KSLU Solved Question Papers
Administrative Law
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
B.A. LL.B. (Five Years) · Sem 5
2014 Dec Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
B.A. LL.B. (Five Years) Sem 5 Administrative Law 2014 Dec Question Paper with Solutions
First published on munotes.in on 21 October 2026.
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The question paper reproduced here is the paper as set by Karnataka State Law University at the 2014 Dec examination.
Contents
The questions below are the paper as Karnataka State Law University set it at the 2014 Dec examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
The Paper as Set
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2014 Dec examination, reproduced as Karnataka State Law University set them, in the order it set them. Long reading passages are shortened to their first and last lines and our summary; the original paper prints them in full. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 3 hours · Total marks 100 · 13 questions answered
How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
Q1Critically examine the doctrine of separation of power.[16]
Answer
For full marks, cover: the claims made for the doctrine (protection of liberty; specialisation; accountability); the main criticisms (functions cannot be sharply divided; a pure separation would paralyse a welfare State; it risks deadlock and irresponsibility; it says nothing about how power is controlled within each organ); the modern restatement as checks and balances (Madison, Federalist No. 51); the Indian experience examined critically through three tensions: executive and legislature (delegation: Delhi Laws Act, Hamdard Dawakhana), judiciary and legislature (basic structure: Kesavananda Bharati, Indira Nehru Gandhi), judiciary and executive (tribunals and appointments: L. Chandra Kumar, Madras Bar Association, the NJAC case), plus the danger of judicial overreach (Asif Hameed); a balanced verdict.
What the doctrine claims to achieve
Supporters of the separation of powers make three claims for it.
- Liberty. The power to make laws, to carry them out and to judge disputes may be held by different hands. Then no single authority can oppress the citizen. Montesquieu, writing in 1748, argued that liberty is lost when these powers are united.
- Specialisation. Each organ develops skill in its own task: the legislature in debating policy, the executive in administration, the courts in impartial adjudication.
- Accountability. When each organ has its own field, it is easier to see who is responsible for a decision.
The criticisms
1. The functions cannot be cleanly divided. Making a rule, applying it and settling disputes about it shade into one another. An officer who fixes a licence fee, refuses a permit and hears an appeal is doing all three. Any line drawn between them is partly artificial.
2. A pure separation would disable modern government. The welfare State regulates industry, labour, health, transport and the environment. It needs administrative bodies that make detailed rules and decide disputes quickly. A strict separation would forbid delegated legislation and tribunals, both of which are indispensable.
3. It can produce deadlock. If each organ is wholly independent and none can check another, they may obstruct each other without any means of resolving the conflict.
4. It is silent on internal control. Separating the organs does not by itself prevent abuse within each one. An executive confined to executive work can still act arbitrarily. Real protection comes from controls applied to the use of power, not merely from its distribution.
5. It can obscure responsibility. A citizen harmed by a policy may find each organ pointing to another. The legislature blames the rules, the executive blames the Act, and the courts decline to interfere with policy. Sharp separation can thus make it harder, not easier, to fix responsibility.
The modern restatement
Because of these criticisms, the doctrine survives today mainly as a theory of checks and balances. James Madison defended the United States Constitution in Federalist No. 51 (1788). He argued that each branch must have the means and motive to resist the others. In his words, "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition." On this view, the organs may share functions, so long as each can restrain the others. The question is no longer whether powers are mixed, but whether each power is checked.
The Indian experience: three tensions
India never adopted a strict separation. The Constitution vests powers in different organs but lets them overlap. Examining how this works in practice shows both the value and the limits of the doctrine.
1. Executive and legislature: how much law-making can be handed over? The executive makes far more law than the legislature, through delegated legislation. In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, AIR 1951 SC 332, allowed delegation but forbade the legislature to give away its essential function of laying down policy. Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 554, struck down a power to add diseases to a list with no guiding principle. Critique: the line between policy and detail is vague. In practice very broad delegations are upheld, so legislative control depends more on scrutiny committees than on the doctrine.
2. Judiciary and legislature: who has the last word on the Constitution? Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461, held that Parliament's amending power cannot destroy the basic structure. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299, struck down an amendment that decided a particular election dispute. Deciding a dispute is judicial power, which the amending body could not take over. Critique: these decisions protect the doctrine's core, but they also make the judiciary the final judge of its own powers. The "basic structure" is defined by the courts themselves.
3. Judiciary and executive: who controls the bodies that judge? L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1125, held that the High Courts' and Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction is part of the basic structure and cannot be excluded. Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, decided 14 July 2021, struck down rules on tribunal members' tenure that undermined their independence. In 2015 the Supreme Court struck down the National Judicial Appointments Commission. That body would have given the Law Minister and two lay members a role in choosing judges. Critique: the courts have rightly protected adjudicating bodies from executive control. But in the appointment of judges, the result is that the judiciary chooses itself, with no outside check. That sits uneasily with checks and balances.
4. The courts and policy. Asif Hameed v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1989 SC 1899, warned that while judicial review restrains the other organs, the only check on the courts is their own restraint. Critique: where courts issue sweeping directions on matters of policy, they risk the very concentration of power the doctrine was meant to prevent.
How administrative law answers the critics
The fourth criticism, that separation says nothing about abuse within an organ, is the one administrative law exists to meet. It supplies controls that work inside and across the organs.
- Control of delegated legislation. Rules are laid before the legislature, examined by its committees, published, and tested in court for vires and arbitrariness.
- Control of adjudication. Tribunals must observe natural justice, give reasons and remain independent. Their decisions are open to judicial review.
- Control of discretion. Courts review discretionary decisions for illegality, irrelevance, improper purpose, unreasonableness and disproportion.
- Non-judicial controls. Ombudsmen, vigilance bodies, audit and the right to information check the executive without involving the courts at all.
These controls do what a pure separation cannot. They allow the organs to share functions, as modern government requires, while ensuring that each function is exercised lawfully and fairly. In that sense administrative law is the practical completion of the separation of powers.
Verdict
As a rigid rule, the separation of powers is neither possible nor desirable. Modern government needs mixed functions, and India rightly rejected a watertight division. As a principle, however, it remains essential. Its core is that no organ should acquire unchecked power, and in particular that the courts must stay independent of the executive. Indian law protects that core firmly. Its weakness is uneven application. The executive's law-making is loosely controlled. The judiciary's own powers, including over its appointments, are checked mainly by its own restraint.
| Aspect | Strength of the doctrine | Weakness |
|---|---|---|
| Liberty | Prevents concentration of power | Abuse within an organ is untouched |
| Delegation | Essential policy kept with legislature | Policy and detail hard to separate |
| Aspect | Strength of the doctrine | Weakness |
|---|---|---|
| Basic structure | Judicial power protected | Courts define their own limits |
| Tribunals and appointments | Independence secured | Judiciary largely unchecked |
Conclusion. Critically examined, the separation of powers fails as a strict rule but succeeds as a guiding principle. It cannot divide functions sharply, and a pure form would paralyse the welfare State. Modern thought therefore restates it as checks and balances (Madison). India follows that form. It allows delegation within limits (Delhi Laws Act, Hamdard Dawakhana). It protects judicial power and review as basic structure (Kesavananda Bharati, Indira Nehru Gandhi, L. Chandra Kumar). It also defends the independence of adjudicating bodies (Madras Bar Association). Its remaining weakness is that the judiciary itself is checked mainly by its own restraint (Asif Hameed). A sound doctrine must apply that check as seriously as the others.
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