KSLU Solved Question Papers
Interpretation of Statutes and Principles of Legislation
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
B.A. LL.B. (Five Years) · Sem 9
2016 Dec (70 marks) Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
B.A. LL.B. (Five Years) Sem 9 Interpretation of Statutes and Principles of Legislation 2016 Dec (70 marks) Question Paper with Solutions
First published on munotes.in on 21 October 2026.
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The question paper reproduced here is the paper as set by Karnataka State Law University at the 2016 Dec (70 marks) examination.
Contents
The questions below are the paper as Karnataka State Law University set it at the 2016 Dec (70 marks) examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
MarksPage
The Paper as Set
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2016 Dec (70 marks) examination, reproduced as Karnataka State Law University set them, in the order it set them. Long reading passages are shortened to their first and last lines and our summary; the original paper prints them in full. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 2½ hours · Total marks 70 · 12 questions answered
How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
Q1Explain the literal rule of Interpretation with the help of decided cases.[10]
Answer
For full marks, cover: statement of the literal rule; why it is the primary rule (words enacted, separation of powers, certainty); the steps (whole Act, definitions, ordinary grammatical meaning, section 13 of the General Clauses Act); casus omissus; illustrations and decided cases (Whiteley v. Chappell, Nelson Motis, Tolaram Relumal, the minority in Abhiram Singh); when the rule gives way (Tirath Singh); merits and criticism.
The rule
The literal rule is also called the grammatical or plain meaning rule. It says that the words of a statute must be given their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If that meaning is clear, the court must apply it, whatever the result. The intention of the legislature is found in the words it used. The court does not guess at what the legislature meant to say, as distinct from what it said.
Why it is the primary rule
- The words are what was enacted. The legislature voted on a text, not on a purpose.
- Separation of powers. Making law is the legislature's job. A court that adds words is legislating.
- Certainty. People plan their affairs by reading the statute, so words must mean what they say.
How the rule is applied
- Read the whole Act, because ordinary meaning is meaning in context.
- If a word is defined in the Act, use the definition.
- Give undefined words their ordinary meaning, and respect grammar and syntax.
- Apply the statutory rules of language. Under section 13 of the General Clauses Act 1897, the masculine includes the feminine and the singular includes the plural, unless the context is repugnant.
- If the meaning is clear, stop. The court does not ask whether the result is wise.
Casus omissus. A case the legislature has left out cannot be supplied by the court. This is the strictest form of the literal rule.
Illustrations from decided cases
1. Whiteley v. Chappell. In Whiteley v. Chappell, (1868) LR 4 QB 147, a statute made it an offence to personate "any person entitled to vote" at an election. The accused personated a voter on the list who had died. The court held that a dead person is not "entitled to vote". So, on the literal words, there was no offence. The result looks odd, but the court would not stretch the words of a penal law.
2. Nelson Motis v. Union of India. In Nelson Motis v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1981, a government servant's removal was set aside by a tribunal, with liberty to hold a fresh inquiry. Rule 10(4) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 then "deemed" him placed under suspension from the date of removal. He argued that the rule should be read down, like the neighbouring rule 10(3). The Supreme Court refused. It held that if the words are clear and "reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, it must be construed by giving effect to that meaning, irrespective of consequences". The change of wording from rule 10(3) was deliberate.
3. Tolaram Relumal v. State of Bombay. In Tolaram Relumal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 496, section 18(1) of the Bombay Rent Act 1947 punished taking a premium for the "grant, renewal or continuance of a lease". The appellants took money under an agreement to grant a lease of premises not yet built. The Supreme Court held that the words meant an existing or actual lease. It would not stretch a penal provision to carry out what the legislature may have intended. The conviction was set aside.
4. Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen. In Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen, AIR 2017 SC 401, seven judges considered section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act 1951. The majority read "his religion" purposively to cover the voter's religion too. The three dissenting judges held to the literal reading: "his" meant the candidate's. They said that imperfections "cannot be attended to by an exercise of judicial redrafting". The case shows the literal rule and its rival side by side.
When the literal rule gives way
The literal rule yields where the plain words lead to absurdity or to a result plainly against the object of the Act. In Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 830, a proviso on its literal words required fresh notice even to a person already a party to an election petition. The Supreme Court admitted that the literal argument was "unanswerable". It still read the proviso as covering only non-parties, to avoid an absurd result. This is the golden rule, which modifies the literal rule.
Merits and criticism
| Merits | Criticism |
|---|---|
| Respects the legislature's words | Can produce absurd results (Whiteley v. Chappell) |
| Gives certainty and predictability | Words often have more than one ordinary meaning |
| Keeps judges from making law | Ignores the purpose of the Act |
| Easy to apply | Leaves gaps for the legislature to fill |
Conclusion. The literal rule is the first rule of interpretation: clear words are given their ordinary grammatical meaning and applied. Nelson Motis and Tolaram Relumal show courts applying plain words whatever the consequence. Whiteley v. Chappell shows the cost of doing so. Where the literal meaning is absurd or defeats the object, courts turn to the golden or mischief rule, as Tirath Singh shows.
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