B.A. LL.B. (Five Years) Sem 9 Interpretation of Statutes and Principles of Legislation 2018 Jun Question Paper with Solutions

For full marks, cover: what the statement means (rules of interpretation are aids or guides, not binding commands); the authority that a rule of construction is not a "law in force" (Superintendent and Legal Remembrancer v. Corporation of Calcutta); the rules shown to be guides: they apply only in their conditions (Hospital Mazdoor Sabha; Amar Chandra Chakraborty), their indicators are not conclusive (Sharif-ud-Din), their presumptions are weak (Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar), and judges may choose differently (Abhiram Singh); where interpretation does become law (the General Clauses Act, article 367, definition clauses, decisions under article 141); why the statement is sound; its limits; a table; conclusion.

What the statement means

Consider the rules of interpretation: the literal rule, the golden rule, the mischief rule, ejusdem generis and the presumptions. They are not rules of law in the sense that a statute is. They do not command a court to reach a particular result. They are aids or guides that help the court find the meaning the legislature intended. The court uses them as tools, chooses among them, and sets them aside where they do not help.

1. In State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610, the Supreme Court refused to narrow the word "undertaking" in the definition of "industry" by noscitur a sociis. It held that the maxim applies only where there is a doubt. Either the meaning of the wider words, or the intention in grouping them with narrower words, must be in doubt.
2. In Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. Collector of Excise, AIR 1972 SC 1863, the Court set out five conditions for ejusdem generis. It refused to apply the rule because the listed causes did not form a class, and the language and object of the sections negatived it.

2. Their indicators are not conclusive. In Sharif-ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone, AIR 1980 SC 303, the Court said that the word "shall" is not conclusive on whether a provision is mandatory or directory. The court must look at the object, design and context of the provision.

3. Their presumptions can be weak. In Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana, AIR 1957 SC 23, the Court said that the presumption that a word bears the same meaning throughout an Act "is not of much weight". It held that "grounds" meant different things in two sections of the same Act.

3. Definition and interpretation clauses in particular Acts bind the court for that Act.
4. Decisions under article 141. When the Supreme Court interprets a particular provision, its interpretation is law declared by it and binds all courts. What binds is the meaning given to that provision, not the canon the Court used to reach it.

How judges use the canons

In practice, a court works through a question of meaning in steps.

1. It reads the words in the context of the whole Act.
2. If the words are clear, it applies them, and the other rules are not needed.
3. If they are doubtful, it looks at the purpose of the Act, the mischief and the aids, internal and external.
4. It uses the canons that fit the problem, such as ejusdem generis for a list, or the golden rule for an absurd result.
5. It chooses the meaning that best carries out the intention of the legislature.

2. The canons conflict. The literal rule and the mischief rule can point different ways. If both were binding law, the court could not obey both.
3. Flexibility. Language and society change. The courts need tools that can be adapted, not rules that freeze meaning.

Its limits

1. The canons are not arbitrary. They reflect settled experience of how words are used, and courts follow them consistently.
2. A court that ignored the canons without reason would be open to criticism for judicial law-making.
3. Where the canons have been made statutory, as in the General Clauses Act, they must be applied unless the context shows otherwise.

Summary