Justice in Greek Thought: Plato and Aristotle

Distributive justice. The allocation of honours, offices and goods among the members of a community. It proceeds by geometric proportion: goods are distributed according to merit, so that equals receive equally and unequals unequally in proportion to the relevant difference. The proposition that equals are to be treated equally and unequals unequally is Aristotle's, and it is the formula Indian courts apply under Article 14 when they permit classification.

Corrective justice. The restoration of a balance disturbed by a wrong. It proceeds by arithmetic proportion: the court disregards the standing of the parties and asks only what was taken and what must be restored. It does not matter whether a good man defrauded a bad one or the reverse; the loss is measured and repaired. This is the justice of contract, tort and crime.

Why the division matters for a lawyer. They use opposite methods. Distributive justice attends to who the parties are; corrective justice deliberately ignores it. A statute allocating reserved seats is doing the first; a decree for damages is doing the second, and applying the method of one to the subject matter of the other produces confusion.

Equity. Aristotle's epieikeia: law speaks generally, and cases arise which the general statement does not fit. Equity is the correction of the law where it is defective by reason of its generality. It is a rectification of law rather than a departure from it, and it is the ancestor of both the English equity jurisdiction and every modern doctrine permitting a court to depart from a literal application.

The Indian connection

Article 14 uses Aristotle's formula. The classification test, that a law may treat people differently if the classification rests on an intelligible differentia bearing a rational nexus to the object, is the proposition that unequals may be treated unequally in proportion to a relevant difference.

Its insufficiency is Indian too. E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555, added the substantive test.

Facts. A senior member of the Indian Administrative Service, appointed Chief Secretary of Tamil Nadu, was moved to posts he said were inferior, alleging mala fides because he had displeased the Chief Minister, and complaining under Articles 14 and 16.

Held. The petition failed on the facts. In reasoning, equality is a dynamic concept which cannot be cribbed, cabined and confined within traditional and doctrinaire limits; from a positivistic point of view equality is antithetic to arbitrariness; equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies, so an arbitrary act is implicitly unequal and violates Article 14.

Why it matters here. Aristotle's proportion supplies a formal test that a bad classification can satisfy. Royappa supplies the substantive one, which is the same move from formal to substantive justice described in [What Justice Is].

Equity is in the Indian codes. Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, preserving the inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice, is epieikeia in statutory form.

A worked example

Two questions about the same profession.

How should medical seats be allocated? Distributive justice. The criterion is contested: examination marks, need of the region, historic disadvantage. Aristotle's answer is according to merit, and the disputed question is what merit consists in for this good, which is exactly the Indian reservation debate.

A doctor negligently injures a patient. What is owed? Corrective justice. The court does not ask whether the doctor deserves his practice or whether the patient deserves compensation in general. It measures the loss and restores it.

Why the distinction matters. A judge who imported distributive reasoning into the second question, reducing damages because the patient was wealthy, would be applying the wrong kind of justice, and every developed legal system forbids it.

Quick revision

1. Plato, Republic: justice is each part of the city and of the soul doing its own work. Three classes, three parts of the soul.
2. Thrasymachus's answer, that justice is the interest of the stronger, is the ancestor of the equivalence theories in Module IV.
3. Plato's contribution is justice as a structural condition; the objection is that the structure is fixed and anti-democratic, and the parallel with varnashrama dharma includes the objection.
4. Aristotle: universal justice as complete virtue towards others; particular justice as fairness in distribution and exchange.
5. Distributive justice, by geometric proportion, according to merit; equals treated equally and unequals unequally.
6. Corrective justice, by arithmetic proportion, disregarding the parties' standing.
7. Epieikeia, equity, as the correction of law where its generality fails; section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is its statutory form.
8. Article 14's classification test is Aristotle's formula; Royappa adds the substantive test.

Test yourself

1. State Plato's account of justice and the objection to it. That justice is each part of a whole performing the function proper to it: in the city, the rulers ruling, the guardians defending and the producers producing, none meddling in another's work; and in the individual, reason ruling, spirit supporting and appetite governed. The objection is that the class structure is fixed and anti-democratic, so that each doing his own work can mean everybody remaining in an allotted place, which is the same objection made to differentiation by birth in varnashrama dharma.

2. Distinguish distributive from corrective justice by method as well as by subject. Distributive justice allocates honours, offices and goods by geometric proportion, according to merit, so that equals are treated equally and unequals unequally in proportion to a relevant difference; it attends to who the parties are. Corrective justice restores a balance disturbed by a wrong by arithmetic proportion, measuring what was taken and what must be restored; it deliberately disregards the parties' standing.

3. What is epieikeia and what is its modern trace in Indian law? Aristotle's equity: law speaks generally, and cases arise which the general statement does not fit, so equity corrects the law where it is defective by reason of its generality. It is a rectification of law and not a departure from it. Its statutory trace in India is section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, preserving the inherent power of the court to make such orders as are necessary for the ends of justice.

4. Show how Aristotle's formula and its insufficiency both appear in Indian constitutional law. The classification test under Article 14, that a law may differentiate on an intelligible differentia bearing a rational nexus to its object, is Aristotle's proposition that unequals may be treated unequally in proportion to a relevant difference. Its insufficiency is that a bad classification can satisfy it, and Royappa supplied the substantive answer: equality is antithetic to arbitrariness, so an arbitrary measure violates Article 14 however consistently applied.