LLM Foundation Course Judicial Process Feb 2026 - ATKT Question Paper with Solutions

That is why the statement is right. A court's authority does not rest on force or on elections. It rests on public trust. A judiciary seen to protect its own loses that trust, and with it the willingness of people and governments to obey its orders.

The difficulty is that accountability pulls against independence. A judge who can be punished for a decision is not independent. A judge who can never be questioned is not accountable. Every mechanism must reach misconduct without reaching the decision itself.

Two kinds of accountability must be kept apart.

1. Accountability for decisions, which is met by reasons and appeals.
2. Accountability for conduct, which is the harder problem: corruption, bias, impropriety or incapacity.

The existing mechanisms

Constitutional provisions.

1. Removal under Article 124(4). A Supreme Court judge may be removed by the President after an address by each House, supported by a majority of its total membership and two thirds of those present and voting, on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. Article 218 applies the same to High Court judges.

K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCR 189. A former Chief Justice of the Madras High Court was prosecuted for possessing assets disproportionate to his income. He argued that a superior court judge is not a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, and that prosecution would compromise independence. Held: on 25 July 1991 the Court held that such a judge is a public servant and can be prosecuted. As a safeguard, no criminal case may be registered against him without first consulting the Chief Justice of India. Why it matters: judges are not above the criminal law, yet the executive cannot use prosecution as a weapon.

C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, (1995) 5 SCC 457. The Bombay Bar Association demanded the resignation of the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court over royalties for a book. Held: the Bar may not agitate for a judge's removal, because the only constitutional route is Article 124(4). The "yawning gap" between proved misbehaviour, which alone justifies removal, and bad conduct unworthy of the office is to be filled by an in-house procedure run by the Chief Justice of India, who may counsel the judge, advise resignation, or withdraw judicial work. Why it matters: it names the real problem, conduct below the removal threshold, and supplies the only answer India has.

2. The in-house procedure has no legal sanction. Ravichandran Iyer itself noted this. Its findings are not published and cannot be enforced.
3. There is nothing between counselling and removal. No graded penalties, such as censure or suspension of work, exist in law.
4. The judiciary runs the checks on itself. Appointments are made by the collegium, contempt is decided by courts, and the in-house procedure is run by the Chief Justice. Self-regulation alone rarely satisfies the public.
5. Complaints have no statutory home. A citizen with a complaint against a judge has no body with a legal duty to receive, investigate and report on it.
6. Contempt can still chill criticism, even with the truth defence, because the risk deters.

2. Complaints can be used to harass judges who decide against powerful litigants.
3. The NJAC decision shows the Court's concern that executive participation in judicial matters may breach the basic structure.

The balanced answer. A separate law is needed, but its design decides whether it helps or harms.

1. It should reach conduct, never decisions. Wrong decisions belong to appeal.
2. Its inquiry body should be judge-led, with limited outside members, so that independence survives.
3. It should have graded measures between advice and removal, and give the in-house procedure a statutory base.
4. It should filter frivolous complaints and protect judges from harassment.
5. It should publish outcomes, while protecting complainants and judges from premature disclosure.

A worked example: credible allegations against a judge

Suppose credible reports say a High Court judge decided cases in favour of a company in which a relative holds an interest.

A lesson from the NJAC decision for any new law

The NJAC case of 16 October 2015 sets the boundary a new law must respect. The majority held that primacy of the judiciary in appointments is part of judicial independence, and so of the basic structure. A statute giving the executive a decisive voice over judges' conduct would face the same objection. So a valid accountability law must keep the decisive role in judicial hands, while opening its working to the public through published procedures, reasons and outcomes. Transparency, not executive control, is the route to credibility that the Constitution allows.

Independence and accountability serve one end

They are often presented as enemies, but both exist for the same reason: so that judges decide according to law, not according to pressure. Independence protects judges from outside pressure. Accountability ensures that the freedom is used for its purpose. A system that has only one of them loses credibility either way.