B.A. LL.B. (Five Years) Sem 4 Political Science (International Relations and Organisation) 2024 Aug Question Paper with Solutions

The classic definition is by J. S. Mill in Considerations on Representative Government (1861). He wrote: "A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others". These sympathies "make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people". They also make them "desire to be under the same government".

The French scholar Ernest Renan gave a second famous definition in 1882. He said: "A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle." One part of it lies in the past, a shared store of memories. The other part lies in the present, the wish to go on living together. Renan called the existence of a nation "a daily plebiscite". A plebiscite is a vote of the whole people. So a nationality lasts only as long as its people keep choosing to stay together.

Two points follow from these definitions. First, nationality is psychological and spiritual, not merely physical. Second, a nationality is not yet a state. When a nationality becomes politically organised and seeks or gains statehood, it becomes a nation.

5. Common history. Mill called this "the strongest of all": "the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret". Shared victories, defeats and heroes bind a people.
6. Common culture and traditions. Shared customs, dress, food, art and ways of life build a sense of "we".
7. Common economic interests. A single market, trade and shared economic life tie regions together. The German customs union of the nineteenth century prepared the way for German unity.
8. Common political aspirations. The wish to live under one government of one's own is the political core of nationality. This is Renan's "daily plebiscite".
9. Common subjection and struggle. Foreign rule often creates nationality. The Indian national movement against British rule turned many communities into one people.

No single element is essential

Mill himself warned: "None of these circumstances, however, are either indispensable or necessarily sufficient by themselves." He gave Switzerland as proof. It has "a strong sentiment of nationality, though the cantons are of different races, different languages, and different religions".

The Court held, by eleven votes to three, that the claim was inadmissible. It said that, according to state practice, nationality is "the juridical expression of the fact that an individual is more closely connected with the population of a particular State". It looked at "habitual residence", "the centre of his interests, his family ties, his participation in public life". Nottebohm's ties with Liechtenstein were "extremely tenuous", while his real links were with Guatemala.

The case bears on this question because it shows that even law treats nationality as a matter of real attachment. A legal status that lacks the social elements of nationality may not be respected by other states.

Conclusion. Nationality is a group's sense of oneness and its wish to live under a government of its own. It grows from race, language, religion, geography, history, culture, economic ties, common aspirations and common struggle. Mill showed that none of these is indispensable, and Switzerland and India prove it. What matters most is the shared memory and the present will to live together, Renan's "daily plebiscite". International law, in Nottebohm, also asks for this genuine attachment.