LLM Group 1 Constitutional and Administrative Law Constitutionalism Pluralism and Federalism 2018 Question Paper with Solutions

For full marks, cover: the three competing models of secularism, so that the Indian model can be identified rather than assumed; the constitutional provisions which made India secular before 1976; what the Forty-second Amendment actually altered; the case law establishing secularism as a basic feature, worked out; the two companion words, socialism and integrity, which most candidates ignore; the 2024 decision upholding the insertion; and a critical assessment.

Three models, and which one India adopted

Naming the models first is what allows the rest of the answer to be precise. The French model, laïcité, requires the State to exclude religion from the public sphere, and it produces prohibitions on conspicuous religious symbols in State schools. The American model builds a wall of separation between church and State, derived from the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, so the State neither aids nor hinders religion. Neither describes India.

India was secular before 1976

The provisions that make the Constitution secular were all in the document as adopted. Articles 25 to 28 guarantee freedom of conscience, the right of denominations to manage their religious affairs, freedom from taxation for the promotion of a religion, and restrictions on religious instruction in State institutions. Articles 14, 15 and 16 forbid discrimination on the ground of religion in law, in access to public places and in public employment. Articles 29 and 30 protect cultural and educational rights. Article 44 contemplates a uniform civil code. Article 325 provides that no person shall be ineligible for inclusion in an electoral roll on grounds of religion, race, caste or sex, which abolished the separate electorates of the colonial period.

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, listed the secular character of the Constitution among its basic features three years before the word entered the Preamble. That single fact answers most of the question: the amendment could not have created what a thirteen judge Bench had already found.

Secularism as a basic feature: the case law

S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1, is the decisive authority and it must be given with its facts. After the demolition of the Babri Masjid on 6 December 1992 the Union dismissed the governments of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh under Article 356; the Karnataka government had earlier been dismissed on a claim of lost majority. Nine judges held that secularism is a basic feature, that a State government acting against the secular character of the Constitution furnishes ground for action under Article 356, and that the President's satisfaction is justiciable on the material before him. The Karnataka dismissal was set aside because the majority question should have been tested on the floor of the House. The dismissals following the demolition were upheld, so the case is not only a statement about secularism but an application of it against elected governments.

Anjum Kadari v. Union of India, decided 5 November 2024, is the most recent statement of the doctrine and it should be used. The Allahabad High Court had struck down the Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004, as violating secularism. The Supreme Court set that aside and upheld the Act, holding that a statute may be struck down only for breach of Part III or want of legislative competence, that regulating the standard of education in madarsas is within Entry 25 of the Concurrent List, and that ensuring students attain a level of competence enabling them to participate in society is consistent with Articles 21A and 30. Only the provisions conferring Fazil and Kamil degrees were severed, as conflicting with the University Grants Commission Act, 1956. Positive secularism means the State may regulate the secular component of religious education, and must not abolish it.

"Integrity" is territorial and answers secession. It enters a line beginning with the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, which added the sovereignty and integrity of India as a ground of restriction under Article 19(2), (3) and (4) and to the oaths in the Third Schedule. It was relied on in Bommai, where a threat to the unity and integrity of the country was treated as relevant material for a proclamation.

The 2024 decision, and the criticism

Dr. Balram Singh v. Union of India, decided 25 November 2024, disposed of the challenge to the insertion itself. Petitioners argued that the Constituent Assembly had deliberately omitted the two words and that the Preamble, bearing the date 26 November 1949, could not be amended without falsifying that date. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the amending power extends to the Preamble, that the date of adoption does not freeze its text, and that in the Indian context "socialist" denotes a welfare State committed to equality of opportunity rather than any economic doctrine, while "secular" expresses the equal treatment of faiths the Constitution already required. That is a judicial endorsement of the proposition in the question.

Conclusion. The claim in the question is right, provided it is stated exactly. The Forty-second Amendment did not make India secular, socialist or indivisible; the Constitution was already all three on the reading a thirteen judge Bench gave it in Kesavananda three years earlier. What section 2 did was move three commitments from inference to text, so that they could be applied as express standards. Secularism has done most with that status, decisively in Bommai, in the election cases and most recently in Anjum Kadari; integrity has worked quietly through Article 19(2) and Article 356; socialism has done least, and Property Owners Association has now fixed its limit. Balram Singh in November 2024 confirms that the insertion was valid and describes its effect in almost the words the question uses.