The Theories of Political Obligation: A Map
Chapter Twenty-Eight
Syllabus topic 2.2, "Theories of Political Obligation"
Pages 132 to 135 of 506
In one line
Five theories, five answers to one question, and they can be arranged in a single line running from "obey because God said so" to "obey because it has always been so".
In the wording a student can write in an exam: MU sets five theories of political obligation, the divine right theory of kings, the social contract or consent theory, the theory of force, the theory of prescriptive possession, and the Marxist view; the first four are attempts to justify the duty to obey and the fifth denies that any such general duty exists.
The five, in one sentence each
Divine right of kings. The ruler holds power from God, so disobedience to the ruler is disobedience to God. Chapter 290.
Social contract and consent. People agreed, expressly or by implication, to be governed, and are bound by their own agreement. Chapters 300 to 340, which take Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau separately because they contract for different things on different terms.
Force. The state arose from conquest and rests on superior strength; obedience is owed to whoever can compel it. Chapter 350.
Prescriptive possession. The arrangement has stood so long that its origins may no longer be questioned, and long possession itself confers title. Chapter 360.
Marx. The state is an instrument of one class against another, so there is no general duty to obey it at all. Chapter 370.
The line they can be arranged on
Set them out by where the obligation comes from, and the whole module becomes one argument rather than five.
From outside the human world. Divine right. The duty exists because a source above all human beings placed the ruler there.
From the citizen's own act. Social contract and consent. The duty exists because you did something, promised or accepted or took a benefit.
From nothing at all except superior strength. Force. Strictly this is not a theory of obligation but a denial that one is needed, and saying so is worth a mark.
From time. Prescription. The duty exists because the arrangement is old, and its age is what makes questioning it improper.
Nowhere. Marx. There is no general duty; there is a class that rules and a class that is ruled, and calling the relation a duty is part of how it is maintained.
Notice that the middle three answer the four problems from chapter 240 quite differently. Contract explains particularity best, because you contracted with this state. Prescription explains generality best, because age covers the whole arrangement. Force explains none of them, which is its defect. And Marx explains why the question keeps being asked, which is a different kind of contribution.
The Theories of Political Obligation: A Map
What each has to answer for
| Theory | Its strongest claim | Its fatal difficulty |
|---|---|---|
| Divine right | Explains why the duty is absolute and why the ruler cannot be judged by subjects | It is an argument from a premise not everybody accepts, and it cannot say which claimant God chose |
| Social contract | A person is bound by their own undertaking, which is the clearest source of duty there is | The contract never happened, and nobody alive agreed to anything |
| Force | It describes how most states actually began | Might does not make right; it explains power and not obligation |
| Prescription | It fits how people actually treat settled institutions | Age cannot convert a wrong into a right, or every injustice would become lawful by lasting |
| Marx | It explains whose interest the question of obedience serves | If there is no duty at all, it cannot explain why revolutionaries also build states and demand obedience |
The historical order, which is not the logical order
Students often assume the theories replaced one another in sequence. Roughly, divine right dominated in Europe until the seventeenth century, contract theory displaced it in the seventeenth and eighteenth, force and prescription were argued in the eighteenth and nineteenth, and Marx wrote in the nineteenth. But they overlap, they were argued against each other in the same decades, and all five are still used today in slightly different clothing.
Where each survives now. Divine right survives wherever a ruler claims a religious sanction. Contract survives as the whole theory of democratic consent, which is Module IV. Force survives in every argument that a regime should be obeyed because resistance is futile. Prescription survives in every appeal to tradition, to precedent and to settled expectations, and in the legal doctrines of limitation and adverse possession. And Marx survives in every argument that a law serves the interest of those who wrote it.
A worked example
A tenant is served with a notice to quit under a rent law they think unjust.
A divine right theorist would say the sovereign's command must be obeyed and that judging it is not the tenant's place.
A contract theorist would ask what the tenant is taken to have agreed to by living in this state and enjoying its protection, and would say the duty is the tenant's own undertaking coming back.
A force theorist would observe that the bailiff will arrive whatever the tenant thinks, and would treat that as the end of the matter.
A prescriptive theorist would point to the long settled system of tenancy law under which both parties took their positions, and would say that the tenant may not now reopen the foundation on which the whole arrangement rests.
A Marxist would ask who owns the building, note that rent law is the form in which the relation between owner and tenant is stabilised, and deny that the tenant owes any duty to a system built to protect the owner.
The Theories of Political Obligation: A Map
And a court would ask only whether the notice complies with the statute. That is worth noticing: the legal question and the obligation question are different, and this module is about the second.
What this map is NOT
It is not a ranking. Each theory is strongest where the others are weakest.
It is not exhaustive. Chapter 260 set out grounds MU does not list separately, including fair play and the natural duty of justice, and a strong answer may bring them in.
The theories are not mutually exclusive. Locke uses contract and also relies on natural rights; Burke uses prescription and also appeals to an original settlement. Real writers mix them.
Force is not a theory of obligation at all, and saying so is a point in your favour rather than a quibble.
Quick revision
- Five theories: divine right, social contract and consent, force, prescriptive possession, and Marx.
- Arrange them by the source of the duty: from God, from your own act, from strength, from time, and from nowhere.
- Contract explains particularity best; prescription explains generality best; force explains none.
- Marx denies the duty, so it is not a rival justification but a rejection of the question's premise.
- All five survive today in other clothing: religious sanction, democratic consent, futility of resistance, appeals to tradition and precedent, and the claim that a law serves its authors.
- They are not mutually exclusive, and real writers mix them.
Test yourself
1. Name the five theories MU sets and give each in one sentence. Divine right of kings: the ruler holds power from God, so disobeying the ruler is disobeying God. Social contract and consent: people agreed to be governed and are bound by their own agreement. Force: the state rests on superior strength and obedience is owed to whoever can compel it. Prescriptive possession: the arrangement has stood so long that its origin may no longer be questioned. Marx: the state is an instrument of class rule, so no general duty to obey it exists.
2. Arrange the theories by the source of the obligation. Divine right locates it outside the human world altogether, in a source above all human beings. Contract locates it in the citizen's own act, a promise, an acceptance or the taking of a benefit. Force locates it in nothing but superior strength, which is why it is strictly not a theory of obligation at all. Prescription locates it in time, since the age of the arrangement is what makes questioning it improper. Marx locates it nowhere, denying that any general duty exists.
The Theories of Political Obligation: A Map
3. Why is the theory of force not properly a theory of political obligation? Because it explains why people comply and not why they ought to. Superior strength produces being obliged, in Hart's phrase, and not being under an obligation, and the whole point of the concept of obligation is to mark the difference between a state and a gunman. A theory that says obedience is owed to whoever can compel it has abandoned the question rather than answered it, and it cannot distinguish an occupying army from a lawful government.
4. Which theory best explains particularity, and which generality? Contract explains particularity best: you are bound to this state because it was with this state, or with these fellow citizens, that the undertaking was made, which is why a contract theorist has no difficulty saying you owe nothing to a better governed state next door. Prescription explains generality best: what is protected by long standing is the whole settled arrangement rather than any selected part of it, so the argument covers the entire body of law without needing to justify each rule.
5. Do the theories exclude one another? Give examples. No. Locke argues from contract and simultaneously from natural rights that exist before any contract, and his right of resistance depends on both. Burke argues from prescription while also appealing to an original settlement that the prescription is said to preserve. Modern democratic argument uses consent, fair play and the common good together. Real writers combine them, and an answer that treats the five as sealed boxes misdescribes every one of the authors.
The rest of this subject
These notes are cut from the University's printed syllabus. Open the syllabus itself, or the past papers, for the same subject.