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Criminal Jurisprudence
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LLM · Group 5 Criminal Law and Criminal Administration
2023 Examination
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LLM Group 5 Criminal Law and Criminal Administration Criminal Jurisprudence 2023 Question Paper with Solutions
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First published on munotes.in on 13 August 2026.
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Contents
The questions below are the paper as the University of Mumbai set it at the 2023 examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
The Paper as Set
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2023 examination, reproduced as the University of Mumbai set them, in the order it set them. Nothing has been reworded, added or left out. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 3 hours · Total marks 100 · 7 questions answered
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SECTION I
Paper Subject Code 76017, sat 27 June 2023. Attempt any FOUR questions, all questions carry equal marks
any four of seven · 100 Marks
1.State General Exceptions as laid down under the Indian Penal Code. Discuss any three of them in detail.[25]
Answer
For full marks, cover: two commands, marked separately. State the whole chapter first, briefly and in a form the examiner can tick off. Then take three and go deep. The three chosen here are private defence, unsoundness of mind and accident, because private defence is the largest of the exceptions and candidates rarely choose it for a "discuss any three". Each gets facts, holding and criticism. This exact question is printed on 3 of the papers in this folder, and the answer is the same on every one of them: a candidate sitting either paper writes this.
The enumeration
Chapter IV of the Indian Penal Code, sections 76 to 106, contains the General Exceptions; they are now Chapter III of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, sections 14 to 44. Section 6 of the Code directed that every definition of an offence be read subject to them, so an act within an exception is not an offence at all rather than an offence forgiven.
Sections 76 and 79, now 14 and 17: act of a person bound, or by mistake of fact believing himself bound, by law; and act of a person justified, or by mistake of fact believing himself justified, by law. Sections 77 and 78, now 15 and 16: judicial acts, and acts done pursuant to a judgment or order. Section 80, now 18: accident in doing a lawful act. Section 81, now 19: necessity. Sections 82 and 83, now 20 and 21: infancy, absolute below seven and conditional between seven and twelve. Section 84, now 22: unsoundness of mind. Sections 85 and 86, now 23 and 24: intoxication, involuntary and voluntary. Sections 87 to 92, now 25 to 30: the consent group, including consent to risk, acts in good faith for a person's benefit, acts for a child or person of unsound mind, consent vitiated by fear or misconception, and acts done without consent in an emergency. Section 93, now 31: communication made in good faith. Section 94, now 32: act to which a person is compelled by threats. Section 95, now 33: act causing slight harm. Sections 96 to 106, now 34 to 44: the right of private defence.
They divide into justifiable acts, which the law approves, and excusable acts, which the law does not approve but does not punish because the actor lacked capacity or fault.
The burden. Section 105 of the Evidence Act, 1872, now section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, places on the accused the burden of proving that his case falls within an exception, discharged on a preponderance of probabilities, the general burden of proving guilt never leaving the State.
The first: the right of private defence, sections 96 to 106
The basis. The State undertakes to protect person and property but cannot be present at every attack, and a law requiring the citizen to submit and sue afterwards would ask him to bear an injury the State failed to prevent. Section 96, now section 34, states the effect: nothing done in the exercise of the right is an offence.
Two characteristics govern everything. The right is preventive, not punitive, so it is lost the moment it becomes retribution. And it runs against an aggressor only, so a person who begins an attack cannot claim it against the resistance he provokes, and a free fight is outside the sections altogether.
What it covers. Section 97, now section 35, gives the right against any offence affecting the human body, and against theft, robbery, mischief and criminal trespass in relation to property. The property list is closed: there is no right of private defence against cheating or criminal breach of trust. Section 98, now section 36, gives the right even against a person who is himself immune by youth, immaturity, unsoundness of mind or misconception.
When it extends to death. Section 100, now section 38, lists seven occasions for the body: apprehension of death; apprehension of grievous hurt; assault with intent to commit rape; assault with intent to gratify unnatural lust; assault with intent to kidnap or abduct; assault with intent to confine wrongfully where the person cannot reach the public authorities; and the throwing or administering of acid, added in 2013. Section 103, now section 41, lists four for property: robbery; house-breaking after sunset and before sunrise; mischief by fire or explosive on a dwelling or a place for the custody of property; and theft, mischief or house trespass causing reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt. Otherwise sections 101 and 104, now 39 and 42, permit harm short of death only.
Timing. Sections 102 and 105, now 40 and 43: the right begins with the reasonable apprehension and continues while it continues.
The four restrictions in section 99, now section 37, are where most marks are lost. There is no right against an act of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of office where it does not reasonably cause apprehension of death or grievous hurt; none against an act done by his direction; none where there is time to have recourse to the public authorities; and never more harm than is necessary.
The cases. Amjad Khan v. State, AIR 1952 SC 165: during communal rioting at Katni the appellant, inside his shop with his family, heard a mob break the door of the adjoining shop and begin battering his own, and fired through the door, killing one man. The Supreme Court set aside the murder conviction, holding that he had reasonable grounds to apprehend death or grievous hurt and was not bound to wait for the door to give way; the occasion under section 100 was made out on sound and inference alone.
Deo Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1973) 1 SCC 347: in a land dispute the deceased's party advanced with lathis and struck the appellant on the head; he used a spear and caused a fatal chest injury. The Supreme Court acquitted, holding that a person facing reasonable apprehension of grievous hurt need not wait until he is injured, and that force cannot be weighed in golden scales in the stress of an attack.
James Martin v. State of Kerala, (2004) 2 SCC 203: during a bandh a mob came to the accused's flour mill to force it to close and assaulted those inside; the accused and his father fired, killing two. The Supreme Court accepted that the right had arisen but held it exceeded, saying that the right is defensive and circumscribed by the statute and never a pretext for a vindictive, aggressive or retributive purpose.
Excess is not fatal. Exception 2 to section 300, now Exception 2 to section 101, reduces murder to culpable homicide where the accused in good faith and without premeditation exceeded the power given by law without intending more harm than necessary.
Criticism. The property provisions are said to value property against life, since section 103 permits killing to prevent robbery and night house-breaking; the answer is that each listed offence carries a real risk to the persons inside. The person provisions are said to be too wide, because apprehension is asserted after the event by the survivor and is very hard to disprove where the other participant is dead; the courts' answer is evidentiary, the injuries on both sides and the question of who began the incident being the objective checks.
The second: unsoundness of mind, section 84, now section 22
The provision. Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.
Four elements. Unsoundness of mind; existing at the time of the act; producing incapacity and not mere abnormality; and incapacity of one of the two kinds named.
Its source. The section enacts the answers the judges gave the House of Lords in M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 10 Cl & F 200, after Daniel M'Naghten, under a delusion of persecution, shot Edward Drummond, private secretary to Sir Robert Peel, in mistake for Peel, and was acquitted to public outrage.
Where section 84 is wider than the English rule. R v. Windle, [1952] 2 QB 826, read "wrong" in the M'Naghten formula as legally wrong, so a man who knew his act was unlawful but believed it morally right was convicted. Section 84 says "either wrong or contrary to law", in the disjunctive, so an accused whose disease destroyed his grasp of moral wrongness is protected even if he knew the act was unlawful.
The cases. Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand, (2011) 11 SCC 495: the appellant, convicted of murder, pleaded unsoundness of mind supported by evidence of mental illness. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that section 84 is for legal insanity and not medical insanity, that every mentally diseased person is not exempt, and that the incapacity must be proved at the moment of the act.
Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563: the appellant killed his wife and pleaded insanity. The Supreme Court held that the accused's burden under section 105 is no heavier than a civil burden, and that even where he fails to establish the exception the material he has led may still raise a reasonable doubt about the intention the offence requires, in which case he must be acquitted on the general burden. The plea therefore has two lives.
Ratan Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1970) 3 SCC 533: the crucial point of time is the time of the offence, conduct before and after being relevant only as evidence of the state of mind then.
Criticism. The test is purely cognitive: it asks what the accused knew and never what he could control or feel. Irresistible impulse is no defence, and Bapu alias Gajraj Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2007) 8 SCC 66, confirms that mere abnormality of mind, partial delusion or compulsive behaviour does not attract the section. Other systems have added a volitional limb, as the Model Penal Code does by asking whether the accused lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, or a plea of diminished responsibility, as the Homicide Act, 1957 did in England. India has neither, and the Sanhita reproduced section 84 unchanged.
The third: accident, section 80, now section 18
The provision. Nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune, and without any criminal intention or knowledge, in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means and with proper care and caution.
Five conditions, and separating them is where the marks are. The occurrence must be an accident or misfortune, meaning unintended and unforeseen. There must be no criminal intention or knowledge. The act being done must be lawful. It must be done in a lawful manner and by lawful means. And it must be done with proper care and caution.
The last condition is decisive, because it separates accident from negligence. A man who kills while doing something lawful but carelessly is not within section 80; he is within section 304A, now section 106, which punishes causing death by a rash or negligent act. The Code's own illustration is the exposition: A is at work with a hatchet, the head flies off and kills a bystander, and if there was no want of proper caution the death is accidental.
The case. Tunda v. Rex, AIR 1950 All 95. Tunda and Munshi were friends and keen wrestlers. In a bout Munshi was thrown, his head struck the hard edge of a chabutra, his skull was fractured and he died. Tunda was charged under section 304A. The Allahabad High Court acquitted him, holding that when two men agree to wrestle each impliedly consents to suffer the accidental injuries the sport carries, and that in the absence of any proof of foul play the death was accidental and unintentional. Sections 80 and 87 operated together: the act was lawful because both had consented to the risk, and the outcome was accidental because there was no want of care.
Criticism. The requirement that the act itself be lawful narrows the defence sharply, so an accused doing something unlawful in a wholly unrelated respect loses the protection even though the death was pure misfortune. And the line between an accident and a want of proper care is in truth a question of fact dressed as a rule, which makes outcomes hard to predict.
Conclusion. The General Exceptions are Chapter IV of the Penal Code, sections 76 to 106, now Chapter III of the Sanhita, sections 14 to 44, and they operate by subtraction: an act within them is not an offence. Of the three taken in detail, the right of private defence in sections 96 to 106 is an enumerated right, preventive and not punitive, permitting killing only on the seven occasions of section 100 and the four of section 103 and limited throughout by the four restrictions in section 99, as Amjad Khan, Deo Narain and James Martin show. Unsoundness of mind in section 84 requires legal and not medical incapacity at the moment of the act, as Surendra Mishra holds, and after Dahyabhai Thakker a failed plea may still raise a reasonable doubt about intention. Accident in section 80 excuses the unintended consequence of a lawful act lawfully and carefully done, as Tunda v. Rex shows, and fails the moment proper care is wanting.
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