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Public International Law
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
B.A. LL.B. (Five Years) · Sem 7
2023 Mar (100 marks) Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
B.A. LL.B. (Five Years) Sem 7 Public International Law 2023 Mar (100 marks) Question Paper with Solutions
First published on munotes.in on 21 October 2026.
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Contents
The questions below are the paper as Karnataka State Law University set it at the 2023 Mar (100 marks) examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
MarksPage
The Paper as Set
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2023 Mar (100 marks) examination, reproduced as Karnataka State Law University set them, in the order it set them. Long reading passages are shortened to their first and last lines and our summary; the original paper prints them in full. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 3 hours · Total marks 100 · 13 questions answered
How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
Q1Evaluate the concept of International law in light of definitions of different International Jurists.[16]
Answer
For full marks, cover: why definitions matter (who is bound, and why); the name (Bentham); Austin's command view and its denial that international law is law; Oppenheim's definition (customary and conventional rules, considered legally binding, civilised States, intercourse with each other), his universal, general and particular law, and his reply to Austin; the Permanent Court's view in Lotus; the wider definitions after 1945 (Starke); an evaluation, element by element: the subjects (Reparation, Nuremberg), the basis of obligation (consent and jus cogens, article 53 VCLT; Barcelona Traction), the sources (article 38 of the ICJ Statute), and "civilised"; a table; the modern definition; a conclusion.
Why the definitions matter
Every definition of international law answers two questions. Who is bound by it, and why is it binding? The answers have changed over two centuries. So to evaluate the concept, one must read each definition for what it includes, what it leaves out, and why.
The name: Bentham
The older name was the law of nations, from the Latin jus gentium. Jeremy Bentham coined the word "international" in his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, printed in 1780 and published in 1789. He meant the law between sovereign States, as distinct from the internal law of each.
Austin: not law at all
John Austin, in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832), defined law proper as a command of a sovereign backed by a sanction. International law has no sovereign above States. So he wrote that "the law obtaining between nations is not positive law". It is "law (improperly so called) set by general opinion", enforced by "moral sanctions", the fear of provoking general hostility. He called it "positive international morality".
Austin's view denies the concept altogether. It is the starting point of the debate, not a definition one adopts.
Oppenheim: the classical definition
L. Oppenheim gave the definition every syllabus quotes. In his treatise (§ 1, as printed in the second edition of 1912) he wrote:
"Law of Nations or International Law ... is the name for the body of customary and conventional rules which are considered legally binding by civilised States in their intercourse with each other."
Four elements are packed into it.
- "Customary and conventional rules." The sources are custom and treaty ("conventional" means arising from conventions).
- "Considered legally binding." The rules bind because the States themselves regard them as law. This is the positivist, consent-based view.
- "Civilised States." Only States, and only those then called civilised.
- "In their intercourse with each other." It governs relations between States, not a State's treatment of its own people.
Oppenheim added a useful division. Universal international law binds all States. Particular international law binds two or a few. General international law binds a great many States, including leading Powers, and tends to become universal. He gave the Declaration of Paris of 1856 as an example.
He also answered Austin. A rule is law, he said, if "by common consent of the community it shall eventually be enforced by external power". And "For the existence of law neither a law-giving authority nor courts of justice are essential." So a law between States needs no world sovereign.
The Permanent Court: the law of free and independent States
In S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), PCIJ Series A, No. 10 (1927), a French ship collided with a Turkish ship on the high seas and Turkish sailors died. Turkey prosecuted the French officer of the watch. The Permanent Court upheld Turkey's jurisdiction. It described international law as a law "the basis of which is the free will of independent States". Restrictions on States, it said, cannot be presumed.
This is the classical concept in judicial form: a law made by States, for States, resting on their will.
Wider definitions after 1945
Later writers widened the definition. J. G. Starke wrote the Introduction to International Law. He defines the subject first by the rules of conduct which States feel bound to observe in their relations with each other. He then expressly adds two further groups. One is the rules on the functioning of international institutions and organisations. The other is certain rules relating to individuals and non-State entities, so far as their rights and duties concern the international community.
Starke's definition is longer than Oppenheim's because the law itself had grown.
Evaluation, element by element
1. Who is bound? States are no longer the only subjects.
The leading case is Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 174. The General Assembly asked whether the UN could claim for injuries to its agents. The Court held that the Organization has a large measure of international personality, though it is not a super-State. A definition limited to States cannot explain this.
Individuals, too, now have duties under international law. The Nuremberg Tribunal said in 1946: "Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities". Human rights treaties give individuals rights.
2. Why is it binding? Consent alone no longer explains everything.
Oppenheim's "considered legally binding" and Lotus's "free will" rest the law on consent. But article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 makes some rules stronger than consent. A treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law, called jus cogens. Such a norm binds whether or not a State consents. And in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3, the Court recognised obligations "towards the international community as a whole", obligations erga omnes.
3. Where does it come from? More than custom and treaty.
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court lists treaties, custom, "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations", and, as subsidiary means, judicial decisions and the teachings of publicists. Oppenheim's two sources are therefore incomplete.
4. "Civilised States." The phrase reflects the nineteenth-century division of the world. Today every State is bound by and shares in making international law. Where the phrase survives in article 38(1)(c), it is read as referring to the legal systems of the world generally.
5. Law or morality? Austin's objection rests on his own narrow test of law. Oppenheim's reply, that law needs common consent to enforcement rather than a legislature or courts, fits a horizontal system of equal States better.
6. Hart's middle view. H. L. A. Hart, in The Concept of Law (1961), rejected Austin's command theory. He said international law resembles a simple society with primary rules of obligation but without secondary rules, such as a rule of recognition. On this view it is law, though of a simpler kind than a developed municipal system.
Three limits of any definition
- Circularity. Oppenheim defines the law by what States consider binding, which assumes they already know which rules are law.
- Lag. Definitions trail behind practice. Oppenheim wrote before the League, the United Nations and the human rights treaties.
- Fragmentation. Trade law, the law of the sea, human rights and the law of armed conflict now have their own institutions and courts. One sentence can cover all of them only at a high level of generality.
Table of definitions
| Jurist | Who is bound | Why binding | What is missing |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bentham (1780/1789) | Sovereign States | Not addressed | Coined the name only |
| Austin (1832) | Nobody, in law | Opinion and moral sanction | Denies it is law |
| Oppenheim (§ 1) | Civilised States | Considered binding by them | Organisations, individuals, general principles, jus cogens |
| Lotus (1927) | Independent States | Their free will | The same |
| Starke | States, institutions, some individuals | Rules States feel bound to observe | Little; the widest classical definition |
A modern definition
International law is the body of rules and principles that governs the relations of States with each other. It also governs their relations with international organisations and, in defined respects, with individuals. It comes from treaties, custom and general principles of law. Most of it rests on consent, but a small core of peremptory norms binds all States regardless.
Conclusion. Bentham named the subject, and Austin denied it was law at all. Oppenheim's classical definition spoke of customary and conventional rules considered legally binding by civilised States. It captured a law of consent between States, as did Lotus. That concept is now too narrow. Reparation added organisations, Nuremberg added individuals, and article 53 VCLT and Barcelona Traction added rules beyond consent. Starke's wider definition fits better. International law today governs States, organisations and individuals, and rests mainly, but not only, on consent.
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