Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
Global Trade Under World Trade Organisation
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LLM · Group 2 Business Law
2015 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
Global Trade Under World Trade Organisation
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LLM · Group 2 Business Law
2015 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
First published on munotes.in on 12 August 2026.
Published by munotes.in, Mumbai.
Model answers written and edited by the munotes.in editorial desk.
Passages from this volume may be quoted, in print, online or by an AI system, with credit: name munotes.in and link to this volume's page. The volume may not be reproduced as a whole. Full terms at munotes.in/content-license.
munotes.in is an independent study resource for students of the University of Mumbai. It is not affiliated with the University of Mumbai, and is not endorsed by it.
The University does not publish an official answer key for this paper. The answers in this volume are model answers, written to show how a full-mark answer is built. They are a study aid, not an authority on what an examiner marked.
The question paper reproduced here is the paper as set by the University of Mumbai at the 2015 examination.
The answers in this volume state the law as it stands today, not as it stood when each paper was set, and four changes bear on answers throughout this folder. The Appellate Body has had no members since 30 November 2020, having lost its quorum on 11 December 2019, so a losing party can appeal into a void and prevent adoption; India did exactly that on 11 January 2022 in the sugar and sugarcane disputes and on 8 December 2023 in the information technology tariff dispute. The Fourteenth Ministerial Conference at Yaounde, 26 to 30 March 2026, closed without a declaration, and the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions expired on 31 March 2026, for the first time since 1998. The Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies entered into force on 15 September 2025. And TRIPS Article 31bis, in force 23 January 2017, remains the only amendment ever made to a WTO agreement. Where an answer turns on any of these it gives the date.
The questions below are the paper as the University of Mumbai set it at the 2015 examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
MarksPage
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2015 examination, reproduced as the University of Mumbai set them, in the order it set them. Nothing has been reworded, added or left out. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 3 hours · Total marks 100 · 14 questions answered
How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
Q.P. Code 12212, printer line BB-Con. 9033-15
any four of seven, all carrying equal marks of 25 · 100 Marks
Answer
For full marks, cover: the purposes as stated, then the four legal instruments through which they were to be achieved, because those instruments are the measure of success; then the record round by round with figures; then the failures, which are failures of coverage rather than of design; and a verdict.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was signed at Geneva on 30 October 1947 by twenty three countries and applied from 1 January 1948 under a Protocol of Provisional Application. It was Chapter IV of the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, detached and brought into force early so that the tariff concessions negotiated at Geneva in 1947 would take effect without waiting for the Charter's ratification. The Charter died in the United States Senate in 1950, and the fragment became the whole system for forty seven years.
The Preamble states the purposes and the order matters. The contracting parties recognised that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world, and expanding the production and exchange of goods. The means were reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.
Two consequences follow and both should be stated at the outset. Liberalisation is a means and not an end: the ends are living standards, employment and real income. And the purpose has two distinct objects pursued by different machinery, reduction of barriers by negotiation and elimination of discrimination by rule.
Article II and the Schedules of Concessions. A binding is a promise not to exceed a stated rate on a stated product, and the Schedules annexed under Article II are made an integral part of the Agreement. The value of a binding is predictability rather than the level: an importer can plan around a bound rate, and an unbound rate can be raised overnight. India's applied rates remain well below its bindings on most industrial lines, which is why the Indian information technology tariff dispute, DS582, turned on whether the goods fell inside a binding at all.
Article I, most favoured nation treatment. Any advantage granted to a product of any other country must be extended immediately and unconditionally to the like product of every contracting party. This is what multilateralises a bilateral bargain and what makes joining a round worthwhile.
Article III, national treatment. Internal taxes and regulations must not be applied so as to protect domestic production, so that a member cannot take back inside the border what it conceded at it.
Article XI, elimination of quantitative restrictions. Quotas, licences and other non tariff restrictions are prohibited outright, because a quota is opaque, transfers a rent to the licence holder, insulates domestic from world prices, and is discriminatory in its administration. Together the four express one legislative preference: protection may be given, but only by a bound and visible tariff.
On tariffs the record is without parallel, and the eight rounds should be named. Geneva 1947, Annecy 1949, Torquay 1951, Geneva 1956, the Dillon Round 1960 to 1961, the Kennedy Round 1964 to 1967, which introduced across the board linear cuts instead of product by product bargaining, the Tokyo Round 1973 to 1979, which added the nine codes on non tariff measures, and the Uruguay Round 1986 to 1994. Average industrial tariffs in the developed countries fell from about forty per cent in 1947 to under four per cent once the Uruguay Round commitments were phased in. World merchandise trade grew faster than world output in almost every year of that period. No competing explanation for a change of that size exists.
On membership it succeeded beyond its design. Twenty three original contracting parties became one hundred and twenty eight by the end of 1994, and the successor organisation had one hundred and sixty six members by 2026. A body created as the remnant of an unratified charter became the framework of nearly all world trade.
On technique it produced two durable inventions. Reciprocity multilateralised by MFN, which makes liberalisation self spreading; and the settlement of complaints by reasoned panel report against agreed rules, which is the direct ancestor of the modern dispute system.
The Protocol of Provisional Application and the grandfather clause. Because the Agreement applied provisionally, Part II, Articles III to XXIII, applied only "to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation". Domestic law already enacted prevailed indefinitely. The waiver granted to the United States in 1955 under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, permitting agricultural quotas contrary to Article XI, was never withdrawn.
The two sectors that mattered most to developing countries were the two that escaped. Agricultural domestic support and export subsidies were effectively unregulated, Article XVI:3 permitting export subsidies on primary products subject only to an unenforceable equitable share test. Textiles and clothing were governed from 1974 by the Multi Fibre Arrangement, a licensed derogation from Articles I and XI under which importing countries imposed bilateral quotas on precisely the products in which developing countries were competitive.
Non tariff barriers grew as tariffs fell. Voluntary export restraints and orderly marketing arrangements sat outside Article XI because they were formally imposed by the exporter, and by the 1980s they covered a large share of trade in steel, automobiles and machine tools. Only Article 11.1(b) of the Safeguards Agreement in 1995 prohibited them.
Dispute settlement was blockable, and this is the deepest failure. A panel could be established only by consensus and its report adopted only by consensus, so the respondent could veto either step. The two Tuna Dolphin reports, GATT Panel Report DS21/R of 3 September 1991 and DS29/R of 1994, both found against the United States and neither was ever adopted. A rule the respondent can stop a tribunal from applying is not enforceable.
Fragmentation was the fifth failure. The Tokyo Round's nine codes bound only their signatories, so the same conduct could be lawful against one partner and unlawful against another. The single undertaking of Annexes 1 to 3 was written to end that.
Measured against its own purposes GATT succeeded almost completely on tariffs, substantially on predictability and non discrimination in industrial goods, and hardly at all where its own waivers and derogations had removed the rule. The failures were failures of coverage and enforcement, not of principle: the rules of 1947 were re-enacted almost unchanged as GATT 1994, which is the strongest possible testimonial to them.
The proof is India: Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WT/DS90/AB/R, adopted 22 September 1999. India had maintained import licensing on 2,714 tariff lines for decades under Article XVIII:B, a provision in force since 1948. The United States complained. The panel and the Appellate Body held that the DSB was competent to decide whether the balance of payments justification survived, that the International Monetary Fund's assessment of the adequacy of India's reserves was to be accepted under Article XV:2, and that the restrictions were no longer justified. India lost and phased them out by 1 April 2001. The provision was fifty years old; only the procedure was new; and the outcome changed. That is exactly the diagnosis which produced the Uruguay Round and the World Trade Organization.
The first figure is binding coverage, not the tariff level. By the close of the Uruguay Round almost all industrial tariff lines of the developed members were bound, and a large majority of developing members' lines were bound for the first time. A bound line is a legal ceiling, so the significance is that protection ceased to be a matter of executive discretion and became a matter of treaty obligation. That change is invisible in an average tariff figure and it is the more durable of the two achievements.
The second figure is participation. Twenty three contracting parties in 1947 became one hundred and twenty eight by the end of 1994, and thirty six further accessions have been completed since. Governments do not undertake a decade of legislative reform to join an arrangement they regard as ornamental, so accession is the best available revealed preference test of whether GATT worked.
The counterfactual is the strongest argument and it is the one most scripts omit. GATT was legislated against a specific disaster: the sequence of competitive devaluation, exchange control and tariff retaliation that cut the value of world trade by roughly two thirds between 1929 and 1934. Measured against that, the record is that no general resort to tariff retaliation has occurred in any post war recession, including after the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, the crisis of 2008 and the pandemic of 2020, when trade contracted sharply and recovered without a tariff war.
Protection did rise in each episode, and it rose within the system, through anti-dumping duties and safeguards rather than through unilateral tariff increases, which is precisely what the framework was designed to channel. Whether that outcome is attributable to GATT or merely coincident with it cannot be proved, but GATT is the only candidate explanation on offer, and its authors would have regarded it as the whole of their purpose achieved.
Conclusion. The basic purposes of GATT were to raise living standards, employment and real income by the substantial reduction of trade barriers and the elimination of discrimination, and they were translated into four instruments: the bound Schedule under Article II, most favoured nation treatment under Article I, national treatment under Article III and the prohibition of quotas under Article XI. On the first, eight rounds cut industrial tariffs from about forty per cent to under four, and membership grew from twenty three to one hundred and twenty eight, which is success on a scale no other economic institution can claim.
On the second, the rule held for industrial goods and was suspended for agriculture by the 1955 waiver and for textiles by the Multi Fibre Arrangement, while voluntary export restraints grew up beside Article XI and the grandfather clause in the Protocol of Provisional Application protected inconsistent domestic law throughout. The system's own remedy was unusable, as the two unadopted Tuna Dolphin reports show. GATT therefore achieved its purposes to the exact extent that its instruments were allowed to operate, and its failures are the agenda of the Uruguay Round, which is the most that can honestly be said and a great deal more than most institutions achieve in half a century.
The rest of the answers
You have read the paper as it was set and the first model answer in full. The remaining answers come with the bundle, along with every other solved paper for this semester.
See the semester for ₹798 Already bought it? Sign in
Or just the solved papers: ₹499
The question paper itself stays free, as does the syllabus and module one of every subject.
Found an error in this volume? Report it and we will check it against the paper.