LLM Foundation Course Indian Constitutional Law New Challenges 2019 Question Paper with Solutions

Distinguish Article 29. Article 29(1) protects the right of any section of citizens with a distinct language, script or culture to conserve it, and is not confined to minorities. Article 29(2) forbids denial of admission to a State or State-aided institution on grounds only of religion, race, caste or language, and is an individual right of the citizen. Article 30(1) is a community right, confined to minorities, and is a right against the State.

Who is a minority. The Constitution supplies no definition and the determining unit is the State, not the country. D.A.V. College, Bhatinda v. State of Punjab (1971) 2 SCC 269 held Hindus in Punjab to be a religious minority for this purpose; T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481, by eleven judges, confirmed the State as the unit, since States were reorganised on linguistic lines. Numerical inferiority is the test; social or economic backwardness is not required.

The regulation line. In re Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (AIR 1958 SC 956): the right is not absolute and reasonable regulation for standards of teaching, qualification of teachers and conditions of service is permissible; aid may be conditioned but not on terms requiring surrender of the right. Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay (AIR 1963 SC 540): a compulsory reservation of eighty per cent of seats for government nominees struck down. State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial (1970) 2 SCC 417: no takeover of management. Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society v. State of Gujarat (1974) 1 SCC 717, nine judges: choice of teachers, disciplinary control and medium protected, subject to regulation for excellence. T.M.A. Pai Foundation (2002): establishing an institution is an occupation under Article 19(1)(g); unaided minority institutions have the widest autonomy in admission and fees; no capitation and no profiteering, though a reasonable surplus is permitted. Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka (2003) 6 SCC 697: fee and admission committees. P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 6 SCC 537: the State cannot impose its own reservation quota on unaided institutions, minority or otherwise.

Conclusion. Article 30 rests on a plain constitutional judgment: a community's language and culture will not survive unless it can educate its own, and a majoritarian legislature cannot be relied on to secure that. The case law has settled a workable balance, regulation for excellence yes, takeover no, profiteering no, a State-imposed quota on an unaided institution no. What has moved in the last decade is the reach of the right rather than its content: Pramati placed minority schools outside the right to education legislation, which puts a growing part of the school system outside its principal equalising provision, and the 2024 Aligarh Muslim University decision reopened minority status for every institution incorporated by statute. Those two developments are where this branch of law is now going.

Its two forms. Substantive ultra vires, where the content of the act is outside the power conferred. Procedural ultra vires, where the power exists but the prescribed procedure has not been followed, for example a failure to consult, to publish or to lay the rule before the legislature where the statute requires it. Raza Buland Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board, Rampur (AIR 1965 SC 895) supplies the test for when non-compliance is fatal, which is whether the requirement is mandatory or directory, judged by the object of the statute and the consequences of non-compliance.

Level one, legislation tested against the Constitution. A law is ultra vires if the legislature lacked competence under Article 246 and the Seventh Schedule, or if it offends Part III by force of Article 13, or if it breaks any other constitutional limitation. Four allied doctrines belong here and each should be named with a case.

Pith and substance: if a law is in substance within the enacting legislature's list, an incidental encroachment on another list does not invalidate it. State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara (AIR 1951 SC 318); Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce, Khulna (AIR 1947 PC 60).

Level two, delegated legislation. A rule, regulation or notification is ultra vires if it goes beyond the rule-making power in the parent Act, if it is inconsistent with the Act or with any other law, if it offends the Constitution, or if the parent Act itself amounts to an abdication of the essential legislative function. In re Delhi Laws Act, 1912 (AIR 1951 SC 332) is the foundational authority: the legislature may delegate but may not delegate its essential legislative function, which is the laying down of policy and its enactment as a binding rule of conduct. Applications: Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India (AIR 1960 SC 554), where a power to add to a list of diseases without any guiding policy was struck down; Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. Co. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax (1974) 4 SCC 98 on the standards test; State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Sabanayagam (1998) 1 SCC 318 on conditional legislation; and Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641, which held that subordinate legislation may be challenged on the additional ground of manifest arbitrariness and unreasonableness, unlike a statute at that time.

Proportionality as a distinct ground was recognised in Om Kumar v. Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 386 for fundamental rights cases, and given a four-part structure in Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 7 SCC 353 and Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1: legitimate aim, suitability, necessity in the sense that no less restrictive alternative exists, and a fair balance.

The limits of the doctrine. Judicial review on this ground goes to the legality of the decision and not to its merits: Tata Cellular says in terms that the court reviews the decision-making process and does not sit in appeal on the decision. The presumption of constitutionality applies to a statute, and the burden is on the challenger. Economic and fiscal policy attracts the widest latitude, R.K. Garg v. Union of India (1981) 4 SCC 675 and BALCO Employees' Union v. Union of India (2002) 2 SCC 333. And the power of judicial review is itself part of the basic structure, so it cannot be excluded by statute or by amendment: L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 held that the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 and of the Supreme Court under Article 32 cannot be ousted, and that tribunal decisions remain subject to review by a Division Bench of the High Court.

For full marks, cover: why the Constitution says "Union of States"; the federal and unitary features; the three distributions; the case law to Bommai; and the trust half, which is Article 263, the GST Council and the Governor, ending with the advisory opinion of 20 November 2025.

Article 1(1): India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States. Dr Ambedkar explained the choice: the Union is not the result of an agreement between the States, and the States have no right to secede. The federation is created by the Constitution, not by a compact between pre-existing sovereigns.

Three distributions. Legislative, under Article 246 with the doctrines of pith and substance, colourable legislation and repugnancy under Article 254. Administrative, under Articles 256 to 263. Financial, under Articles 268 to 281, with grants-in-aid under Article 275 and the Finance Commission under Article 280; and, since the One Hundred and First Amendment, 2016, Article 246A giving Parliament and the State legislatures concurrent power over goods and services tax, Article 269A on inter-State supply and Article 279A establishing the GST Council, whose decisions require a three-fourths majority with the Union holding one-third of the weight.

Now the trust half. The machinery is thin and largely permissive. Article 263 allows the President to establish an Inter-State Council; recommended by the Sarkaria Commission in 1988, it was constituted only in 1990 and rarely meets, despite the Punchhi Commission's recommendation in 2010 that it meet three times a year. The Zonal Councils are statutory, under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. Article 261 requires full faith and credit to public acts and records. Article 262 removes inter-State water disputes from the courts, though State of Karnataka v. State of Tamil Nadu (2018) 4 SCC 1 held that an appeal under Article 136 lies notwithstanding section 11 of the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956.

Conclusion. Indian federalism is federal in structure and unitary in emergency, which is why Bommai preferred to describe it in its own terms. The distribution of powers, the Seventh Schedule and the Article 368 proviso are genuine guarantees, and since Bommai federalism is part of the basic structure and beyond amendment. The relationship of trust and faith, by contrast, rests on institutions the Constitution merely permits: an Inter-State Council that rarely meets, a Finance Commission whose recommendations do not bind, and a Governor who owes his office to the Union. The GST Council shows what a properly constituted joint forum can do; the Presidential Reference of November 2025 shows what happens when trust fails and the parties reach for the Court instead.

Employment. Since the New Industrial Policy of 24 July 1991 the State has disinvested undertakings, contracted out services and left whole sectors. A disinvested undertaking ceases to satisfy the test on the day the shares are sold, and its posts leave the reservation roster. BALCO Employees' Union v. Union of India (2002) 2 SCC 333 upheld exactly such a sale, treating disinvestment as economic policy not ordinarily justiciable and holding that the employees had no right to be heard because a change of ownership affected no right of theirs. The constitutional consequence, which the Court did not deny, is that Articles 14 and 16 governed those workers on one day and not the next. Reservation percentages have risen for thirty years while the base has shrunk, and there is no constitutional provision for reservation in private employment.

That sequence is the answer to the question. Affirmative action had to be re-legislated into the private sector by constitutional amendment, because privatisation had taken the sector out of its reach. It is direct evidence that the policy affects the programme, and equally that the effect can be remedied where the political will exists.

Three second-order effects. The minority exemption from Article 15(5) and from the Right to Education Act creates an incentive to seek minority status, sharpened by Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal (8 November 2024). Outsourcing within government converts reserved posts into contract positions held by an employer who is not State, bypassing the roster without abolishing a post. And the growth of private higher education means the reserved seat secures access to the tier the State still funds rather than the tier that now confers the greatest advantage.

Conclusion. The policy of privatisation affects the principle of affirmative action in a way that is structural rather than incidental: the principle is defined by Articles 15 and 16 to operate on the State, the State is defined by Article 12 in terms of ownership and control, and privatisation reduces both. The effect therefore requires no decision to reduce anybody's rights and is invisible in any statute. Indian constitutional law has answered not by widening Article 12, which Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India (2005) 4 SCC 649 declined to do, but by attaching public obligations to private providers through Article 15(5) and section 12(1)(c). That answer has been upheld and works, and it has exactly two gaps: it covers education and not employment, and it exempts minority institutions. Those two gaps are the whole of the current debate.

2. declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament; and
3. make such incidental and consequential provisions as appear necessary, including suspending in whole or in part the operation of any provision of the Constitution relating to any body or authority in the State.

Article 356(3) and the Forty-fourth Amendment. Every Proclamation must be laid before each House and ceases to operate at the expiry of two months unless approved by resolutions of both Houses. Once approved it continues for six months from the date of issue, and may be extended by further resolutions for six months at a time, subject to a maximum of three years. The Forty-fourth Amendment, 1978 added the crucial condition in Article 356(5): beyond one year a Proclamation may be continued only if a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation in the whole or part of the State and the Election Commission certifies that the difficulties of holding a general election to the State Assembly make the extension necessary. The Thirty-eighth Amendment had made the President's satisfaction final and non-justiciable by inserting clause (5); the Forty-fourth Amendment deleted that provision, which is what made Bommai possible.

1. the Proclamation is justiciable, and the Court may examine whether it was issued on relevant material and whether the satisfaction was reached mala fide or on wholly extraneous grounds, though it will not go into the sufficiency or adequacy of the material;
2. the floor of the House is the only test of a government's majority, and the Governor's subjective assessment is not;
3. the power under Article 356(1)(c) does not extend to dissolving the Assembly before both Houses of Parliament have approved the Proclamation; until then it may only be kept in suspended animation;
4. if the Court finds the Proclamation invalid it may restore the dismissed government and the dissolved Assembly, and the fact that fresh elections have been held is not an absolute bar;
5. secularism is part of the basic structure, so a State government acting against it may be dismissed, which is how the dismissals following 6 December 1992 were upheld; and
6. the Union's power under Article 356 is an exceptional power, to be used only where the constitutional machinery has genuinely failed.

Where a Proclamation declares that the powers of the State legislature are exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament, Article 357(1) provides that Parliament may confer on the President the power of the State legislature to make laws, and may authorise the President to delegate that power to any other authority; that Parliament, the President or that other authority may make laws conferring powers and imposing duties on the Union or its officers; and that the President may, when the House of the People is not in session, authorise expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of the State pending sanction by Parliament. Article 357(2) provides that a law made in this way continues in force after the Proclamation ceases, until altered, repealed or amended by a competent legislature.

Conclusion. Article 356 was intended, in Dr Ambedkar's phrase in the Constituent Assembly, to remain a dead letter and to be used as a last resort, and for four decades it was used as an instrument of ordinary politics. Two things changed that: the Forty-fourth Amendment, which deleted the finality clause and made continuance beyond a year conditional, and S.R. Bommai, which made the Proclamation justiciable and the floor of the House the only test of majority. Since 1994 its use has fallen sharply, which is the strongest available evidence that judicial review can discipline a political power. The legislative side of the provision, Article 357, is less discussed and equally important: it allows Parliament to hand the legislative power of a State to the President and permits him to delegate it further, and laws so made survive the end of the Proclamation until a competent legislature alters them, which is a substantial and lasting displacement of a State's own legislative authority.

Legal disputes go to the Supreme Court under Article 131, which gives it exclusive original jurisdiction in any dispute between the Government of India and one or more States, or between two or more States, if and in so far as the dispute involves any question, whether of law or fact, on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. The proviso excludes disputes arising out of a pre-Constitution treaty or agreement still in operation. It is not a forum for political grievance: State of Bihar v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 67 held that a suit against a public sector undertaking is not a suit against the Union, and the scope of the jurisdiction was referred to a larger bench in State of Jharkhand v. State of Bihar (2015) 2 SCC 396. The Maharashtra and Karnataka boundary dispute over Belgaum has been pending on the original side since 2004, which shows the jurisdiction's practical limits.

Why water disputes take so long, which is what an examiner wants: no binding time limit; a fresh tribunal constituted for each dispute; delay in notifying an award in the Official Gazette, which is what makes it binding under section 6; the absence of authenticated basin-wide hydrological data; and the political impossibility of a State government appearing to concede water.

Political and administrative disputes go to the Inter-State Council under Article 263, which the President may establish to enquire into and advise upon disputes, to investigate subjects of common interest and to make recommendations for better coordination. Recommended by the Sarkaria Commission in 1988, it was constituted only in 1990. The Zonal Councils under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 are statutory. Article 261 requires full faith and credit to public acts and records; Articles 301 to 307 guarantee freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse, re-read by nine judges in Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2017) 12 SCC 1.

(b) Separation of power in Indian Constitution

India does not adopt a strict separation of powers, and saying so first is the answer's foundation. There is no provision corresponding to Articles I, II and III of the United States Constitution. What the Constitution has is a functional separation with extensive checks.

Where it is deliberately breached. The executive sits in the legislature: Articles 75(5) and 164(4) require a Minister to be a member of the House within six months. The legislature exercises judicial functions in removal proceedings under Articles 61, 124(4) and 217, and through its power to punish for contempt of itself. The executive exercises legislative functions through ordinances under Articles 123 and 213 and through delegated legislation. The judiciary exercises legislative functions through rule-making under Articles 145 and 227 and, in practice, through directions such as those in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241; and it exercises administrative functions in appointments to the subordinate judiciary under Article 235.

The limit on the legislature's power to overrule a judgment is worth a line: a legislature may remove the basis of a judgment by amending the law retrospectively, but it may not simply declare a judgment invalid, which would be an exercise of judicial power. Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India (1978) 2 SCC 50; Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, In re 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96.

(c) Right to strike

There is no fundamental right to strike in India, and that is the whole answer stated in a sentence; the marks come from showing where it does and does not exist.

Not under Article 19(1)(c). In All India Bank Employees' Association v. National Industrial Tribunal (AIR 1962 SC 171) the Court held that the right to form associations under Article 19(1)(c) does not carry with it a guaranteed right to achieve the objects for which the association was formed, and therefore no fundamental right to strike or even to collective bargaining. The union's activity may be regulated by law under Article 19(4).

Government servants. T.K. Rangarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu (2003) 6 SCC 581 held in the plainest terms that government employees have no fundamental, statutory, moral or equitable right to strike, and upheld the mass dismissal of striking employees, though it directed reinstatement on terms. The Tamil Nadu Government Servants' Conduct Rules and their counterparts elsewhere forbid participation in a strike.

Lawyers. Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India (2003) 2 SCC 45 held that lawyers have no right to strike or to give a call for boycott of courts, that a lawyer who abstains is liable to be proceeded against for professional misconduct, and that at most a one-day token protest may be permitted in the rarest case; reaffirmed in Common Cause v. Union of India (2005) and in later contempt proceedings.

Doctors and essential services. The Essential Services Maintenance Act, 1968 and State counterparts permit the prohibition of strikes in notified services, and the courts have consistently upheld their application where life and health are at stake.

The cases. Kishansing Tomar v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad (2006) 8 SCC 352: elections must be held before the term expires and neither funds nor preparedness excuses delay. K. Krishna Murthy v. Union of India (2010) 7 SCC 202: reservation in local bodies upheld, with backward class reservation on a distinct footing requiring empirical enquiry, formalised as the triple test in Vikas Kishanrao Gawali v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 6 SCC 73. Rajbala v. State of Haryana (2016) 1 SCC 463: educational and other qualifications for candidates upheld, widely criticised.

Assessment. More than twenty States have raised the reservation to one-half, and above 1.4 million women hold elected local office. Against that: rotation prevents an incumbent from seeking re-election in the same seat; the sarpanch pati phenomenon is widely documented; and devolution under Article 243G is discretionary, so the seat often carries little power.

For full marks, cover: the three organs and their constitutional locations, which the question asks for expressly; why the conflict is structural rather than personal; the four historic battlegrounds, being amendment, property, appointments and privileges; the rules that govern a legislative response to a judgment; and recent examples, of which there are several in the last three years.

The organs, since the question asks. The legislature: Parliament under Articles 79 to 122, and the State legislatures under Articles 168 to 212. The executive: the President and the Council of Ministers under Articles 52 to 78, the Governor and the State Council of Ministers under Articles 153 to 167. The judiciary: the Supreme Court under Articles 124 to 147, the High Courts under Articles 214 to 232, and the subordinate courts under Articles 233 to 237. India does not adopt a rigid separation of powers, as Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR 1955 SC 549) held, but separation of powers is part of the basic structure on Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225.

Battleground one: the amending power. Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (AIR 1951 SC 458) and Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1965 SC 845) held that Article 368 permits amendment of fundamental rights. I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (AIR 1967 SC 1643) held that it does not. Parliament answered with the Twenty-fourth Amendment. Kesavananda Bharati (1973) overruled Golak Nath and upheld the Twenty-fourth Amendment, while holding that Parliament may not damage or destroy the basic structure. Parliament answered again with the Forty-second Amendment, whose section 55 declared that there shall be no limitation on the constituent power and that no amendment shall be called in question in any court; that was struck down in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625, together with the widening of Article 31C. Waman Rao v. Union of India (1981) 2 SCC 362 and I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2 SCC 1 fixed 24 April 1973 as the date from which Ninth Schedule entries are open to basic structure review.

Battleground two: property and land reform, which produced the First, Fourth, Seventeenth, Twenty-fifth and Thirty-fourth Amendments and the Ninth Schedule, and ended with the Forty-fourth Amendment, 1978 removing the right to property from Part III and inserting Article 300A.

The rules governing a legislative response to a judgment, which is the doctrinal core of the question. A legislature may validate a law by retrospectively removing the basis on which it was struck down, and it may not simply declare a judgment invalid or direct a court to decide differently, because that would be an exercise of judicial power. Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India (1978) 2 SCC 50; Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, In re 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96; State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala (2014) 12 SCC 696, which struck down the Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2006 as an attempt by a State legislature to nullify a judgment.

Recent examples, which the question asks for expressly.

One, section 33B of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, enacted to undo Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) 5 SCC 294 on candidate disclosure, and struck down in PUCL v. Union of India (2003) 4 SCC 399.

Four, the Governor's assent. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, decided 8 April 2025, a two-judge bench prescribed timelines under Articles 200 and 201 and declared ten Bills deemed assented. The President then made a Reference under Article 143(1), and on 20 November 2025 the Supreme Court held that courts may not prescribe timelines, that deemed assent is alien to the Constitution, and that decisions under those Articles are not ordinarily justiciable, while holding that a Governor may not sit on a Bill indefinitely. This example is unusual and worth stating carefully: the conflict was resolved not by amendment but by the executive invoking the Court's own advisory jurisdiction against an earlier decision of the Court.

Five, the Delhi services dispute. After Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2023) 9 SCC 1 held that the elected government controls services other than police, public order and land, Parliament enacted the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (Amendment) Act, 2023, and the challenge to it is pending.

Origin. Part IVA, containing Article 51A, was inserted by the Forty-second Amendment, 1976 on the recommendation of the Swaran Singh Committee (1976), which had proposed eight duties and a penalty for non-compliance; Parliament enacted ten and no penalty. An eleventh, clause (k), was added by the Eighty-sixth Amendment, 2002, obliging a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to a child between six and fourteen. India borrowed the idea from the Constitution of the erstwhile Soviet Union; Japan and a few other constitutions have analogues.

First, they are an aid to interpretation. In AIIMS Students' Union v. AIIMS (2002) 1 SCC 428 the Court said that fundamental duties, though not enforceable by a writ, may be used to interpret ambiguous statutes and are of equal importance with fundamental rights. In Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India 1992 Supp (1) SCC 594 a government training programme was upheld by reference to Article 51A(j).

Second, they can support the reasonableness of a restriction. A law giving effect to a fundamental duty is more readily held to be a reasonable restriction under Articles 19(2) to (6). Rangnath Mishra v. Union of India (2003) 7 SCC 133, where the Court directed the Union to consider operationalising the duties along the lines of the Justice Verma Committee Report (1999), which had identified the legal provisions already enforcing several of them.

The judicial background. Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (1992) 3 SCC 666 held the right to education to be concomitant to the fundamental rights and capitation fees to be arbitrary. Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 1 SCC 645 confined it: the right flows from Article 21 but is a fundamental right only up to fourteen, beyond which it is subject to the State's economic capacity under Article 41. The Eighty-sixth Amendment enacted that holding.

The statute is the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, in force 1 April 2010: section 3, free and compulsory elementary education in a neighbourhood school; section 4, age-appropriate admission with special training; section 12(1)(c), at least twenty-five per cent of the entry class in unaided schools from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups against reimbursement; section 13, no capitation fee and no screening; section 16, no holding back or expulsion, amended in 2019 to permit examination and detention in classes 5 and 8; and the Schedule on pupil-teacher ratio and infrastructure. Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 102 upheld the Act against non-minority unaided schools, and Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India (2014) 8 SCC 1 held it inapplicable to all minority institutions.

5. The scheme framed in Unni Krishnan, of free and payment seats in professional colleges, was held unworkable and unconstitutional and was set aside; it had, the Court said, made private education economically unviable.
6. Article 30(1) does not confer a higher right than Article 19(1)(g); it protects the minority character of the institution, and the right to administer does not include a right to maladminister.

Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka (2003) 6 SCC 697 then created fee and admission committees to police the line, and P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 6 SCC 537 held that the State cannot impose its own reservation on unaided institutions; Parliament reversed Inamdar by the Ninety-third Amendment, 2005 inserting Article 15(5).

Why the two notes belong together. Article 21A places the obligation on the State to provide, and the State discharges a growing part of it through private schools, which is why section 12(1)(c) exists. T.M.A. Pai is the case that fixed how far the State may regulate those private providers, and it is therefore the constitutional foundation on which the delivery of Article 21A now rests.

This question is question 3 of Q.P. Code 29510 in the same scan, differing only in that it does not ask about the trust between Centre and States. The full answer is there. The plan follows.

Article 1(1): a Union of States, created by the Constitution and not by a compact; no right of secession.

Federal features: a written supreme Constitution; distribution of legislative power by Article 246 and the Seventh Schedule; the proviso to Article 368(2), requiring ratification by half the States for amendments touching the Seventh Schedule, the representation of States in Parliament or the distribution of legislative power; an independent judiciary with the Supreme Court's exclusive original jurisdiction under Article 131; a Council of States under Article 80.

The cases, which the question asks for expressly. State of West Bengal v. Union of India (AIR 1963 SC 1241): the States are not sovereign; federalism is a matter of degree. State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977) 3 SCC 592: a strongly centralist reading. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1: federalism is basic structure; Article 356 is justiciable; the floor of the House is the test of majority; no dissolution before parliamentary approval. Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006) 7 SCC 1: quasi-federal. Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2018) 8 SCC 501 and (2023) 9 SCC 1: collaborative federalism. Union of India v. Mohit Minerals (2022) 10 SCC 700: GST Council recommendations are not binding. Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2017) 12 SCC 1: Articles 301 to 304 re-read and the compensatory tax doctrine abandoned.

The current strain, and it belongs in any 2026 answer: the Governor's assent. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, 8 April 2025, prescribed timelines and declared ten Bills deemed assented; on a Presidential Reference the Supreme Court held on 20 November 2025 that no timelines may be judicially prescribed, that deemed assent is alien to the Constitution, and that such decisions are not ordinarily justiciable, while holding that a Governor may not sit on a Bill indefinitely.

For full marks, cover: what Part XXI is and why it exists; Articles 371A to 371I taken State by State with what each protects; then Article 370 as it was, the 2019 orders and the Reorganisation Act; and In Re: Article 370 (11 December 2023) with its holdings and what it left undecided.

Part XXI, Articles 369 to 392, is headed "Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions". Article 371 and its lettered successors create asymmetric federalism: a single Union in which particular States hold particular protections, negotiated at accession or on the creation of the State, usually to protect land, customary law, tribal institutions or the balance between regions within a State. Asymmetry is not a departure from Indian federalism; it is a feature of it, and this Part is the proof.

Article 371D and 371E, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, inserted by the Thirty-second Amendment, 1973: equitable opportunities in public employment and education for different parts of the State, local cadres, and an Administrative Tribunal. In P. Sambamurthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1987) 1 SCC 362 the proviso permitting the State to modify or annul the Tribunal's orders was struck down as violating the rule of law and judicial review. Article 371E provides for a central university in Andhra Pradesh.

Article 371F, Sikkim, inserted by the Thirty-sixth Amendment, 1975 on its admission as a State: continuation of existing laws, protection of the different sections of the population, a minimum Assembly strength of thirty, and a special responsibility of the Governor for peace and equitable arrangements.

Article 371G, Mizoram, inserted by the Fifty-third Amendment, 1986, in almost the same terms as 371A: no Act of Parliament in respect of Mizo religious or social practices, Mizo customary law and procedure, the administration of civil and criminal justice involving Mizo customary law, and the ownership and transfer of land applies unless the Assembly so resolves.

Stage one, the provision as it stood. Headed "Temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir", Article 370 provided that Parliament's power to make laws for the State was limited to the matters in the Instrument of Accession, in consultation with the State Government, and that other Union List and Concurrent List matters could be extended only with the concurrence of the State Government. Article 370(3) provided that the President may by public notification declare that the Article shall cease to be operative or shall operate with exceptions, provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification. That Constituent Assembly was dissolved in 1957 without recommending anything, and the argument for four decades was that Article 370 had thereby become permanent. Article 35A, inserted by the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954, protected State laws defining permanent residents and conferring special rights on them.

2. Article 370 was a temporary provision, both by its heading and its purpose, which was to serve an interim arrangement during the conflict.
3. The power under Article 370(3) survived the dissolution of the State's Constituent Assembly in 1957; to hold otherwise would be to freeze the integration process, and the recommendation of that Assembly was a recommendation, not a condition binding the President forever.
4. The route taken through Article 367 to reinterpret Article 370(3) was impermissible, since an interpretation clause cannot be used to amend the very provision being applied. The Court nonetheless held the exercise valid because the President could have acted under Article 370(3) directly, which he in substance did by Order 273.

Assessment. Two criticisms are standard and should be stated. First, the exercise depended on the State being under President's rule, so that the concurrence required from the State Government was given by the Union's own appointee and the recommendation required from the State legislature came from Parliament acting in its place; the Court did not squarely decide whether Article 356 may be used to take irreversible constitutional steps on behalf of a State, holding only that the challenge to the Proclamation itself was not pressed. Second, by declining to decide the Union territory question the Court left open the most far-reaching issue in the case, whether Article 3 permits a State to be extinguished altogether. Against that, the judgment's central reasoning on the temporary character of Article 370 is textually strong, and the direction to restore statehood is the only judicial check the case produced.

For full marks, cover: Article 12 and why it is inclusive; then the "enlist" half literally, as a list of what has and has not been held to be State, with authority for each; the settled test; and the two doctrines that now supplement it.

The provision. In Part III, unless the context otherwise requires, "the State" includes the Government and Parliament of India, the Government and the Legislature of each of the States, all local authorities, and other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. Article 36 carries the same meaning into Part IV. The word "includes" makes the definition a floor and not a ceiling.

Why it matters. Article 13 voids any law inconsistent with Part III and Article 32 supplies the remedy, both against the State. Whether a body is State therefore decides whether a citizen has any constitutional remedy against it.

"Other authorities" and the settled test. The narrow reading in University of Madras v. Shantha Bai (AIR 1954 Mad 67), which applied ejusdem generis, was rejected in Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1962 SC 1621) and Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal (AIR 1967 SC 1857). The instrumentality doctrine came from Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram (1975) 1 SCC 421 (Mathew J.), was given tests in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India (1979) 3 SCC 489 and made form-neutral in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1981) 1 SCC 722. The test today is Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) 5 SCC 111, a bench of seven: the body must be financially, functionally and administratively dominated by, or under the control of, the Government; the control must be particular to the body and pervasive; and control which is merely regulatory does not suffice.

Now "enlist", which the question asks for. Held to be State:

• statutory corporations: the Rajasthan State Electricity Board (Mohan Lal, 1967); ONGC, LIC and the Industrial Finance Corporation (Sukhdev Singh, 1975); the International Airport Authority (R.D. Shetty, 1979);
• a registered society running a college (Ajay Hasia, 1981);

• a private bank regulated by the Reserve Bank (Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas (2003) 10 SCC 733);
• the Board of Control for Cricket in India (Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India (2005) 4 SCC 649), though a writ under Article 226 lies against it for a public duty;
• the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (K.K. Saksena v. ICID (2015) 4 SCC 670); and
• a co-operative society not otherwise controlled by government, on the ordinary application of the test.

The two supplements to Article 12. Public function: Andi Mukta Sadguru Trust v. V.R. Rudani (1989) 2 SCC 691 holds that mandamus lies under Article 226 against any person or body performing a public duty, whatever its constitutional character, and Zee Telefilms expressly preserved that remedy; K.K. Saksena supplies the limit, that the duty must be public and not merely owed to members of the public. Horizontality: Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023) 4 SCC 1 held by 4:1 that the rights under Articles 19 and 21 are enforceable against non-State actors, joining Articles 15(2), 17, 20(2), 23, 24 and 29(2), which are horizontal on their own terms.

This question is question 4 of Q.P. Code 29510 in the same scan, printed with different capitalisation, and the full answer is there. The plan follows.

The link. Article 16(1) protects equality of opportunity in employment under the State; Articles 15(4), 16(4), 16(4A) and 16(6) enable reservation; and "the State" is defined by Article 12, whose test after Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) 5 SCC 111 is financial, functional and administrative domination or control, with merely regulatory control insufficient. Every criterion is one of ownership, so the programme's reach falls automatically as the State withdraws.

Employment. A disinvested undertaking leaves the reservation roster the day the shares are sold. BALCO Employees' Union v. Union of India (2002) 2 SCC 333 upheld such a sale and denied the workers a hearing. There is no constitutional provision for reservation in private employment.

The doctrinal close. State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas (1976) 2 SCC 310 held Article 16(4) to be a facet of equality and not an exception, so the State's obligation is to secure substantive equality; on that footing it is arguable that the obligation cannot be discharged by transferring the field to actors not bound by it. Against that stand Article 19(1)(g) and T.M.A. Pai.

Two concessions, since the instruction is to comment critically. Private employment has grown far faster than the public sector could have, so the absolute number of opportunities has risen; and the Court's refusal in BALCO to review economic policy is consistent with its general approach and not hostility to affirmative action.

Conclusion. The effect is structural and automatic, because the programme is defined to operate on the State and the State is defined by ownership. The constitutional response has been to attach public obligations to private providers by amendment and statute rather than to widen Article 12, which Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India (2005) 4 SCC 649 declined to do. That response covers education and not employment, and exempts minority institutions, which is the whole of the present debate.

Who is a minority: the unit is the State (D.A.V. College, Bhatinda v. State of Punjab (1971) 2 SCC 269; T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481). "Establish and administer" is conjunctive, and S. Azeez Basha v. Union of India (AIR 1968 SC 662) was overruled on that point in Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal, 8 November 2024, which held that incorporation by statute does not destroy minority character.

The regulation line: In re Kerala Education Bill (1958), Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai (1963), Very Rev. Mother Provincial (1970), Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College (1974), T.M.A. Pai (2002), Islamic Academy (2003).

Now P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 6 SCC 537, which the question names. A bench of seven judges decided it on 12 August 2005, to settle the confusion left by Islamic Academy. Its holdings:

1. Neither the policy of reservation nor any quota can be enforced by the State in private unaided educational institutions, whether minority or non-minority. To do so would amount to nationalising seats and would violate Article 19(1)(g) for non-minority institutions and Article 30(1) for minority ones.
2. There is no fundamental right to a seat in an unaided institution; the institution's right to select is part of its autonomy under T.M.A. Pai.

And what happened to Inamdar. Parliament reversed holding (1) within months by the Ninety-third Amendment, 2005, inserting Article 15(5) to permit reservation in private educational institutions including unaided ones, minority institutions excepted. The amendment was upheld for aided institutions in Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008) 6 SCC 1 and for unaided ones in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India (2014) 8 SCC 1. So the case is now chiefly authority for propositions (2) to (6), and its central holding survives only in relation to minority institutions, which Article 15(5) exempts.

For full marks, cover: both notes, since the paper prints no choice, at roughly twelve or thirteen marks each.

The width of the power. Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner (1978) 1 SCC 405: Article 324 is a reservoir of power, and where the law is silent the Commission may act for a free and fair election, subject to natural justice. A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai (1984) 2 SCC 656: it cannot act contrary to a statute, and the use of voting machines without statutory authority was bad, which Parliament cured by section 61A in 1989. Kanhiya Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi (1985) 4 SCC 628: the Election Symbols Order, 1968 is within Article 324. Election Commission of India v. State of Tamil Nadu 1995 Supp (3) SCC 379: the Commission may requisition central forces. T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995) 4 SCC 611: the Commission is a multi-member body acting by majority and the Chief Election Commissioner is not superior to his colleagues.

Its three functions. Administrative, in rolls, schedule, symbols, registration of parties under section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and enforcement of the Model Code. Advisory, under Articles 103(2) and 192(2), where the President or Governor decides a sitting member's disqualification according to the opinion of the Commission, which is binding. Quasi-judicial, in disputes over recognition and symbols, upheld in Sadiq Ali v. Election Commission of India (1972) 4 SCC 664.

(b) Grass root Democracy, Panchayati Raj and Reservation to Women

Grass root democracy became a constitutional obligation with the Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth Amendments, 1992, in force 24 April 1993 and 1 June 1993, which inserted Part IX (Articles 243 to 243-O) with the Eleventh Schedule and Part IXA (Articles 243P to 243ZG) with the Twelfth Schedule. Before them local government was a State subject under entry 5 of List II and elected bodies were superseded for years at a time. Article 40, a directive principle, had asked for village panchayats as units of self-government since 1950, and the Balwant Rai Mehta (1957), Ashok Mehta (1978), G.V.K. Rao (1985) and L.M. Singhvi (1986) committees had each recommended action.

Reservation to women. Article 243D(3): not less than one-third of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in every panchayat reserved for women, including the seats reserved for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe women under clause (2), allotted by rotation. Article 243D(4): not less than one-third of the offices of chairperson at every level. Articles 243T(3) and (4) for municipalities. Article 15(3) supplies the constitutional warrant, and K. Krishna Murthy v. Union of India (2010) 7 SCC 202 upheld the scheme.

Enforcement and limits. Kishansing Tomar v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad (2006) 8 SCC 352: elections must be held before the term expires; funds and unpreparedness are no excuse. Vikas Kishanrao Gawali v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 6 SCC 73: the triple test for backward class reservation in local bodies. Rajbala v. State of Haryana (2016) 1 SCC 463: educational qualifications upheld, and criticised. The standing criticisms are rotation, which prevents an incumbent from standing again in the same seat, the sarpanch pati phenomenon, and the fact that devolution under Article 243G is discretionary, so the reserved seat often carries little power.