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Administrative Process and Judicial Control
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LLM · Group 1 Constitutional and Administrative Law
2018 Examination
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LLM Group 1 Constitutional and Administrative Law Administrative Process and Judicial Control 2018 Question Paper with Solutions
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First published on munotes.in on 12 August 2026.
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Model answers written and edited by the munotes.in editorial desk.
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The University does not publish an official answer key for this paper. The answers in this volume are model answers, written to show how a full-mark answer is built. They are a study aid, not an authority on what an examiner marked.
The question paper reproduced here is the paper as set by the University of Mumbai at the 2018 examination.
The answers in this volume state the law as it stands today, not as it stood when each paper was set, and three decisions since 2025 change answers that recur throughout this folder. Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 19 November 2025, struck down key provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, held that re-enacting provisions already declared invalid is an impermissible legislative override, and directed a National Tribunals Commission within four months. Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 29 January 2025, holds that a defect at the initial stage cannot generally be cured at the appellate stage, which bears directly on every question here about the post-decisional hearing. K. Purushottam Reddy v. Union of India, 2025, holds that legitimate expectation cannot be invoked against the constitutional arrangement itself. Where an answer relies on any of these it gives the date.
Contents
The questions below are the paper as the University of Mumbai set it at the 2018 examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
MarksPage
The Paper as Set
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2018 examination, reproduced as the University of Mumbai set them, in the order it set them. Nothing has been reworded, added or left out. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 3 hours · Total marks 100 · 14 questions answered
Instructions printed on the paper
- Please check whether you have got the right question paper.
How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
SECTION I
Q.P. Code 29533. Attempt any four questions, all questions carry equal marks, cite relevant cases
any four of seven · 100 Marks
Q.1"State actions are amenable in the panorama of Judicial Review only to the extent that the state must act validly for discernible reasons and not whimsically for any ulterior purpose." Elucidate.[25]
Answer
For full marks, cover: where the sentence comes from, since it is a quotation from a decided case and not an abstract proposition; the rule of law foundation that makes State action reviewable at all; then the sentence applied in four fields, government contracts, service, licensing and policy, because "elucidate" is best answered by showing the proposition doing work rather than by paraphrasing it; the duty to give reasons as the mechanism that makes the standard testable; and finally a critical section, since the sentence is a limit on review as much as a justification for it.
The source of the sentence
The sentence is drawn from the reasoning in Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651, and it is a compressed statement of both the justification for judicial review and its boundary. The Government had invited tenders for cellular mobile telephone services in the four metropolitan cities; the composition of the evaluation committee was challenged, in particular the presence of the Director General of Telecommunications whose department was itself interested. The Supreme Court laid down that the Government must have freedom of contract, that the court does not sit as a court of appeal over a tender decision, but that the decision making process is amenable to review for illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety.
Read closely the sentence contains three requirements and one limit. The requirements are that the State must act validly, meaning within the power conferred; for discernible reasons, meaning reasons that can be seen and tested; and not for an ulterior purpose, meaning not for an object other than that for which the power was given. The limit is in the words "only to the extent": review examines those three matters and nothing more, so that the choice between lawful courses remains with the administration.
Why State action is amenable at all
The proposition rests on the rule of law and on the idea that public power is held on trust. A private person may act for any reason or none; a public authority holds its power for a purpose defined by the statute that conferred it, and holds it on behalf of others. That difference is the whole reason why State action is examinable and private action is not.
The Indian courts have given the idea a constitutional anchor. In S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427, dealing with the quota rule and the seniority of income tax officers, the Supreme Court held that the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law, that discretion must be confined within clearly defined limits, and that a decision should be predictable so that the citizen knows where he is; it quoted Douglas J. to the effect that where discretion is absolute, men have always suffered. In E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3, Bhagwati J. held that equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies and that arbitrary State action violates Article 14, which converted a general principle into an enforceable constitutional standard.
The sentence applied: government contracts
This is the field the sentence came from, and the law here shows both halves of the proposition. In Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489, a tender for a restaurant at the Bombay airport was accepted from a party who did not satisfy the eligibility condition the authority had itself published. The Supreme Court held that the Government and its instrumentalities cannot act arbitrarily in the matter of contracts, that they must act in conformity with the standards or norms which they have themselves laid down, and that a departure from a published condition, unless rational and non discriminatory, is bad. That is the "validly, for discernible reasons" half.
The other half is equally established. In Tata Cellular itself the Court refused to examine the merits of the evaluation, saying that the Government must have freedom of contract and that fair play in the joints is what the administration is entitled to. In Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 216, the Court held that the terms of an invitation to tender are not open to judicial scrutiny, being in the realm of contract, and that the court should interfere only where the process is arbitrary or mala fide, or where public interest is affected.
The sentence applied: service and disciplinary decisions
Here "discernible reasons" is the operative requirement. In Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor, (1974) 2 SCC 836, officers were superseded for selection to the Indian Administrative Service with the single expression "not found suitable" recorded against their names. The Supreme Court held that reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions, that they must disclose how the mind was applied, and that a formula is a conclusion and not a reason. In S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594, a Constitution Bench generalised the requirement: except where expressly excluded, the recording of reasons is a necessary concomitant of every decision affecting rights, because it disciplines the decision maker, assures the party that the matter was considered, and makes judicial review effective.
On the "not whimsically" side, Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611, is the illustration. A soldier who had complained against a superior officer was tried by a court martial in which that officer took part, and was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment and dismissal for refusing to eat food. The Court quashed the proceedings for bias, applying the test of reasonable apprehension rather than proof of actual prejudice, and added that a sentence strikingly disproportionate to the offence is itself evidence of the mind that imposed it.
The sentence applied: licensing and regulatory decisions
Here the "ulterior purpose" limb does the work. In Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16, a licence to construct a cinema was granted and then cancelled, the cancellation having in truth been directed by the Government, which had no power to give such a direction. The Supreme Court held the cancellation void because the Commissioner had abdicated a discretion that was his to exercise, and laid down the evidentiary rule that public orders publicly made must be construed objectively by what they say and cannot be explained away afterwards by affidavit.
In Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295, an order for investigation into a company's affairs was set aside because the circumstances disclosed did not answer the statutory description on which the requisite opinion had to be founded; the Court held that although the formation of opinion is subjective, the existence of relevant circumstances is a condition precedent** and is justiciable. That is the technique by which a court reaches a decision framed in subjective terms without claiming to substitute its own judgment.
The sentence applied: policy
Here the limit dominates. In Balco Employees Union v. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333, the disinvestment of the Government's holding in Bharat Aluminium Company was challenged. The Supreme Court declined to examine the wisdom of the decision, holding that in matters of economic policy the court is not the forum and that it is not for the court to consider the relative merits of different economic policies; it confined itself to asking whether the decision was taken by a competent authority following a lawful process. In Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637, by contrast, the Court examined restrictions on communication and movement in Jammu and Kashmir and held that every such order must be published, must be reasoned, must be the least restrictive measure, and must be periodically reviewed. The two cases together show that the sentence is not a fixed intensity of review: what varies is the court's assessment of its own competence in the field.
The mechanism: reasons
"Discernible" is the load bearing word, because a reason that cannot be discerned is, for review, no reason at all. In Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, the Supreme Court summarised the law: an adjudicator must record reasons; reasons are the link between the material and the conclusion; they must show that the mind was applied; recording reasons excludes arbitrariness; and reasons introduce transparency, which is a requirement of the rule of law. It also warned against a mechanical recital, holding that reasons must be intelligible and must deal with the substantial points raised. That duty is the practical mechanism by which "validly", "discernible" and "no ulterior purpose" are all made testable, which is why an administration that records real reasons usually survives review and one that does not converts every challenge into an inquiry into its motives.
A critical assessment
The sentence is elegant and it conceals the difficulty. Whether a reason is "discernible" is a matter of degree, and the same doctrine therefore produces Balco, where the Court would not look behind the policy, and Anuradha Bhasin, where it required each order to be published so that its reasons could be tested. The formula does not draw that line; the court's sense of its institutional competence draws it.
A second difficulty is that the intensity of review turns on classification rather than on the seriousness of the interference. After Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386, a restriction on a fundamental right is examined by the court as a primary reviewer applying proportionality, while a service penalty is examined as a secondary reviewer applying Wednesbury ([1948] 1 KB 223); so how the case is characterised does much of the work. The Court has continued to press the underlying principle at a high level of generality, observing in BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 937 (6 August 2025) that accountability is itself an essential principle of administrative law, but the level of scrutiny still varies with subject matter, and an answer that says so is a better answer than one that does not.
The Indian authority on reasons that is most often expected
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405, is the decision an examiner looks for here, and it makes two points that bear directly on this question. The first is that fairness is demanded of every kind of action, judicial, quasi judicial and administrative alike, so the duty does not depend on classifying the function. The second is the one that decides cases: a statutory order must be judged by the reasons it bears on its face, and its validity cannot be propped up by fresh reasons supplied afterwards in an affidavit. The Court approved Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji on that point and observed that an order is not like old wine, becoming better as it grows older. The practical consequence is severe for the administration: reasons invented after the challenge is filed are worthless, so the record must be made at the time the decision is taken or not at all.
Conclusion. The sentence states, in one line, the settlement Indian administrative law has reached. State action is reviewable because public power is held for a purpose and on trust, which is why an ulterior purpose is fatal whether or not it is dishonest, as Gordhandas Bhanji and Barium Chemicals show; because the citizen is entitled to know where he stands, which is Jaisinghani; and because arbitrariness is itself unconstitutional after Royappa. It is reviewable only to the extent stated, because the choice among lawful courses belongs to the administration, which is what Tata Cellular, Michigan Rubber and Balco protect. The middle requirement is what makes the other two workable: after Mohan Lal Capoor, S.N. Mukherjee and Kranti Associates, an authority that records intelligible reasons has supplied the material on which validity and purpose can be tested, and one that does not has invited the court to infer the worst. The sentence is therefore best read not as a description of how much courts interfere, which varies, but as a statement of what they are entitled to demand: power, reasons and purpose, in that order.
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