BLS LLB 5 Years Sem 9 CPC 2021-22 Question Paper with Solutions

The answer is (a), it may be rejected.

Order VII Rule 11(a) provides that the plaint shall be rejected where it does not disclose a cause of action. The word in the rule is "shall": once the court is satisfied that the plaint, read as it stands, discloses no cause of action, rejection follows.

The answer is (d), at or before settlement of Issues.

Section 21(1) provides that no objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional court unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.

The scan of this paper is missing a page, and options (c) and (d) of this question are on it. Only options (a) and (b) survive, and both are wrong, so the answer has to be given as law rather than as a letter.

The correct answer is that issues arise out of the plaint and the written statement together, that is, out of the material propositions of fact or law affirmed by one party and denied by the other.

Order XIV Rule 1(1): issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by the one party and denied by the other.

Rule 1(2): material propositions are those propositions of law or fact which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue, or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence.

Rule 1(3): each material proposition affirmed by one party and denied by the other shall form the subject of a distinct issue.

The answer is (d), to suits as well as execution proceedings.

Explanation VII to section 11, inserted by the Amendment Act of 1976, provides that the provisions of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree, and that references in this section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references, respectively, to a proceeding for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree.

The answer is (c), when it appears that there is not sufficient ground for a review.

Order XLVII Rule 4(1) provides that where it appears to the court that there is not sufficient ground for a review, it shall reject the application.

The answer is (a), a continuation of original proceedings.

An appeal is a rehearing of the suit by a superior court, and the settled principle is that an appeal is a continuation of the suit. Section 107(2) puts it in statutory form: the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein.

The answer is (c), 90 days.

Section 148A(5) provides that where a caveat has been lodged under sub-section (1), such caveat shall not remain in force after the expiry of ninety days from the date on which it was lodged, unless the application referred to in sub-section (1) has been made before the expiry of the said period.

The answer is (b), a Second Appeal may lie from an appellate decree passed ex parte.

Section 100(2) provides in terms that an appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte.

The answer is (d), Revision.

Section 115(1) provides that the High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate court appears (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit.

The three clauses are, in the words of the question, excess of jurisdiction, failure of jurisdiction, and abuse or irregular exercise of jurisdiction. That mapping is exact, and it is why the answer is revision.

The answer is (b), for 20 years.

Section 25(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that where the access and use of light or air to and for any building have been peaceably enjoyed therewith as an easement, and as of right, without interruption, and for twenty years, and where any way or watercourse, or the use of any water, or any other easement, whether affirmative or negative, has been peaceably and openly enjoyed by any person claiming title thereto as an easement and as of right without interruption and for twenty years, the right to such access and use of light or air, way, watercourse, use of water, or other easement shall be absolute and indefeasible.

Municipal Authorities ignored complaint made by Mr. B since Mrs.

A is local Councilor of Bandra (West), Mumbai.

For full marks, cover: two different forums for two different opponents, and say why; section 16 for the civil suit and the Bombay City Civil Court's pecuniary limit; Article 226 against the Corporation with the reason that its inaction is a failure of statutory duty; the reliefs against each; and the notice under section 527 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888.

(a) Which court, and why

Section 15 then requires the suit to be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it, that is, the court whose pecuniary jurisdiction covers the value of the suit. In Greater Mumbai that court is the Bombay City Civil Court, whose pecuniary jurisdiction was raised from one crore rupees to ten crore rupees with effect from 28 January 2024 by the Bombay City Civil Court (Amendment) Act, 2023; above that limit the suit lies to the Bombay High Court on its Original Side. Bandra (West) falls within the suburban jurisdiction of the City Civil Court.

Against the Municipal Authorities, a writ petition to the High Court.

The complaint against the Corporation is not that it has infringed a private right but that it has failed to perform a public duty: it has been told of a construction said to be illegal and has done nothing, and the reason given is that the builder's wife is a Councillor. That is a case of a public authority failing to exercise a statutory power for extraneous reasons, and the remedy for it is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to the Bombay High Court, praying for a writ of mandamus directing the Corporation to consider and decide the complaint according to law.

At the trial the plaintiff shall not be permitted to go into evidence of any cause of action except such as is set forth in the notice. Note that section 80 of the Code does not apply, because the Corporation is a statutory body and not "the Government"; its own statute supplies the notice provision.

(b) The reliefs

Against Mr. A, in the civil suit:

A declaration that Mr. B is entitled to an easement of light and air to the windows and openings of his building, acquired by grant or by prescription under section 15 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 and section 25 of the Limitation Act, 1963, on twenty years of peaceable and uninterrupted enjoyment as of right, that period ending within two years before the suit.

A permanent prohibitory injunction under section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 restraining Mr. A, his agents and servants from raising the construction any higher, or in any manner obstructing the access of light and air to Mr. B's building.

A direction to inspect the construction and to act under the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888: to require the production of the sanctioned plans, and, if the work is unauthorised or is in breach of the sanctioned plan, to issue a stop-work notice and to take action for its removal under the Corporation's building provisions.

An interim direction restraining further construction pending the hearing.

A direction that the complaint be dealt with by an officer other than the one who ignored it, if bias is alleged and made out.

Costs.

For full marks, cover: the four essentials named as a list, then two of them worked out with the provisions; and the machinery by which a suit is instituted under section 26 and Order IV.

The four essentials of a suit are:

1. Parties, that is, a plaintiff and a defendant;
2. A cause of action;
3. A subject-matter; and
4. A relief claimed.

If any one of them is absent there is no suit that a court can try: a proceeding without parties is not adversarial, a proceeding without a cause of action discloses nothing to try, a proceeding without a subject-matter is academic, and a proceeding without a relief asks the court for nothing.

Discussed at length: (1) Parties, and (2) Cause of action.

I. Parties

Rule 10(2), addition and striking out of parties. The court may at any stage, either on application or of its own motion, order that the name of any party improperly joined be struck out, and that any person whose presence is necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit be added.

Rule 8, representative suits. Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit, one or more of them may, with the permission of the court, sue or be sued, or defend, on behalf of or for the benefit of all, the court giving notice to all persons so interested.

Rule 13 requires an objection on the ground of misjoinder or non-joinder to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity, and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before settlement, or it is deemed waived.

The distinction between a necessary and a proper party is the practical heart of this essential:

A cause of action is the bundle of essential facts which the plaintiff must prove in order to succeed, that is, every fact which, if traversed, he would have to establish in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. The classic formulation is Brett LJ's in Cooke v. Gill (1873), adopted in India ever since.

Two things it is not: it does not include the evidence by which those facts are proved, and it does not include facts pleaded merely to anticipate a defence.

Order VII Rule 1(e) requires the plaint to state the facts constituting the cause of action and when it arose. The requirement of the date is deliberate, because four different consequences turn on it.

It fixes the place of suing. Section 20(c) allows a suit to be instituted where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.

It decides whether the plaint survives Order VII Rule 11. By clause (a) the plaint shall be rejected where it does not disclose a cause of action, and on such an application the court reads the plaint alone, assuming its averments to be true.

How a suit is instituted. Section 26(1): every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed; section 26(2) requires the facts to be proved by affidavit. Order IV Rule 1 requires the plaint to be presented in duplicate and to comply with Orders VI and VII, and Rule 2 requires particulars of every suit to be entered in a register of civil suits.

Conclusion. A suit needs four things and the absence of any one of them leaves nothing a court can try: parties opposed in interest, a cause of action, a subject-matter and a relief claimed. Of the four, the cause of action does the most work, because it fixes the place of suing under section 20, decides whether the plaint survives Order VII Rule 11, defines the unit for Order II Rule 2, and starts the limitation clock, which is why Order VII Rule 1(e) demands the date as well as the facts.

1. There must be a right to some relief against him in respect of the matter involved in the proceeding; and
2. It must not be possible to pass an effective decree in his absence.

II. The comparison

Effect of non-joinder of a proper party. None that is fatal. It is an irregularity. The court may add him under Order I Rule 10(2), at any stage, on application or of its own motion, and the suit proceeds. If he is never added, the decree binds the parties before the court and does not bind him.

Effect of non-joinder of a necessary party. The suit is liable to be dismissed, because no effective decree can be passed. In practice a court will not dismiss without first giving the plaintiff an opportunity to implead him under Rule 10(2), and will dismiss only if the plaintiff refuses, or if by then the claim against the necessary party has become barred by limitation, which is the situation in which the objection is usually fatal. Note section 21 of the Limitation Act: where a new defendant is added, the suit is deemed, as regards him, to have been instituted on the date he was made a party, so limitation runs against the impleadment and not against the original plaint.

Effect of misjoinder of parties. Also an irregularity. The court may strike out the name of a party improperly joined under Order I Rule 10(2). Misjoinder becomes serious only when it is combined with a misjoinder of causes of action, producing what is called multifariousness, where the court may require the plaintiff to elect and to confine the suit.

Conclusion. A necessary party is one without whom no effective decree can be passed and against whom relief is claimed; a proper party is one whose presence merely lets the court settle everything completely. That difference decides the consequence. Order I Rule 9 says no suit shall be defeated for misjoinder or non-joinder, and its 1976 proviso takes the non-joinder of a necessary party out of that protection, so that alone is fatal. Everything else is curable under Rule 10(2), and by Rule 13 an objection not taken at or before the settlement of issues is waived.

"Actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received". The measure is not what the wrongdoer chose to earn but what the property was capable of yielding to a person of ordinary diligence. A trespasser who leaves land fallow is not thereby excused; he is charged with what a diligent occupier would have got from it.

"Together with interest on such profits". Interest is part of the mesne profits themselves, not something added afterwards, and it runs on each year's profits from the date they accrued.

"But shall not include profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession". A wrongdoer who has improved the property, by building on it, irrigating it or bringing it into better cultivation, is not charged with the additional yield attributable to his own improvement. To charge him would be to make the true owner richer at his expense.

II. Who is liable, and to whom

The person in wrongful possession is liable, and he is liable to the person entitled to possession. Where there are several trespassers, the liability is joint and several, and the decree-holder may recover the whole from any of them, leaving them to contribution among themselves.

So the mechanism is a preliminary decree for possession plus a direction for an inquiry, followed by a final decree. The decree for possession does not have to wait for the accounts.

Rule 12A applies the same rule to a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property.

The three-year cap in clause (c)(iii) is the most examinable single fact in the rule: mesne profits after the decree run only up to three years from the date of the decree, or until possession is delivered or relinquished, whichever is earlier. Beyond that the decree-holder must take out execution rather than let the profits accumulate.

IV. Arriving at the figure

The court, or the commissioner to whom the inquiry is referred, works from the annual yield of the property, and the usual materials are:

the rent actually realised by the person in possession, proved by his receipts, accounts and returns;

the prevailing rent of comparable premises in the same locality, proved by leases, agreements and, where available, the rateable value in the municipal assessment;

A commission is the usual route where the inquiry is at all complex. Under section 75(b) and Order XXVI Rule 9 the court may issue a commission for local investigation expressly for ascertaining the amount of any mesne profits or damages or annual net profits, and by Rule 10(2) the commissioner's report and the evidence he takes are evidence in the suit and form part of the record. Where accounts have to be gone into, a commission to examine or adjust accounts lies under section 75(c) and Rules 11 and 12.

V. Limitation

Article 109 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 governs a suit for mesne profits: the period is three years, running from when the profits are received. So a plaintiff who waits recovers only the last three years' profits before suit, and this is why mesne profits are claimed in the possession suit itself rather than separately.

For full marks, cover: the two definitions, a comparison table, the different consequences, misjoinder of causes of action and multifariousness, and the four provisions: Order I Rules 9, 10(2) and 13, and section 99.

I. The two definitions

Non-joinder is the failure to join as a party to the suit a person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or as defendant.

Misjoinder is the joining as a party of a person who ought not to have been joined, that is, a person against whom, or by whom, no relief arises out of the same act or transaction and about whom no common question arises.

II. The comparison

Order I Rule 9: no suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, and the court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. The proviso, added by the Amendment Act of 1976: nothing in this rule shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party.

Read the rule and the proviso together and the whole difference emerges: misjoinder is never fatal; non-joinder is fatal only where the party omitted is a necessary party.

IV. Misjoinder of causes of action, and multifariousness

The word "misjoinder" is used in a second sense, and a complete answer distinguishes it.

Order II Rule 3 allows a plaintiff to unite in the same suit several causes of action against the same defendant, or against the same defendants jointly. Order II Rule 6 allows the court, where it appears that the causes of action cannot be conveniently tried together, to order separate trials.

Waiver. Both objections are deemed waived under Order I Rule 13 if not taken at the earliest possible opportunity and, where issues are settled, at or before settlement. The reason is that both are objections of form: a party who takes his chance on the merits and raises the point only when he is losing has no complaint.

Conclusion. Non-joinder is leaving out someone who should have been joined; misjoinder is bringing in someone who should not. Order I Rule 9 forgives both, and its proviso forgives all but one: the non-joinder of a necessary party, which is fatal because no effective decree can be passed without him. Everything else is cured under Rule 10(2) by adding or striking out a name, and by Rule 13 an objection not taken at or before the settlement of issues is deemed waived. Section 99 carries the same policy into the appellate stage.

Section 139, oath on affidavit by whom to be administered. In the case of any affidavit under the Code, (a) any court or magistrate, (aa) any notary appointed under the Notaries Act, 1952, or (b) any officer or other person whom a High Court may appoint in this behalf, or (c) any officer appointed by any other court which the State Government has generally or specially empowered in this behalf, may administer the oath to the deponent.

Order XIX, affidavits.

Rule 1, power to order any point to be proved by affidavit. Any court may at any time for sufficient reason order that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavit, or that the affidavit of any witness may be read at the hearing, on such conditions as the court thinks reasonable; but the proviso is important: where it appears to the court that either party bona fide desires the production of a witness for cross-examination, and that such witness can be produced, an order shall not be made authorising the evidence of such witness to be given by affidavit.

Order VI Rule 15(4): the person verifying a pleading shall also furnish an affidavit in support of his pleadings.

Order XXXII Rule 3(4): an application for the appointment of a guardian for the suit shall be supported by an affidavit verifying the minority.

Order XXXIII Rule 2: the application to sue as an indigent person shall be signed and verified in the manner prescribed for the signing and verification of pleadings, with a schedule of property.

Order XXXVIII Rules 1 and 5: arrest and attachment before judgment are ordered where the court is satisfied by affidavit or otherwise.

Order XXXIX Rules 1, 2 and 3: an injunction is granted where the matter is proved by affidavit or otherwise, and an ex parte injunction requires the applicant to file an affidavit of delivery of the papers.

Order XXI Rule 46A: a garnishee notice issues on an application made on affidavit.

Order XLI Rule 3A: an appeal presented after limitation must be accompanied by an application supported by affidavit.

It supports the pleadings. Since 2002, both the plaint (section 26(2)) and the verification of any pleading (Order VI Rule 15(4)) must be supported by affidavit, so that a party who pleads a fact stakes his oath on it from the outset.

It saves the time of witnesses and of the court. Under Order XIX Rule 1 a fact may be ordered to be proved by affidavit, and under Order XVIII Rule 4(1), as substituted in 2002, the examination-in-chief of a witness shall be on affidavit, with copies supplied to the opposite party. That single change has removed the largest part of the time formerly spent on recording chief examination.

It is checked by cross-examination. The Code does not let an affidavit stand unchallenged: by Order XIX Rule 2 the court may order the deponent's attendance for cross-examination, and by the proviso to Rule 1 it will not allow evidence by affidavit where a party bona fide wants the witness produced and he can be produced.

IV. The limit: an affidavit is not "evidence" as such

For full marks, cover: the time limits in Order VIII Rule 1 and SCG Contracts; the rules of specific denial in Rules 3, 4 and 5; new facts and grounds of defence under Rule 2; documents under Rule 1A; set-off and counterclaim; verification and the affidavit; and the consequence of failing to file, Rule 10.

Order VIII governs the written statement, and the precautions are best set out in the order in which a drafter meets them.

I. Time. This is the first and the most unforgiving precaution.

Order VIII Rule 1: the defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence. The proviso: where he fails to do so, he shall be allowed to file it on such other day, as may be specified by the court, for reasons to be recorded in writing and on payment of such costs as the court deems fit, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons.

Rule 4, evasive denial. Where a defendant denies an allegation of fact, he must not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance. Thus if it is alleged that he received a certain sum of money, it shall not be sufficient to deny that he received that particular amount, but he must deny that he received that sum or any part thereof, or else set out how much he received. And if an allegation is made with diverse circumstances, it shall not be sufficient to deny it along with those circumstances.

Rule 5, specific denial. Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted, except as against a person under disability. The proviso preserves the court's discretion to require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. Sub-rule (2): where the defendant has not filed a pleading, it shall be lawful for the court to pronounce judgment on the basis of the facts contained in the plaint, except as against a person under disability, but the court may in its discretion require any such fact to be proved.

So the first precaution in drafting is arithmetical: go through the plaint paragraph by paragraph and deal with every single averment. An averment not dealt with is an averment admitted, and the case may be lost on the pleading before any evidence is led.

Rule 1A(1): where the defendant bases his defence upon a document, or relies on a document in his possession or power as evidence in support of his defence, he shall enter it in a list and produce it in court when the written statement is presented, and shall deliver it and a copy with the written statement.

Rule 1A(2): where a document is not in his possession or power, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is.

Rule 1A(3): a document which ought to be produced and is not so produced shall not, without the leave of the court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.

Rule 1A(4) saves three cases from that bar: a document produced for the cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses, one handed to a witness merely to refresh his memory, and one produced in reply to the plaintiff's case.

V. Set-off and counterclaim

The precaution here is to decide, before drafting, whether the cross-demand should be a set-off or a counterclaim. A set-off is a defence and falls with the suit; a counterclaim survives it. A set-off must be for an ascertained sum; a counterclaim need not. Court fee is payable on a counterclaim as on a plaint, and that must be budgeted for.

VI. Form and verification

Order VI Rule 14: every pleading shall be signed by the party and by his pleader.

Order VI Rule 15: every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by some other person acquainted with the facts, who shall specify, with reference to the numbered paragraphs, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what upon information received and believed to be true; the verification shall be signed and dated. Sub-rule (4), inserted in 2002, requires the person verifying to furnish an affidavit in support of his pleadings.

Order VI Rule 2: the written statement shall contain a statement in a concise form of the material facts, and not the evidence, divided into paragraphs, numbered consecutively, with dates, sums and numbers expressed in figures as well as in words.

Conclusion. A written statement is drafted against a clock and against a rule. The clock is thirty days from service, ninety at the outside, and in a commercial suit a mandatory hundred and twenty after which the right is forfeited. The rule is Order VIII Rule 5: every allegation not specifically denied is taken to be admitted, so the drafter must go through the plaint paragraph by paragraph. And every bar he wants, limitation, res judicata, Order II Rule 2, want of notice, must be pleaded under Rule 2 or it is lost.

The thirty-day cap was inserted by the Amendment Act of 1999 with effect from 1 July 2002. Before that, section 148 carried no outer limit and courts extended time freely; older textbooks and older judgments are misleading on this.

Conclusion. Section 148 lets a court enlarge a period it fixed or granted, and it may do so even after that period has expired, but since 2002 by not more than thirty days in total. It cannot touch a period fixed by statute, and it cannot be used to get round a provision the Code makes mandatory, which is why it will not save a commercial defendant past the hundred and twenty days for his written statement. Section 149 is its more generous companion: no cap at all, and its effect is retrospective, so making good the court fee validates the filing from the beginning.

(2) Notice by the caveator. Where a caveat has been lodged under sub-section (1), the person by whom the caveat has been lodged shall serve a notice of the caveat by registered post, acknowledgement due, on the person by whom the application has been or is expected to be made under sub-section (1). Since the Repealing and Amending Act, 2025, in force from 20 December 2025, the words are "speed post with registration and proof of delivery".

(3) Duty of the court. Where, after a caveat has been lodged under sub-section (1), any application is filed in any suit or proceeding, the Court shall serve a notice of the application on the caveator.

(4) Duty of the applicant. Where a notice of any caveat has been served on the applicant, he shall forthwith furnish the caveator, at the caveator's expense, with a copy of the application made by him and also with copies of any paper or document which has been, or may be, filed by him in support of the application.

(5) Life of the caveat. Where a caveat has been lodged under sub-section (1), such caveat shall not remain in force after the expiry of ninety days from the date on which it was lodged unless the application referred to in sub-section (1) has been made before the expiry of the said period.

For full marks, cover: the proposition and why it follows from section 3; four consequences that prove it; the two statutory exceptions, section 27 and section 25; and section 25(3) of the Contract Act with section 29(1) of the Limitation Act, which are the strongest proof of the rule.

I. The proposition

Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that, subject to sections 4 to 24, every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.

Read the words: the section directs the dismissal of the proceeding. It does not say that the debt is discharged, that the obligation is at an end, or that the title has passed. What the expiry of the period destroys is the remedy, that is, the ability to obtain the assistance of a court. The right itself survives.

The Limitation Act is therefore called a statute of repose, of peace and of limitation, and it is procedural in character.

This is the strongest proof of the whole proposition. If the right had been destroyed there would be nothing left to be consideration; the promise is enforceable precisely because the debt still exists. Section 29(1) of the Limitation Act expressly preserves the position: nothing in this Act shall affect section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

3. A time-barred claim may be used defensively. Limitation bars a suit, appeal or application; it does not bar a plea. A defendant may set up in defence a right that he could no longer enforce by suit, and an equitable set-off arising out of the same transaction has been allowed even where a suit upon it would be barred.

4. The rule is procedural, so the law in force on the date of the suit governs, subject to transitional provisions, and a change in the period does not revive a claim already barred.

III. The exceptions

There are two, and both are in the Act itself.

Exception 1: section 27, extinguishment of right to property.

At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.

Where the access and use of light or air to and for any building have been peaceably enjoyed therewith as an easement and as of right, without interruption, for twenty years, and where any way, watercourse, use of water or other easement has been peaceably and openly enjoyed by a person claiming title thereto as an easement and as of right without interruption for twenty years, the right shall be absolute and indefeasible. Where the property belongs to the Government, the period is thirty years.

Sub-section (2) requires each such period of twenty years to be one ending within two years next before the institution of the suit in which the claim is contested.

Here the Act does something even more remarkable than section 27: it creates a right where none existed, out of long enjoyment.

IV. A note on what is not an exception

Sections 18 and 19 are not exceptions. An acknowledgment in writing, or a part payment, made before the prescribed period expires, gives a fresh period; it does not revive a dead right, and it does not operate at all once the period has run. What operates after expiry is section 25(3) of the Contract Act, and that is a new contract, not a revival of the old remedy.