Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
Copyrights Law and other related rights
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LLM · Group 3 Law of Intellectual Property and Information Technology
2025-26 - Set 2 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
Copyrights Law and other related rights
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LLM · Group 3 Law of Intellectual Property and Information Technology
2025-26 - Set 2 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
First published on munotes.in on 12 September 2026.
Published by munotes.in, Mumbai.
Model answers written and edited by the munotes.in editorial desk.
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The University does not publish an official answer key for this paper. The answers in this volume are model answers, written to show how a full-mark answer is built. They are a study aid, not an authority on what an examiner marked.
The question paper reproduced here is the paper as set by the University of Mumbai at the 2025-26 - Set 2 examination.
The law in these answers is stated as at September 2026, and five things date every textbook on this subject. THE COPYRIGHT BOARD NO LONGER EXISTS: it was merged into the Intellectual Property Appellate Board by the Finance Act, 2017 with effect from 26 May 2017, and that Board was abolished by the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, so the licensing and rate fixing jurisdiction under sections 31 to 32B, assignment disputes under section 19A, tariff appeals under section 33A, rectification under section 50 and appeals under section 72 now lie to the Commercial Court. Section 25 was OMITTED by the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012 with effect from 21 June 2012, and the words other than a photograph were removed from section 22, so a photograph now takes the author's life plus sixty years and not sixty years from publication. India ACCEDED to the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty on 25 September 2018, and remains outside the Rome and Brussels Conventions. The Bombay High Court held on 23 April 2019 in Tips Industries Limited v. Wynk Music Limited that the statutory broadcasting licence in section 31D does not reach internet streaming, and the contrary departmental memorandum of 2016 was withdrawn on 21 August 2024. And the Act has NOT been amended since 2012: the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade published a working paper on generative artificial intelligence and copyright on 8 December 2025, and the Delhi High Court refused an interim injunction in ANI Media Private Limited v. OpenAI on 24 July 2026.
The questions below are the paper as the University of Mumbai set it at the 2025-26 - Set 2 examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2025-26 - Set 2 examination, reproduced as the University of Mumbai set them, in the order it set them. Nothing has been reworded, added or left out. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 3 hours · Total marks 100 · 7 questions answered
Instructions printed on the paper
How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
Answer
For full marks, cover: two limbs, and the second is where the marks are. Define infringement from SECTION 51 itself, distinguishing primary from secondary infringement, because a candidate who only says "copying without permission" has not used the Act. Then take substantial similarity properly: it exists because copyright protects expression and not idea, so the court must decide how much expression has been taken. Work R.G. Anand in full, because it is the governing Indian authority and its seven propositions are the answer. Add the film cases, the modern software approach, and finish on what artificial intelligence has done to the test, using the July 2026 ruling.
Section 51 of the Copyright Act, 1957 defines infringement and divides it in two.
PRIMARY infringement is in section 51(a)(i): copyright is infringed when any person, without a licence granted by the owner or the Registrar of Copyrights or in contravention of the conditions of a licence, does anything the exclusive right to do which is by the Act conferred upon the owner of the copyright. The exclusive rights are in section 14, so section 51(a)(i) has no content of its own; it borrows the list of acts in section 14 and makes doing any of them without authority an infringement.
SECONDARY infringement is the rest. Section 51(a)(ii) catches the person who permits for profit any place to be used for the communication of the work to the public where such communication constitutes an infringement, unless he was not aware and had no reasonable ground for believing that it would be an infringement. Section 51(b) catches dealings in INFRINGING COPIES, defined in section 2(m): making for sale or hire, selling or letting for hire, distributing either for trade or to an extent that prejudicially affects the owner, exhibiting in public by way of trade, or importing into India. The proviso to section 51(b)(iv) excepts importation of one copy for the private and domestic use of the importer.
Two features follow. Primary infringement is a STRICT LIABILITY wrong: intention, motive and knowledge are irrelevant to the civil claim, though they matter to remedies and to the offence under section 63. Secondary infringement, by contrast, is built on knowledge, which is why section 51(a)(ii) has its own defence of absence of reasonable ground for belief.
Copyright does not protect ideas. It protects the expression in which an idea is clothed. Article 9(2) of the TRIPS Agreement states the rule for the trading system: copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such. Section 13 of the Indian Act says copyright subsists in WORKS, and section 14 defines the rights by reference to the work.
The consequence is that a defendant who takes the idea takes nothing actionable, and a defendant who reproduces the work verbatim plainly infringes. Every real case is between the two, and the question the court must answer is whether what was taken is a SUBSTANTIAL PART of the expression. Substantiality is assessed qualitatively rather than by counting: a short but central passage can be substantial where a long but banal one is not.
R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118, is the case the examiner wants and it must be worked, not named.
The facts. The appellant was an architect and playwright who wrote and produced a play called Hum Hindustani in 1953, on the theme of provincialism, in which a Punjabi boy and a Madrasi girl wish to marry and their parents object on provincial grounds. In 1954 the second respondent, a film producer, met the appellant, heard the play narrated and said nothing about making a film of it. In 1956 the respondents produced and released a film called New Delhi. The appellant saw it, considered it a copy of his play, and sued for a permanent injunction and damages.
The holding. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Fazal Ali J. laid down seven propositions, and the answer should give them:
On the facts the Court held that provincialism was the idea, that the film dealt with provincialism AND with the evil of dowry, that the treatment, characters and incidents differed materially, and that a viewer would not get the unmistakable impression that the film was a copy of the play.
The seventh proposition produced a long dispute about what it means to "make a copy of a film". The Bombay High Court in Star India Pvt Ltd v. Leo Burnett (India) Pvt Ltd, 2003 (27) PTC 81 (Bom), took the narrow view that the copyright in a cinematograph film under section 14(d) protects against physical copying of the film itself, so a second film shot independently could not infringe however similar.
The Delhi High Court departed from that in MRF Limited v. Metro Tyres Limited, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8973, judgment of 1 May 2019, on a complaint that the defendant's advertisement copied the plaintiff's. The Court held that a cinematograph film must itself be ORIGINAL to attract copyright under section 13(3)(a), that the expression "to make a copy of the film" in section 14(d)(i) is not confined to making a physical copy, and that the test of SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY applies to films as it does to other works, so a film may infringe another film if it is substantially, fundamentally, essentially and materially similar. That is now the better view and the one to state.
Where the work is functional, the difficulty is that expression and idea merge. The technique developed in the United States in Computer Associates International Inc v. Altai Inc, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992), and used in India in argument, is ABSTRACTION, FILTRATION AND COMPARISON: break the program into levels of abstraction, filter out at each level what is dictated by efficiency, by external factors or taken from the public domain, and compare only the protectable core that remains.
The Indian counterpart on originality is Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1. The appellants published copy-edited law reports and complained that the respondents had copied them onto CD-ROMs. The Supreme Court rejected the English "sweat of the brow" standard and the American requirement of novelty alike, and held that originality requires a MINIMAL DEGREE OF CREATIVITY, being skill and judgment rather than mere labour. Applying it, no copyright subsisted in the raw text of a judgment, which is a government work in the public domain, but copyright did subsist in the appellants' own additions: paragraph numbering, the segregation of opinions, and editorial notes indicating which judges concurred. Substantial similarity is therefore measured against the protectable additions, not against the whole printed page.
A finding of substantial similarity does not end the case, because section 52 removes a long list of acts from infringement altogether. The most important are section 52(1)(a), fair dealing with any work other than a computer programme for private or personal use including research, criticism or review, and the reporting of current events; section 52(1)(i), reproduction by a teacher or pupil in the course of instruction; and section 52(1)(zb), reproduction in an accessible format for persons with disability.
The reach of section 52(1)(i) was settled by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services, judgment of 9 December 2016. Three publishers sued a photocopy shop and Delhi University over course packs of extracts compiled for students. The Court held that the preparation of course packs falls within section 52(1)(i) and requires no licence, because reproduction by a teacher in the course of instruction is not confined to the physical classroom, and it remitted for trial only the factual question whether the particular inclusions were necessary for the purpose of instruction.
| Stage | Question | Authority |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Does copyright subsist, and is the part taken original? | Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 |
| 2 | Is what was taken idea or expression? | R.G. Anand, proposition 1 |
| 3 | Is the taking substantial, qualitatively? | R.G. Anand, propositions 2 and 3 |
| 4 | Do the dissimilarities negative copying? | R.G. Anand, proposition 5 |
| 5 | Is the act nevertheless within section 52? | Rameshwari Photocopy, 9 December 2016 |
This is the newest limb and it is what dates an answer.
ANI Media Private Limited v. OpenAI, Delhi High Court, order of 24 July 2026, is the first Indian judicial engagement with the question. The news agency alleged that OpenAI had scraped and stored its news content to train ChatGPT, and that ChatGPT reproduced its work in responses. Amit Bansal J. DISMISSED the application for an interim injunction.
Three holdings matter for substantial similarity. First, the Court accepted that storing copyright works for the purpose of training falls within the scope of copyright, so the activity is not outside the Act; it must be tested against the exceptions. Second, it held that the training here was FAIR DEALING under section 52(1)(a), being an internal research process, limited in its use, not a substitute for ANI's works, with no demonstrated harm to market share, and with a public interest in technological innovation weighing in the balance. Third, on the outputs, it applied the idea and expression distinction directly: copyright protects only the original expression and not the underlying FACTS, and since ANI's articles postdated the completion of training, the responses complained of were more likely generated by retrieval augmented generation than reproduced from memorised data.
The order is INTERIM. The merits go to trial, and an answer that presents it as settled law is overstating it. What it establishes for now is that the machine's ingestion of a work is tested under section 52 rather than treated as automatic infringement, and that an output which conveys the same facts in different words is not a substantial reproduction of expression.
Four honest criticisms. The R.G. Anand third proposition is an impression test administered by a judge, which makes outcomes hard to predict and gives little guidance to a party advising before litigation. Idea and expression cannot be separated cleanly in functional works, which is why software cases import a foreign filtration method the Act does not mention. Proof is demanding: proposition 6 requires clear and cogent evidence of piracy, which is difficult where access cannot be shown. And the test was designed for human copying at human scale; a model trained on billions of works reproduces nothing identifiable while depending on all of it, which is the problem the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade addressed in its Working Paper on Generative Artificial Intelligence and Copyright of 8 December 2025, proposing a licensing model rather than leaving the question to substantial similarity at all.
Conclusion. Copyright infringement under section 51 is of two kinds: doing without authority any act reserved to the owner by section 14, which is strict, and dealing in infringing copies or permitting a place to be used for infringing communication, which turns on knowledge. Because the Act protects expression and not idea, the operative question in almost every contested case is whether a SUBSTANTIAL part of the expression was taken, and the governing test is the seven propositions of R.G. Anand, of which the third, the unmistakable impression of a copy formed by the reader, spectator or viewer, is the one the courts apply. The test now reaches films on the same footing as other works after MRF v. Metro Tyres in 2019, and it is measured against the protectable additions alone after Eastern Book Company. Even substantial similarity yields to section 52, as the course pack litigation showed in December 2016. And since 24 July 2026 the same two questions, is this expression and is it fairly dealt with, are being asked of a machine.
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