KSLU Solved Question Papers
Law and Social Transformation in India
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LL.M. (Two Years) · Sem 1
2014 Dec Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
KSLU Solved Question Papers
Law and Social Transformation in India
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LL.M. (Two Years) · Sem 1
2014 Dec Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
First published on munotes.in on 1 November 2026.
Published by munotes.in, Mumbai.
Model answers written and edited by the munotes.in editorial desk.
Passages from this volume may be quoted, in print, online or by an AI system, with credit: name munotes.in and link to this volume's page. The volume may not be reproduced as a whole. Full terms at munotes.in/content-license.
munotes.in is an independent study resource for students of Karnataka State Law University. It is not affiliated with Karnataka State Law University, and is not endorsed by it.
The University does not publish an official answer key for this paper. The answers in this volume are model answers, written to show how a full-mark answer is built. They are a study aid, not an authority on what an examiner marked.
The question paper reproduced here is the paper as set by Karnataka State Law University at the 2014 Dec examination.
The questions below are the paper as Karnataka State Law University set it at the 2014 Dec examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
MarksPage
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2014 Dec examination, reproduced as Karnataka State Law University set them, in the order it set them. Long reading passages are shortened to their first and last lines and our summary; the original paper prints them in full. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 3 hours · Total marks 80 · 20 questions answered
Instructions printed on the paper
How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
Answer
For full marks, cover: the proposition (law as the product of tradition and culture: Savigny, Maine, Ehrlich) and what a progressive society is (one committed to change by its Constitution); six complexities: (1) whose tradition, in a plural society (personal laws, tribal customary law, article 371A); (2) proving and limiting custom (HMA s.3(a); article 13(3)(a)); (3) freedom of religion against reform (articles 25(1), 25(2)(b), 26(b); Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin 1962, referred to nine judges in 2023; Ratilal Panachand Gandhi); (4) popular morality against constitutional morality (Indian Young Lawyers Association, the reference heard by nine judges from April 2026; Navtej Singh Johar); (5) who speaks for a tradition; (6) law that runs ahead of practice; how a progressive society resolves them; a table; a conclusion.
Many jurists see law as a product of tradition and culture. Savigny held that law grows from a people's common consciousness, as language does. Sir Henry Maine traced how law develops from early customs and family status. Eugen Ehrlich found the "living law" in the customs of groups rather than in statutes. On this view, law should follow tradition.
A progressive society is one that seeks to change itself towards greater equality, liberty and dignity. India became such a society by choice in 1950. Its Constitution promised justice, liberty, equality and fraternity to a society that did not yet have them. The complexity lies here. If law grows out of tradition, how can it also change that tradition? The tension shows itself in six ways.
India has not one tradition but many. Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsis and Jews have their own family laws. Tribal communities follow customary laws, and article 371A protects Naga customary law from Acts of Parliament unless the Nagaland Assembly agrees. Castes and regions have their own customs of marriage, inheritance and dispute settlement.
So "law as the product of tradition" yields many laws, not one. A progressive society must decide whether to keep this pluralism or move towards uniform rules, as article 44 suggests. Every choice favours some traditions over others.
Custom is hard to prove and easy to abuse. Section 3(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 therefore recognises a custom only if it has been observed continuously and uniformly for a long time. It must also be certain, and not unreasonable or opposed to public policy.
Article 13(3)(a) goes further. It treats "custom or usage having the force of law" as "law", so a custom that violates fundamental rights is void. A custom may be ancient and certain, yet still fail because it denies equality. Tradition is thus a source of law, but a subordinate one.
Much of Indian tradition is religious. Article 25(1) protects the freedom to practise religion. Article 26(b) lets every denomination manage its own religious affairs. But article 25(2)(b) allows laws for social welfare and reform. The courts must decide where religion ends and reform may begin.
Facts. In Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853, the head of the Dawoodi Bohra community challenged the Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act 1949. Held. By majority, the Act was void. Excommunication on religious grounds was part of the community's management of its religious affairs. Ayyangar J said social reform could not mean reforming a religion "out of existence or identity". Sinha CJ dissented, seeing excommunication as a form of civil death. Why it matters. Tradition defeated a reform law. In 2016 Maharashtra passed a law against social boycott. In February 2023 a Constitution Bench sent the correctness of the 1962 ruling to a Bench of nine judges.
Facts. In Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388, trustees of Jain and Parsi trusts challenged State control under the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950. Held. The State may regulate how religious property is administered, but may not take over the administration or divert funds from their religious purposes. Why it matters. The line between protected tradition and regulable secular activity must be drawn case by case.
The "essential religious practices" test makes this harder still. To decide what is essential to a religion, secular judges must interpret theology.
A tradition may be widely followed and still conflict with the Constitution.
Facts. In Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1, women aged ten to fifty were barred by custom from the Sabarimala temple. Held. By four to one, the bar was struck down. It was not an essential practice, and Chandrachud J called exclusion based on menstruation a form of untouchability. Indu Malhotra J dissented: what is essential to a faith is for its believers to decide. Why it matters. The judgment met strong protest. In November 2019 wider questions were referred to a larger Bench, and nine judges began hearing them in April 2026.
Facts. In Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 4321, section 377 of the Penal Code was challenged as it applied to consenting adults of the same sex. Held. It was unconstitutional to that extent. Why it matters. The Court said that constitutional morality, not majority social morality, governs fundamental rights.
Traditions are not fixed, and they have many voices. Priests, community heads, reformers, women and dissenters within a faith may disagree about what the tradition requires. When a court or legislature asks "what does the tradition say", it must choose whose account to accept. Reformers such as Rammohun Roy and Gandhi argued from within tradition that its harsh practices were corruptions. A progressive society often finds its best allies inside the tradition itself.
When law moves faster than tradition, it may be ignored. Dowry was banned in 1961 and is still common, and child marriage persists despite the 2006 Act. A progressive law that ignores culture risks becoming a dead letter. A law that merely follows culture risks entrenching injustice.
| Complexity | Legal point | Case |
|---|---|---|
| Whose tradition | Personal and customary laws; art. 371A | |
| Proving custom | HMA s.3(a); art. 13(3)(a) | |
| Religion against reform | Arts. 25(1), 25(2)(b), 26(b) | Syedna; Ratilal |
| Popular against constitutional morality | Arts. 14, 15, 17, 21 | Indian Young Lawyers; Navtej |
| Complexity | Legal point | Case |
|---|---|---|
| Who speaks for tradition | Reform from within | |
| Law ahead of practice | Dowry Act 1961; PCMA 2006 |
Conclusion. Law in India is partly the product of tradition, through custom, personal law and customary tribal law. But in a progressive society that origin creates real complexities. There are many traditions, custom must be proved and limited, religious freedom competes with reform, and popular morality may clash with constitutional morality. Syedna shows tradition prevailing over reform, while Indian Young Lawyers Association and Navtej show reform prevailing. The doubts in both directions are now before larger Benches. The Constitution's answer is to respect tradition as a source of law while subjecting it to fundamental rights. Change should come through legislation, choice and persuasion where it can, and through constitutional morality where it must.
The rest of the answers
You have read the question paper and its first answer in full. Buy the solved papers once and you can read every answer of every solved paper in this semester.
Solved papers: ₹499 Already bought it? Sign in
The question paper itself stays free, and so does the syllabus.
What should we fix or add?
Found an error in this volume? Report it and we will check it against the paper.