BLS LLB 5 Years Sem 9 CPC 2025-26 Question Paper with Solutions

Under the proviso to Order XVII Rule 1(1), inserted by the Amendment Act of 1999 and brought into force in 2002, no adjournment shall be granted to a party more than three times during the hearing of the suit. The court may adjourn only if sufficient cause is shown, must record its reasons in writing, and under Rule 1(2) may impose costs occasioned by the adjournment.

A proper party is a person whose presence before the court is not indispensable to the passing of an effective decree, but whose presence enables the court to completely and effectually adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. Order I Rule 10(2) empowers the court to add such a party at any stage, on application or of its own motion.

Under Order IX Rule 13 the court shall set aside an ex parte decree if the defendant satisfies it either that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. The application lies to the court which passed the decree and, under Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963, must be made within thirty days of the decree or of the date the defendant had knowledge of it.

A caveat is a caution or warning lodged under section 148A of the Code by a person who apprehends that an application is going to be made, or has been made, in a suit or proceeding to which he is likely to be affected, asking the court not to grant any order on that application without first giving him notice. It remains in force for ninety days from the date it is lodged.

Reference is the power of a subordinate court, under section 113 read with Order XLVI, to state a case and refer it for the opinion of the High Court where it entertains a reasonable doubt on a question of law, and to pass its decree in conformity with that opinion. Under the proviso to section 113 the reference is mandatory where the court doubts the validity of an Act, Ordinance or Regulation and thinks it ultra vires, and no higher court has so declared.

An interpleader suit is defined by section 88 and governed by Order XXXV. Where two or more persons claim adversely to one another the same debt, sum of money or other property, movable or immovable, from a person who claims no interest in it other than for charges or costs, and who is ready to deliver it to the rightful claimant, that person may institute a suit of interpleader against all the claimants, so that the court may decide who among them is entitled to it.

The essential requisites are five:

1. There must be some debt, sum of money or other property, movable or immovable, in dispute.
2. Two or more persons must claim it adversely to one another.
3. The person from whom it is claimed must claim no interest in it, other than charges or costs.
4. He must be ready and willing to pay or deliver it to the rightful claimant.
5. There must be no suit pending in which the rights of the rival claimants can properly be decided.

Summons is the document issued under section 27 and Order V by which the court calls upon the defendant to appear and answer the claim. Order V Rule 1(1) requires it to be issued when a suit is duly instituted, and the defendant to appear and answer the claim and to file his written statement within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, extendable by the court, for reasons recorded in writing, to not later than ninety days from the date of service.

The modes of service are:

1. Personal or direct service (Rules 10 to 16). The ordinary mode. The summons is delivered or tendered to the defendant in person, or to his authorised agent, and his signature is taken on the original by way of acknowledgment. Rule 15 permits service on an adult member of the family residing with him, but expressly not on a servant. Rule 17 permits affixation on the outer door of the house where the defendant or his agent refuses to sign, or cannot be found after due diligence.

5. Service where the defendant resides outside the jurisdiction (Rules 21 to 26). The summons may be sent to the court within whose jurisdiction he resides, or served directly by post; Rules 25 and 26 govern service in a foreign territory and through political agents.

6. Service on special classes of defendant. A prisoner through the officer in charge of the prison (Rule 24); a public officer or a servant of a railway or local authority through the head of the office (Rule 27); a soldier, sailor or airman through his commanding officer (Rule 28); a corporation on the secretary, director or principal officer, or by post to the registered office (Order XXIX Rule 2; Order V Rule 29 is a different thing, the duty of the person to whom a summons is sent under Rules 24, 27 or 28 to return it with an endorsement of service); partners under Order XXX Rule 3.

Conclusion. Every mode in Order V is a different way of proving one thing, that the defendant had a real opportunity to know of the suit, and the Order ranks them accordingly: personal service first, service on an agent or an adult family member next, then affixation, then post or electronic means, and substituted service last of all and only on the court's recorded satisfaction. That ranking matters after the decree as much as before it, because the strength of the service is exactly what an application under Order IX Rule 13 will turn on.

The essentials, remembered as nec vi, nec clam, nec precario, possession not by force, not by stealth and not by permission, are:

1. Possession must be actual and exclusive.
2. It must be open and notorious, so that the owner may know of it.
3. It must be hostile, that is, in denial of the owner's title, and to his knowledge.
4. It must be continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period.
5. The identity of the property and the date the possession became adverse must be pleaded with precision.

Conclusion. Twelve years of possession that is actual, open, hostile to the owner's knowledge and uninterrupted does not merely bar his suit; by section 27 it extinguishes his title, and thirty years is required where the owner is the Government. The claim fails far more often on the quality of the possession than on its length, because permissive possession is never adverse. Since Ravinder Kaur Grewal the possessor who has completed the period holds a title he can enforce as a plaintiff, and not merely a defence.

Suit against a person of unsound mind (Rule 3). Where the defendant is of unsound mind, the court, on application and after notice to the person with whom he resides, shall appoint a guardian for the suit, who continues until the disability ceases or until he is removed.

Who may be next friend or guardian (Rule 4). Any person of sound mind who has attained majority, whose interest is not adverse to that of the person under disability, and who is not a defendant when he is to be a next friend, nor a plaintiff when he is to be a guardian. A person may not be appointed guardian without his consent in writing.

Rule 5. Every application to the court on behalf of such a person, other than an application under Rule 10(2), shall be made by his next friend or guardian.

Rule 6. The next friend or guardian shall not receive any money or movable property on behalf of the person under disability except with the leave of the court, and shall furnish security.

Rule 7. No agreement or compromise entered into by a next friend or guardian on behalf of such a person shall have effect without the leave of the court, expressly recorded in the proceedings. A compromise without such leave is voidable at his instance.

• (b) the knowledge of the right or title on which a suit is founded is concealed by the fraud of the defendant or his agent, or
• (d) where a document necessary to establish the right of the plaintiff has been fraudulently concealed from him,

the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud or the concealment, or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it; and in the case of a concealed document, until he first had the means of producing it or compelling its production.

The facts fit clause (d) exactly: a document necessary to establish Mr. Gala's right to the property was fraudulently concealed from him. They fit clause (b) as well, because what was concealed was the knowledge of the very title on which his suit is founded.

The suit would be one for possession of immovable property based on title, governed by Article 65, twelve years. Reckoned from 25 May 2024, Mr. Gala has until 25 May 2036.

(b) The effect of the provision on computation

The proviso protects innocent third parties. Nothing in section 17 enables a suit to be brought to recover property which, in the case of fraud, has been purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was not a party to the fraud and did not at the time of purchase know, or have reason to believe, that any fraud had been committed. So if Mr. Gupta has already sold the property to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, Mr. Gala's remedy against the property fails and he is left to a personal action against Mr. Gupta.

Conclusion. Limitation begins to run against Mr. Gala on 25 May 2024, the day he discovered the concealed document, and not in 2020 when it was concealed, so a suit for possession under Article 65 is in time until 25 May 2036. He must plead the fraud with particulars and prove the date of discovery, and he will lose the property, though not his personal remedy against Mr. Gupta, if it has by then passed to a purchaser for value who had no notice of the fraud.

Section 19 of the Code provides that where a suit is for compensation for wrong done to the person or to movable property, and the wrong was done within the local limits of the jurisdiction of one court and the defendant resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, within the local limits of the jurisdiction of another court, the suit may be instituted at the option of the plaintiff in either of the said courts.

Applying it:

Delhi, because that is where the defendant resides. Section 19 gives the plaintiff the court of the defendant's residence as one of his two options, and section 20(a) says the same thing independently.

Bangalore, because that is where part of the wrong was done: the interview was given there and the matter was published there.

Calcutta, because the matter was also published there, and in the law of defamation every publication is a fresh wrong. Publication is the gist of the tort; the same words published in two cities give rise to a cause of action in each. Section 20(c) supports this independently, since a part of the cause of action arose at Calcutta.

Section 19 carries an illustration that is this problem almost word for word:

For full marks, cover: that the answer is no, the second suit is barred; Order II Rule 1 and Rule 2(1), (2) and (3); the illustration to Order II Rule 2, which is this problem; the distinction between omitting a portion of a claim, governed by Rule 2(2) with no leave exception, and omitting a relief, governed by Rule 2(3) where leave is available.

(a) Can he file a fresh suit?

Rule 2(3). A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of them; but if he omits, except with the leave of the court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted.

The Order carries an illustration that is this problem exactly:

A lets a house to B at a yearly rent of Rs. 1,200. The rent for the whole of the years 1905, 1906 and 1907 is due and unpaid. A sues B in 1908 only for the rent due for 1906. A shall not afterwards sue B for the rent due for 1905 or 1907.

Change the years and the figure and the case is decided.

The reason the rule applies is that the arrears arise from one cause of action, the single tenancy and the obligation to pay rent under it. They are not three causes of action but one claim in three parts. The rule bites on a portion of a claim omitted from a suit on one cause of action; it does not compel a plaintiff to join distinct causes of action.

How Mr. Vinod could have saved himself. Three ways, all closed to him now:

For full marks, cover: that the Bangalore suit is not to be tried and will be stayed, not dismissed; section 10 and the difference between stay and dismissal; the five conditions; and section 151, under which the Bangalore court could consolidate or the Mumbai court could restrain.

(a) Is the Bangalore suit maintainable?

The Bangalore suit is not to be proceeded with. It will be stayed under section 10 of the Code.

3. Both suits must be between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title. Jyoti and Prasanna are the same two people; that they have exchanged the roles of plaintiff and defendant makes no difference.
4. The previously instituted suit must be pending in the same court, or in any other court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, or before the Supreme Court.
5. The court in which the earlier suit is pending must be competent to grant the relief claimed in the later suit.

Applied to the facts, all five are satisfied and the Bangalore suit must be stayed.

Conclusion. The Bangalore suit is not maintainable in the sense that it cannot be tried, and the order the court will make is a stay under section 10, not a dismissal and not a rejection of the plaint. All five conditions are satisfied here, and the fact that Mr. Prasanna is the plaintiff at Bangalore and the defendant at Mumbai makes no difference. The cleaner course, since each party has a claim on the same facts, is a transfer under section 25 and a single consolidated trial.

For full marks, cover: Order VII Rules 14 to 18 and Order VIII Rules 1A to 1C for production with the pleadings; Order XIII Rules 1 to 11 for production at the hearing, admission, endorsement, impounding, return and rejection; section 151 and the Evidence Act's insufficiently-stamped document rule; and the consequence in Order VII Rule 14(3) that a document not produced with the plaint shall not be received in evidence without leave.

Documents pass through a civil suit in three stages, and the Code deals with each separately: production, admission and impounding, and return.

I. Production with the pleadings

Order VII Rule 14 governs the plaintiff. Where he sues upon a document, or relies on a document in his possession or power as evidence in support of his claim, he shall enter it in a list and produce it in court when the plaint is presented, and shall at the same time deliver the document and a copy to be filed with the plaint. Rule 14(2) covers a document not in his possession or power: he shall state, wherever possible, in whose possession or power it is, and file a copy.

Rule 1. The parties shall produce, at or before the settlement of issues, all the documentary evidence in original where the copies have been filed with the pleadings. Sub-rule (3) exempts documents produced for cross-examination or to refresh a witness's memory.

Rule 3. The court may at any stage reject any document which it considers irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, recording its reasons.

Rule 4, endorsement on documents admitted in evidence. Every document admitted in evidence shall have endorsed on it, in the handwriting of the Judge or under his direction, the number and title of the suit, the name of the person producing it, the date on which it was produced, and a statement of its having been so admitted; and the endorsement shall be signed or initialled by the Judge. This endorsement is what makes an exhibit an exhibit.

Rule 5 deals with endorsement on entries in books, accounts and records, and Rule 6 with the recording of a document rejected as inadmissible, with the ground of rejection.

III. Impounding: Order XIII Rule 8

Rule 9, return of admitted documents. Any person, whether a party or not, desirous of receiving back a document produced by him and placed on the record shall, after the suit has been disposed of, be entitled to receive it back, provided that where the document is one upon which a suit has been founded, or which has been used as evidence of the truth of its contents, it shall not be delivered until the time for appeal has elapsed, or until the appeal has been disposed of. A copy is substituted on the record, and a receipt is taken.

Rule 10, court may send for records of its own or another court. The court may of its own motion, or on the application of a party, send for the record of any other suit or proceeding and inspect it, subject to the objections of the court whose record is called for.

Rule 11. The provisions on documents apply, so far as may be, to material objects produced in evidence.

For full marks, cover: the meaning and the three maxims; section 11 quoted in substance; the six conditions; all eight Explanations, with I, IV, VI and VIII named; constructive res judicata; res judicata between co-defendants; and the four situations in which it does not apply.

Res judicata means "a matter already adjudged". The doctrine bars the re-trial of an issue which has been heard and finally decided by a competent court in a former suit between the same parties. It is enacted in section 11 of the Code, but it is wider than the section and applies to writ petitions, execution proceedings and other proceedings as a matter of public policy.

The three maxims on which it rests:

1. Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa : no man should be vexed twice for the same cause.
2. Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium : it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation.
3. Res judicata pro veritate accipitur : a judicial decision must be accepted as correct.

5. The matter must have been heard and finally decided in the former suit.
6. There must be a former suit, that is, a suit previously decided, whichever was instituted first being immaterial.

The eight Explanations

Explanation I. "Former suit" means a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question, whether or not it was instituted prior to it. Order of decision, not order of filing.

Explanation II. The competence of the court is to be determined irrespective of any provision as to a right of appeal from the decision of that court.

Explanation III. The matter must have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other.

Explanation IV, constructive res judicata. Any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in the former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in that suit. This is the most important of the eight and is dealt with separately below.

Explanation IV extends the bar from what was decided to what should have been raised. A defendant who had a defence available and did not plead it cannot raise it in a later suit; a plaintiff who had a ground of attack and did not take it cannot take it later.

The leading illustration is State of Uttar Pradesh v. Nawab Hussain (AIR 1977 SC 1680). A sub-inspector dismissed from service challenged his dismissal by writ petition on one ground, failed, and then filed a suit raising a different ground, that he had been dismissed by an officer subordinate to the appointing authority. The Supreme Court held the suit barred by constructive res judicata: the ground was available and ought to have been taken in the writ petition.

Res judicata between co-defendants

An adjudication operates as res judicata between co-defendants if four conditions are satisfied: there was a conflict of interest between them; it was necessary to decide that conflict in order to give the plaintiff the relief he claimed; the question was finally decided; and the co-defendants were necessary or proper parties in the former suit.

Where res judicata does not apply

For full marks, cover: sections 6, 7, 8 and 9 and how the four fit together; that section 8 is a proviso to sections 6 and 7 and not an independent rule; the three recognised disabilities; that the disability must exist at the time the cause of action accrues; and the illustrations to section 6.

The principle

The Limitation Act requires a person to sue within a fixed time or lose his remedy. That is unjust if he is legally incapable of suing at all. Sections 6 to 9 deal with the position of a person who is under a disability, and they do so by extending the time, not by stopping the clock in the ordinary sense.

Section 6, legal disability

The illustrations to section 6 are printed in the bare Act and should be reproduced:

(a) The right to sue for the hire of a boat accrues to A during his minority. He attains majority four years after such accruing. He may institute his suit at any time within three years from the date of his attaining majority.

(b) A right to sue accrues to Z during his minority. After the accrual, but while Z is still a minor, he becomes insane. Time runs against Z from the date when his insanity and minority cease.

(c) A right to sue accrues to X during his minority. X dies before attaining majority and is succeeded by Y, his minor son. Time runs against Y from the date of his attaining majority.

Section 7, disability of one of several persons

This is the section students most often get wrong. Section 8 is not a separate rule of disability; it is a ceiling on sections 6 and 7. A minor entitled to file a suit for possession under Article 65, twelve years, does not get twelve years after majority; he gets whichever is shorter, the balance of the twelve years or three years from attaining majority, and never more than three from the cessation of the disability. Where the ordinary period is short, section 6 gives him the full ordinary period after majority; where it is long, section 8 caps him at three years.

Section 9, continuous running of time

Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it. The proviso saves one case: where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of the period for a suit to recover the debt shall be suspended while the administration continues.

The rule is absolute. If the cause of action accrued while the plaintiff was of full age and sound mind, and he afterwards becomes insane, time keeps running. The disability must exist at the moment the cause of action accrues or it is worth nothing.

For full marks, cover: the meaning of execution and section 51 with its five clauses and the proviso; the courts by which a decree may be executed under sections 38 and 39; each mode in turn with its Order XXI rules; sections 55 to 59 on arrest and detention; sections 60 to 64 on attachment with the section 60 proviso list; and Order XXI Rules 64 to 73 on sale.

Meaning

Execution is the enforcement of a decree by the judicial process, by which the decree-holder compels the judgment-debtor to obey the decree and obtains the fruits of his litigation. The term is not defined in the Code. Sections 36 to 74 and Order XXI, the longest Order in the Code with 106 rules, contain the law.

Which court executes: sections 38 and 39

(e) in such other manner as the nature of the relief granted may require.

The proviso to section 51 is essential. Where the decree is for the payment of money, execution by detention in prison shall not be ordered unless, after giving the judgment-debtor an opportunity of showing cause why he should not be committed to prison, the court, for reasons recorded in writing, is satisfied that the judgment-debtor, with the object or effect of obstructing or delaying execution, is likely to abscond or leave the local limits, or has after the institution of the suit dishonestly transferred, concealed or removed any part of his property, or has committed any other act of bad faith in relation to his property; or that he has, or has had since the date of the decree, the means to pay the amount and refuses or neglects to pay; or that the decree is for a sum for which he was bound in a fiduciary capacity to account.

The modes in detail

The proviso to section 60(1) exempts, among others: the necessary wearing apparel, cooking vessels, beds and bedding of the judgment-debtor, his wife and children, and such personal ornaments as, in accordance with religious usage, cannot be parted with by any woman; tools of artisans and, where the judgment-debtor is an agriculturist, his implements of husbandry, cattle and seed-grain; houses and other buildings belonging to an agriculturist, a labourer or a domestic servant and occupied by him; books of account; a mere right to sue for damages; any right of personal service; stipends and gratuities allowed to pensioners of the Government; wages of labourers and domestic servants; salary to the extent of the first one thousand rupees and two-thirds of the remainder in execution of any decree other than a decree for maintenance, the figure of one thousand rupees having been substituted for the earlier four hundred by the Amendment Act of 1999; and an expectancy of succession by survivorship or other merely contingent or possible right or interest.

Section 64 makes a private transfer or delivery of attached property void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment, which is the reason attachment is worth obtaining early. Sub-section (2), added in 2002, saves a transfer made in pursuance of a contract entered into and registered before the attachment.

Section 55 governs the manner of arrest: no dwelling house shall be entered after sunset or before sunrise, no outer door broken open unless the dwelling house is in the occupancy of the judgment-debtor and he refuses access, and where the room is occupied by a woman who by custom does not appear in public, reasonable time and facility must be given to her to withdraw.

Section 56 is absolute: the court shall not order the arrest or detention in civil prison of a woman in execution of a decree for the payment of money.

Section 58 fixes the period of detention: where the decree is for the payment of a sum exceeding five thousand rupees, up to three months; where it exceeds two thousand but does not exceed five thousand rupees, up to six weeks; and no order of detention shall be made where the decretal amount does not exceed two thousand rupees. Sub-section (2) preserves the debt: release does not discharge the judgment-debtor from his liability.

Section 59 requires release on the ground of illness.

Order XXI Rule 37 requires the court, instead of issuing a warrant at once, ordinarily to issue a notice to show cause why he should not be committed to prison.

5. Any other manner the relief requires (section 51(e)). The residuary clause. It covers partition of an estate under section 54 by the Collector where the decree is for partition of an undivided estate assessed to land revenue; execution of a decree for specific performance by the court executing the conveyance under Order XXI Rule 34 if the judgment-debtor does not; execution of a decree for an injunction or specific performance by detention or attachment under Order XXI Rule 32; and execution of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights under Rule 32, which may be enforced by attachment of property but not by detention.

Conclusion. Section 51 gives the decree-holder five modes and the choice among them is his to ask for, but the court's to allow, and he may pursue the person and the property of the judgment-debtor at the same time. Attachment and sale is the ordinary route and the section 60 exemptions are its real boundary. Detention is the last resort, hedged by the proviso to section 51, by section 56 in the case of a woman and by the periods in section 58, and after Jolly George Verghese it is not available against a man who simply cannot pay.