Analytical and Critical Legal Research
Chapter Ninety-Four
Syllabus topic 5, "Research Methods"
Pages 343 to 345 of 543
In one line
Analytical research takes a rule apart to see how it works; critical research judges it against a standard, and the difference between them is that the second must name the standard.
In the wording a student can write in an exam: analytical legal research examines a legal rule, concept or institution by breaking it into its elements, identifying the conditions it imposes, the assumptions it makes and its relation to other rules, in order to establish precisely what it does; critical legal research goes further and evaluates the rule against a stated external standard such as a constitutional value, justice, efficiency, coherence or the rule's own declared purpose, in order to say whether it succeeds.
Analytical research
What it does. Takes the rule apart.
Its operations, and a student can run them mechanically over any provision.
Break it into elements. What must be true for the rule to apply. Section 13(1) of the Legal Services Authorities Act has two: the person satisfies a criterion in section 12, and the Authority is satisfied of a prima facie case, chapter 570.
Identify who decides each element, on what material, and by what standard.
Identify what follows, that is, the consequence.
Identify the exceptions and provisos, which is where most litigation lives.
State what the rule assumes. This is the operation that produces the interesting findings. Chapter 690's example: the duty to inform assumes the magistrate has time, that the accused understands, that a lawyer can be assigned, and that somebody would know if it were not done.
And place the rule among its neighbours. What it overrides, what overrides it, and where it conflicts.
What it produces. An exact account of what the rule does, which is more than a statement of what it says.
Critical research
What it does. Judges the rule.
Its indispensable requirement. The standard must be named. Chapter 780: an evaluation whose criterion is unstated is a preference.
The standards available.
Constitutional value. Does the rule serve or defeat equality, liberty, or a directive principle. Article 39A is used this way throughout Module II.
A judicially stated standard. Anita Kushwaha's four facets of access to justice, chapter 530, are the best example in this book because they are specific enough to measure against.
The rule's own declared purpose. The strongest standard of all, because the rule cannot object to being judged by what it said it was for. Schedule II says the clinical papers are to be assessed by practical exercises; measuring against that is criticism the instrument itself licenses, chapter 390.
Efficiency. Does it achieve the result at proportionate cost.
Coherence. Is it consistent with the rest of the law.
Analytical and Critical Legal Research
And justice, which must be specified, because the word alone carries no content: justice as fairness of procedure, as equality of outcome, or as desert are three different standards.
The relation between them
Analysis comes first. You cannot judge a rule you have not taken apart, and most bad criticism is criticism of a rule the writer has misread.
Criticism without analysis is complaint. It objects to an impression of the rule.
Analysis without criticism is description. Complete, useful, and it stops.
And both are doctrinal in their material, chapter 840, which is why they can be done in a library.
What good criticism looks like
It states the standard first, before the judgment.
It applies the standard to the rule as analysed, not to a caricature.
It concedes what the rule does well. Chapter 350's treatment of the traditional examination is written this way on purpose, and the concession makes the criticism stronger.
It identifies whose interest the rule serves, which is often the most illuminating question and is rarely asked in student work.
It distinguishes the rule from its administration. A rule may be sound and its administration bad, and the remedies differ entirely, chapter 710.
And it stops where the evidence stops. A criticism that the rule is not working is an empirical claim, chapter 830, and needs data.
The failure modes
The unnamed standard. Judging without saying by what.
The moving standard. Criticising one feature for inefficiency and the next for injustice, so that the rule cannot satisfy both and the criticism is unanswerable.
Criticising the rule for what its administration does.
Criticising a rule for not doing what it never claimed to do.
And the counsel of perfection. Comparing the rule with an ideal rather than with the available alternatives, which produces criticism that is true and useless.
A worked example
Section 13(1) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, analysed and then criticised.
Analysis. Two elements: satisfaction of a section 12 criterion, and the Authority's satisfaction of a prima facie case to prosecute or defend. The decider is the concerned Authority. The material is the application and whatever scrutiny under regulation 7 of the 2010 Regulations produces. The standard is prima facie, that is, at first sight, not probability of success. The consequence of satisfaction is entitlement to legal services. The assumption is that an Authority can judge a case's prima facie merits on paper without the applicant.
Criticism, standard named. Judged by Anita Kushwaha's fourth facet, affordability of access, the filter is defensible: public funds are finite and directing them away from hopeless matters increases what is available for the rest.
Judged by the first facet, an effective adjudicatory mechanism, it is more doubtful: the decision is administrative, taken on paper, often without the applicant being heard, and a refusal leaves them without a lawyer and without an obvious remedy.
Analytical and Critical Legal Research
The concession. No system can fund every application, so some filter is necessary; the criticism is of this filter's procedure, not of filtering.
And the empirical limit. Whether refusals are in fact frequent or arbitrary is a question of fact that criticism cannot settle, and the refusal figures held by any District Authority would settle it. That last sentence is the honest stopping point, and writing it is what distinguishes disciplined criticism from confident opinion.
Quick revision
Analytical research breaks a rule into elements, identifies who decides each and on what material, states the consequence, the exceptions and what the rule assumes, and places it among its neighbours.
Critical research evaluates the rule against a named standard: a constitutional value, a judicially stated standard such as Anita Kushwaha's four facets, the rule's own declared purpose, efficiency, coherence, or a specified conception of justice.
Analysis first. Criticism without analysis is complaint; analysis without criticism is description.
Good criticism: names the standard first; applies it to the rule as analysed; concedes what the rule does well; asks whose interest it serves; separates the rule from its administration; and stops where the evidence stops.
Failure modes: the unnamed standard; the moving standard; blaming the rule for its administration; criticising a rule for what it never claimed; and comparing it with an ideal rather than with the alternatives.
Test yourself
1. Distinguish analytical from critical research. Analytical research takes a rule apart to establish exactly what it does, identifying its elements, the decider, the consequence, the exceptions and its assumptions. Critical research evaluates the rule against a stated external standard in order to say whether it succeeds.
2. Which standard is the strongest for criticism, and why? The rule's own declared purpose, because the rule cannot object to being judged by what it said it was for. Schedule II's own prescription that the clinical papers be assessed by practical exercises licenses the criticism that examining them by written paper is a failure of the instrument.
3. Name five failure modes in critical writing. Not naming the standard; moving the standard between features so that the rule cannot satisfy the criticism; criticising the rule for faults of its administration; criticising a rule for not achieving something it never claimed; and comparing the rule with an ideal rather than with the available alternatives.
4. Why must analysis precede criticism? Because a rule cannot be judged until it has been taken apart, and most poor criticism is directed at a misreading. Criticism without analysis objects to an impression of the rule rather than to the rule.
The rest of this subject
These notes are cut from the University's printed syllabus. Open the syllabus itself, or the past papers, for the same subject.