exchange control law, then the pricing guidelines and now the Non-debt Instruments Rules, and so is contrary to the public policy of India.
The Supreme Court enforced the awards. It held that a contravention of a provision of an enactment is not synonymous with a contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law, and that a breach of FEMA or of the rules made under it does not reach that threshold. The reason given is the one that matters for this answer: a FEMA contravention is remediable, because permission may be granted after the event and the contravention may be compounded under section 15, so the transaction is not void and the law is not defied by enforcing the award.
Why it bears on this question. It concerned a transfer of shares by residents to a non-resident, which is a capital account transaction on any view, and the objection was to its pricing. The Supreme Court's answer, that a breach of the pricing rules is remediable and compoundable and does not make the transaction contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law, is the strongest available authority on what actually follows when a capital account transaction is carried out irregularly.
The second authority is Hindustan Steel Ltd v. State of Orissa, (1969) 2 SCC 627, decided on 4 August 1969, and it governs the exercise of every discretionary power to penalise in an Indian fiscal statute. A government undertaking sold bricks, steel and cement, which it had procured for its own construction, to the contractors building its factory, and was assessed to sales tax as a dealer and penalised for failing to register. It was held liable to the tax.
But the penalty was set aside, and the reasoning is general. A penalty is quasi-criminal; the authority is not bound to impose one merely because it is lawful to do so; and a penalty should not be imposed for a technical or venial breach, or where the breach flows from a bona fide belief that the person is not liable. What is required is deliberate defiance of the law, contumacious or dishonest conduct, or a conscious disregard of obligation.
Why it bears on this question. Every one of these provisions ends, if it ends adversely, in a penalty imposed under a discretion expressed as a maximum. This decision states how such a discretion must be exercised: a penalty is quasi-criminal, is not to be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so, and is not for a technical or venial breach or one flowing from a bona fide belief.
Conclusion. The three concepts form one architecture. Section 2(e) defines a capital account transaction as one that alters cross-border assets or liabilities including contingent liabilities, and section 2(j) defines a current account transaction as everything else, with four inclusive limbs covering trade payments, interest and investment income, family maintenance abroad and travel, education and medical expenses. Section 5 then frees the current account subject only to reasonable restrictions prescribed by the Central Government in the public interest, contained in the Current Account Transactions Rules, 2000 with their three schedules of prohibited, Government-approved and Reserve Bank-approved transactions.
Section 6 keeps the capital account regulated, and it must be stated as it now stands. Section 6(3) was omitted on 15 October 2019, leaving section 2(e) with a cross-reference to nothing; section 6(2) leaves debt instruments with the Reserve Bank and section 6(2A) gives non-debt instruments to the Central Government, which made the Non-debt Instruments Rules, 2019, while section 47(3) saved the older regulations in the meantime. The proviso to section 6(2) puts amortisation of loans and depreciation of direct investments beyond restriction, and sections 6(4) and 6(5) grandfather assets lawfully acquired while the holder was on the other side of the residence line.
Exports are the transaction that feeds the whole system, and sections 7 and 8 work as a pair: a true declaration of full export value, and all reasonable steps to realise and repatriate what is due or has accrued, with repatriation defined in section 2(y) to include discharge of a foreign currency liability. Because the same shipping bill serves both statutes, a mis-declared export value is at once a contravention under section 13 of FEMA and a ground of confiscation under section 113 of the Customs Act, and that overlap is the practical reason this subject is taught as one paper rather than two.
Answer
For full marks, cover: all five notes, each to about six marks; for (i) the doctrine, its statutory embodiment in sections 27 and 28D, Mafatlal Industries and the ITC Ltd refinement; for (ii) the Act's structure by chapter with the 2010 amendment; for (iii) the point that FEMA has no arrest power and that section 14 is civil imprisonment; for (iv) section 2(u) with its seventh limb; for (v) Chapter IX with the periods, interest and the MOOWR scheme.
The doctrine holds that a person should not be enriched at the expense of another without a legal justification, and in customs law it answers a specific question: when duty has been collected unlawfully, who has actually lost the money? If the importer has recovered the duty from his buyer in the price, refunding it to him puts him in a better position than if the duty had never been levied, at the expense of the consumer who really bore it.
The Act embodies the doctrine in two provisions. Section 27(2) requires that duty and interest found refundable be credited to the Consumer Welfare Fund established under section 12C of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and paid to the applicant only where he falls within one of the exceptions, principally where the incidence of the duty had not been passed on to any other person, or where the claim is for duty paid by an individual on goods imported for his personal use, or is a refund of export duty under section 26, or of drawback. Section 28D raises a presumption that the full incidence of the duty has been passed on to the buyer unless the contrary is proved. Section 18(5) applies the same test to a refund arising on the finalisation of a provisional assessment.
The source is Mafatlal Industries Ltd v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536, decided on 19 December 1996 by a Bench of nine judges. The Court was asked to reconcile a long line of conflicting decisions on refund of indirect taxes. It held that every claim for refund, except where the levy is held to be unconstitutional, must be made and adjudicated under section 11B of the Central Excise Act or section 27 of the Customs Act and not otherwise; that a civil suit for refund does not lie and Article 226 cannot be used to bypass the statutory machinery; and that the claimant must establish that he has not passed on the burden of the duty to another.
The reasoning is not technical: a refund to a person who has already recovered the tax is itself an unjust enrichment, this time of the trader at the consumer's expense, and the Consumer Welfare Fund is the legislature's answer to the question of where the money should go instead.
The procedural refinement came in ITC Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata IV, decided 18 September 2019, 2019 INSC 1049. A refund of about Rs 35.89 crore of additional customs duty was claimed on self-assessed bills of entry which had never been appealed against. The Court held the claim not maintainable: a self-assessment under section 17 is an order of assessment, it is appealable under section 128, and the refund authority cannot sit in appeal over it. Section 18A, inserted by the Finance Act 2025 with effect from 1 May 2025, now permits a voluntary revision of an entry after clearance, which restores a route that decision had closed.
The Act replaced the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, and the change of name states the change of purpose: the 1947 Act controlled, the 1992 Act develops and regulates. It is a short Act of twenty sections, and almost the whole of it was rewritten by the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2010 (Act 25 of 2010), with effect from 27 August 2010, so anything written from an older text is wrong on the machinery.
Chapter II gives the power to regulate. Section 3 empowers the Central Government by order to make provision for the development and regulation of foreign trade by facilitating imports and augmenting exports, and to prohibit, restrict or otherwise regulate the import or export of goods, services or technology. Section 4 continues existing orders. Section 5, as substituted in 2010, empowers the Central Government to formulate and announce, by notification in the Official Gazette, the foreign trade policy, and to amend it in like manner, with a proviso for Special Economic Zones. Section 6 provides for the appointment of the Director General of Foreign Trade, to advise the Central Government in formulating the policy and to be responsible for carrying it out.
Chapter III creates the code and the licence. Section 7: no import or export except under an Importer-exporter Code Number granted by the Director General, with a proviso added in 2010 confining the requirement, in the case of services or technology, to a provider taking benefits under the foreign trade policy or dealing with specified services or specified technologies.
Section 8: suspension or cancellation of the code for contravention of the Act, the policy, or any law relating to central excise, customs or foreign exchange, or a notified economic offence, or an import or export prejudicial to India's trade relations or to other traders or bringing disrepute, on notice and hearing, with section 8(2) permitting trade thereafter only under a special licence. Section 9: grant, renewal, refusal, suspension and cancellation of a licence, certificate, scrip or any instrument bestowing financial or fiscal benefits, the composite expression substituted for "licence" in 2010, with reasons in writing and an appeal under section 15.
Section 9A, inserted in 2010, is the safeguard provision. Where goods are imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic industry, the Central Government may impose quantitative restrictions. The proviso exempts goods originating from a developing country whose share of imports does not exceed three per cent, or, where several developing countries are involved, whose aggregate share does not exceed nine per cent. Restrictions cease after four years unless extended, and may never continue beyond ten years.
Chapter IV contains the sanctions. Section 10 gives powers of search and seizure. Section 11(2): a contravention attracts a penalty of not less than ten thousand rupees and not more than five times the value of the goods, services or technology, whichever is more; section 11(3) applies the same range to a knowingly forged, tampered or materially false declaration; section 11(4) permits a settlement on admission; and section 11(5) provides for recovery, including by requiring an officer of customs to deduct the amount as if it were payable under the Customs Act, 1962. Section 11A requires all penalties to be credited to the Consolidated Fund of India.
Sections 14A to 14E, inserted in 2010, are the non-proliferation controls and are the least known part of the Act: 14A controls on export of specified goods, services and technology; 14B transfer controls; 14C catch-all controls; 14D suspension or cancellation of a licence for specified goods; and 14E, under which the penalty for a contravention relating to specified goods, services or technologies is that provided by the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, 2005.
Chapter V is the remedy. Section 13 makes the Director General or a notified officer the Adjudicating Authority; section 15 gives an appeal within forty-five days, extendable by thirty, subject to a mandatory pre-deposit of the penalty or redemption charges with a dispensation for undue hardship; and section 16 gives a power of review exercisable suo motu or otherwise, with a show cause notice required within two years where the variation would prejudice a person.
One provision is now out of date and it is worth saying so. Section 11B empowers the Settlement Commission constituted under section 32 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 to regularise an export obligation default, a settlement by that Commission being deemed a settlement under this Act. That Commission ceased to function on 1 April 2025 under the Finance Act 2025, its pending work passing to an Interim Board for Settlement, so section 11B now refers to a body that no longer exists.
The note must open by saying that FEMA contains no power of arrest for a contravention. A breach of sections 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 or 10 is a civil contravention under section 13, adjudged by an Adjudicating Authority under section 16. Section 35 of FERA had empowered an officer of Enforcement to arrest a person believed to be guilty of an offence; FEMA deliberately did not reproduce it. The Directorate of Enforcement investigates under section 37, exercising by section 37(3) the powers of an income-tax authority under the Income-tax Act, 1961, which are powers of survey, summons, search and seizure of documents, not of arrest.
What FEMA does provide is civil imprisonment under section 14, and it is a recovery mechanism. A person who fails to pay a penalty imposed under section 13 within ninety days of service of the notice of demand is liable to civil imprisonment. Before an order is made the Adjudicating Authority must issue a show cause notice and be satisfied, on reasons recorded in writing, either that the defaulter has, after the notice, dishonestly transferred, concealed or removed property to obstruct recovery, or that he has the means to pay and refuses or neglects to do so.
A person arrested under a warrant must be brought before the Authority within twenty-four hours; the proviso to section 14(9) allows a period of not more than fifteen days to satisfy the arrears before a detention order; and section 14(11) fixes the term at up to three years where the demand exceeds one crore rupees and up to six months otherwise. Section 14(12) provides that release does not discharge the liability but bars a second arrest under the same certificate, and the Explanation to section 14(6) deems the karta to be the defaulter where the defaulter is a Hindu undivided family.
Section 14A has never come into force. It would let an officer of Enforcement not below the rank of Assistant Director recover arrears with income-tax powers under the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961, but the India Code footnote records that it "shall stand inserted (date to be notified) by Act 28 of 2016, section 229", and no notification has issued.
Imprisonment returns in one class of case. Section 13(1C), inserted with effect from 9 September 2015, makes a person holding foreign exchange, foreign security or immovable property outside India above the section 37A threshold punishable with imprisonment up to five years and with fine, in addition to a penalty of three times the sum and confiscation of equivalent Indian assets under section 13(1A); section 13(1D) requires a complaint in writing by an officer not below the rank of Assistant Director; and section 37A(6) excludes compounding for such a case.
In practice the arrest comes from another statute, since a serious foreign exchange contravention, particularly hawala, is a scheduled offence under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, and section 19 of that Act gives the same officers of the Directorate of Enforcement the power to arrest on material and recorded reasons, with the grounds to be communicated and production before a Special Court within twenty-four hours.
Section 2(u) defines "person" inclusively in seven limbs: an individual; a Hindu undivided family; a company; a firm; an association of persons or a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not; every artificial juridical person not falling within the preceding sub-clauses; and any agency, office or branch owned or controlled by such person.
The seventh limb is the operative one and it is what most notes miss. By treating an agency, office or branch owned or controlled by a person as itself a person, the Act makes an Indian company's foreign branch and a foreign company's Indian branch separate persons, so that a transfer between a head office and its own branch across the border is a transaction between two persons and can be a contravention of sections 3 or 4. Without that limb, inter-branch dealings would fall outside the Act.
The definition must be read with section 2(v) and 2(w). A person resident in India is one residing in India for more than one hundred and eighty-two days during the course of the preceding financial year, but excluding a person who has gone out of or stays outside India for or on taking up employment, for carrying on a business or vocation, or for any other purpose in circumstances indicating an intention to stay outside India for an uncertain period; and excluding, correspondingly, a person who has come to or stays in India otherwise than for those purposes.
It then deems resident any person or body corporate registered or incorporated in India, an office, branch or agency in India owned or controlled by a person resident outside India, and an office, branch or agency outside India owned or controlled by a person resident in India. Section 2(w) defines a person resident outside India as a person who is not resident in India.
The interaction of the arithmetical test and the purpose exclusions is what generates the litigation. A person may have been in India for more than 182 days in the preceding year and yet be a non-resident, because he has since left to take up employment abroad; and a person may have been in India for fewer than 182 days and yet be a resident, because he has come to India to take up employment here. The day-count is the starting point, not the answer.
Liability attaches to a "person", so the width of section 2(u) means a firm, an unincorporated association or a branch may be proceeded against in its own name, and section 42, whose Explanation makes a firm a company and a partner a director, then reaches the individuals behind it.
Chapter IX of the Customs Act, sections 57 to 73A, allows imported goods to be deposited in a warehouse without payment of duty, and the point of the chapter is deferment: the taxable event for the rate is the removal from the warehouse, not the importation.
Sections 57, 58 and 58A provide for three kinds of warehouse. A public warehouse licensed under section 57, where any importer may deposit goods; a private warehouse licensed under section 58, for the deposit of dutiable goods imported by or on behalf of the licensee; and a special warehouse licensed under section 58A, in which goods notified by the Board are deposited and which is locked by the proper officer, no person entering or removing goods without his permission. Section 58B provides for cancellation of a licence, and section 59 for the warehousing bond, in a sum equal to three times the duty assessed, with an undertaking to comply with conditions, to pay duty and interest, and to pay any penalties.
Section 60 governs the permission for removal to a warehouse, section 61 the period for which goods may remain warehoused. For capital goods intended for use in any hundred per cent export oriented undertaking, electronic hardware technology park unit, software technology park unit or any warehouse where manufacture or other operations are permitted under section 65, the period is until clearance; for goods other than capital goods in such units, until consumption or clearance; and for any other goods, one year from the date of the order under section 60, extendable by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, on sufficient cause being shown, by not more than one year at a time, and reducible where the goods are likely to deteriorate. Interest is payable under section 61(2) where goods remain beyond ninety days, at the rate fixed under section 47.
Sections 62 to 64 govern control and the owner's rights. The former section 62 on custody has been recast, and the goods are in the custody of the licensee under the Warehouse (Custody and Handling of Goods) Regulations, 2016 and the Special Warehouse (Custody and Handling of Goods) Regulations, 2016. Section 64 permits the owner, with the sanction of the proper officer and on payment of fees, to inspect the goods, separate damaged or deteriorated goods, sort or change their containers, deal with them to prevent loss or deterioration, show them for sale, and take samples.
Section 65 is commercially the most important provision in the chapter. It permits, with the sanction of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner and subject to prescribed conditions, manufacture and other operations in relation to warehoused goods in a warehouse. That is the statutory basis of the Manufacture and Other Operations in Warehouse Regulations, 2019, under which a manufacturer may import inputs and capital goods without paying duty, manufacture in the bonded warehouse, and pay duty on the inputs only when the finished goods are cleared into the domestic market, or no duty at all if they are exported. It converts the warehouse from a storage facility into a duty-deferred manufacturing regime.
Clearance is governed by sections 68 and 69. Section 68 permits clearance for home consumption on presentation of a bill of entry, payment of duty, interest, fine and penalties, and an order of clearance by the proper officer; the proviso permits relinquishment of title to the goods before an order for clearance, in which case the owner is not liable for duty, though not where an offence appears to have been committed. Section 69 permits clearance for export on a shipping bill or bill of export, payment of the export duty and charges, and an order of the proper officer.
Sections 71 to 73A close the chapter. Section 71 forbids removal except as provided; section 72 deals with improperly removed goods, entitling the proper officer to demand the full amount of duty with interest, fine and penalties from the owner and, on failure, to detain and sell so much of the goods as is sufficient; section 73 provides for cancellation and return of the bond; and section 73A places the warehoused goods in the custody of the licensee and makes him responsible for them until they are cleared, with a liability, where goods are removed in contravention of section 71, to pay duty, interest, fine and penalties.
Conclusion. The five notes range across both statutes and one policy Act. Unjust enrichment is the rule that a refund goes to whoever actually bore the tax, embodied in section 27(2)'s Consumer Welfare Fund and section 28D's presumption, settled by the nine judges in Mafatlal Industries, and made procedurally harder by ITC Ltd in 2019 until section 18A restored a route on 1 May 2025.
The Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 is the policy statute, rewritten in 2010, giving the foreign trade policy its statutory basis in section 5, the Importer-exporter Code its foundation in section 7, quantitative safeguards their machinery in section 9A with the three and nine per cent developing-country thresholds and the ten-year outer limit, and penalties of not less than ten thousand rupees and up to five times value in section 11, with the non-proliferation controls in sections 14A to 14E routed to the Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2005.
FEMA has no arrest power at all; section 14 provides civil imprisonment for a defaulter after ninety days, capped at three years above one crore rupees and six months below, with section 14A never notified and imprisonment returning only for undisclosed foreign assets under section 13(1C). "Person" in section 2(u) is deliberately wide, and its seventh limb, covering an agency, office or branch, is what makes a cross-border transaction between a head office and its own branch a transaction between two persons.
Warehousing under Chapter IX is the deferment mechanism that follows from the taxable event being removal rather than importation: three kinds of warehouse under sections 57, 58 and 58A, a triple-duty bond under section 59, periods and interest under section 61, the owner's rights under section 64, clearance for home consumption or export under sections 68 and 69, and, most significantly, section 65 and the Manufacture and Other Operations in Warehouse Regulations, 2019, which turn a bonded warehouse into a place where goods can be made from duty-free inputs and the duty paid only if and when they enter the Indian market.
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This volume prints the 2016 Law Relating to Customs and Foreign Exchange paper set by the University of Mumbai for LLM Group 2 Business Law, with a model answer to each of its 7 questions.
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12 August 2026.
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