Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
Public Authorities and Power Holders
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LLM · Group 1 Constitutional and Administrative Law
2015 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
Public Authorities and Power Holders
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LLM · Group 1 Constitutional and Administrative Law
2015 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
First published on munotes.in on 12 August 2026.
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Model answers written and edited by the munotes.in editorial desk.
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The University does not publish an official answer key for this paper. The answers in this volume are model answers, written to show how a full-mark answer is built. They are a study aid, not an authority on what an examiner marked.
The question paper reproduced here is the paper as set by the University of Mumbai at the 2015 examination.
The answers in this volume state the law as it stands today, not as it stood when the paper was set. Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, inserted in 2018, again requires prior approval before any inquiry into a public servant, and in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 13 January 2026, two judges divided on its validity, so the question now goes to a larger Bench. CBI v. R.R. Kishore, 11 September 2023, held section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act void from its insertion in 2003. The amending Acts of 2021, upheld in Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India, let the Director's two year tenure be extended to five. State of West Bengal v. Union of India, 10 July 2024, held maintainable a State's suit over investigation without its consent. And the Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014, has never been brought into force, so protected disclosures still rest on the Resolution of 2004. Where an answer relies on any of these it gives the date.
The questions below are the paper as the University of Mumbai set it at the 2015 examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
MarksPage
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2015 examination, reproduced as the University of Mumbai set them, in the order it set them. Nothing has been reworded, added or left out. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 3 hours · Total marks 100 · 12 questions answered
How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
Paper 15878, printer's form BB-Con. 8191-15. Attempt any four questions, all questions carry equal marks, 25 marks each
any four of six · 100 Marks
Answer
For full marks, cover: both notes, each worth about twelve and a half marks by the paper's own arithmetic, and each written as a compressed essay rather than as a list. For (a), where a committee gets the power to compel anybody to do anything, the committees that matter, how an inquiry proceeds, one worked case and the limits. For (b), the fact that the agency rests on no statute of its own, its origin and divisions, the consent problem under section 6, the two cases that define its autonomy, and an honest word on its record.
A legislative committee inquiry is an examination, conducted by a body of members on behalf of the House, into the conduct of the administration, the spending of public money or the conduct of members themselves. It is neither a trial nor a Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, and its power to summon officials and call for files therefore has to be traced to the Constitution.
Two constitutional provisions supply it. Article 105, and Article 194 for the States, states the powers, privileges and immunities of each House, its members and of its committees. Article 105(3) provides that those privileges shall be such as Parliament may define by law and, until it does, those that obtained immediately before the coming into force of section 15 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, which preserved the position under which the privileges were those of the House of Commons at the commencement of the Constitution. Parliament has never enacted the defining law. The privilege that matters is the power to send for persons, papers and records, and its sanction is the House's power to punish for contempt. Article 118, and Article 208 for the States, empowers each House to make rules regulating its procedure, and it is under those Rules that the committees themselves exist.
The committees that conduct inquiries fall into four groups. The financial committees: the Public Accounts Committee, constituted every year under Rule 308 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, of twenty-two members, fifteen from the House of the People and seven from the Council of States, with the Chairman appointed from the Opposition by practice since 1967, which examines the audit reports laid under Article 151 and the Appropriation and Finance Accounts; the Estimates Committee of thirty members of the House of the People, which examines the estimates and suggests economies; and the Committee on Public Undertakings, which examines the accounts and audit reports of public undertakings.
The Departmentally Related Standing Committees, twenty-four of them in their present form since 1993, each attached to a group of ministries, examining demands for grants, Bills referred to them and annual reports. The scrutiny committees, chiefly the Committee on Subordinate Legislation, the Committee on Government Assurances and the Committee on Petitions. And the committees on conduct, the Committee of Privileges and the Ethics Committee, together with ad hoc Joint Parliamentary Committees appointed for a particular scandal, of which the committees on the securities and banking irregularities of 1992 and on stock market transactions in 2001 are the standard examples.
How an inquiry proceeds. The committee decides its subject within its allotted field, calls for written memoranda from the ministry, examines the ministry's Secretary and other officials orally, and may call non-official witnesses and experts. It sits in private, its evidence is confidential until presented, and it deliberates and reports across party lines, which is why its reports are often unanimous on matters that divide the House. The report is presented to the House and, in the case of the financial committees, the ministries must furnish Action Taken Notes on the recommendations.
Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184, is the case to cite. In December 2005 a television investigation showed eleven Members of Parliament accepting money for asking questions in the House. An inquiry committee of the Lok Sabha and the Ethics Committee of the Council of States examined the matter and, on their reports, the members were expelled. They challenged the expulsion, contending that the House had no power to expel and that its procedure was unfair. The Supreme Court held that the power to expel is among the privileges continued by Article 105(3); that Article 122(1) bars judicial review only on the ground of irregularity of procedure and not where illegality or unconstitutionality is alleged; and, having examined the committees' procedure and found that the members had notice and a hearing, upheld the expulsions. The case establishes three things at once: a committee inquiry into members' conduct is competent, it must observe natural justice, and its result is reviewable on narrow grounds.
The limits. Article 121, and Article 211 for the States, forbids any discussion of the conduct of a Judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court except on a motion for removal, so a committee cannot inquire into a judge's judicial conduct. By convention committees examine officials and not Ministers, so the person collectively responsible to the House under Article 75(3) does not himself appear. The Government may withhold documents on grounds of security or confidentiality, and there is no arbiter between it and the committee. And the reports recommend; nothing compels acceptance, and Action Taken Notes are often overdue.
The Central Bureau of Investigation is the Union's principal investigating agency for corruption, economic offences and serious crime, and the first thing to say about it is that no statute establishes it. It was created by a resolution of the Ministry of Home Affairs dated 1 April 1963, which reorganised the Delhi Special Police Establishment. That establishment began in 1941 to investigate bribery and corruption in war-time supplies and was given a statutory footing by the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. The agency exercises the powers of that establishment, and its officers are in law police officers of the Union territory of Delhi. The Gauhati High Court once held its constitution invalid for want of a statute; that decision was stayed by the Supreme Court and the matter remains pending, so the position is unsettled and should be stated as such.
Its work divides into three. The Anti-Corruption Division investigates offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, by central government servants and employees of central public sector undertakings and public sector banks, and it is over this division that the Central Vigilance Commission exercises superintendence under section 8(1)(b) of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003. The Economic Offences Division investigates large frauds, bank frauds and cases with a cross-border dimension, and the agency is India's National Central Bureau for Interpol. The Special Crimes Division takes up serious conventional crime, chiefly at the request of a State or on the direction of a constitutional court.
Jurisdiction is its central legal difficulty. Under section 2 of the Act of 1946 the establishment's powers extend to the Union territories; under section 5 the Central Government may extend them to a State; but section 6 provides that no such extension operates in a State without the consent of that State Government. Consent may be general or case by case. By 2024 ten States had withdrawn general consent, including Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Kerala, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Punjab, Rajasthan, Telangana, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka withdrew in September 2024. A constitutional court may still direct the agency to investigate notwithstanding the absence of consent, which is why a large share of its most important work now comes by judicial direction.
Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226, decided on 18 December 1997, is the foundation of the modern law on this agency. The Jain hawala diaries, seized in 1991, recorded payments to politicians and civil servants, and for years nothing was done. On a public interest petition by a journalist the Supreme Court held that the failure was structural. It struck down the single directive, an executive instruction requiring prior sanction before officers above a certain rank could even be investigated; directed a minimum tenure of two years for the Director and a transparent selection process; and placed the agency's anti-corruption work under the superintendence of a Central Vigilance Commission that was to be given statutory status. It also used the technique of continuing mandamus, retaining the petition and supervising compliance.
That protection has since been altered by Parliament: the Delhi Special Police Establishment (Amendment) Act, 2021 allows the two year tenure to be extended by one year at a time, up to five years in all, on the recommendation of the same committee, and in Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India, decided on 11 July 2023, the Supreme Court upheld that Act and the parallel Central Vigilance Commission (Amendment) Act, 2021, while quashing the particular extensions granted to the incumbent Director of Enforcement. An extendable tenure is a weaker guarantee than a fixed one, because it leaves the holder looking to the authority that grants the extension.
Subramanian Swamy v. Director, CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682, decided on 6 May 2014, completed that work. After Vineet Narain, Parliament had re-enacted the single directive as section 6A of the Act of 1946, requiring the Central Government's prior approval before any inquiry into an officer of the rank of Joint Secretary and above. A Constitution Bench of five judges struck it down as violating Article 14: the classification protected the senior officer from central investigation while the State police could investigate him without approval, and a provision that impedes the prosecution of high-level corruption offends the rule of law, which is itself part of Article 14. In CBI v. Dr. R.R. Kishore, decided on 11 September 2023, a Constitution Bench clarified that the invalidity operates from the date section 6A was inserted in 2003 and not merely from 2014.
Parliament has since built the gate a third time, and an answer that stops at 2023 is out of date. Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, inserted by the amending Act of 2018 with effect from 26 July 2018, forbids a police officer from conducting any enquiry, inquiry or investigation into an offence under that Act alleged against a public servant, where the alleged offence relates to a recommendation made or a decision taken by him in the discharge of his official functions, without the previous approval of the appropriate authority. In one respect it is wider than section 6A, because it protects every public servant and not only officers of the rank of Joint Secretary and above.
Its constitutional validity is now unresolved, and this is the most current point in the subject. In Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 55, decided on 13 January 2026, a Bench of two judges divided. Viswanathan J. upheld section 17A as a protection for honest officers against vexatious complaints that would otherwise paralyse administration, while observing that the power to approve ought to rest with the Lokpal or a Lokayukta rather than with the Government. Nagarathna J. held it unconstitutional under Article 14, on the reasoning of Subramanian Swamy, as an impermissible classification shielding officers engaged in decision making while leaving others unprotected. The matter has been referred to the Chief Justice of India for a larger Bench, so the correct statement is that the approval requirement stands and its constitutionality is undecided.
Its record, stated honestly. The agency has investigated the largest corruption matters of the last three decades, from the hawala diaries and the fodder scam to spectrum, coal and a series of bank frauds, much of it under court monitoring. Against that, its conviction rate in Prevention of Corruption Act cases is modest relative to the number of trials pending; it depends on the Government for officers, sanction and facilities; and its reach in the States now follows the political map. The Supreme Court's description of it in 2013 as a caged parrot has endured because it names the structural point rather than a passing failure.
Conclusion. The two institutions in this question are the two halves of a single problem. A legislative committee has independence, cross-party composition and the House's inherited privilege to send for persons, papers and records, and it cannot compel anyone to act on what it finds. The Central Bureau of Investigation can arrest, charge and prosecute, and it rests on a resolution of 1963 and an Act of 1946 written for another purpose, needs a State's consent under section 6 that eleven States have withdrawn, and is staffed and funded by the executive whose conduct it examines. Raja Ram Pal shows how far a committee's power reaches and that it is reviewable; Vineet Narain and Subramanian Swamy show the courts steadily removing the executive's power to stop an investigation before it starts. Neither line of authority has yet produced an institution that combines credible independence with the capacity to compel.
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