The Method of History
Chapter Ten
Syllabus topic 1, "Nature of judicial process"
Pages 40 to 43 of 356
In one line
Some rules can only be understood by knowing what they grew out of, and their origin often fixes how far they may honestly be stretched.
In the wording a student can write in an exam: the method of history directs the judge, when the authorities do not decide, to ask how the doctrine before him came into existence and what problem it was created to solve. Cardozo's proposition is that many legal rules are intelligible only as historical products, and that where a rule is the residue of conditions that have passed, history both explains its shape and limits the direction in which it can properly be developed.
Why history binds at all
Because a rule carries its purpose with it. A provision enacted to prevent a specific mischief is presumed to be aimed at that mischief. Knowing what the mischief was tells the court how wide the words should run. This is the historical method operating inside statutory interpretation, where it is called the mischief rule.
Because doctrines have shapes that only origin explains. Why does the Indian Constitution say "procedure established by law" in Article 21 rather than "due process of law"? Because the Constituent Assembly considered the American phrase, was advised against it, and deliberately chose the narrower Japanese formulation. That fact does not decide the meaning of Article 21 today, but no honest account of A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27, or of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597, can be given without it.
Because continuity is itself a value. A legal system that could be redirected at will would offer no security. History is a brake, and brakes are useful.
How the method runs
Step one: find the origin of the rule. What was the state of affairs before it, and what was it a response to?
Step two: ask whether the conditions that produced it still obtain. If they do, the rule should be applied in its original scope. If they have passed, that is a reason for confining rather than extending it.
Step three: use the origin to fix the direction of development. The rule may be extended along the line its purpose runs, and not across it.
The Indian illustrations
1. The Ninth Schedule. Articles 31A and 31B and the Ninth Schedule were inserted by the First Amendment in 1951 for a specific historical purpose: to save agrarian reform legislation from challenge under the property right. Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458, upheld that amendment.
Facts. The Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951, which inserted Articles 31A and 31B and the Ninth Schedule to protect agrarian reform laws, was challenged on the grounds that the provisional Parliament was not competent to amend the Constitution and that an amendment abridging fundamental rights was void under Article 13(2).
The Method of History
Held. The amendment was upheld. The provisional Parliament was competent to exercise the amending power under Article 368, and the word "law" in Article 13(2) means ordinary legislation made in exercise of legislative power and does not include a constitutional amendment made in exercise of constituent power.
Why it matters here. Once the Schedule had been created for agrarian reform, it was used for much else. The historical method is what allowed later courts to say that the protection had outgrown its purpose, which is the reasoning that runs through Waman Rao v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 271, and I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, decided on 11 January 2007.
Facts. A nine judge Bench was asked to determine the nature and extent of the protection given by Article 31B to laws added to the Ninth Schedule by amendments made after 24 April 1973, the date of Kesavananda, because parts of the Gudalur Janmam Estates Act 1969 had been struck down and then placed in the Schedule.
Held. A law placed in the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973 is not immune merely because it is there. Its validity is open to challenge on the ground that it damages or destroys the basic structure, and the test is the effect of the law on the fundamental rights, particularly Articles 14, 19 and 21, rather than the form of the amendment. Judicial review being a basic feature, blanket immunity cannot be conferred.
Why it matters here. The Court's reasoning is historical throughout: it traces what the Schedule was for, notes what it had become, and confines it accordingly.
2. Article 21 and the deliberate rejection of due process. The framers' choice is the strongest historical argument for the Gopalan reading, and Maneka Gandhi had to overcome it. It did so not by denying the history but by the method of philosophy, holding that the guarantees form a single scheme, so that arbitrariness forbidden by Article 14 could not be permitted by Article 21. That is the honest way to describe the relation between the two methods: history states the starting position, and another method must displace it.
3. Sovereign immunity. The immunity of the State in tort in India descends from the East India Company's distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign functions, a distinction with no place in a republic committed to Article 300. The historical account of where it came from is what allowed Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, AIR 1993 SC 1960, to hold that the defence does not apply to a claim in public law for breach of a fundamental right.
The Method of History
The limits of the method
It can freeze the law. If origin controls, a rule can never outgrow its beginnings, and a constitution written in 1950 could never answer a question of 2026. This is the objection to strict originalism, and the Indian answer is [The Constitution as a Living Document].
History is contested. Constituent Assembly debates are long, and both sides quote them. Historical argument is rarely decisive because the record rarely speaks with one voice.
Origin does not settle authority. That a rule began badly does not by itself abolish it, and that it began well does not preserve it. The historical fact has to be converted into a legal reason by some further step.
It sits uneasily with a transformative constitution. The Indian Constitution was written to change Indian society, not to record it. A method that asks what the rule grew out of is in tension with an instrument whose purpose was to break with what preceded it.
A worked example
A statute of 1885 penalises "obstruction of a public thoroughfare". A protest march is prosecuted under it.
By history. The provision was enacted in a colonial period against nuisances such as abandoned carts and stray cattle, and to control assemblies the colonial state disliked. The first purpose is neutral; the second is one the Constitution has repudiated.
What follows. The court may read the section as directed at physical obstruction of the kind the provision was aimed at, and not at temporary assembly, since applying it to protest would give continued effect to a purpose Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) reject.
What the method could not do alone. It could not decide the case. It supplied a reason for a narrow reading; the choice between narrow and wide was completed by the constitutional values that the method of sociology brings in.
Distinctions
| Uses history to LIMIT | Uses history to EXTEND | |
|---|---|---|
| Reasoning | the mischief has passed, so confine the rule | the mischief persists in a new form, so the rule reaches it |
| Indian example | the Ninth Schedule confined in Coelho | sovereign immunity traced to its colonial origin and rejected |
| Risk | freezing law at the moment of enactment | using origin to justify a result reached on other grounds |
Quick revision
- Method of history: ask what the doctrine grew out of and what problem it was created to solve.
- It works because a rule carries its purpose, because origin explains shape, and because continuity is a value.
- Three steps: find the origin, ask whether the conditions persist, let the origin fix the direction of development.
- Indian illustrations: the Ninth Schedule from Sankari Prasad to Coelho; the deliberate rejection of due process in Article 21; the colonial descent of sovereign immunity, rejected in Nilabati Behera.
- Limits: it can freeze the law, the history is contested, origin is not authority, and it sits uneasily with a transformative constitution.
- In Maneka Gandhi, history stated the starting position and the method of philosophy displaced it.
The Method of History
Test yourself
1. State the method of history and its three steps. It directs the judge to ask how the doctrine before him arose and what problem it answered. Find the origin; ask whether the conditions that produced the rule still obtain; and let the origin fix the direction in which the rule may honestly be developed.
2. Trace one Indian doctrine through the method of history. The Ninth Schedule. Created by the First Amendment in 1951 to protect agrarian reform, and upheld on that footing in Sankari Prasad, AIR 1951 SC 458. Its use spread far beyond agrarian reform. Waman Rao drew a line at 24 April 1973, and Coelho, decided 11 January 2007, held that laws placed there after that date remain open to challenge for damaging the basic structure, the test being the effect on Articles 14, 19 and 21.
3. What is the strongest objection to letting history control? That it freezes the law at the moment of enactment, so that a constitution of 1950 could never answer a question of 2026. The Indian answer is that the Constitution is a living document whose spirit must evolve with time, which is why the historical argument for the Gopalan reading of Article 21 did not survive Maneka Gandhi.
4. Why is history an unusually weak method under the Indian Constitution specifically? Because that Constitution was transformative rather than declaratory. It was written to change an existing social order, not to record it, so a method that asks what a provision grew out of is in tension with an instrument whose point was to break with what preceded it.
The rest of this subject
These notes are cut from the University's printed syllabus. Open the syllabus itself, or the past papers, for the same subject.