Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
Administrative Process Nature and Scope
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LLM · Group 1 Constitutional and Administrative Law
2025-26 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
Administrative Process Nature and Scope
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
LLM · Group 1 Constitutional and Administrative Law
2025-26 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
First published on munotes.in on 12 August 2026.
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Model answers written and edited by the munotes.in editorial desk.
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The University does not publish an official answer key for this paper. The answers in this volume are model answers, written to show how a full-mark answer is built. They are a study aid, not an authority on what an examiner marked.
The question paper reproduced here is the paper as set by the University of Mumbai at the 2025-26 examination.
The answers in this volume state the law as it stands today, not as it stood when the paper was set, and four changes alter answers here. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 28 June 2024, overruled Chevron, so United States courts now decide for themselves what a statute means instead of deferring to the agency, which affects the comparative question set in seven of the eight papers in this folder. Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 16 May 2024, read seven procedural sub-rights into Article 300A. Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India, 25 July 2024, held by nine judges that royalty on minerals is not a tax and overruled India Cement. And Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 19 November 2025, struck down the appointment and tenure provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 and directed a National Tribunals Commission. Where an answer relies on any of these it gives the date.
The questions below are the paper as the University of Mumbai set it at the 2025-26 examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2025-26 examination, reproduced as the University of Mumbai set them, in the order it set them. Nothing has been reworded, added or left out. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 3 hours · Total marks 100 · 7 questions answered
How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
Form 16781. Attempt any four questions, all questions carry equal marks
any four of seven · 100 Marks
Answer
For full marks, cover: the question asks how, so the answer must be a causal account and not a description of the present. Show the administrative process as it was before 1991, the crisis and the policy decision, then the transformation in four dimensions, the instrument of control, the institution that exercises it, the form of State participation, and the sanction; give the legal developments in each dimension with dates; then the judicial decisions, which fall into two groups, those that permitted the withdrawal and those that set the constitutional limits on how it may be done; and end with the honest qualification, which is that what happened was not deregulation but re-regulation by a different instrument, and that the newest developments prove it.
Control operated by prior permission granted case by case. The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 required a licence to establish, expand, relocate or diversify an industrial undertaking. The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 required large houses to obtain approval before expansion. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 prohibited every foreign exchange transaction unless permitted. Import required a licence, capital issues required consent, and prices in many sectors were administered.
Two consequences followed for administrative law. The characteristic legal event was an individual discretionary decision by an officer, which is the form of State power hardest to review and easiest to sell; and the State was itself the principal producer through public enterprise, so its commercial behaviour was largely outside public law until the courts brought it in.
Dimension one: the instrument changed from permission to rule. The New Industrial Policy of 24 July 1991 abolished industrial licensing except for a short reserved list, removed MRTP approval for expansion, and opened most sectors to foreign investment. FERA was replaced by the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, which reverses the default so that transactions are free unless regulated, and the change of a single word in the title, from Regulation to Management, is the most economical summary of the whole transformation available. The MRTP Act gave way to the Competition Act, 2002, which regulates conduct and combinations rather than size.
Dimension two: the institution changed from ministry to regulator. The Securities and Exchange Board of India became statutory in 1992, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India in 1997, the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission in 1998, the insurance regulator in 1999, the Competition Commission in 2003 with substantive enforcement from 2009, the petroleum regulator in 2006, and the real estate and insolvency regulators in 2016. Each is a body that makes regulations, investigates and adjudicates, at arm's length from the department.
Dimension three: the form of State participation changed. Disinvestment converted the State from producer to shareholder in many sectors, and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 replaced a discretionary rehabilitation regime with a time-bound creditor-driven process. The Goods and Services Tax of 2017 replaced a patchwork of indirect taxes with a common electronic system.
Dimension four, and the newest: the sanction changed from criminal to civil. The Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act, 2023 decriminalised 183 provisions across 42 Central Acts, converting minor offences into civil penalties; a further Bill in 2025 covered seventeen laws, and the Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Bill, 2026 proposes to amend eighty Central Acts. The Union Budget for 2025-26 announced a High Level Committee for Regulatory Reforms to review non-financial sector regulations, licences and permissions, and a Deregulation Commission was announced on 16 February 2025.
Group one: the decisions that permitted the withdrawal. Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 405 upheld the opening of telecommunications to private operators, holding that the choice of economic policy is for the government. BALCO Employees' Union v. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333 held that the decision to disinvest is a matter of economic policy in which the court will not interfere in the absence of illegality or violation of a statute or fundamental right, and that no employee has a right to be heard on it. Vivek Narayan Sharma v. Union of India, (2023) 3 SCC 1 shows the same posture in monetary policy, upholding demonetisation by four to one.
Group two: the decisions that set the limits. Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 had already held that the State cannot act arbitrarily in distributing largesse and must conform to standards that are not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant, and ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 553 confirmed that a writ lies against an instrumentality of the State in a contractual matter where it acts arbitrarily. Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1 cancelled 122 telecom licences allotted on a first-come-first-served basis, because the method of alienating a public resource was arbitrary; and the advisory opinion in Natural Resources Allocation, In re Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1 corrected the over-reading of that decision by holding that auction is not the only constitutionally permissible method, the test being whether the method serves the common good and is not arbitrary. Read together they state the constitutional rule for a deregulating State: the government chooses whether to withdraw, and the court examines how.
Group three: the decisions about who counts as the State once it has withdrawn. Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111, a bench of seven, requires financial, functional and administrative domination for a body to be State under Article 12, excluding merely regulatory control. Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649 held the Board of Control for Cricket in India not to be State despite its monopoly, while allowing a writ under Article 226 for the discharge of a public duty. The practical result is that the constitutional standard has migrated from Article 12 to the public function jurisdiction, and further, after Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 4 SCC 1, to the horizontal enforcement of Articles 19 and 21 against private persons.
Group four: the decisions that discipline the new regulators. Clariant International Ltd. v. SEBI, (2004) 8 SCC 524 treated the regulator's determination as adjudicatory and requiring reasons; Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 744 held a direction to investigate to be administrative so that reasons are required but no hearing; Cellular Operators Association of India v. TRAI, (2016) 7 SCC 703 struck down a regulation compelling operators to compensate subscribers for call drops as manifestly arbitrary; and Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel Ltd., (2019) 2 SCC 521 gave the sectoral regulator priority on technical questions where jurisdictions overlap.
One further decision limits the redistributive argument for regulation. Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, decided 5 November 2024, held by nine judges that not every privately owned resource is a material resource of the community within Article 39(b), overruling the wider dictum to the contrary.
The State did not withdraw; it changed instrument, and the evidence is that regulation has grown in the same period. The number of regulators has increased steadily since 1992. Sectors that were opened have been re-regulated in detail, telecommunications and electricity most obviously. Entirely new regulatory subjects have been created, most recently by the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, whose Rules were notified on 13 November 2025, which imposes duties on every entity processing personal data, including the State. And the compliance burden that Jan Vishwas addresses is the burden created by that growth.
The honest description is therefore that liberalisation replaced discretionary permission with published rules, which is a large improvement for administrative law even where it is not a reduction in the quantity of regulation. A rule can be read, challenged as ultra vires or manifestly arbitrary, and applied uniformly; a permission decided in an officer's discretion cannot.
The general account above is best tested against a single sector, and telecommunications is the one in which every stage of the transformation is visible and litigated.
1994 to 1997, opening and the creation of a regulator. The National Telecom Policy of 1994 admitted private operators to a service the State had provided as a departmental monopoly. The change was challenged and upheld in Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 405, where the Court held that whether the sector should be opened is a question of economic policy for the government, while insisting that the terms of the licences be settled with care because a public utility was being handed to private hands. The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 followed, and an amendment in 2000 separated the regulatory and adjudicatory functions by creating the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal, which is the clearest Indian example of separation of function inside a regulatory scheme.
2012, the constitutional limit on how a public resource may be given away. Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1 cancelled 122 licences allotted on a first-come-first-served basis, holding the method arbitrary. The advisory opinion in Natural Resources Allocation, In re Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1 then corrected the over-reading, holding that auction is not the only constitutionally permissible method and that the test is whether the method serves the common good and is not arbitrary.
2016 to 2019, the discipline of the regulator itself. Cellular Operators Association of India v. TRAI, (2016) 7 SCC 703 struck down a regulation compelling operators to compensate subscribers for call drops as manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable, holding a regulator's regulations to be subordinate legislation testable on that ground. Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel Ltd., (2019) 2 SCC 521 held that where the sectoral regulator and the competition regulator both have jurisdiction, the sectoral regulator's findings on the technical questions come first.
2023, re-regulation by a new statute. The Telecommunications Act, 2023 replaced the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 and the Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933, consolidating authorisation, spectrum assignment, right of way and interception into a single modern framework more than a century after the original.
The sector therefore contains the whole argument in miniature. A State monopoly was opened, a regulator was created and then split from its own tribunal, the method of allotting the resource was held to be governed by Article 14, the regulator's own rules were struck down for arbitrariness, its jurisdiction was reconciled with the competition regulator, and the entire statutory basis was replaced in 2023 with a law that regulates more comprehensively than the Act of 1885 ever did. That is not deregulation; it is the replacement of permission by rule, and the growth of rules thereafter.
Conclusion. Globalisation and liberalisation transformed the Indian administrative process by changing four things and leaving one thing untouched. The instrument moved from prior permission to published rule, the institution from ministry to independent regulator, the State's role from producer to shareholder and referee, and the sanction from imprisonment to civil penalty, the last of these still in progress through the Jan Vishwas legislation and the Deregulation Commission announced in February 2025. What did not change is the constitutional standard, and that is the point on which the answer should end. Ramana Dayaram Shetty, the 2G decision and the natural resources reference together hold that the State may choose its economic policy and may not choose to be arbitrary in carrying it out; Pradeep Kumar Biswas and Zee Telefilms ensure that public power does not escape scrutiny merely by changing its legal clothing; and Clariant, Cellular Operators and Bharti Airtel subject the new regulators to the same discipline of reasons and non-arbitrariness that once applied to the licensing officer. Deregulation in India has therefore been a change in the technique of control and not a retreat of public law.
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