The Divine Right Theory of Kings

Bossuet made the parallel case in France for Louis XIV.

The Indian parallels, and where they differ

An answer written in India should say something about India, and the honest thing to say is that the parallels are real and imperfect.

Indian political thought contains ideas of divinely sanctioned kingship, and rulers took titles and performed rites that asserted a sacred character. The Manusmriti attributes a divine element to the king, and the doctrine of the king's protection carried a religious as well as a political duty.

But two differences matter and should be stated rather than glossed over. Indian kingship was generally bound by dharma, a law the king did not make and could not alter, and by the authority of those who expounded it, so the king was not the source of the law in the way the European doctrine required. And the Indian material contains a strong strand in which a ruler who fails in his duty of protection forfeits his claim, which the European theory of indefeasible right does not allow. The parallel is with divinely sanctioned kingship in general, not with the specific early modern doctrine of indefeasible hereditary right and non-resistance.

The criticisms

Locke's answer, which killed it in English political thought. Locke's First Treatise is a line by line demolition of Filmer, and the Second Treatise builds the alternative. The core objections are simple and devastating. Even if Adam had such authority, there is no way of establishing who now holds it, since the line cannot be traced. Fatherly authority is not political authority: a father's power is temporary, ends at majority, is shared with the mother and does not extend to life and death. And on the merits, Locke's own account puts political power in the community, holding government as a trust, so that when the trust is broken the power reverts to the people.

It cannot settle a contested succession. The theory's political purpose was to make succession unarguable, and it fails at exactly that point: when two claimants each say God chose them, the doctrine has no way to decide, and the matter is settled by force, which is the theory it was meant to displace.

It is an argument from a premise not everybody shares. In a society of several religions, an argument that rests on a particular theology cannot bind those outside it. In India this objection is fatal by itself.

It makes tyranny unanswerable. If the king answers to God alone, the subject of a cruel king has no remedy in this world at all. The theory's own writers felt this and produced passive obedience as the escape, which is a very narrow one.

It confuses the origin of authority with its limits. Even granting that authority comes from God, it does not follow that it is unlimited, and medieval writers had said exactly that: power from God, held for the people's good, forfeited by abuse.

A worked example

A king orders his subjects to pay a tax that no assembly has approved, and orders them to worship in a manner their conscience forbids.

On the theory, the tax must be paid. The king is accountable to God alone. Whether the tax is just is not for the subject to determine, and refusing is sedition.

The worship order is the interesting one. Here the king commands what the subject believes God forbids. The theory does not say the subject must comply, because the whole basis of royal authority is God's, and a command against God's law cannot carry God's authority. What the theory says is passive obedience: the subject may refuse to perform the act, and must then submit to whatever punishment follows, without resistance and without joining any rebellion.

Notice what has just happened. The theory has admitted a limit, and once a limit is admitted somebody must decide when it is reached. The subject deciding for themselves when a royal command is contrary to God's law is the beginning of the right of resistance, which is topic 2.3.2, and it is how the doctrine dissolved from inside.

Distinctions that carry marks

What this theory is NOT

It is not the same as a religious state. A state may apply religious law and derive its authority from a constitution; divine right is a claim about the personal title of a ruler.

It is not merely medieval. Its systematic form is early modern, and it was constructed against the Church's claim to intermediate.

It is not extinct. Every claim that a leader has a mandate from a source above politics, and that opposing them is therefore not merely wrong but impious, is the same structure in modern clothing.

Passive obedience is not the right of resistance. It permits refusal and forbids resistance, and requires the refuser to accept the punishment. It is, however, the same shape as satyagraha at topic 2.3.3, and the resemblance is worth noticing.

Quick revision

1. Four propositions: monarchy is divinely ordained; the crown is hereditary and indefeasible; the king answers to God alone; and the subject owes non-resistance.
2. The sanction is divine. Disobedience is sin, and the penalty is God's. This is the University's own question.
3. Filmer's Patriarcha: God's grant to Adam descends to kings, so royal authority is fatherly authority and no consent is needed.
4. Passive obedience: where the command is against God's law, refuse to perform and submit to the punishment without resisting.
5. Locke's answer: the line from Adam cannot be traced; fatherly power is not political power; government holds a trust and the power reverts when the trust is broken.
6. Other criticisms: it cannot settle a contested succession; it rests on a premise not all share; it leaves tyranny unanswerable; it confuses the origin of authority with its limits.
7. In India: divinely sanctioned kingship existed, but the king was bound by dharma he did not make, and forfeiture for failure of protection has no counterpart in indefeasible right.

Test yourself

1. State the divine right theory of kings in its four propositions. That monarchy is an institution ordained by God rather than a human convenience; that the crown descends by hereditary and indefeasible right, so that no act of the king and no decision of any body can defeat the lawful heir; that the king is accountable to God alone and may be judged by no earthly parliament or court; and that the subject owes non-resistance, being permitted at most passive obedience where a command conflicts with God's law.

2. What is the sanction behind political obligation on this theory? A divine sanction. Because the king holds his authority immediately from God, disobedience to the king is disobedience to God and is therefore sin, punished by God rather than merely by the king's officers. This is what gives the theory its force: the subject cannot escape the sanction by escaping the king's reach, and obedience is owed as a religious duty and not only as a political one.

3. Summarise Filmer's argument and Locke's reply. Filmer argued in Patriarcha that God gave Adam authority over his family and the earth, that this authority descended through the patriarchs to kings, and that royal authority is therefore fatherly authority, requiring no consent since a child does not consent to a father. Locke replied that even granting the premise, the line of descent cannot be traced, so nobody can show they hold Adam's right; that fatherly power is not political power, being temporary, ending at majority, shared with the mother and not extending to life and death; and that political power rests in the community, government holding it on trust.

4. Explain passive obedience and why it undermined the theory. Passive obedience permits a subject to decline to perform a command that is contrary to God's law, while forbidding forcible resistance and requiring submission to the resulting punishment. It undermined the theory because it concedes a limit on royal authority, and once a limit exists somebody must judge when it has been reached. The subject who decides for themselves that a royal command offends God's law has begun to exercise private judgment against the king, which is the seed of the right of resistance.

5. How far does the theory apply to Indian kingship? Ideas of divinely sanctioned kingship existed in India, rulers asserted a sacred character, and texts such as the Manusmriti attribute a divine element to the king. But two differences prevent a simple identification. The Indian king was bound by dharma, a law he neither made nor could alter, and expounded by others, so he was not the source of law as the European doctrine required. And Indian thought contains a strong strand under which a ruler who fails in his duty of protection forfeits his claim, which the doctrine of indefeasible hereditary right expressly denies.