Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
Global Trade Under World Trade Organisation
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LLM · Group 2 Business Law
2025-26 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
Global Trade Under World Trade Organisation
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LLM · Group 2 Business Law
2025-26 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
First published on munotes.in on 12 August 2026.
Published by munotes.in, Mumbai.
Model answers written and edited by the munotes.in editorial desk.
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The University does not publish an official answer key for this paper. The answers in this volume are model answers, written to show how a full-mark answer is built. They are a study aid, not an authority on what an examiner marked.
The question paper reproduced here is the paper as set by the University of Mumbai at the 2025-26 examination.
The answers in this volume state the law as it stands today, not as it stood when each paper was set, and four changes bear on answers throughout this folder. The Appellate Body has had no members since 30 November 2020, having lost its quorum on 11 December 2019, so a losing party can appeal into a void and prevent adoption; India did exactly that on 11 January 2022 in the sugar and sugarcane disputes and on 8 December 2023 in the information technology tariff dispute. The Fourteenth Ministerial Conference at Yaounde, 26 to 30 March 2026, closed without a declaration, and the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions expired on 31 March 2026, for the first time since 1998. The Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies entered into force on 15 September 2025. And TRIPS Article 31bis, in force 23 January 2017, remains the only amendment ever made to a WTO agreement. Where an answer turns on any of these it gives the date.
The questions below are the paper as the University of Mumbai set it at the 2025-26 examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2025-26 examination, reproduced as the University of Mumbai set them, in the order it set them. Nothing has been reworded, added or left out. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 3 hours · Total marks 100 · 6 questions answered
How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
form 05059, sat 2 August 2026
any four of the paper, all carrying equal marks of 25 · 100 Marks
Answer
For full marks, cover: the purposes as the Preamble to GATT 1947 actually states them; the three operative articles through which those purposes were to be achieved; then a measured verdict, because the question says examine how far, which requires evidence on both sides and not a list of achievements.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was signed at Geneva on 30 October 1947 by twenty three countries and applied from 1 January 1948 under a Protocol of Provisional Application. It was never meant to stand alone. It was the commercial policy chapter of the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, brought into force early so that the tariff concessions negotiated in 1947 would not go stale while the Charter was ratified. The Charter was never ratified, the United States Congress declining to put it to a vote in 1950, and the fragment survived as the whole. Every strength and every defect of GATT follows from that accident.
The Preamble states the purpose in four limbs and they should be quoted in that order. The contracting parties recognised that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world, and expanding the production and exchange of goods. The means were to be reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.
Two things follow from that language and examiners look for both. First, trade liberalisation in GATT is instrumental and not an end in itself: the ends are living standards, employment and real income, and liberalisation is the chosen means. Second, the purpose has two distinct objects, the reduction of barriers and the elimination of discrimination, and they are pursued by different machinery. Reduction is done by negotiation, which produces Schedules. Elimination of discrimination is done by rule, which produces Articles I and III.
Article II and the Schedules of Concessions. A tariff binding is a promise not to charge more than a stated rate on a stated product. The Schedules annexed under Article II are made an integral part of the Agreement and are the concrete output of every negotiating round. The economic point of a binding is not the level but the predictability: an importer can plan around a bound rate, whereas an unbound rate can be raised overnight. India's bound rates remain well above its applied rates on most industrial lines, which is why India retains room to raise duties without breaching Article II, and why the Indian ICT tariff dispute turned on the narrow question of whether the goods fell within a binding at all.
Article I, most favoured nation treatment. Any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a contracting party to a product originating in or destined for any other country must be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product of all other contracting parties. This is the article that converts a bilateral concession into a multilateral one, and it is what makes a round of negotiations worth joining.
Article III, national treatment, and Article XI, elimination of quantitative restrictions. Article III forbids internal taxes and regulations that protect domestic production, and so stops a member from taking back at the border's inside edge what it conceded at the border. Article XI prohibits quotas, import and export licences and other non tariff restrictions. Together the three articles express a single legislative preference: protection may be given, but only by a bound and visible tariff, never by a quota and never by internal discrimination.
On tariffs the record is very strong and should be given with figures. Eight rounds were held between 1947 and 1994: Geneva 1947, Annecy 1949, Torquay 1951, Geneva 1956, the Dillon Round 1960 to 1961, the Kennedy Round 1964 to 1967, the Tokyo Round 1973 to 1979 and the Uruguay Round 1986 to 1994. Average industrial tariffs in the developed countries fell from roughly forty per cent in 1947 to under four per cent after the Uruguay Round commitments were phased in. World merchandise trade grew faster than world output in almost every year of that period. No other explanation for a change of that magnitude is available.
On membership it succeeded beyond its design. Twenty three original contracting parties became one hundred and twenty eight by the end of 1994, and the successor organisation had one hundred and sixty six members by 2026. A club that began as a fragment of an unratified charter became the framework within which almost all world trade was conducted.
On technique it produced two durable inventions. The first is reciprocity plus most favoured nation treatment, which allows two large traders to strike a bargain that then benefits everyone, and so makes liberalisation self spreading. The second is the practice of settling trade complaints by reference to agreed rules and reasoned panel reports rather than by retaliation, which is the direct ancestor of the modern dispute settlement system.
The birth defect: the Protocol of Provisional Application and the grandfather clause. Because GATT applied provisionally, Part II, which contains Articles III to XXIII, applied only "to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation". Existing inconsistent domestic law was therefore protected indefinitely. The United States Agricultural Adjustment Act waiver of 1955 is the clearest instance: the United States obtained a waiver of Article XI for agricultural quotas which was never withdrawn, and agriculture stood substantially outside the disciplines for forty years.
Agriculture and textiles, the two sectors that mattered most to developing countries, were the two that escaped. Agricultural export subsidies and domestic support were effectively unregulated until the Agreement on Agriculture of 1995. Textiles and clothing were governed from 1974 by the Multi Fibre Arrangement, a licensed derogation from Article XI which allowed importing countries to impose bilateral quotas on precisely the products in which developing countries were competitive. GATT's non discrimination rule was suspended for the sectors where developing countries could have used it.
Non tariff barriers grew as tariffs fell. Voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements and grey area measures sat outside the Agreement because they were not formally imposed by the importing state. By the 1980s these covered a large share of trade in steel, automobiles and machine tools. Article XI prohibited quotas and said nothing about a quota an exporter had been persuaded to impose on itself. Only Article 11 of the Safeguards Agreement in 1995 prohibited them.
Dispute settlement was consensual and therefore blockable. A panel could be established only by consensus of the Contracting Parties and its report adopted only by consensus, so the losing party could block either step. Panels were blocked in a number of significant cases, and the two Tuna Dolphin reports of 1991 and 1994 were never adopted for that reason. A rule which the respondent can prevent a tribunal from applying is a weak rule.
United States: Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Mexico v United States), GATT Panel Report DS21/R, 3 September 1991. The United States Marine Mammal Protection Act embargoed imports of yellowfin tuna caught in the eastern tropical Pacific with purse seine nets, because that method killed dolphins, unless the exporting country's incidental dolphin kill rate was within a set proportion of the American rate. Mexico complained.
The panel held the embargo an Article XI quantitative restriction, not saved by Article III because it addressed a process and not a product characteristic, and not saved by Article XX(b) or (g) because those exceptions could not be applied to protect life or resources outside the jurisdiction of the importing state, and because the measure was not necessary when other means had not been tried. Mexico won, and the report was never adopted, Mexico not pressing for adoption while it negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement.
A second panel in 1994 (United States: Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R, brought by the European Communities) rejected the jurisdictional limit but still found against the United States on the ground that a measure designed to force a change in another country's policies could not be "necessary" or "relating to" conservation within Article XX. That report was also never adopted. The two cases are the standing proof of the adoption defect, and they are also the reason the Appellate Body's later decision in United States: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, mattered so much: it accepted that a trade measure taken for an environmental purpose could in principle be justified under Article XX(g), and struck the American measure down only for the arbitrary and unjustifiable way it was applied.
Measured against its stated purpose, GATT succeeded almost completely on tariffs, substantially on predictability and non discrimination in industrial goods, and hardly at all on the sectors and instruments that its own exceptions carved out. The honest formulation is that GATT achieved the means it chose, tariff reduction by negotiation, and that its failures were failures of coverage rather than of design: agriculture, textiles, services and intellectual property were outside it, and the grey area measures were beside it. That is precisely the diagnosis that produced the Uruguay Round, and it is why the World Trade Organization Agreement of 15 April 1994 is drafted as a single undertaking with a compulsory and unblockable dispute settlement procedure.
Conclusion. The basic purpose of GATT was to raise living standards, employment and real income by reducing tariffs and eliminating discrimination in trade, and its instruments were the bound Schedule under Article II, most favoured nation treatment under Article I, national treatment under Article III and the prohibition of quotas under Article XI. On the first instrument it succeeded to a degree without parallel in economic history, reducing industrial tariffs from about forty per cent to under four.
On the second it succeeded for industrial goods and failed for agriculture and textiles, where its own waivers and the Multi Fibre Arrangement suspended the rule for forty years. Its deepest failure was procedural: a system in which the respondent could block both the panel and the report could not enforce what it promised, and the two unadopted Tuna Dolphin reports are the evidence. GATT therefore succeeded well enough to make its own replacement necessary, which is the most that can fairly be said and considerably more than most institutions achieve.
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