SPPU Solved Question Papers
Constitutional Law I
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LL.B. (Three Years) · Sem 1
Oct 2025 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
SPPU Solved Question Papers
Constitutional Law I
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LL.B. (Three Years) · Sem 1
Oct 2025 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
First published on munotes.in on 17 October 2026.
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The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the Oct 2025 examination, reproduced as Savitribai Phule Pune University set them, in the order it set them. Nothing has been reworded, added or left out. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 3 hours · Total marks 70 · 13 questions answered
Instructions printed on the paper
How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
PART A
Answer any two · 30 Marks
Answer
For full marks, cover: how the Assembly was formed under the Cabinet Mission Plan, its members and first sitting, the issues before it, the Objectives Resolution, the committees and the Drafting Committee, the three readings, adoption and the two commencement dates, Dr Ambedkar's warning, and the criticisms with replies.
The Constitution of India was not handed down by the British Parliament. It was made by an Indian body, the Constituent Assembly. A constituent assembly is a body chosen to frame a constitution. Ours sat for 2 years, 11 months and 18 days, over 11 sessions. It adopted the Constitution on 26 November 1949. The Constitution came fully into force on 26 January 1950.
First sitting. The Assembly first met on 9 December 1946, in the Constitution Hall at New Delhi. The Muslim League stayed away. Dr Sachchidananda Sinha, the oldest member, presided as temporary chairman. Dr Rajendra Prasad was elected permanent President on 11 December 1946. Sir B.N. Rau was the Constitutional Adviser.
After partition. Members from the areas that went to Pakistan withdrew. The strength fell to about 299.
Two roles. From 15 August 1947, section 8 of the Indian Independence Act 1947 made the Assembly a fully sovereign body. It also became the Dominion Legislature, the law-making body of the new Dominion. As a legislature, G.V. Mavalankar presided. As a constitution-making body, Dr Rajendra Prasad presided.
The Assembly had to settle some hard questions:
Partition changed several answers. The Assembly chose a strong Centre. It chose reserved seats instead of separate electorates. It divided rights into enforceable fundamental rights (Part III) and non-enforceable directive principles (Part IV).
Jawaharlal Nehru moved the Objectives Resolution on 13 December 1946. The Assembly adopted it on 22 January 1947. It stated what the Assembly set out to do:
This resolution is the Preamble in draft. Its words passed almost unchanged into the Preamble. Two points changed later. Residuary powers went to the Union, not the units. The word "Socialist" was added to the Preamble only by the Forty-second Amendment in 1976.
The Assembly did not write the text on the floor. It sent each part of the work to a committee.
| Committee | Chairman | What it decided |
|---|---|---|
| Union Powers Committee | Jawaharlal Nehru | A strong Union, with residuary power (article 248) |
| Union Constitution Committee | Jawaharlal Nehru | The President, Parliament and the Union judiciary |
| Provincial Constitution Committee | Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel | The Governor and the State government |
| Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights and Minorities | Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel | Parts III and IV; reserved seats, not separate electorates |
| Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee | J.B. Kripalani | The split between justiciable and non-justiciable rights |
| Drafting Committee | Dr B.R. Ambedkar | Put the draft into legal form |
The Drafting Committee was appointed on 29 August 1947. It had seven members:
The drafts. Sir B.N. Rau prepared a draft of 243 articles and 13 schedules in October 1947. The Drafting Committee published its own Draft Constitution in February 1948, with 315 articles and 8 schedules. The draft was kept open to the public for eight months, and comments were considered.
| Stage | Dates | What happened |
|---|---|---|
| First reading | 4 to 9 November 1948 | Ambedkar moved the draft; general discussion |
| Second reading | 15 November 1948 to 17 October 1949 | Clause by clause; 7,635 amendments tabled, 2,473 moved and decided |
| Third reading | 14 to 26 November 1949 | Final debate; Constitution adopted on 26 November 1949 |
As adopted, the Constitution had 395 articles, 8 schedules and 22 Parts. 284 members signed it on 24 January 1950.
Article 394 sets two dates.
Why 26 January? At its Lahore session in December 1929, the Congress adopted purna swaraj, or complete independence, as its goal. 26 January 1930 was then observed as Independence Day. Commencing the Constitution on 26 January honoured that date.
On 25 November 1949, Dr Ambedkar spoke to the Assembly before the final vote. He warned that a constitution depends on the people who work it. He said: "However good a Constitution may be, it is sure to turn out bad because those who are called to work it, happen to be a bad lot."
He gave three warnings:
These warnings explain why the Constitution joins political democracy with social and economic justice.
Conclusion. The Constituent Assembly was formed under the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 and became sovereign under section 8 of the Indian Independence Act 1947. Through its committees, a seven-member Drafting Committee under Dr Ambedkar and three readings, it adopted the Constitution on 26 November 1949. The Constitution came fully into force on 26 January 1950 under article 394. The Assembly was not elected on adult franchise. But it built adult franchise, justiciable rights and directive principles into the document it made. Dr Ambedkar's warning of 25 November 1949 remains the test of that Constitution. Its success depends on how faithfully it is worked.
Answer
For full marks, cover: single citizenship and articles 5 to 11; the five modes of acquisition under the Citizenship Act 1955 (birth, descent, registration, naturalisation, incorporation of territory) with the dates for birth and descent; sections 6A and 6B; the three modes of loss (renunciation, termination, deprivation); the Overseas Citizen of India card; and the leading cases.
A citizen is a full member of the State. Some fundamental rights belong only to citizens. Articles 15, 16, 19, 29 and 30 are examples. India has single citizenship. A person is a citizen of India alone, not of any State.
The Constitution deals with citizenship in Part II, articles 5 to 11. Articles 5 to 9 only decide who was a citizen on 26 January 1950. Article 11 leaves everything else to Parliament. Parliament then made the Citizenship Act 1955. That Act governs acquisition and loss today.
1. By birth, section 3. The rule depends on the date of birth in India.
| Born in India | What is needed |
|---|---|
| 26 January 1950 to 30 June 1987 | Birth in India alone |
| 1 July 1987 to 2 December 2004 | Birth in India, and either parent a citizen |
| On or after 3 December 2004 | Both parents citizens, or one a citizen and the other not an illegal migrant |
India began with jus soli, which means citizenship by place of birth. The amendments of 1986 and 2003 moved it towards jus sanguinis, which means citizenship through the parents. Section 3(2) excludes a child of a foreign diplomat, and a child of an enemy alien born in occupied territory.
An illegal migrant, under section 2(1)(b), is a foreigner who entered without a valid passport. It also covers a foreigner who stayed on after his permitted time ran out.
2. By descent, section 4. This is for a person born outside India.
| Born outside India | What is needed |
|---|---|
| 26 January 1950 to 9 December 1992 | The father a citizen at the time of birth |
| On or after 10 December 1992 | Either parent a citizen at the time of birth |
The birth must be registered at an Indian consulate within one year. For births on or after 3 December 2004, the parents must also declare that the child holds no other passport. The 1992 change removed discrimination against Indian mothers.
3. By registration, section 5. This is for a person who already has an Indian connection. He must not be an illegal migrant. The main classes are:
The applicant takes an oath of allegiance. Marriage alone never makes a person a citizen.
4. By naturalisation, section 6. This is for a foreigner with no Indian connection. The Third Schedule requires:
The Government may waive these for a person of distinguished service to science, art, literature, world peace or human progress.
5. By incorporation of territory, section 7. When a territory becomes part of India, the Central Government names the persons who become citizens. Nobody applies. It was used for Pondicherry, Goa, Daman and Diu, Sikkim in 1975, and the enclaves received from Bangladesh in 2015.
Two special routes.
| Mode | Section | How it works |
|---|---|---|
| Renunciation | 8 | A citizen of full age who is also a national of another country declares that he gives up Indian citizenship |
| Mode | Section | How it works |
|---|---|---|
| Termination | 9 | A citizen who voluntarily acquires another country's citizenship stops being a citizen of India automatically |
| Deprivation | 10 | The Central Government takes away citizenship by order, on specified grounds |
1. Renunciation, section 8. The citizenship ends when the declaration is registered. His minor children also lose it. A child may take it back by a declaration within one year of turning eighteen.
2. Termination, section 9. No order or hearing is needed. Acquisition of another citizenship ends Indian citizenship at once. This is how the Act shows that India does not allow dual citizenship. Under section 9(2), the question whether a person acquired another citizenship is decided by the prescribed authority, not by a civil court.
3. Deprivation, section 10. This applies only to a citizen by registration, naturalisation or article 5(c). It never applies to a citizen by birth or descent. The grounds are:
The Government must give written notice. On the first four grounds, the person may ask for a Committee of Inquiry, headed by a person with judicial experience.
The Overseas Citizen of India card, sections 7A to 7D. It is not citizenship. A cardholder is a foreign national with a lifelong visa and some rights. He cannot vote or hold a constitutional office.
Conclusion. Articles 5 to 9 fixed who was a citizen on 26 January 1950, and article 11 left the rest to Parliament. Under the Citizenship Act 1955, citizenship is acquired by birth, descent, registration, naturalisation and incorporation of territory, with special routes in sections 6A and 6B. It is lost by renunciation, by automatic termination on voluntarily taking another citizenship, and by deprivation, which reaches only acquired citizenship. The law has moved from citizenship by birthplace towards citizenship through parents. India still allows only single citizenship. An Overseas Citizen of India card is a status, not a second citizenship.
Answer
For full marks, cover: secularism as the setting; article 25 (conscience, profess, practise, propagate) and its limits; the State's powers in article 25(2); the essential religious practices test; article 26 for denominations; article 27 (taxes) and article 28 (religious instruction); article 290A; the leading cases; and an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses.
India has no State religion. The Preamble calls India a secular republic. Indian secularism does not build a wall between State and religion. It asks the State to treat all religions equally and to keep a principled distance from them. In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918, the Supreme Court held secularism to be a basic feature of the Constitution.
The right to freedom of religion is in articles 25 to 28. Article 25 protects the individual. Article 26 protects religious groups. Articles 27 and 28 protect the taxpayer and the student.
Article 25(1) says that "all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion".
There is no right to convert another person. In Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1977 SC 908, the Madhya Pradesh and Orissa Acts punished conversion by force, fraud or allurement. The Supreme Court upheld both Acts. "Propagate" means to spread or transmit one's religion. It does not mean a right to convert. What is freedom for one is freedom for the other in equal measure. The Acts were public order laws.
Article 25 has no separate "reasonable restrictions" clause like article 19. The limits are written into the right itself. The right is subject to:
Article 25(2): the State's own powers.
Courts protect only those practices that are essential to a religion. The test is made by judges. It is not written in the Constitution.
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, 1954 AIR 282. Facts: the head of the Shirur Mutt at Udipi challenged the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 1951. The Act let an executive officer take over a Math's administration and levied a contribution of up to five per cent of income. Held: several sections were void under articles 19(1)(f), 25 and 26. Religion is not necessarily belief in God. It can prescribe rituals, and even food and dress. What is essential is decided by the doctrines of the religion itself. Why it matters: it is the foundation of the whole subject.
The Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, 1961 AIR 1402. The Court added, in passing, that practices born of superstition are not protected. Only practices that are an essential and integral part of the religion are protected. From then on, judges began to decide for themselves what is essential.
Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, (1986) 3 SCC 615. Facts: three Jehovah's Witness children stood respectfully during the National Anthem but did not sing, because their faith forbids it. They were expelled from school. Held: their rights under articles 19(1)(a) and 25(1) were violated, and they were readmitted. The question is whether a belief is genuinely and conscientiously held, not whether it appeals to the judge. Why it matters: it shows a sincerity test that does not require judges to decide what a religion teaches.
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1 (Sabarimala). Facts: women aged ten to fifty were kept out of the Sabarimala temple by custom, under Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Rules of 1965. Held: by four to one, the exclusion was set aside. The majority held that the practice was not essential to the religion. Chandrachud J. held that excluding women for menstruation is a form of untouchability. Indu Malhotra J. dissented. She held that the devotees had a case for denominational protection under article 26. The review petitions came next. In Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association, decided on 14 November 2019, they were kept pending. Larger questions were sent to a bench of at least seven judges. So the test is not settled.
Every religious denomination, or a section of it, has the right:
A denomination, per Shirur Mutt, is a group with a common faith, a common organisation and a distinctive name.
Article 26 is subject to public order, morality and health only. Unlike article 25, it is not expressly subject to the rest of Part III.
The key line is between clause (b) and clause (d). The right to manage religious affairs cannot be taken away. The right to administer property can be regulated by law. In Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, 1954 AIR 388, a Jain temple and the Parsi Punchayet challenged the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950. The Court allowed registration, audit and a supervision fee. But it struck down provisions that made the Charity Commissioner a trustee of religious institutions, and that let trust money be diverted. The rule is: regulation yes, substitution no.
Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255. Facts: a temple of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins claimed article 26(b) against a temple-entry law. Held: by harmonious construction, the temple had to be open to all Hindus. The denomination kept the right to exclude others only during certain special ceremonies. Why it matters: it reconciles article 26(b) with article 25(2)(b).
No person shall be compelled to pay any tax whose proceeds are specifically appropriated for promoting a particular religion or denomination. The article bars a tax, not a fee. A fee pays for a service given to the payer. In Shirur Mutt, the five per cent contribution was held to be a tax. In Ratilal, the contribution under the Bombay Act was held to be a fee. Even-handed spending on all religions is outside article 27.
| Kind of institution | Rule |
|---|---|
| Wholly maintained by the State | No religious instruction at all (clause 1) |
| State-run, but set up under a trust requiring religious instruction | Instruction allowed (clause 2) |
| Recognised by the State | Instruction allowed, but no one may be compelled without consent (clause 3) |
| Aided by the State | Same as recognised (clause 3) |
For a minor, the guardian gives consent.
Article 290A charges an annual sum on the Consolidated Fund of Kerala for the Travancore Devaswom Fund. It also charges a sum on the Consolidated Fund of Tamil Nadu for the Devaswom Fund there. These pay for the upkeep of Hindu temples in areas once part of Travancore-Cochin. It is an exception written into the Constitution itself, so article 27 does not reach it.
Strengths.
Weaknesses.
Conclusion. Articles 25 to 28 give every person freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practise and propagate religion. They also give denominations the right to manage their religious affairs. The right is limited by public order, morality, health and the rest of Part III. It is also limited by the State's power to regulate secular activity and to reform. Articles 27 and 28 keep public money and public schools neutral. The design is sound and fits a plural society. Its weak point is the judge-made essentiality test, which is now before a seven-judge bench. Until that bench decides, the law on where religious freedom ends remains unsettled.
Answer
For full marks, cover: article 19(1)(a) and what it includes (press, circulation, information, silence); the eight grounds in article 19(2); the rule that the grounds are exhaustive; the test of reasonableness; prior restraint; and the leading cases with facts.
Article 19(1)(a) says that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. Free speech is the base of democracy. People cannot choose rulers or criticise them without it. But the freedom is not absolute. Article 19(2) lets the State make a law imposing reasonable restrictions on certain grounds only.
The right belongs to citizens. A foreigner cannot claim article 19.
"Expression" is wider than speech. It covers writing, printing, pictures, films and any other way of conveying an idea.
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, 1950 AIR 124. Facts: Cross Roads was a weekly journal published in Bombay. The Madras Government banned its entry and circulation in Madras, under section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act 1949. Held: freedom of speech includes the freedom to spread ideas, and that is ensured by freedom of circulation. Section 9(1-A) allowed restrictions for public safety and public order. Those were then outside article 19(2), so the section was wholly void. Why it matters: circulation is part of the freedom. The case also led to the First Amendment of 1951.
Sakal Papers (P) Ltd v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305. Facts: the Newspaper (Price and Page) Act 1956 fixed how many pages a newspaper could print at a given price. Its object was to help smaller newspapers. Held: the Act and Order were void under article 19(1)(a). The right covers the volume of circulation. Helping small newspapers is not a ground in article 19(2). Why it matters: a good purpose does not create a new ground.
Bennett Coleman & Co v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106. Facts: the newsprint policy limited the pages newspapers could print. The Government called it rationing of a scarce commodity. Held: shareholders and editors of a newspaper company keep their article 19 rights, so they could challenge the policy. A measure is judged by its effect on speech, not its label. Why it matters: an indirect restriction on the press is still a restriction.
The State may restrict speech only by a law, and only in the interests of these eight grounds:
The three circles of order. Think of three circles, one inside the other. Law and order is the widest. Public order sits inside it. Security of the State is the smallest, at the centre. A small quarrel disturbs law and order. A riot disturbs public order. An armed rebellion threatens the security of the State.
The list in article 19(2) is closed. No other ground may be added.
Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt Ltd v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 515. Facts: newspapers challenged customs duty on imported newsprint as a burden on the press. Held: freedom of the press is part of article 19(1)(a). There can be no restriction on speech other than those in article 19(2). There can be no interference "in the name of public interest". Why it matters: "public interest" is not one of the grounds.
Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh, decided on 3 January 2023. Facts: a Constitution Bench considered statements made by Ministers about pending criminal cases. Held: the grounds in article 19(2) are exhaustive. No further restriction can be added by judges, even on Ministers. A code of conduct is for Parliament to make. Why it matters: it is the latest and most authoritative statement of the rule.
A restriction must have a listed ground, and it must also be reasonable. The courts look at:
The word "reasonable" applies to the restriction, not only to the law's purpose. A good aim pursued by an excessive restriction fails.
A law is required. An executive instruction is not enough. In Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, (1986) 3 SCC 615, school circulars could not restrict article 19(1)(a), because they had no statutory basis.
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1. Facts: section 66A of the Information Technology Act 2000 punished online messages that were "grossly offensive" or caused "annoyance" or "inconvenience". Held: section 66A was struck down completely. Its words were vague, so an ordinary person could not know what was banned. It was over-broad, because it caught protected speech. It had a chilling effect, scaring people away from lawful speech. Section 69A, on blocking, was upheld because it needs a reasoned order on article 19(2) grounds. Why it matters: it separates discussion and advocacy, which are protected, from incitement, which may be punished.
Prior restraint means stopping speech before it is published, for example by pre-censorship. It is not banned outright in India. Censorship of films has been upheld, because a film affects viewers differently from print. But courts examine prior restraint strictly, because it stops ideas before anyone can judge them.
Brij Bhushan v. The State of Delhi, 1950 AIR 129. Facts: a law let the Government make an editor submit all communal matter, and all matter about Pakistan, for scrutiny before publication. Held: it was void, because public order was not then a ground in article 19(2). Why it matters: even pre-censorship needs a ground in the list. The First Amendment then added public order.
After Romesh Thappar and Brij Bhushan, Parliament passed the First Amendment in 1951. It added public order, friendly relations with foreign States and incitement to an offence. It also added the word "reasonable". That word lets the courts review every restriction.
The scheme is balanced. Speech is wide, covering the press, circulation and the internet. Restrictions are allowed only on listed grounds, only by law, and only if reasonable. The courts have kept the list closed and have struck down vague laws. One concern is that grounds like "public order" and "decency or morality" are broad. They can be stretched, so courts must test each restriction for proportion.
Conclusion. Article 19(1)(a) guarantees every citizen freedom of speech and expression. It includes the press, circulation and the right to receive information. Article 19(2) allows reasonable restrictions on eight grounds only, and only by law. Indian Express Newspapers and Kaushal Kishor hold that the list is exhaustive, so "public interest" cannot justify a restriction. Shreya Singhal adds that a restriction must be clear and narrow. A restriction that is vague, excessive or outside the list will fail. The freedom is wide, but it is not absolute.
PART B
Answer any three · 30 Marks
Answer
For full marks, cover: the text of article 12 and why it matters; the four named categories and "local authorities"; the meaning of "includes"; the growth of "other authorities" from Rajasthan Electricity Board to Pradeep Kumar Biswas; the Ajay Hasia factors; the negative case of Zee Telefilms; and whether the judiciary is State.
A fundamental right is mainly a limit on the State. So the first question in any rights case is: was the wrong done by "the State"? Article 12 answers it. It says that in Part III, unless the context otherwise requires, "the State" includes:
Article 12 is a definition, not a right. If a body is "State", Part III binds it and a writ lies under article 32. If it is not, Part III does not reach it directly.
The word "includes" matters. It makes the list open, not closed. Courts have used this to widen the meaning of "State".
The State works through corporations, companies and societies, not only through departments. If "other authorities" meant only departments, a Government could escape Part III by moving a function into a company. The Supreme Court prevented this, step by step.
1. Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857. Facts: employees of the State Government were posted to the Electricity Board, a statutory body. One was refused consideration for promotion. Held: the Board is an "other authority". The phrase includes every authority created by statute with governmental or quasi-governmental powers. It does not matter that the Board also trades. The ejusdem generis rule does not apply. That rule would have limited "other authorities" to bodies like the ones named before it.
2. Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, AIR 1975 SC 1331. Held: the ONGC, LIC and the Industrial Finance Corporation are authorities under article 12. Their regulations have the force of law. Mathew J. first spoke of a body as an instrumentality or agency of the State.
3. Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628. Facts: the Airport Authority accepted a tender for a restaurant from a party that did not meet its own published conditions. Held: the Authority is State, as an instrumentality of the Government. Accepting the tender was arbitrary and violated article 14. Why it matters: article 14 governs even the State's contracts.
4. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, AIR 1981 SC 487. Facts: a registered society ran the Regional Engineering College, Srinagar. Students challenged a two-minute viva that carried one-third of the marks. Held: the society is State. Its members were Government nominees, its money came from the Governments, and they controlled it deeply. The form of the body, a society, does not matter. The Court gave six factors:
5. Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, decided on 16 April 2002 by seven judges. Facts: the question was whether the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, a registered society, is State. An earlier case had said it was not. Held: it is State. The Ajay Hasia factors are not a rigid checklist. The real test, on the cumulative facts, is whether the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. The control must be particular to the body and pervasive. Control that is merely regulatory is not enough. Why it matters: this is the test applied today.
6. Zee Telefilms Ltd v. Union of India, decided on 2 February 2005. Facts: Zee challenged the BCCI's cancellation of its telecast rights. Held: the BCCI is not State. It is not made by statute. The Government holds no shares in it and gives it almost no money. Its monopoly is not given by the State, and the State's control over it is only regulatory. Why it matters: a powerful body doing a public function is still not State unless the Government dominates it. The Court noted that a writ may still lie under article 226 where a body performs a public duty.
Article 12 does not name the courts. When a court makes rules or employs staff, it is State, and Part III applies. Judicial orders stand on a different footing. In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1, the Court held that such an order does not violate a fundamental right. This holds where the court had jurisdiction and applied a valid law. A wrong order is corrected by appeal, not by a writ.
Conclusion. Article 12 decides against whom fundamental rights can be enforced. Because it uses the word "includes", the courts have widened "other authorities" from statutory bodies (Rajasthan Electricity Board) to instrumentalities and societies (Ramana Dayaram Shetty, Ajay Hasia). Today the test is the one in Pradeep Kumar Biswas. The body must be financially, functionally and administratively dominated by the Government. That control must be particular and pervasive, not merely regulatory. Zee Telefilms marks the limit, since the BCCI is not State. Such a body may still answer under article 226.
Answer
For full marks, cover: the text; its four parts (source of authority, nature of the State, objectives, date); its object and purpose; whether it is part of the Constitution and whether it can be amended (Berubari, Kesavananda); and its use in interpretation, with its limits (Berubari, Kesavananda, Minerva Mills, S.R. Bommai).
"WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens: JUSTICE, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation; IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION."
The words "Socialist", "Secular" and "and integrity" were added by the Forty-second Amendment in 1976.
Its purpose is to state what the Constitution sets out to achieve. It is the key to the minds of the makers. It grew from the Objectives Resolution of 1947. The Preamble was adopted last, on 17 October 1949, so that it would match the finished text.
In re Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves, Special Reference No. 1 of 1959, advisory opinion of 14 March 1960. Facts: the President asked whether a 1958 agreement with Pakistan, to transfer part of Berubari Union, needed a law, and under which article. Held: a constitutional amendment under article 368 was needed. On the Preamble, the Court said it is "a key to open the mind of the makers". But it is not a part of the Constitution. It is not a source of power, and not a source of limitations. It can help only where an article is ambiguous.
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461. Facts: the head of a religious math challenged Kerala land reform laws and the Twenty-fourth, Twenty-fifth and Twenty-ninth Amendments. Held: the Preamble is part of the Constitution. The Assembly adopted it by vote, like every other part. It can be amended under article 368. But no amendment may damage or destroy the basic structure. The Preamble shows what that basic structure is. Why it matters: it overruled Berubari on whether the Preamble is part of the Constitution.
The Preamble has been amended only once, by the Forty-second Amendment in 1976.
Where the Preamble can be used:
Where it cannot be used:
| Question | Berubari, 1960 | Kesavananda, 1973 onwards |
|---|---|---|
| Part of the Constitution? | No | Yes |
| Can it be amended? | Not decided | Yes, but not the basic structure |
| Source of power? | No | Still no |
| Use in interpretation | Only where an article is ambiguous | That, and to identify the basic structure |
Conclusion. The Preamble states three things. The Constitution comes from the people of India. India is a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic. Its goals are justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. After Kesavananda Bharati it is part of the Constitution and can be amended, but not so as to destroy the basic structure. It gives no power and no enforceable right. Its value lies in interpretation. It resolves ambiguities, and since Kesavananda, Minerva Mills and S.R. Bommai it guides the courts in identifying the basic features the Constitution must keep.
Answer
For full marks, cover: why a right needs a remedy; the four clauses of article 32; Dr Ambedkar's description; why article 32 is itself a fundamental right (Romesh Thappar); the five writs; how the Court moulds relief (compensation, PIL); suspension under articles 358 and 359 and ADM Jabalpur; article 32 as basic structure (L. Chandra Kumar); and article 32 compared with article 226.
A right without a remedy is a right only on paper. Part III gives many rights, but they would be empty if a citizen could not enforce them. Article 32 gives that remedy. In the Constituent Assembly, Dr Ambedkar called article 32 "the very soul of the Constitution and the very heart of it". The question asks why.
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, 1950 AIR 124. Facts: the Madras Government banned the circulation of the journal Cross Roads. Its editor went straight to the Supreme Court under article 32. Madras argued that he should have gone first to the High Court under article 226. Held: the objection failed. Article 32 is placed in Part III, not in the chapter on the Court's jurisdiction. So the remedy is itself a fundamental right. The Court is "the protector and guarantor of fundamental rights". It cannot refuse to entertain a petition for their protection. There is no rule that other remedies must be used first. Why it matters: this is the main reason article 32 is called the soul of the Constitution.
| Writ | Meaning | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Habeas corpus | "You may have the body" | To produce a detained person and test the detention |
| Mandamus | "We command" | To make a public authority perform its legal duty |
| Prohibition | "Forbid" | To stop a lower court or tribunal acting beyond its jurisdiction, while proceedings are pending |
| Certiorari | "To be certified" | To quash an order already made without jurisdiction, or against natural justice |
| Quo warranto | "By what authority" | To ask a person holding a public office to show his legal right to it |
The words "including" and "in the nature of" mean the Court is not limited to these five. It can mould relief.
1. Compensation for breach of rights.
Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 1086. Facts: Rudul Sah was acquitted of murder but kept in jail for over fourteen years after the acquittal. Held: the detention was wholly unjustified. Article 21 would lose its meaning if the Court could only order release. The Court awarded compensation as an interim measure. Why it matters: article 32 can give money relief for a breach of a fundamental right.
Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, AIR 1993 SC 1960. Facts: a young man died in police custody. The police said he was run over by a train. Held: it was a custodial death. Compensation under article 32 or 226 is a public law remedy based on strict liability. Sovereign immunity is no defence. The Court said it must "forge such new tools as may be necessary". Why it matters: it gave compensation a firm legal basis.
2. Public interest litigation. In S.P. Gupta v. President of India, AIR 1982 SC 149, the Court widened standing, meaning who may file a case. Where poor or disadvantaged people cannot reach the Court, any member of the public may apply for them under article 32.
3. Guidelines and continuing orders. Because article 32(2) uses the words "directions or orders", the Court can issue guidelines and keep a case open to watch compliance.
Clause (4) allows suspension only as the Constitution provides:
Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, AIR 1976 SC 1207. Facts: during the 1975 Emergency, a Presidential Order suspended the right to enforce articles 14, 21 and 22. Detenus asked High Courts for habeas corpus. Held: by four to one, no detenu could challenge his detention, even for mala fides. Khanna J. dissented. He held that the State cannot take life or liberty without the authority of law even in an Emergency. Why it matters: it shows what happens when the soul is switched off. The Forty-fourth Amendment then protected articles 20 and 21. The majority is no longer good law, and the dissent has since been approved.
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1125. Held: the power of judicial review under article 32 and article 226 is an essential feature of the Constitution. It is part of the basic structure. Even a constitutional amendment cannot take it away. Provisions in articles 323A and 323B that excluded the High Courts and Supreme Court were struck down to that extent.
| Point | Article 32 | Article 226 |
|---|---|---|
| Nature | A fundamental right | A constitutional power of the High Court |
| Purpose | Only to enforce Part III rights | Part III rights and any other purpose |
| Can the court refuse? | Cannot refuse to entertain | Discretionary |
| Area | All of India | The High Court's own territory |
Article 226 is wider in purpose. But only article 32 is itself a guaranteed right.
Conclusion. Article 32 turns the rights in Part III from promises into enforceable law. It is itself a fundamental right, so the Supreme Court cannot refuse to hear a petition to enforce Part III (Romesh Thappar). Through writs, compensation (Rudul Sah, Nilabati Behera) and public interest litigation (S.P. Gupta), the Court has made the remedy real for ordinary people. ADM Jabalpur shows the danger when it is suspended, and the Forty-fourth Amendment now protects articles 20 and 21. L. Chandra Kumar puts article 32 in the basic structure. That is why Dr Ambedkar called it the soul and heart of the Constitution.
Answer
For full marks, cover: the text of articles 23 and 24; traffic in human beings; begar and other forced labour, and why payment is no defence; bonded labour; the exception for compulsory public service; child labour; the special features (binds private persons, makes an offence); the statutes; and the cases (PUDR, Bandhua Mukti Morcha, M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu).
Articles 23 and 24 form the right against exploitation. They protect the weakest people: those sold, forced to work, or made to work as children. Both articles protect every person, not only citizens.
Article 23(1): "Traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law."
1. Traffic in human beings. This means dealing in people as if they were goods. It covers:
2. Begar. Begar is labour taken without any payment, as a customary duty. The word is "begar", not "beggar". It has nothing to do with begging.
3. Other similar forms of forced labour. This is the widest part. Begar is one kind of forced labour. The article bans all forced labour, paid or unpaid.
People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1473 (the Asian Games case). Facts: workers on the construction sites for the 1982 Asian Games in Delhi were paid below the minimum wage. A letter to Bhagwati J. was treated as a writ petition. Held: article 23 binds private persons as well as the State. It strikes at forced labour "in whatever form it may manifest itself". To limit it to unpaid labour would make the words "other similar forms of forced labour" meaningless. Why it matters: the compulsion may come from hunger or poverty, not only from force. So work for less than the minimum wage is forced labour.
4. Bonded labour. Bonded labour is work given in repayment of a debt or advance, or of a customary obligation. The worker loses the freedom to work elsewhere, the freedom to move, and the market value of his work.
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802. Facts: labourers in the stone quarries of Faridabad, Haryana, worked in dust, drank dirty water and lived in huts of piled stones. Some were not allowed to leave. Held:
The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976 abolishes the system and extinguishes the debt. It restores the labourer's property and creates offences. Under section 12, the District Magistrate must inquire into forced labour.
5. The exception: article 23(2). The State may impose compulsory service for public purposes, such as military service or service during a flood or epidemic. But it must not discriminate on grounds only of religion, race, caste or class.
Article 24: "No child below the age of fourteen years shall be employed to work in any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous employment."
M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1997 SC 699. Facts: the match and firework factories of Sivakasi employed many children in dangerous work. An accident in a cracker factory killed 39 people. Held: article 24 has been a fundamental right since the Constitution began. The Court directed:
Why it matters: the Court turned article 24 into a working scheme, joining it with the directive principles on children.
The Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986, as amended in 2016, goes further than article 24. A child below fourteen may not be employed in any occupation, with narrow exceptions such as helping a family business after school. An adolescent of fourteen to eighteen may not work in hazardous occupations.
Conclusion. Article 23 bans trafficking, begar and every other form of forced labour, and makes a breach an offence. It binds private employers, and payment below the minimum wage is no defence (PUDR). Bonded labour is forced labour, and the law requires release and rehabilitation (Bandhua Mukti Morcha). Article 24 bans children below fourteen from factories, mines and hazardous work. M.C. Mehta and the 1986 Act, as amended in 2016, extend that protection. Together the two articles protect human dignity against exploitation by anyone.
Answer
For full marks, cover: article 16(1) and (2) and the extra grounds; the link with article 14 (Royappa); the clauses that allow exceptions (3), (4), (4A), (4B), (5) and (6); the rationale for reservation under article 16(4), from N.M. Thomas and Indra Sawhney; the fifty per cent ceiling and the creamy layer; promotion (Nagaraj, Jarnail Singh); and the EWS quota (Janhit Abhiyan).
Article 16(1) says there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State.
Article 16(2) protects against discrimination in public employment. No citizen shall be ineligible or discriminated against on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth or residence. Descent and residence are two grounds more than in article 15(1).
Link with article 14. In E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555, a senior IAS officer challenged his transfer from the post of Chief Secretary. The plea of mala fides failed on the facts. But the Court held that article 16 is a species of the genus of equality in article 14. Equality is opposed to arbitrariness. So a service decision that is arbitrary violates articles 14 and 16.
Permitted exceptions in article 16.
1. Equality means real equality, not only formal equality. If unequal people are treated equally, the inequality continues. Some groups were kept out of education and public life for centuries because of caste. Treating them "equally" from today would keep them behind. So the State may help them catch up.
State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, AIR 1976 SC 490. Facts: a Kerala rule gave Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe employees time to pass departmental tests needed for promotion. Held: the rule was upheld. If equality of opportunity in article 16(1) means real, effective equality, then article 16(4) is not an exception to article 16(1). It is a way of carrying equality further, even to reservation. Why it matters: reservation is part of equality, not a departure from it.
2. Adequate representation in the services. Public services run the country. When a large part of society has almost no share in them, government loses touch with those people. Reservation gives backward classes a voice in the administration. That is why article 16(4) speaks of classes "not adequately represented".
3. The Constitution's own directions. Article 46 directs the State to promote the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections, especially the SCs and STs. Article 335 asks that their claims be considered in appointments, consistently with efficiency of administration.
4. Social justice in the Preamble. The Preamble promises justice, social, economic and political, and equality of status and of opportunity. Reservation is one way to deliver it.
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477 (Mandal case). Facts: the Central Government reserved 27 per cent of posts for Other Backward Classes (OBCs), on the Mandal Commission report. Held: nine judges upheld the reservation and settled the law:
1. The fifty per cent ceiling. It began in M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649, where a 68 per cent reservation in professional colleges was struck down as a "fraud on the constitutional power". Indra Sawhney fixed fifty per cent as the general rule. In Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, (2023) 5 SCC 1, the Court upheld the ten per cent EWS quota by three to two. It held that the fifty per cent limit is not inflexible, and applies to reservations under articles 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4).
2. The creamy layer. It keeps benefits for those who are still backward. Without it, the better-off members of a class would take the benefits meant for the poorest.
3. Promotion. M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212, upheld article 16(4A), consequential seniority and the carry-forward rule. But the State had to collect quantifiable data on backwardness, inadequate representation and efficiency. In Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta, decided on 26 September 2018, the data on the backwardness of SCs and STs was held unnecessary, because the Presidential lists already settle it. Data on representation and efficiency is still needed.
4. Efficiency. Article 335 requires that reservation stay consistent with the efficiency of administration.
Conclusion. Article 16 gives every citizen an equal chance at public employment and forbids discrimination on seven grounds. Reservation under article 16(4) does not break this rule. As N.M. Thomas and Indra Sawhney held, it carries equality further for classes that history held back and that are still under-represented. It has four limits. The fifty per cent ceiling is now flexible after Janhit Abhiyan. The creamy layer is excluded. Promotion needs data. And efficiency of administration must be kept. Within those limits, reservation is part of the Constitution's promise of equality of opportunity.
PART C Short Notes
Answer any two · 10 Marks
Answer
For full marks, cover: article 51A and its origin; the eleven duties in groups; their features; whether they are enforceable; and how courts use them.
The original Constitution had no duties. Part IVA, with a single article, article 51A, was added by the Forty-second Amendment in 1976, on the advice of the Swaran Singh Committee. Ten duties were added then. The eleventh, clause (k), came by the Eighty-sixth Amendment in 2002.
It is the duty of every citizen of India:
Duties are made enforceable through statutes, such as the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act 1971 and the Environment (Protection) Act 1986. Courts also use them to interpret the law.
Society for Un-aided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, decided on 12 April 2012. The Right to Education Act 2009 made unaided schools admit 25 per cent of children from weaker sections. The Court upheld it. It cited article 51A(k) to say that the right to education places a burden on parents as well as on the State.
But a duty cannot cut down a fundamental right. In Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, (1986) 3 SCC 615, children who stood respectfully but did not sing the National Anthem could not be expelled. No law required them to sing.
Conclusion. Article 51A lists eleven duties of citizens. They cannot be enforced in court directly. But statutes give effect to many of them, and courts use them to read the Constitution and test laws.
Answer
For full marks, cover: article 13(1); the meaning of the doctrine; the elements; Bhikaji Narain Dhakras; the position of post-Constitution laws (Deep Chand); and the citizens-only point.
Article 13(1) says that laws in force before the Constitution are void to the extent they are inconsistent with the fundamental rights. In Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 128, the Court held that such a law is not void from the beginning. It becomes unenforceable only from 26 January 1950.
So the law is not dead. It is eclipsed, or overshadowed, by the fundamental right. If the right is later changed so that the conflict disappears, the shadow lifts. The law then works again without being re-enacted. An eclipse hides the sun but does not destroy it.
Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1955 SC 781. Facts: a 1947 Act let the Government run motor transport as a monopoly, excluding private operators. From 1950 this conflicted with article 19(1)(g), the freedom of trade. The First Amendment (1951) then allowed State monopolies under article 19(6). Held: the Act was only eclipsed. Once the amendment removed the conflict, the Act revived and became enforceable again.
A law made after 26 January 1950 is different. If it breaches a fundamental right, it is generally void from the start. Article 13(2) forbids the State to make such a law. It cannot be revived by a later amendment.
There is one qualification. In Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 648, Das C.J. and Sinha J. said the doctrine can still apply where the right infringed belongs only to citizens, such as article 19. Such a law is shadowed as against citizens. It stays effective against non-citizens.
A pre-Constitution law that breaches a citizens-only right, like article 19, is eclipsed only as against citizens. It still applies to non-citizens.
Conclusion. The doctrine of eclipse says a pre-Constitution law that conflicts with a fundamental right is overshadowed, not destroyed. When the conflict is removed, as in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras, the law revives without re-enactment. A post-Constitution law is generally void from the start. Deep Chand shows a limited exception where the right belongs only to citizens.
Answer
For full marks, cover: article 20(2); the four requirements; the meaning of "same offence"; departmental proceedings; Maqbool Hussain; and the statutory protection after acquittal.
Article 20(2) says: "No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once." This is the rule against double jeopardy. It protects a person from being tried and punished again and again for one offence.
All four must be present for the bar to apply:
Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, 1953 AIR 325. Facts: customs authorities confiscated the appellant's gold under the Sea Customs Act 1878. He was then prosecuted under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947 for the same act. Held: the customs proceeding was not a prosecution, and confiscation was not a punishment by a court. So the later prosecution was not barred. Article 20(2) includes the English plea of autrefois convict (already convicted). But it needs both a prosecution and a punishment the first time.
The test is the ingredients of the offence. One act can create two different offences with different ingredients. Both may be prosecuted. Section 26 of the General Clauses Act 1897 states the same idea. A person may be prosecuted under either of two laws. But he may not be punished twice for the same offence.
Conclusion. Article 20(2) bars a second prosecution and punishment for the same offence. It applies only after an earlier prosecution and punishment by a court, as Maqbool Hussain held. Departmental proceedings and offences with different ingredients fall outside it. Protection after an acquittal comes from criminal procedure law, not from the Constitution.
Answer
For full marks, cover: the meaning of PIL; why it was needed; S.P. Gupta's two forms of standing; the procedural changes (letters, commissions, continuing mandamus); examples; and the limits.
Public interest litigation (PIL) is a case filed in the interest of the public, or for people who cannot reach the court themselves. The court relaxes the old rule of locus standi. That rule allowed only the injured person to file a case. In a PIL, any member of the public acting in good faith may file under article 32 or article 226.
The people who most need their rights enforced are often the least able to come to court. Examples are prisoners, bonded labourers and pavement dwellers. A right they cannot enforce is no right at all.
S.P. Gupta v. President of India, AIR 1982 SC 149. Advocates challenged a circular about transferring additional judges. The Court laid down two kinds of standing:
In Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991) 1 SCC 598, the Court held that a PIL brought for a personal grudge is an abuse of process. The petitioner must act in good faith, and his allegations must be backed by material. PIL is also not a substitute for an ordinary civil suit.
Conclusion. PIL opened the courts to people who could not reach them, through relaxed standing, letter petitions and continuing mandamus. It has freed prisoners and bonded labourers and protected working women. The courts guard it against misuse by requiring good faith and real material.
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