LLM Foundation Course Indian Constitutional Law New Challenges 2015 Question Paper with Solutions

Why widening was needed. The framers wrote Article 12 for a State that governed. Within a decade the State was the country's largest industrialist, insurer, banker, carrier and employer, and it did that business through statutory corporations, government companies and registered societies rather than departments. Had those bodies been outside Article 12, the State could have taken any function beyond the reach of Part III by choosing a corporate vehicle for it, and the guarantees of Articles 14 and 16 would have ended at the gate of every public sector undertaking.

The decided cases, each with its contribution.

University of Madras v. Shantha Bai (AIR 1954 Mad 67) applied ejusdem generis and confined "other authorities" to bodies exercising sovereign or governmental functions. Doubted in Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1962 SC 1621).

Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal (AIR 1967 SC 1857) rejected that reading: "other authorities" includes every constitutional or statutory authority on which powers are conferred by law, and it is immaterial that the body also carries on trade; ejusdem generis has no application because the preceding words share no genus.

Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) 5 SCC 111, a bench of seven, overruled Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India (1975) 1 SCC 485 and settled the test: the body must be financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government, that control must be particular to the body and pervasive, and merely regulatory control will not do.

Where the widening stopped. Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India (2005) 4 SCC 649: the Board of Control for Cricket in India is not State, despite a monopoly in fact and the selection of the national team, because none of the Pradeep Kumar Biswas criteria is satisfied; but a writ under Article 226 lies against it for the discharge of a public duty. Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas (2003) 10 SCC 733: a private bank is not State, because even the Reserve Bank's detailed regulation is regulation and not control.

Conclusion. The need to widen Article 12 arose because the State went into business behind corporate forms, and the courts met it in six steps, from ejusdem generis to statutory creation, to instrumentality, to the composite control test of Pradeep Kumar Biswas. That widening is complete, and Zee Telefilms shows why it cannot go further: control is the only principled criterion available, and a definition that catches every powerful private body is no definition at all. The need has not disappeared; it has changed shape. The threat to Part III now is not the State hiding behind a company but the State ceasing to own the enterprise, and no reading of "other authorities" reaches a genuinely private operator. The answer, if the guarantees are to survive privatisation, lies in the public function jurisdiction under Article 226 and in the horizontal reading of Kaushal Kishor, and not in Article 12 itself.

Its three functions. Administrative: rolls, schedule, symbols under the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968, registration of parties under section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and enforcement of the Model Code. Advisory: under Articles 103(2) and 192(2) the President or Governor decides a sitting member's disqualification according to the opinion of the Commission, which binds. Quasi-judicial: disputes over recognition and symbols, upheld in Sadiq Ali v. Election Commission of India (1972) 4 SCC 664.

The width of the power and its limit. Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner (1978) 1 SCC 405: Article 324 is a reservoir of power, and the Commission may act where the law is silent, subject to natural justice. A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai (1984) 2 SCC 656: it may not act contrary to a statute. T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995) 4 SCC 611: the Commission is a multi-member body acting by majority and the Chief Election Commissioner is not superior to his colleagues.

One, appointment. For seventy-three years the Commission was constituted by the executive alone, without any statute, although Article 324(2) expressly contemplates one. In Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) 6 SCC 161, decided 2 March 2023, a Constitution Bench held unanimously that appointments must be made by the President on the advice of a committee of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Chief Justice of India, until Parliament legislated, reasoning that democracy is a basic feature, that free and fair elections are inseparable from it, and that a Commission appointed by the executive alone cannot deliver them with the necessary appearance of impartiality. Parliament legislated within the year: the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 substituted a Union Cabinet Minister for the Chief Justice, restoring a two-to-one executive majority. The challenge to that Act has not been decided. The Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990) and the Law Commission's 255th Report (2015) had both recommended a plural appointment body.

Four, dependence on personality. The Commission's assertiveness has tracked the character of its members rather than its constitutional protection, which is what a well-designed institution should not do. The Court said as much in Anoop Baranwal, observing that an Election Commissioner who is weak or a "yes man" defeats the purpose of the office.

Also from the courts, not the Commission: candidate disclosure (Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) 5 SCC 294, and the striking down of section 33B in PUCL v. Union of India (2003) 4 SCC 399), NOTA (PUCL v. Union of India (2013) 10 SCC 1), immediate disqualification on conviction (Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2013) 7 SCC 653) and publication of criminal antecedents (Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 224).

For full marks, cover: the guarantees of independence grouped by what they protect; appointment through the four Judges Cases; then accountability at length, which is removal, the in-house procedure, criminal liability, transparency and post-retirement appointments; and a conclusion treating the two as complements.

Appointment. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India 1981 Supp SCC 87: consultation is not concurrence and the executive has the last word. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441: overruled by nine judges, primacy to the Chief Justice acting with senior colleagues, the collegium created. Special Reference No. 1 of 1998 (1998) 7 SCC 739: the collegium is the Chief Justice with the four senior-most Judges for the Supreme Court and two for a High Court. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 1, decided 16 October 2015: the Ninety-ninth Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 struck down 4:1, because any two members of the proposed Commission could veto a name and judicial primacy in appointments is part of the basic structure. Chelameswar J. dissented on the collegium's opacity.

Now accountability, which is the half most scripts neglect.

Criminal liability. K. Veeraswami v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 655: a Judge of the higher judiciary is a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act, but no case may be registered without the prior consultation of the Chief Justice of India, a protection against harassment that is criticised as producing near-immunity.

Transparency. Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2020) 5 SCC 481, a Constitution Bench, held the office of the Chief Justice of India to be a public authority under the Right to Information Act, 2005, so information about judges' assets and about collegium deliberations falls within the Act subject to its exemptions and the public interest test. The decision was given against the Court's own registry. Collegium resolutions have been published since 2017, but usually without reasons, which remains the principal criticism.

Conclusion. The Constitution protects independence competently in the four areas it addresses and says almost nothing about the two that matter most, appointment and accountability. Both gaps have been filled by the judiciary: the collegium, built out of the single word "consultation", and the in-house procedure, built out of nothing at all. Neither is written, neither publishes reasons, and both are defended chiefly because the alternative is executive involvement. That is a weak justification for a permanent arrangement, and it is why the unfinished Memorandum of Procedure is the sharpest criticism available of the present state of affairs: it is the one reform that could supply published criteria and timelines without surrendering the primacy the Court has held to be basic structure.

The code is five articles and they do different work. Article 14, equality before the law and equal protection of the laws, for any person. Article 15, no discrimination against a citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, with clause (2) binding private persons in access to shops, hotels, wells and places of public resort, and clauses (3) to (6) enabling special provision. Article 16, equality of opportunity in public employment, with clauses (4), (4A), (4B) and (6) enabling reservation. Article 17, the absolute abolition of untouchability, subject to no exception and binding private persons directly. Article 18, abolition of titles.

The doctrinal pivot. In State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas (1976) 2 SCC 310 the Court held that Article 16(4) is a facet of Article 16(1) and not an exception to it, a holding adopted in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217. Without it, every measure below is a departure from equality; with it, each is an application of it.

Now the examples, which the question requires.

Under Article 15, protective discrimination. Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P.B. Vijayakumar (1995) 4 SCC 520 upheld preference for women in State employment under Article 15(3). Article 15(4), inserted by the First Amendment after State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (AIR 1951 SC 226), is the basis of reservation in education. Article 15(5), inserted by the Ninety-third Amendment, was upheld in Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008) 6 SCC 1 and Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India (2014) 8 SCC 1. Article 15(6), the economically weaker sections quota inserted by the One Hundred and Third Amendment, was upheld 3:2 in Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1540, which also held the fifty per cent ceiling not to be inviolable.

Assessment, since "aims at" invites one. The code has delivered most where it operates negatively, striking down a discriminatory law: adultery, triple talaq, section 377, the air hostess regulations in Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (1981) 4 SCC 335. It has delivered unevenly where it operates positively, through reservation, because benefits concentrate within a protected class, which is precisely what the creamy layer in Indra Sawhney and sub-classification in Davinder Singh address. And it has delivered least on economic justice as such, because Article 14 does not guarantee a wage, land or housing, and the provisions that speak to those, Articles 38, 39 and 46, are unenforceable directives. What gains there have been on that front came through Article 21: Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545 on the right to livelihood and Consumer Education and Research Centre v. Union of India (1995) 3 SCC 42 on health.

For full marks, cover: both notes, since the paper prints no choice, at roughly twelve or thirteen marks each.

(a) Political reservation to women is a part of 'Grass Root Democracy'

True of local government since 1993, and true of Parliament only since April 2026, where it is still not operative. That contrast is the answer.

The provisions. The Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth Amendments, 1992, in force 24 April 1993 and 1 June 1993, inserted Parts IX and IXA. Article 243D(1) reserves seats for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes in proportion to population; 243D(2) reserves one-third of those for women of those groups; 243D(3) reserves not less than one-third of all directly elected seats for women, allotted by rotation; 243D(4) applies the same one-third to the offices of chairperson at every level. Articles 243T(3) and (4) do the same for municipalities. Article 15(3) supplies the constitutional warrant.

Assessment. More than twenty States have raised the reservation to one-half by their own legislation, and above 1.4 million women hold elected local office, the largest such body anywhere. Studies of West Bengal and Rajasthan panchayats found greater investment in drinking water and roads under women pradhans and reduced bias against women candidates in later elections. Against that: rotation prevents an incumbent from standing again in the same seat; the sarpanch pati phenomenon is widely documented; and devolution under Article 243G is discretionary, so the reserved seat often carries little power.

The national contrast. The Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Act, 2023 inserts Articles 330A and 332A reserving one-third of the seats in the Lok Sabha and the State Assemblies, but Article 334A makes it operative only after a delimitation on the first census taken after commencement, and it lapses fifteen years after commencement. It was brought into force on 16 April 2026, and the Constitution (One Hundred and Thirty First Amendment) Bill, 2026, introduced to enable an earlier delimitation, was defeated in the Lok Sabha for want of the special majority.

Imposed by the courts: the voter's right to know under Article 19(1)(a), Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) 5 SCC 294, with section 33B struck down in PUCL v. Union of India (2003) 4 SCC 399; NOTA, PUCL v. Union of India (2013) 10 SCC 1; immediate disqualification on conviction, Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2013) 7 SCC 653; publication of criminal antecedents and reasons for selection, Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 224 and the order of 13 February 2020; religious appeals as a corrupt practice, Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017) 2 SCC 629; and the striking down of the Electoral Bond Scheme on 15 February 2024.

Appointment. Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) 6 SCC 161 prescribed a committee including the Chief Justice of India until Parliament legislated; the Act of 2023 replaced him with a Union Cabinet Minister, and the challenge is undecided.

For full marks, cover: Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2) with the two amendments; the freedom of the press and why it has no separate clause; the derived rights; and then the third limb, which is the internet, intermediary regulation, surveillance and synthetic media.

Freedom of the press has no separate article, deliberately: the Constituent Assembly considered one and rejected it because the press has no rights the citizen does not have. Its content came from the courts. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1962 SC 305): a price-page schedule struck down, because the State cannot do indirectly by controlling volume what it may not do directly. Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India (1972) 2 SCC 788: newsprint quotas struck down; the freedom includes both circulation and content. Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641: the press is not immune from general taxation, but taxation that imperils it is open to challenge. Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal (1995) 2 SCC 161: airwaves are public property and the government broadcasting monopoly cannot stand.

Speech on the internet is within Article 19(1)(a). Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 struck down section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 for vagueness and overbreadth, upheld section 69A on blocking as narrowly drawn with reasons and safeguards, and read down section 79(3)(b) so that an intermediary loses safe harbour only on a court order or a government notification. It also restated the governing distinction: discussion and advocacy are protected; only incitement may be restricted. Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) 3 SCC 637 held that speech and trade through the internet are protected under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g), that an indefinite suspension is impermissible, that orders must be published and are reviewable, and that proportionality applies.

Intermediary regulation is the current battleground. The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 impose due diligence, traceability of the first originator and a three-tier grievance mechanism over digital news and streaming, and are under challenge. The 2023 amendment created a government Fact Check Unit, and Rule 3(1)(b)(v) was struck down by the Bombay High Court in Kunal Kamra v. Union of India on 20 September 2024 as violating Articles 14 and 19(1)(a), the Court holding that the State cannot be the judge of the truth of speech about itself.

Two matters that remain open. Sedition: section 124A of the Penal Code was kept in abeyance in S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India on 11 May 2022, and the Penal Code was replaced on 1 July 2024 by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, whose section 152 is the successor with an Explanation saving lawful disapprobation. Hate speech: no statutory definition exists, the Law Commission's 267th Report (2017) not having been enacted, and Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2021) 1 SCC 1 supplies only a framework.

Conclusion. Article 19(1)(a) was written for newspapers and public meetings and has absorbed broadcasting, cable, the internet and social media without a word of amendment, because the Court has consistently held that the medium does not alter the right. Freedom of the press needed no separate clause, and Sakal Papers and Bennett Coleman show why protecting circulation matters as much as protecting content. The pressure now comes from a direction the framers could not have foreseen: not the State suppressing a publisher, but the State compelling a private intermediary to suppress a user, and technology capable of manufacturing speech nobody uttered. Shreya Singhal supplied the method, which is to insist that every restriction fit one of the eight grounds and be narrowly drawn, and Kunal Kamra shows it still working; whether it survives automated moderation is the open question.

Article 30(1): all minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. Article 30(1A), inserted by the Forty-fourth Amendment: compensation on compulsory acquisition of the property of a minority educational institution must not restrict or abrogate the right. Article 30(2): no discrimination in granting aid on the ground that an institution is under minority management.

Four differences, and stating them earns marks. Article 29(1) protects any section of citizens, Article 30(1) only a minority. Article 29(1) protects language, script or culture, Article 30(1) an educational institution. Article 29(2) is an individual right, Article 30(1) a community right. Article 29(2) applies to State and State-aided institutions, while Article 30(1) is a right against the State.

Who is a minority? No definition is given; the determining unit is the State, not the country: D.A.V. College, Bhatinda v. State of Punjab (1971) 2 SCC 269, and T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481 by eleven judges. Numerical inferiority is the criterion; backwardness is not required.

The regulation line. In re Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (AIR 1958 SC 956): the right is not absolute; regulation for standards of teaching, qualifications and conditions of service is permissible; aid may be conditioned but not on surrender of the right. Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay (AIR 1963 SC 540): eighty per cent of seats for government nominees struck down. State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial (1970) 2 SCC 417: no takeover of management. Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society v. State of Gujarat (1974) 1 SCC 717, nine judges: choice of teachers, discipline and medium protected. T.M.A. Pai (2002): running an institution is an occupation under Article 19(1)(g); unaided minority institutions have the widest autonomy in admission and fees; no capitation or profiteering, though a reasonable surplus is permitted; the right to administer is not a right to maladminister. P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 6 SCC 537: no State-imposed quota on unaided institutions.

Now examine critically, which the question asks for. Four points.

Third, the exemption from the right to education. Pramati held the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 inapplicable to all minority institutions, aided or unaided, because Article 21A cannot abrogate Article 30(1), whereas Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 102 had upheld section 12(1)(c) against non-minority unaided schools. A large and growing part of the school system therefore stands outside the twenty-five per cent obligation, and there is an evident incentive to seek minority status, an incentive the 2024 Aligarh decision has sharpened.

Fourth, the defence. Against those three points stands the reason for Article 30 in the first place. The Constituent Assembly enacted it because a minority's language, script and culture cannot survive if the majority controls its schools, and because a majoritarian legislature cannot be relied on to protect what it does not share. That justification does not weaken because the exemptions are inconvenient; it is the whole point of a counter-majoritarian guarantee. The proper answer to the criticism is not to dilute Article 30 but to note that its protection is of the institution's character, not of a right to charge what it likes or to admit whom it pleases without a transparent procedure, which is exactly what T.M.A. Pai held.

For full marks, cover: "Union of States" and why; the federal and unitary features; the three distributions; the case law to Bommai; and the trust half, being Article 263, the GST Council and the Governor, ending with the advisory opinion of 20 November 2025.

Article 1(1): India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States, chosen over "Federation" because, as Dr Ambedkar explained, the Union is not the result of an agreement and the States have no right to secede.

Federal features. A written and supreme Constitution; distribution of legislative power by Article 246 and the Seventh Schedule; the proviso to Article 368(2), requiring ratification by not less than half the State legislatures for amendments touching the Seventh Schedule, the representation of States in Parliament, the extent of executive or legislative power, or Article 368 itself; an independent judiciary with the Supreme Court's exclusive original jurisdiction over federal disputes under Article 131; and a Council of States under Article 80.

The case law. State of West Bengal v. Union of India (AIR 1963 SC 1241): the States are not sovereign; federalism is a matter of degree. State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977) 3 SCC 592: strongly centralist. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1: federalism is basic structure; Article 356 is justiciable; the President's satisfaction must rest on relevant material; the floor of the House is the only test of majority; and an Assembly may not be dissolved before parliamentary approval. Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006) 7 SCC 1: quasi-federal. Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2018) 8 SCC 501 and (2023) 9 SCC 1: collaborative federalism, later altered by statute. Union of India v. Mohit Minerals (2022) 10 SCC 700: GST Council recommendations are not binding. Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2017) 12 SCC 1: Articles 301 to 304 re-read by nine judges.

The strain is the Governor's office. Appointed under Article 155 and holding office during pleasure under Article 156, the Governor exercises discretion under Articles 163 and 200 in States often governed by another party. On government formation, Bommai and Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006) 2 SCC 1. On assent, State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, decided 8 April 2025, held the withholding of assent to ten Bills illegal, prescribed timelines and declared the Bills deemed assented; on a Presidential Reference the Supreme Court held on 20 November 2025 that no rigid timelines may be judicially prescribed under Articles 200 and 201, that deemed assent is alien to the Constitution, and that such decisions are not ordinarily justiciable, while holding that a Governor may not sit on a Bill indefinitely and that limited review lies for unexplained delay.

Indian secularism is neither separation nor exclusion. The American model rests on the Establishment Clause and a wall of separation; the French model of laicite excludes religion from the public sphere. India adopted neither, and chose principled distance, often described as sarva dharma sama bhava: the State establishes no religion, does not discriminate between faiths, and may intervene in religious affairs for social reform. The text proves the choice: Article 25(1) is expressly subject to public order, morality, health and to the other provisions of Part III; Article 25(2)(a) permits regulation of secular activity associated with religious practice; Article 25(2)(b) permits laws for social welfare and reform and for throwing open Hindu religious institutions to all classes and sections of Hindus; Article 17 abolishes untouchability outright; and Article 44 directs a uniform civil code. No State bound by a wall of separation could do any of this.

Freedom of religion, Articles 25 to 28. Article 25(1): freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion, to all persons and not only citizens, subject to public order, morality, health and the other provisions of Part III. Explanation I includes the kirpan; Explanation II extends "Hindus" to Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists. Article 26: every religious denomination may establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, manage its own affairs in matters of religion, own and acquire property, and administer that property in accordance with law; the drafting difference between (b) and (d) is deliberate and examinable. The test for a denomination is a common faith, a common organisation and a distinctive name: S.P. Mittal v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 51. Article 27: no taxes whose proceeds are appropriated for the promotion of a particular religion, though a fee for services is outside it (Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282). Article 28: no religious instruction in a wholly State-funded institution, and no compulsion in an aided or recognised one.

Communal violence. The constitutional answers are Article 355, the Union's duty to protect a State against internal disturbance, and Article 356 as read in Bommai, which made secularism the ground on which a State government may be dismissed. The judicial record after major episodes has been slow, and the transfer of trials out of Gujarat in Zahira Habibulla Sheikh v. State of Gujarat (2004) 4 SCC 158 is the clearest instance of the machinery working, as the repeated failure to enact a Communal Violence Bill is of it not.

Hate speech. There is no statutory definition. The provisions used are sections 196, 197, 299 and 302 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, formerly sections 153A, 153B, 295A and 298 of the Penal Code, and section 123(3A) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India (2014) 11 SCC 477 the Court declined to legislate and referred the question to the Law Commission, whose 267th Report (2017) proposed new offences; nothing was enacted. Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2021) 1 SCC 1 supplied a framework turning on content, intent, harm and the standing of the speaker. In Shaheen Abdulla v. Union of India (2022 and 2023) the Court directed police in several States to register cases suo motu.

Places of worship. The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 freezes the religious character of every place of worship as it stood on 15 August 1947, excepting only the Ayodhya dispute. In M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020) 1 SCC 1 the Court described it as an instrument protecting secular values and embodying non-retrogression. The Act is now itself under challenge, and in December 2024 the Court restrained all courts from ordering surveys or passing effective orders in suits over places of worship pending its decision.

This is question 1 of Q.P. Code 12182 in the same scan, with liberalisation named expressly, and the general answer is there. The plan, with the liberalisation argument given in full because the question turns on it.

The settled test. After Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) 5 SCC 111, a body is State if it is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government, the control being particular to the body and pervasive; merely regulatory control does not suffice. Every criterion is one of ownership and control.

Four justifications for widening, in the backdrop of liberalisation.

Four, the alternative remedies are partial. Regulators, consumer law and contract cover some fields and not others, and none supplies Article 14's guarantee against arbitrariness. The Right to Information Act, 2005 reaches a private body only if "substantially financed" under section 2(h), which is the ownership criterion again.

The counter-arguments must be met. Widening to reach genuinely private bodies would subject ordinary commercial decisions to constitutional review, would chill investment in the very sectors the State has left, and would offend the structure of Part III, which was drafted against the State because the State's power is of a different order. Zee Telefilms accepted all three.

Which is why the development went elsewhere. Public function under Article 226: Andi Mukta Sadguru Trust v. V.R. Rudani (1989) 2 SCC 691, limited by K.K. Saksena v. International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (2015) 4 SCC 670. Horizontality: Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023) 4 SCC 1, holding Articles 19 and 21 enforceable against non-State actors.

For full marks, cover: both notes, since the paper prints no choice, at roughly twelve or thirteen marks each.

(a) Freedom of speech and Expression

Article 19(1)(a) guarantees to all citizens the right to freedom of speech and expression. A company is not a citizen, though its shareholders and editors may assert the right, as Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India (1972) 2 SCC 788 allowed. Article 19(2) permits reasonable restrictions by law in the interests of eight matters and no others: the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation, and incitement to an offence. The First Amendment, 1951 added three of those grounds and the word "reasonable"; the Sixteenth Amendment, 1963 added sovereignty and integrity. Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023) 4 SCC 1 confirmed the list is exhaustive.

How restrictions are tested. Reasonableness: Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1951 SC 118), the restriction must not be arbitrary or excessive; State of Madras v. V.G. Row (AIR 1952 SC 196), weigh the nature of the right, the purpose, the extent and urgency of the evil and the prevailing conditions. Proximity: Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia (AIR 1960 SC 633), the connection with the ground must be proximate and not remote. Proportionality: Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 7 SCC 353 and Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1, requiring a legitimate aim, suitability, necessity and a fair balance. Vagueness and overbreadth: Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1, which struck down section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, upheld section 69A and read down section 79(3)(b), and restated that discussion and advocacy are protected while only incitement may be restricted.

(b) Separation of power in Indian Constitution

India does not adopt a strict separation of powers. There is no equivalent of Articles I, II and III of the United States Constitution. What exists is a functional separation with extensive checks, and the doctrine's real force in India is as a component of the basic structure.

Where it appears. Article 50, a directive principle, requires separation of the judiciary from the executive in the public services. Articles 121 and 211 bar legislative discussion of a Judge's conduct. Articles 122 and 212 bar courts from questioning proceedings in the legislature on the ground of irregularity of procedure. Article 361 gives the President and Governors immunity. Articles 53 and 154 vest executive power; Articles 74 and 163 require ministerial advice.

The cases. Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR 1955 SC 549): the Constitution does not recognise a rigid separation, but the functions have been sufficiently differentiated and no organ may assume functions essentially belonging to another. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225: separation of powers is basic structure. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain 1975 Supp SCC 1: clause (4) of Article 329A struck down as an exercise of judicial power by the legislature, the clearest application of the doctrine in Indian law. Raja Ram Pal v. Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) 3 SCC 184: expulsion of members is justiciable for illegality though not for irregularity of procedure. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 1: judicial primacy in appointments is basic structure. Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass (2008) 1 SCC 683: judicial restraint is a component of judicial independence.

The rule on overruling a judgment, which is where the doctrine bites hardest: a legislature may remove the basis of a decision retrospectively, and may not declare a judgment invalid, which would be judicial power. Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India (1978) 2 SCC 50; Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, In re 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96; State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala (2014) 12 SCC 696.

This is question 7 of Q.P. Code 12182 in the same scan, with an added direction to use cases, and the full answer is there. The plan follows.

The provisions. Article 29(1): any section of citizens with a distinct language, script or culture may conserve it. Article 29(2): no citizen denied admission to a State or State-aided institution on grounds only of religion, race, caste or language. Article 30(1): all minorities, religious or linguistic, may establish and administer educational institutions of their choice; with Article 30(1A) on compensation and Article 30(2) on non-discrimination in aid.

Four differences: any section of citizens against a minority; language and culture against an educational institution; an individual right against a community right; and a right operating on State and aided institutions against a right operating against the State.

Minority status: the unit is the State, D.A.V. College, Bhatinda v. State of Punjab (1971) 2 SCC 269 and T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481.

The three tensions, which is the critical half. One, Article 29(2) against Article 30(1) on admissions, reconciled in St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi (1992) 1 SCC 558 by allowing an aided minority institution to prefer its own community up to about fifty per cent, modified in T.M.A. Pai. Two, the exemption from Article 15(5), inserted by the Ninety-third Amendment and upheld in Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008) 6 SCC 1 and Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India (2014) 8 SCC 1, which excepts minority institutions from the principal affirmative action provision in education. Three, the exemption from the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 for all minority institutions after Pramati, against Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 102, which upheld section 12(1)(c) for non-minority unaided schools.

The defence. Article 30 is a counter-majoritarian guarantee, enacted because a minority's culture cannot survive if the majority controls its schools. The exemptions are the consequence of that guarantee, not an abuse of it, and T.M.A. Pai has already confined the right to the institution's character rather than to a licence to charge or to admit as it pleases.

This question is printed word for word as question 3 of Q.P. Code 12182 in the same scan, and the full answer is there. The plan follows.

Independence, grouped by what it protects. Tenure: retirement at sixty-five and sixty-two; removal only on proved misbehaviour or incapacity by an address of both Houses supported by a majority of the total membership and two-thirds of those present and voting, Article 124(4) with Article 218. Money: salaries charged on the Consolidated Fund, Articles 112(3)(d), 125, 202(3)(d) and 221, and not variable to a Judge's disadvantage. The office: Articles 121 and 211, 129 and 215, 124(7) and 220, and Article 50. The subordinate judiciary: Article 235, read to include disciplinary control in State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi (AIR 1966 SC 447).

Appointment: S.P. Gupta (1981), executive primacy; Second Judges Case (1993), judicial primacy and the collegium; Third Judges Case (1998), the collegium of five and of three; Fourth Judges Case (2016) 5 SCC 1, the Ninety-ninth Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 struck down 4:1 as destroying judicial primacy, which is basic structure.

Conclusion. The Constitution secures independence competently where it speaks and is silent on appointment and accountability, the two things that matter most. Both gaps have been filled by the judiciary itself, neither is written, and both are defended chiefly because the alternative is worse. The unfinished Memorandum of Procedure is the reform that would answer the criticism without surrendering primacy.

The cases: State of West Bengal v. Union of India (AIR 1963 SC 1241); S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1, federalism as basic structure, Article 356 justiciable, the floor of the House the test of majority, no dissolution before parliamentary approval; Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006) 7 SCC 1; Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2018) and (2023), collaborative federalism.

The trust half: Article 263 and the Inter-State Council, constituted only in 1990; the Zonal Councils under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956; Article 261; Article 262 and the water tribunals, subject to State of Karnataka v. State of Tamil Nadu (2018) 4 SCC 1. The strain is the Governor: State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, 8 April 2025, prescribing timelines and declaring ten Bills deemed assented, followed by the Presidential Reference decided 20 November 2025, holding that no timelines may be judicially prescribed, that deemed assent is alien to the Constitution, and that such decisions are not ordinarily justiciable, while a Governor may not sit on a Bill indefinitely.

Conclusion. Federal in structure, unitary in emergency, and unamendably federal since Bommai. The text guarantees the distribution of power; the relationship is left to convention, and it is the convention that has been failing.

The right. Education was a directive principle in 1950: Article 45 required free and compulsory education for all children up to fourteen within ten years, and Articles 41 and 46 supported it. The courts supplied what the political process had not. Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (1992) 3 SCC 666 held the right to education concomitant to the fundamental rights and capitation fees arbitrary. Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 1 SCC 645 confined it: the right flows from Article 21, but reading Articles 21, 41 and 45 together it is a fundamental right only up to fourteen. The Eighty-sixth Amendment, 2002 enacted that: Article 21A, free and compulsory education from six to fourteen; Article 45 substituted, early childhood care up to six; and Article 51A(k), the parental duty. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, in force 1 April 2010, supplies the content: section 3, the entitlement; section 12(1)(c), twenty-five per cent of the entry class in unaided schools from weaker sections against reimbursement; section 13, no capitation and no screening; section 16, no holding back, amended in 2019 to permit examination and detention in classes 5 and 8. Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 102 upheld the Act against non-minority unaided schools; Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India (2014) 8 SCC 1 held it inapplicable to all minority institutions.

The enforcement machinery. Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka (2003) 6 SCC 697 created fee and admission committees, expressly as a temporary regulatory measure. P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 6 SCC 537, seven judges, held that the State cannot impose its own reservation quota on unaided institutions and approved the committees pending legislation. Parliament reversed Inamdar on the reservation point by the Ninety-third Amendment, 2005, inserting Article 15(5), minority institutions excepted, upheld in Ashoka Kumar Thakur (2008) and Pramati (2014). The statutory response to capitation has been at State level, in Acts prohibiting capitation fee, and their enforcement is the standing criticism.

Now the critical half, and there are four points to make.

First, the constitutional character of education has changed. Between Unni Krishnan and T.M.A. Pai education moved from a charity to an occupation. The consequence is not rhetorical: regulation must now be justified as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6), whereas before it was assumed. Every fee cap, admission rule and reservation obligation is now a restriction that must satisfy proportionality.

Conclusion. The right to education and the commercialisation of education are two aspects of one constitutional problem. Article 21A places the obligation to provide on the State, and the State discharges a growing share of it through providers whose activity the Constitution protects as an occupation and who are not themselves bound by Part III. Section 12(1)(c) of the 2009 Act and Article 15(5) are the two devices by which public obligations have been attached to those providers, and both have been upheld; both stop at the door of a minority institution. The result is a right that is guaranteed by the Constitution, delivered largely by the market, regulated by committees devised as a stopgap in 2003, and unenforceable against a large and growing part of the sector. That, rather than the level of fees, is the constitutional criticism worth making.