Mumbai University Solved Question Papers munotes.in
Indian Constitutional Law New Challenges
LLM · Foundation Course
Feb 2026 - Group VI Examination
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
munotes.in Mumbai
Mumbai University Solved Question Papers munotes.in
Indian Constitutional Law New Challenges
LLM · Foundation Course
Feb 2026 - Group VI Examination
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
munotes.in Mumbai
First published on munotes.in on 12 August 2026.
This edition revised 16 November 2026.
Published by munotes.in, Mumbai.
Model answers written and edited by the munotes.in editorial desk.
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munotes.in is an independent study resource for students of the University of Mumbai. It is not affiliated with the University of Mumbai, and is not endorsed by it.
The University does not publish an official answer key for this paper. The answers in this volume are model answers, written to show how a full-mark answer is built. They are a study aid, not an authority on what an examiner marked.
The question paper reproduced here is the paper as set by the University of Mumbai at the Feb 2026 - Group VI examination.
The answers in this volume state the law as it stands today, not as it stood when the paper was set, and in this subject the difference is large. Five changes alter answers here. Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal, 8 November 2024, overruled Azeez Basha on the minority status of an institution incorporated by statute. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 1 August 2024, permitted sub-classification within the Scheduled Castes. The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023 replaced the appointment committee directed in Anoop Baranwal. The Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Act, 2023 came into force on 16 April 2026 and is not yet operative. And the advisory opinion of 20 November 2025 held that no timeline may be set for assent to a Bill. Where a provision has since been replaced, the answer gives the position then and now, and says which is which.
The questions below are the paper as the University of Mumbai set it at the Feb 2026 - Group VI examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the Feb 2026 - Group VI examination, reproduced as the University of Mumbai set them, in the order it set them. Nothing has been reworded, added or left out. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 3 hours · Total marks 100 · 7 questions answered
How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
Attempt ANY FOUR questions, all questions carry equal marks, cite relevant case laws wherever required
any four of seven · 100 Marks
Answer
For full marks, cover: the text of Article 12 and why it is inclusive; the four named limbs; the long march of "other authorities", with each leading case given its facts, its issue and its ratio rather than a bare citation; the retreat in Zee Telefilms and Federal Bank; whether the judiciary is State; and the honest answer to the question asked, which is that the ambit has been expanded in doctrine and narrowed in fact by privatisation, with Article 226 and Kaushal Kishor filling part of the gap.
Article 12 defines "the State" for Part III of the Constitution. Part III is the part that holds the fundamental rights. The Article says: "In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, 'the State' includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India."
So the State includes four groups. They are the Government and Parliament of India, the Government and Legislature of each State, all local authorities, and other authorities. Three features of this wording control the whole subject.
First, it says "includes", not "means". A definition that begins with "means" is exhaustive. It lists everything the word covers, and nothing can be added. A definition that begins with "includes" is extensive. It adds to the ordinary meaning of the word without replacing it. Every widening the courts have made rests on that single word. The Supreme Court has said so many times.
Second, it is a definition for Part III alone, and for Part IV by an express extension. Article 36 says that in Part IV, "the State" has the same meaning as in Part III, unless the context otherwise requires. Part IV holds the Directive Principles of State Policy. So a body may be State for a fundamental right and not for any other purpose in law. The reverse is equally true. A body may be a "public authority" under the Right to Information Act, 2005. It may be an "instrumentality" for some statutory purpose. It may still not be State under Article 12.
Third, the closing words are disjunctive, which means they give two separate alternatives: "within the territory of India OR under the control of the Government of India". So a body inside India is covered even if the Government of India does not control it. A State authority is an example. A body outside India is covered if the Government of India controls it. This second limb brings, for example, an Indian mission abroad within Part III.
Why the definition matters at all. In its ordinary working, Part III is a set of vertical guarantees. Vertical means the citizen holds them against the State, not against another private person. Article 13(2) says the State shall not make any law that takes away or abridges the rights in Part III. A law made against this rule is void to the extent of the conflict. Void means it has no legal effect. Article 32 gives the remedy, which is a petition to the Supreme Court. The right to move the Supreme Court under it is itself a fundamental right.
So the question whether a body is State decides whether the citizen has any constitutional remedy against it at all. Article 12 is the doorway to the whole of Part III. Every argument about its width is really an argument about one thing. How much of national life must obey the fundamental rights?
"The Government and Parliament of India" and "the Government and the Legislature of each of the States" cover the executive and the legislature at both levels. The executive limb reaches the President and the Governors. It also reaches the Council of Ministers, and every department, officer and agent acting for them. This is because Articles 53 and 154 vest the executive power of the Union in the President and that of a State in the Governor. That power is used through officers below them.
So an administrative circular, an executive instruction and a departmental decision are all acts of the State. None of them is "law" for the purposes of Article 13. Each is still bound by Part III. Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986) 3 SCC 615 shows the difference. Three school children were expelled, and the education department relied on two of its circulars to justify it. The Supreme Court held that the circulars were only departmental instructions with no statutory basis. So they were not "law" that could restrict a fundamental right, and the expulsion was set aside.
"All local authorities" takes its meaning from section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. That section defines a local authority as "a municipal committee, district board, body of port commissioners or other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with, the control or management of a municipal or local fund". So the test is the control or management of a municipal or local fund.
On that basis, municipal corporations, panchayats, improvement trusts, port trusts and cantonment boards are State. So are the bodies that manage a local fund under authority given by law. The leading example is Mohammad Yasin v. Town Area Committee (AIR 1952 SC 115). A town area committee imposed a fee on traders. The Supreme Court struck the fee down as violating Article 19(1)(g), the right to carry on any trade or business. The Court proceeded on the basis that the committee was State.
"Other authorities" is the residual limb. Residual means it catches what the named limbs leave out. Seventy years of litigation have taken place on these two words.
Each case below is given with its facts, the issue, what was held, and its ratio. The ratio is the rule of law on which the decision rests.
(a) University of Madras v. Shantha Bai (AIR 1954 Mad 67): the narrow start.
Facts. The University of Madras directed that affiliated colleges could admit women only with the special sanction of the Syndicate. The college also had to meet conditions about accommodation and amenities. Shantha Bai was refused admission. She claimed a breach of Articles 15 and 29(2).
Issue. Is a university an "other authority" within Article 12?
Held. The Madras High Court said no. It applied the rule of ejusdem generis. This Latin phrase means "of the same kind". Under this rule, general words that follow a list of particular words take their meaning from that list. The Court reasoned that "other authorities" follows words that name governmental and legislative bodies. So it must be limited to bodies exercising governmental or sovereign functions. A university performs no sovereign function, so it was outside Article 12.
Why it is wrong, and how it fell. The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where the particular words before the general words form a distinct genus or category. A genus is a class of things that share a common feature. The words in Article 12 do not form one. The Government, Parliament, a State legislature and a local authority share nothing except that each exercises some public power. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1962 SC 1621) doubted this reasoning. The next case rejected it.
(b) Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal (AIR 1967 SC 1857): the statutory test.
Facts. Mohan Lal and several others were permanent employees of the Rajasthan Government. In 1958 their services were placed at the disposal of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board. The Board was set up under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. While Mohan Lal was away on deputation, the Board promoted the others to Assistant Engineer and did not promote him. He complained of a breach of Articles 14 and 16.
Issue. Is a statutory corporation that carries on a commercial activity an "other authority"?
Held. Yes. Bhargava J. wrote for the majority. He held that "other authorities" includes every authority created by the Constitution or by a statute on which powers are conferred by law. The rule of ejusdem generis does not apply, because the words before "other authorities" share no common genus. It is immaterial that the body also carries on a commercial activity. Immaterial means it makes no difference. A body may do commercial work and still hold statutory powers of a governmental kind. He also relied on the Board's power to give directions. Disobeying those directions was punishable as a criminal offence.
Shah J. agreed with the result but gave a narrower test of his own. For him, a body is State when it holds the "power to make rules or regulations and to administer or enforce them to the detriment of citizens and others". Rules and regulations made under a statute have the force of law. He said such a power is in substance the sovereign power of the State, delegated to the Board.
Ratio. A body created by statute and given legal powers is State, whatever its commercial character.
(c) Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi (1975) 1 SCC 421: instrumentality is born.
Facts. Employees of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, the Life Insurance Corporation and the Industrial Finance Corporation were removed from service. Their removal broke the regulations that governed their service. In an ordinary master-and-servant relationship, a wrongful dismissal gives only a claim for damages. The employees wanted reinstatement, which means being put back in their jobs. That remedy needs the employment to carry a statutory status, that is, a status given by law.
Issue. Do the regulations of a statutory corporation have the force of law? Are these corporations State?
Held. By a majority, yes on both questions. The regulations were made under powers given by a statute. They bound the corporation as well as the employee, so they had the force of law. A dismissal in breach of them was therefore void, and reinstatement followed.
The reasoning that mattered most came from Mathew J. in a concurring opinion. A concurring opinion agrees with the result but gives reasons of its own. His idea became the base on which the next thirty years were built. He reasoned in four steps.
In plain words, the State cannot avoid its constitutional duties just by setting up a company to do its work. Mathew J. added the test of the public function. Suppose a corporation carries out State policy and does work the State would otherwise do itself. Then the same constitutional limits apply to it as to the State.
(d) Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India (1979) 3 SCC 489: the tests, and the parallel rule on State largesse.
Facts. The International Airport Authority invited tenders to run a restaurant and two snack bars at Bombay airport. Only "registered second class hoteliers having at least five years' experience" could apply. The Authority then accepted a tender from a party that did not meet that condition at all. Shetty had not tendered, because he too did not meet the condition. He challenged the award. His case was that people like him had been shut out of a contest that the Authority itself then ignored.
Issue. First, is the Authority State? Second, may a State instrumentality depart from the standard it has itself laid down for awarding a contract?
Held. On the first question, yes. Bhagwati J. set out the indicia of an instrumentality. Indicia means signs or indicators. They are worth listing because they became the standard.
The second question is the half of the case that is often forgotten. The Court held that the State and its instrumentalities cannot act arbitrarily in the matter of largesse. Largesse means benefits the State gives out, such as contracts, licences and jobs. Where the State lays down a standard for awarding a contract, it is bound by it. It may not depart from that standard in an individual case. This is because Article 14 forbids arbitrariness in every State action, contractual or otherwise. That holding became the foundation of the whole modern law of government contracts.
(e) Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1981) 1 SCC 722: form ceases to matter.
Facts. Students challenged admissions to the Regional Engineering College, Srinagar. The oral interview carried one-third of the total marks, which was out of proportion. It was also said to have been conducted arbitrarily. The College was not run by a statutory corporation. It was run by a society registered under the Jammu and Kashmir Registration of Societies Act, 1898, which corresponds to the Societies Registration Act, 1860.
Issue. A registered society is formed by an agreement between its members, not by a statute. Can such a society be State?
Held. Yes. Every answer should quote its reasoning. The enquiry is not how the juristic person is born but why it has been brought into existence. A juristic person is a body the law treats as a person, such as a company or a society. A corporation may be an instrumentality of the State whether it is created by a statute or under a statute. The idea of an instrumentality does not depend on how the body was created.
The Court restated the R.D. Shetty indicia as six tests and applied them. It held the society to be State. It then held that giving one-third of the marks to an oral interview was arbitrary and violated Article 14.
Two warnings the Court itself added, and candidates habitually ignore them. The tests are not conclusive but illustrative. They are examples, not a complete list. They must also be applied cumulatively, that is, all taken together. They are not a checklist on which a body scores points.
(f) The intermediate applications. Later cases applied the tests both ways.
(g) Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) 5 SCC 111: the settled test.
Facts. Employees of a laboratory of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) were terminated, and they moved the High Court. The obstacle was Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India (1975) 1 SCC 485. That was a decision of five judges, given on the very same day as Sukhdev Singh. It had held CSIR not to be State in a very short judgment. It looked mainly at the form of CSIR as a registered society.
Issue. Is CSIR State, and does Sabhajit Tewary survive?
Held. A bench of seven judges held, by 5:2, that CSIR is State. Sabhajit Tewary was overruled. The majority restated the whole enquiry as one composite question:
Is the body financially, functionally and administratively dominated by, or under the control of, the Government? Is that control particular to the body and is it pervasive?
The Court added three riders, and each one is examinable.
On the facts, the Court found six things about CSIR.
(a) Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India (2005) 4 SCC 649.
Facts. The Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) cancelled Zee's contract for television rights. Zee moved the Supreme Court under Article 32. For that, Zee had to show that the Board is State.
Held. By 3:2, the Board is not State. The majority applied Pradeep Kumar Biswas and found six things.
The two arguments the Court rejected, and its answers, are the examinable part. The first argument was that the Board selects the national team, so it performs a public function. The second was that it enjoys a de facto monopoly over the sport. De facto means existing in fact, though not given by law. The majority gave three answers.
But the Court preserved the remedy. It held expressly that an aggrieved party is not without a remedy where the Board acts in the discharge of public duties. A writ under Article 226 lies against it in the High Court. A writ is a formal order of a court. Article 226 reaches "any other purpose", so it covers any person or body performing a public duty. Sinha J. dissented. He would have held the Board to be State, because it performs a function the State would otherwise have to perform.
(b) Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas (2003) 10 SCC 733. Federal Bank is a private bank. The Reserve Bank of India licenses and closely regulates it under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. It was held not to be State. This is the cleanest statement of the rule on regulatory control. Regulation, however detailed, is the State doing its own job of supervision. It does not turn the regulated body into a limb of the State.
(c) K.K. Saksena v. International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (2015) 4 SCC 670 completed the picture from the other side. It held that a body may be answerable under Article 226 for a public duty, without being State under Article 12. It also warned that the duty must be truly public. A duty owed to members of the public under a contract is not enough.
In its rule-making and administrative work, yes. Rules framed under Articles 145 and 227 are State action. So are administrative decisions on appointments and service conditions. They can be challenged under Part III. Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner (AIR 1963 SC 996) struck down a rule of the Supreme Court itself. The rule required a petitioner under Article 32 to give security for costs. The Court held that it whittled down a fundamental right.
In its judicial work, no. Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1967 SC 1) was decided by a bench of nine. It held that a judicial order of a competent court cannot be said to violate a fundamental right. The remedy against such an order is an appeal, not a petition under Article 32. Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002) 4 SCC 388 confirmed this. In the same case, it created the curative petition. This is a final remedy, open only in rare cases where a gross miscarriage of justice has occurred.
Expanded, in doctrine, and the direction of travel is unmistakable. The law moved in six steps.
At each step, a class of body that had been outside Part III was brought inside it.
Alongside it the courts opened a second door, which is not Article 12 at all. The case is Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani (1989) 2 SCC 691. It held that a writ of mandamus under Article 226 lies against any person or body performing a public duty, whatever its constitutional character. Mandamus is a writ that orders a person or body to perform a public duty. The Court relied on the words "for any other purpose" in Article 226, which make it wider than Article 32. In that case, a trust ran an affiliated college. It was ordered to pay its teachers. The trust was private, but the duty was public.
And a third door has now been opened. The case is Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023) 4 SCC 1. A bench of five decided it by 4:1. It held that the rights under Articles 19 and 21 are enforceable even against persons other than the State and its instrumentalities. This is called horizontal enforcement, because it runs between private persons. These Articles now join Articles 15(2), 17, 20(2), 23, 24 and 29(2), which are horizontal on their own terms. The Court also held that the State owes a positive duty to protect a person's Article 21 rights. That duty applies even against a threat from a private person. Nagarathna J. partly dissented, and the remedies are still not worked out. But the direction is clear.
Diluted, in fact, and this is the half most answers omit. The reach of Article 12 depends on how much the State owns and controls. Every test in Pradeep Kumar Biswas is a test of ownership and control. Since the New Industrial Policy of 24 July 1991, the State has steadily stepped back. It has sold its shares in public sector undertakings, a process called disinvestment. It has opened reserved sectors and contracted out services. It has left whole industries.
The clearest proof is BALCO Employees' Union v. Union of India (2002) 2 SCC 333. The Union sold fifty-one per cent of Bharat Aluminium Company to a private buyer. The workers challenged the sale. The Court upheld it. It held that disinvestment is a matter of economic policy. The Court has neither the expertise nor the resources to sit in judgment on it. It also held that the employees had no right to be heard, since a change in who owned the shares altered no right of theirs.
The constitutional result was not disputed by the Court. On the day before the sale, a worker could move the High Court for a breach of Articles 14 and 16. On the day after, he could not. Nobody voted to reduce his rights. The definition simply stopped reaching his employer.
The same shrinking happens in three other forms.
Conclusion. Article 12 has been read widely, and rightly so. A constitutional guarantee that could be avoided by choosing a corporate form would be worth nothing. That is exactly what Mathew J. said in Sukhdev Singh, and seven judges confirmed it in Pradeep Kumar Biswas. But Zee Telefilms marks the limit of that widening, and it marks it correctly. Control is the only principled test available. A definition that caught every powerful private body would have no boundary at all.
The result is a doctrine that is settled and still, just when the field it governs is shrinking. Liberalisation has shrunk the State faster than the interpretation has grown. The judicial answer has not been to stretch Article 12 further, which after 2002 it will not bear. Instead the courts have moved the question from what the body is to what the body does. After Andi Mukta, Article 226 reaches any body doing a public duty. After Kaushal Kishor, Articles 19 and 21 can be enforced horizontally. So the ambit of the definition has been expanded, and it is now being quietly replaced by a test of public function. That is where the next decade of litigation on this Article will be fought.
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