The Governor

Article 163 and the extent of discretion

Facts. Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, decided 13 July 2016 by five judges. During a political crisis the Governor advanced the session of the Legislative Assembly by his own order, and fixed its agenda to include a resolution for the removal of the Speaker, acting without the advice of the Council of Ministers and against the advice of the Chief Minister.

Held. Under article 163(1) the Governor is bound by the advice of his Council of Ministers. There are only three exceptions, and they are introduced by the words "except in so far as": where he may act in his discretion as conferred by the Constitution; where he may act in his discretion as conferred under the Constitution; and where he may act in his individual judgment in instances specified by the Constitution. A further narrow category has evolved by constitutional necessity in extraordinary situations, such as those arising under article 356, or in choosing a person to lead the Assembly as Chief Minister. Those limits do not prevent the Assembly framing rules under article 208 or the Governor framing rules of business under article 166.

Why it matters. It is the modern statement that discretion is the exception and advice the rule, and that the exceptions are textual and closed rather than a general reserve of power. Learn the three limbs in the Court's own words.

The functions in which discretion is admitted

Gathered from the text and the case law, and worth listing in an answer:

• Reserving a Bill for the consideration of the President under article 200, on which see below, because the position has just changed.
• Recommending a Proclamation under article 356.
• Appointing a Chief Minister where no party has a clear majority, or where the incumbent has lost it.
• Dismissing a Council of Ministers that has lost the confidence of the House and will not resign.
• Dissolving the Assembly where the Council of Ministers has lost its majority.
• Seeking information from the Chief Minister under article 167.
• The special responsibilities conferred by article 371 on the Governors of certain States, dealt with in [Asymmetric Federalism: Articles 371 to 371-J].

Article 200: what the Governor may do with a Bill

The article gives three courses and one procedure.

Assent. The Bill becomes an Act.

Withhold assent. The Bill does not become an Act.

Reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President. Article 201 then applies: the President may assent or withhold assent, and may direct the Governor to return the Bill to the House, which must reconsider it within six months, after which it is presented to the President again, who is not obliged to assent.

The first proviso. Where the Governor withholds assent to a Bill that is not a Money Bill, he may, as soon as possible after presentation, return it with a message requesting the House to reconsider it or any specified provisions, and to consider the desirability of introducing recommended amendments. If the House passes it again, with or without amendment, and it is presented again, the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom.

The second proviso. The Governor shall not assent to, but shall reserve for the President, a Bill which in his opinion would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position that Court is designed to fill. This is the one case of compulsory reservation.

The gap in the article is obvious and it is what the litigation is about: no time limit is stated anywhere. A Governor who simply does nothing is not, on the face of the text, doing anything the article forbids.

The two decisions, and which one governs

This is the part that has changed, and an answer must have both and in the right order.

Facts. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, 2025 INSC 481, decided 8 April 2025. Ten Bills passed by the Tamil Nadu Assembly were pending with the Governor for long periods. After the Court's decision in the Punjab Governor's case, he reserved all ten for the President, including Bills already returned once and repassed.

Held. Article 200 gives three options; the first proviso is attached to withholding assent and is not a fourth course; neither a pocket veto nor an absolute veto exists, because "shall declare" leaves no room for inaction and "as soon as possible" imports urgency. As a general rule the Governor may not reserve a Bill for the President in the second round after it has been returned and repassed, unless the repassed Bill is materially different. The reservation of the ten Bills was illegal and was set aside. The Court held that it could prescribe timelines and laid down maxima of one month and three months for the various situations, and it declared the ten Bills deemed to have been assented to on the date they were presented after reconsideration.

Why it matters. It was the furthest a court had gone in controlling the office, and it is the decision that provoked the Reference.

Facts. In re Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President, advisory opinion under article 143 pronounced on 20 November 2025 by five judges, Gavai C.J. with Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, Narasimha and Chandurkar JJ. The President referred fourteen questions about articles 200 and 201 and about whether a court may fix time limits.

Held. Summarised by the Court itself at paragraph 165. The Governor has the three options and the first proviso restricts rather than adds to them, the third option being unavailable for a Money Bill. The Governor enjoys discretion in choosing among the three and is not bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers when exercising the article 200 function. The discharge of that function is not justiciable and there can be no merits review; but where inaction is prolonged, unexplained and indefinite, the Court may issue a limited mandamus to act within a reasonable time, without commenting on the merits. Article 361 bars proceedings against the Governor personally, but the constitutional office remains subject to the Court's jurisdiction. It is not appropriate for the Court to prescribe timelines under article 200, and the same applies to the President under article 201, whose assent is likewise not justiciable. Neither decision is justiciable before the Bill becomes law. And article 142 does not permit the concept of deemed assent.

Why it matters. This is the current law. It leaves standing the proposition that the Governor cannot sit on a Bill for ever, and it removes the two remedies the April judgment had supplied. The result is a duty with a much weaker sanction: a court may order the Governor to decide, and may not tell him what to decide, may not fix how long he has, and may not deem the Bill assented to.

How to write this in an answer. State the position under article 200; state the April 2025 decision; then state that the Presidential Reference of 20 November 2025 held that timelines may not be judicially prescribed and that there is no deemed assent, and that discretion under article 200 is not controlled by ministerial advice. Do not present the April 2025 timelines as the law. An answer that gives only the earlier case is out of date by a year.

What is left of the control

Three things survive and should be stated as the residue.

Inaction is not a lawful option. Article 200 says "shall declare", and the Court has not resiled from that.

A limited mandamus is available where inaction is prolonged, unexplained and indefinite. It compels a decision and says nothing about which decision.

The office, though not the person, is subject to the Court's jurisdiction. Article 361's immunity is personal.

What has gone is the timetable and the self-executing remedy. Whether that leaves enough is the argument, and both sides of it are respectable. Against the Reference: a duty to act with no deadline and no consequence is the pocket veto returning by another name. For it: fixing a period the Constitution does not fix is amendment by judgment, and the Court said so.

The reform proposals

The recurring recommendations, all of which are still recommendations:

Sarkaria (1988). The Governor should be an eminent person from outside the State, not belonging to the party in power at the Centre, appointed after consultation with the Chief Minister, and should not be removed before the end of the term except for compelling reasons.

Punchhi (2010). The doctrine of pleasure should be qualified so that removal requires a procedure and reasons; the five-year tenure should be protected; and the Governor's discretion in appointing a Chief Minister should follow a stated order of preference.

Neither has been implemented. This is the point at which the chapter connects to MU's phrase about trust and faith: the office was designed on the assumption that the Union would appoint people who would behave as constitutional heads, and the Constitution supplied almost no rule for the case where that assumption fails.

A worked example

The Legislative Assembly of State A passes a Bill and presents it to the Governor in January. The Governor does nothing for fourteen months. In March of the following year, the State moves the Supreme Court seeking a direction that the Governor decide, a declaration that the Bill is deemed assented to, and a timetable for the future.

Is inaction lawful? No. Article 200 says the Governor "shall declare" one of three things, and the Court has held that this leaves no room for inaction and that neither a pocket veto nor an absolute veto exists.

Is the Bill deemed assented to? No, and this is where the law changed. The April 2025 decision did deem ten Bills assented. The Presidential Reference of 20 November 2025 held that article 142 does not permit the concept of deemed assent. So that relief is unavailable.

Will the Court fix a timetable? No. The Reference held that in the absence of constitutionally prescribed time limits it is not appropriate for the Court to prescribe timelines under article 200, and that the same applies to the President under article 201.

What relief IS available? Where the inaction is prolonged, unexplained and indefinite, the Court may issue a LIMITED MANDAMUS requiring the Governor to discharge his function under article 200 within a reasonable time, without any observation on the merits of the decision he then makes. Fourteen months, unexplained, is capable of meeting that description.

Can the Court review which of the three options he chooses? No. The Reference held the function is not justiciable and there can be no merits review, and that the Governor enjoys discretion in choosing among the three and is not bound by ministerial advice when exercising it.

Answer. A direction to decide, and nothing more.

Quick revision

• Appointed by the Union, removable at pleasure, bound by the advice of a State Council of Ministers. That is the structural problem.
• Nabam Rebia: advice is the rule, discretion the exception, and there are exactly three textual exceptions plus a narrow category of constitutional necessity.
• Article 200: assent, withhold, or reserve; the first proviso requires return "as soon as possible" and forbids withholding after repassage; the second proviso compels reservation where a Bill would endanger the High Court.
• April 2025: no pocket or absolute veto, timelines of one and three months, ten Bills deemed assented.
• 20 November 2025, and this governs: discretion under article 200 is the Governor's and is not controlled by ministerial advice; the function is not justiciable on the merits; no judicially prescribed timelines; no deemed assent; but a limited mandamus lies against prolonged, unexplained and indefinite inaction.
• Sarkaria and Punchhi both proposed protecting the office from the Centre. Neither was implemented.

Test yourself

1. Identify the four structural facts about the office of Governor that create the constitutional problem.

2. State the three exceptions to the rule in article 163(1), in the words used in Nabam Rebia.

3. Set out the three courses open under article 200 and explain what the first and second provisos each do.

4. What did the April 2025 decision hold, and which parts of it no longer stand after 20 November 2025?

5. What survives of judicial control over a Governor who does nothing, and is it enough? Argue both sides.