BLS LLB 5 Years Sem 5 Torts 2024-25 - 60/40 Question Paper with Solutions

Section 2(5) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 defines "complainant" as meaning:

1. a consumer; or
2. any voluntary consumer association registered under any law for the time being in force; or
3. the Central Government or any State Government; or
4. the Central Authority, that is the Central Consumer Protection Authority; or
5. one or more consumers, where there are numerous consumers having the same interest; or
6. in case of death of a consumer, his legal heir or legal representative; or
7. in case of a consumer being a minor, his parent or legal guardian,

who or which makes a complaint.

4. A corporation, which may sue for torts against its property and for defamation affecting its business reputation, but not for personal torts such as assault, false imprisonment or injury to feelings; and
5. A minor and a person of unsound mind, who do not lose the right but must sue through a next friend under Order 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Liability by ratification arises where a person adopts and confirms, after the event, an act done on his behalf by another without his authority. On ratification the act is treated as though it had been authorised from the beginning, and the ratifier becomes liable for it as if he had committed it himself. The maxim is omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori aequiparatur, every ratification relates back and is equivalent to a prior command.

Battery is the intentional and direct application of force to the person of another without lawful justification. The essentials are the use of force, however trivial; applied directly to the plaintiff's body; intentionally; and without consent or lawful excuse.

No harm need result, and battery is actionable per se. As Cole v Turner (1704) puts it, the least touching of another in anger is a battery; throwing water on a person, spitting at him, snatching a book from his hand and pulling away his chair are all batteries.

The scienter rule fixes the liability of the keeper of an animal for damage done by it, and turns on his knowledge of the animal's dangerous disposition; scienter is Latin for "knowingly".

Animals are divided into two classes:

• Ferae naturae, animals of a naturally dangerous species, such as a lion, tiger, elephant, bear or monkey. Knowledge of the vicious propensity is conclusively presumed, and the keeper is strictly liable. May v Burdett (1846), the monkey that bit the plaintiff.
• Mansuetae naturae, animals of a harmless domestic species, such as a dog, horse, cow or sheep. The keeper is liable only if the plaintiff proves that he knew of the vicious propensity of that particular animal.

4. Knowledge of the plaintiff is not essential. Herring v Boyle (1834) held otherwise, on facts involving a schoolboy detained for non-payment of fees who did not know of it, but it has been displaced. Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co (1919): Atkin LJ held that a person may be imprisoned while he is asleep, while drunk, while unconscious and while insane, and that knowledge is not necessary. Murray v Ministry of Defence (1988) confirmed this in the House of Lords, adding that a plaintiff who was unaware and suffered no harm recovers only nominal damages.
5. The means may be physical or by assertion of authority, provided the plaintiff submits to it. Locking a door is one way; a police officer's assertion of authority, submitted to, is another. Moral pressure alone, without submission, is not enough.

Remedies. Damages, including aggravated and in a proper case exemplary damages; a writ of habeas corpus under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution while the detention continues; and self-help, that is escape, using reasonable force. The criminal counterparts are wrongful restraint under Section 339 and wrongful confinement under Section 340 of the Indian Penal Code.

Both are forms of defamation, which is the publication of a statement which tends to lower a person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally, or to make them shun or avoid him, or to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule.

Libel is defamation in a permanent form; slander is defamation in a transient form.

The position in India. The distinction has been held to be of little practical importance. The High Courts have generally taken the view that slander is also actionable per se in India, following Hirabai Jehangir v Dinshaw Edulji (ILR 1927 Bom 167), on the ground that the English rule rests on a historical division of jurisdiction between the common law and the ecclesiastical courts which never applied here. Under Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code both forms are equally the offence of defamation, punishable under Section 500.

The four slanders actionable per se in English law, that is without proof of special damage:

1. an imputation of a criminal offence punishable with imprisonment;
2. an imputation of a contagious or infectious disease, such as would cause others to shun the plaintiff;
3. an imputation of unchastity or adultery to a woman or girl, under the Slander of Women Act, 1891; and
4. an imputation of unfitness, dishonesty or incompetence in any office, profession, calling, trade or business carried on by the plaintiff.

Contributory negligence is the failure of the plaintiff to take reasonable care of his own safety, which combines with the defendant's negligence to cause the damage he complains of. It is not the breach of a duty owed to the defendant; it is a want of care by the plaintiff for himself, and the test is whether he took the care a reasonable and prudent person would have taken in his own interest.

The old common law rule. Contributory negligence was a complete defence. Butterfield v Forrester (1809): the defendant wrongfully put a pole across a road; the plaintiff, riding violently at dusk, did not see it and was thrown. He recovered nothing, because with ordinary care he would have seen the obstruction. The rule was harsh, since the plaintiff's smallest carelessness was a complete answer to the defendant's gross negligence.

The position in India. There is no general statute. The Kerala Torts (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1976 applies apportionment locally, and elsewhere the courts have adopted apportionment as a rule of justice, equity and good conscience: Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v Laxman Iyer (2003) 8 SCC 731, where the Supreme Court held that where both parties are at fault the loss is apportioned according to the degree of responsibility, and that the last opportunity rule survives only as one way of deciding whose negligence was the effective cause. In motor accident claims, the no fault provisions of Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 apply regardless.

Exceptions and situations where the defence fails.

1. Doctrine of alternative danger, or the dilemma principle. A plaintiff put in danger by the defendant's negligence is not contributorily negligent merely because, in the agony of the moment, he chose a course which turned out badly. Jones v Boyce (1816), the passenger who jumped from a coach he reasonably believed about to overturn; Shyam Sunder v State of Rajasthan (1974) 1 SCC 690, the workman who jumped from a burning truck.
2. Rescuers. Haynes v Harwood (1935): a policeman injured stopping a bolting horse in a crowded street recovered in full, because danger invites rescue.

The State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission is the middle tier of the three-tier machinery under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, established by the State Government by notification under Section 42.

Composition, Section 42. The State Commission shall consist of a President and not less than four or such higher number of members as may be prescribed, in consultation with the Central Government. The qualifications, method of recruitment, procedure of appointment, term of office, resignation and removal are prescribed by the Central Government by rules under Section 43. Under the earlier 1986 Act, Section 16, the President was required to be a person who is or has been a Judge of a High Court, appointed in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, and there had to be not less than two members, one of whom shall be a woman.

Jurisdiction, Section 47.

Powers. The State Commission has the powers of a civil court in respect of summoning and enforcing attendance, examining a party or witness on oath, discovery and production of documents, receiving evidence on affidavit, requisitioning reports of test analyses and issuing commissions, and its proceedings are judicial proceedings under Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Under Section 49(2) it may declare any term of a contract null and void if it is found to be an unfair contract. Under Section 50 it may review its own order where there is an error apparent on the face of the record.

Reliefs, Section 39. Removal of the defect, replacement of the goods, return of the price, compensation including punitive damages, removal of the deficiency, discontinuance of an unfair or restrictive trade practice, cessation of a misleading advertisement, withdrawal of hazardous goods, payment to the Consumer Welfare Fund where the loss has been suffered by a large number of consumers not readily identifiable, a corrective advertisement, and costs.

1. The waiter is a servant. He works under a contract of service, is subject to the hotel's control as to the manner in which he serves, is integrated into its business and is paid wages by it. On any of the tests, the control test, the organisation or integration test from Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison Ltd v Macdonald and Evans (1952), or the modern multiple test applied in India in Dharangadhara Chemical Works v State of Saurashtra (AIR 1957 SC 264), he is an employee.
2. The tort was committed in the course of employment. Serving food is precisely what he was employed to do, and doing it carelessly is an unauthorised mode of doing an authorised act, which is squarely within the course of employment. Century Insurance Co v Northern Ireland Road Transport Board (1942) is the closest authority: a petrol lorry driver lit a cigarette while transferring petrol and caused an explosion, and the employer was liable because he was doing his job carelessly. Contrast Beard v London General Omnibus Co (1900), where a conductor drove the bus, which was a different act altogether and outside the employment.

The liability is joint and several: the customer may sue either, or both, and recover the whole from either, though he may have only one satisfaction. In practice he sues the hotel, which can pay.

Two grounds support the indemnity, and they are separate.

1. Implied contractual duty of care. A servant impliedly undertakes, as a term of his contract of service, to perform his duties with reasonable care and skill. If his breach of that implied term causes the employer loss, including a liability to a third party, the employer may recover it as damages for breach of contract. That is the ratio of Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555, where a lorry driver negligently injured his own father, a fellow employee; the employer's insurers, having paid, recovered the amount from the driver.

2. Contribution and indemnity between tort-feasors. The employer's liability is vicarious and not personal: it has committed no wrong itself. As between the two, the loss is wholly the servant's fault, so the master, having been compelled to pay for another's tort, is entitled to be indemnified by the person actually at fault. In India, where the old rule in Merryweather v Nixan (1799) against contribution between joint tort-feasors was never adopted wholesale, contribution and indemnity are allowed where the party claiming was not a conscious wrongdoer: Khushro S Gandhi v N A Guzder (AIR 1970 SC 1468).

i) Whether plaintiff is entitled for damages? Give reason

Yes. The plaintiff is entitled to damages.

These are the facts of Hamps v Darby [1948] 2 KB 311, and the principle is that a person may take steps to protect his property from the depredations of animals only so far as is reasonably necessary, and shooting them without first trying less drastic means is not reasonable.

The reasoning:

3. The defence of necessity, or defence of property, fails on the facts as stated. The problem is explicit that the defendant shot "without firing a scaring shot". Less drastic means were plainly available and were not tried. The defence of property requires the steps taken to be proportionate, and killing four birds and wounding a fifth when a bang would have dispersed them is not proportionate.
4. The measure of damages is the value of the pigeons killed, which for racing pigeons is substantial and may far exceed the value of the grain eaten, together with compensation for the injured bird.

The defendant's remedy was to sue the plaintiff for the damage to the grain, or to detain the birds under distress damage feasant. The Indian law of cattle trespass does not assist him, since pigeons are not cattle within the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871, whose Section 3 lists elephants, camels, buffaloes, horses, mares, geldings, ponies, colts, fillies, mules, asses, pigs, rams, ewes, sheep, lambs, goats and kids.

2. Distress damage feasant. The extra-judicial remedy of seizing and detaining an animal which has strayed onto his land and done damage there, until compensation is paid. It is a right of detention as security only: he may not use, sell or harm the birds, and must feed and care for them. This is the remedy the defendant should have used, and it answers the problem exactly.

3. Abatement, that is taking reasonable steps to drive the birds off, using no more force than is necessary: scaring them, netting the grain, or covering it. This is where the scaring shot belongs.

4. Protection of his own property, but only so far as reasonably necessary, which on these facts did not extend to shooting.

5. Statutory and municipal remedies, that is a complaint to the local authority under its bye-laws where the keeping of birds in large numbers is a public nuisance or a health hazard, and a Magistrate's order under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in a proper case.

i) State with reasons the tortious act for which action can be taken

The tort is negligence, and on these facts the maxim res ipsa loquitur applies.

1. The three essentials of negligence.

Duty of care. A school owes its pupils a duty of care for their safety while they are on the premises and in its charge. The standard is that of a careful parent, and it is a high one, because pupils are children, are compelled to be there, and cannot protect themselves. The duty extends to the safety of the premises and equipment and to the competence and conduct of the staff, and it is a non-delegable duty: the school cannot discharge it by handing the task to somebody else.

3. Occupier's liability. Independently of the teacher's conduct, the school as occupier owes a duty to persons lawfully on its premises. A pupil is an invitee, and the occupier must take reasonable care to see that the premises and the things on them are reasonably safe for the purpose for which he is invited. A blackboard which is not securely fixed is an unsafe condition of the premises.

4. Who is liable. The school, and, if the fall was due to the teacher's carelessness, the teacher personally as well. The school is liable on two independent grounds: for its own negligence in maintenance and inspection, which is primary liability, and vicariously for the teacher's negligence, which is secondary. Their liability is joint and several.

The suit is brought by the pupil through his next friend under Order 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

ii) Is the class teacher liable to injured student? Why?

The teacher is liable if, and only if, the fall was caused by his own want of care. He is not liable merely because the accident happened in his class.

When the teacher is liable:

1. If the blackboard was properly fixed and gave way because of a latent defect which no reasonable inspection would have revealed. That is an inevitable accident: an accident which could not have been avoided by ordinary care, caution and skill, Stanley v Powell (1891). In that case the teacher escapes, but the school may still be liable if the defect ought to have been found by a proper system of inspection.
2. If the fall was caused by the act of a third party over whom he had no control and which he could not have anticipated.

Two points about the teacher's position generally.

A teacher stands in loco parentis. That doctrine cuts both ways. It gives him authority to impose reasonable discipline, and it imposes on him the duty of a careful parent towards the child, which is a higher standard than the ordinary duty owed to a stranger, precisely because children are heedless and must be protected from their own carelessness.

i) whether the plaintiff is liable to receive compensation? Why?

The question asks whether the plaintiff is entitled to compensation, and the answer depends on one fact which the problem leaves open: whether the defendant's walls altered the flow of the water.

A. If the defendant's construction diverted or channelled the water onto the plaintiff's wall, the plaintiff is entitled to compensation.

The tort is private nuisance, and in an appropriate case negligence as well. A landowner is entitled to build on his own land, but he is not entitled to build in such a way as to discharge water onto his neighbour's property and damage it. The maxim is sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, so use your own as not to injure another's.

Bradford Corporation v Pickles (1895) is the strongest authority for the proposition that a lawful use of one's own land is not actionable, even where the motive is malicious; Chasemore v Richards (1859) and Acton v Blundell (1843) hold that there is no right to percolating underground water; and the Gloucester Grammar School Case (1410) is the classic statement of the maxim.

C. Which way the problem points. The facts as given say that the damage occurred "as a result of which" the defendant built the walls. That causal link is stated by the paper itself, and on it the plaintiff succeeds: the defendant's own construction created the concentrated flow that damaged the wall, and the maxim which decides the case is sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. The defendant would escape only by proving that the water would have done the same damage in any event, in which case his walls caused nothing.

The plaintiff's remedies are damages for the cost of repair and the diminution in value, and an injunction, prohibitory to restrain the continuance and mandatory to require the defendant to alter the walls or provide drainage, under Sections 37 to 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, with a temporary injunction meanwhile under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

2. The maxim does not create rights which the law does not recognise. A landowner has no right to the flow of percolating water, to a prospect or view, or to the free flow of air except through a defined aperture. Interference with those causes damnum sine injuria and is not actionable, however great the loss.
3. A lawful act does not become unlawful because of a bad motive. Bradford Corporation v Pickles (1895). The one qualification is that in nuisance the reasonableness of the user is itself an ingredient, so malice may tip a tolerable use into an unreasonable one: Christie v Davey (1893) and Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v Emmett (1936).

The competing maxim on these facts is damnum sine injuria, and the two are the opposite faces of the same coin. Sic utere tuo says that the law will protect a right against a neighbour's use of his own land. Damnum sine injuria says that where no right exists, the loss lies where it falls. Which of the two governs a given case depends entirely on whether the plaintiff can point to a right, and here his right is the ordinary right of an occupier not to have water discharged against his structure by his neighbour's works.

Definition. Defamation is the publication of a statement which tends to lower a person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally, or which tends to make them shun or avoid him, or which exposes him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, without lawful justification. The interest protected is reputation, that is what others think of the plaintiff, and not his own feelings.

The two forms. Libel is defamation in a permanent form addressed to the eye; slander is defamation in a transient form addressed to the ear. In English law libel is actionable per se and slander requires proof of special damage, save in four cases: an imputation of a criminal offence punishable with imprisonment, of a contagious or infectious disease, of unchastity or adultery to a woman or girl (Slander of Women Act, 1891), and of unfitness, dishonesty or incompetence in any office, profession, calling, trade or business. In India the distinction is of little practical importance, and the High Courts have generally held slander also actionable per se: Hirabai Jehangir v Dinshaw Edulji (ILR 1927 Bom 167).

The three essentials.

Tolley v J S Fry and Sons Ltd (1931) AC 333: an amateur golfer was depicted in a chocolate advertisement without his consent; to those who knew the rules of amateur status, it conveyed that he had prostituted that status for money, and the innuendo succeeded.

To plead an innuendo the plaintiff must prove the extrinsic facts and that the statement was published to persons who knew them.

2. The statement must refer to the plaintiff.

It is enough that reasonable people would understand the words to refer to him. The defendant's intention is irrelevant, and liability is in this respect strict.

Hulton and Co v Jones (1910) AC 20: a newspaper published a humorous article about the imaginary misdeeds of a fictitious "Artemus Jones", a churchwarden at Peckham. A real barrister of that name sued, and his friends swore they believed the article referred to him. The House of Lords held the newspaper liable, although it had never heard of him and intended no reference to him.

Newstead v London Express Newspaper Ltd (1940) 1 KB 377 goes further: a true report about "Harold Newstead, thirty-year-old Camberwell man", convicted of bigamy, was held to defame another Harold Newstead of Camberwell of about the same age.

Defences. Justification or truth, a complete defence in civil law, the defendant proving the substantial truth of the sting; fair comment, that is an honest opinion on a matter of public interest based on facts truly stated; absolute privilege, for parliamentary and judicial proceedings and State communications; qualified privilege, for statements made in the discharge of a legal, moral or social duty to a person with a corresponding interest, defeated by malice; apology; consent; and innocent dissemination.

The Indian constitutional dimension. R Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 632, the Auto Shankar case, held that no action lies in respect of a publication concerning a public official's discharge of his public duties, even if untrue, unless the official proves reckless disregard for the truth. Subramanian Swamy v Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 221 upheld the constitutional validity of criminal defamation under Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code.

Facts. A ship was chartered to carry a cargo including tins of petrol, which leaked so that the hold filled with petrol vapour. While the cargo was being unloaded at Casablanca, the charterers' servants negligently allowed a heavy plank to fall into the hold. The plank struck something, produced a spark, ignited the vapour, and the ship was destroyed by fire.

Held. The charterers were liable for the whole loss. Some damage from the falling plank was foreseeable; destruction by fire was not. But the fire was the direct consequence, and that sufficed. Scrutton LJ: if the act would or might probably cause damage, the fact that the damage it in fact causes is not the exact kind one would expect is immaterial, so long as the damage is directly traceable to the negligent act.

Criticism. The rule was condemned as unjust to defendants, since it made liability turn on the accident of physical sequence rather than on anything the defendant could have contemplated, and produced enormous liability for a small piece of carelessness.

C. The modern test: reasonable foreseeability. The Wagon Mound (1961).

Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and Engineering Co Ltd, The Wagon Mound (No. 1) [1961] AC 388 (PC) overruled Re Polemis.

Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v The Miller Steamship Co [1967] 1 AC 617 arose from the same fire, brought by the owners of two ships damaged at the wharf. On the evidence in that case a reasonable engineer would have realised there was a small but real risk of the oil catching fire. The Privy Council held the appellants liable, laying down that a risk which is foreseeable though very slight must be guarded against where there is no justification for running it, that is where it could be eliminated at small cost and with no advantage lost.

E. What must be foreseeable: the kind of damage, not its extent or manner.

Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837. Post Office workmen left an open manhole covered by a tent and surrounded by paraffin lamps. A boy of eight knocked a lamp into the hole; the paraffin vaporised and there was an explosion, and he was badly burned. Held liable: injury by burning was a foreseeable kind of harm, and the unforeseeable manner of its occurrence did not matter.

Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Co [1964] 1 QB 518. An asbestos cement cover was knocked into a cauldron of molten liquid; a chemical reaction occurred and an eruption injured the plaintiff. Held not liable: injury by splashing was foreseeable, injury by an unforeseeable chemical reaction was a different kind of damage.

The chain may be broken by a new and independent act. A free, deliberate and informed act of a third party, or of the plaintiff, generally breaks it. But it does not where the defendant's duty was precisely to guard against that act: Stansbie v Troman (1948), the decorator who left the house unlocked and was liable for the theft that followed, and Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co (1970), where borstal officers negligently allowed boys in their charge to escape and were liable for the damage they did.

H. The Indian position.

Indian courts follow The Wagon Mound. The foreseeability test is applied in negligence, and the eggshell skull rule in personal injury and motor accident claims. The assessment principles in fatal accident and personal injury claims are those of Sarla Verma v Delhi Transport Corporation (2009) 6 SCC 121 and the Constitution Bench in National Insurance Co Ltd v Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680.

Limits: consent obtained by fraud (Hegarty v Shine, 1878); consent under legal or moral compulsion, so a rescuer is not met by the defence (Haynes v Harwood, 1935); and volenti is no answer to a breach of statutory duty.

2. Plaintiff the wrongdoer: ex turpi causa non oritur actio. No action arises from a base cause. The defence is narrow: the illegality must be connected with the harm. Bird v Holbrook (1828): a trespasser injured by a spring gun set without notice recovered damages.

3. Inevitable accident. An accident which could not have been avoided by ordinary care, caution and skill. Stanley v Powell (1891), the pellet glancing off a tree; Brown v Kendall (1850), the fighting dogs; Assam State Cooperative Marketing Federation v Anubha Sinha (AIR 2001 Gau 18). It is no defence to strict liability.

4. Act of God (vis major). An operation of natural forces without human intervention, so extraordinary that no human foresight could reasonably anticipate it. Nichols v Marsland (1876) succeeded; Greenock Corporation v Caledonian Railway (1917) failed; Ramalinga Nadar v Narayana Reddiar (AIR 1971 Ker 197): the act of an unruly mob is the act of man. Unlike inevitable accident, act of God is an exception to Rylands v Fletcher.

8. Statutory authority. Where a statute authorises the very act complained of, the defendant is not liable, provided he acts without negligence and the damage is the inevitable consequence of what was authorised. The authority may be absolute, where the act must be done, or conditional, where it may be done only without infringing private rights. Vaughan v Taff Vale Railway (1860) and Hammersmith Railway v Brand (1869), against Metropolitan Asylum District v Hill (1881).

9. Judicial and quasi-judicial acts. A judge is not liable for acts done in the discharge of his judicial function, protected in India by the Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850, and the immunity extends to persons exercising quasi-judicial powers in good faith.

10. Parental and quasi-parental authority. A parent, and a person in loco parentis, may impose reasonable correction and restraint, a defence much narrowed by Section 17 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.

11. Acts causing slight harm: de minimis non curat lex. The law does not concern itself with trifles.

3. Vindication of rights: which is why torts actionable per se exist and why Ashby v White (1703) gave a remedy to a voter who lost nothing, and why nominal damages are awarded at all.
4. Loss distribution: liability is placed on the party best able to insure and spread the cost, which is the modern justification for vicarious liability, for strict liability under Rylands v Fletcher, and for absolute liability under M C Mehta v Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 395, where the Supreme Court held that the measure of compensation must be correlated to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise.

Section 15: there shall be an Investigation Wing headed by a Director General, for the purpose of conducting inquiry or investigation as directed by the Authority.

C. Functions and duties: Section 18.

The CCPA shall:

1. protect, promote and enforce the rights of consumers as a class, and prevent violation of consumer rights;
2. prevent unfair trade practices and ensure that no person engages in them;
3. prevent false or misleading advertisements and ensure that no person takes part in their publication;
4. inquire or cause an inquiry or investigation into violations of consumer rights or unfair trade practices, either on its own motion, or on a complaint received, or on the direction of the Central Government;
5. file complaints before the District, State or National Commission;
6. intervene in any proceeding before a Commission involving allegations of violation of consumer rights or unfair trade practices;
7. review the safety and quality of goods and services and recommend the adoption of standards;

2. Search and seizure, Section 22. The Director General or an authorised officer may enter any premises and search for and seize documents, records or articles, and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 relating to search and seizure apply.

3. Recall, refund and discontinuance, Section 20. Where the Authority is satisfied after investigation that there is sufficient evidence of violation of consumer rights or of an unfair trade practice, it may by order:

• recall goods or withdraw services which are dangerous, hazardous or unsafe;
• order reimbursement of the prices of goods or services so recalled to the purchasers; and
• order discontinuation of practices which are unfair and prejudicial to consumers' interest.

4. False or misleading advertisements, Section 21. Where an advertisement is false or misleading and prejudicial to the interest of any consumer or in contravention of consumer rights, the Authority may:

• direct the trader, manufacturer, endorser, advertiser or publisher to discontinue the advertisement or modify it within the time stated;

F. Penalties. Section 88: failure to comply with a direction of the CCPA is punishable with imprisonment up to six months or fine up to Rs. 20 lakh, or both. Section 89: a manufacturer or service provider who causes a false or misleading advertisement to be made is punishable with imprisonment up to two years and fine up to Rs. 10 lakh, and for every subsequent offence up to five years and Rs. 50 lakh.

G. Rules. The Central Consumer Protection Authority (Prevention of Misleading Advertisements and Necessary Due Diligence for Endorsement of Advertisements) Guidelines, 2022 were issued under the Act, and lay down what makes an advertisement valid, restrict surrogate advertising and advertisements directed at children, and set out the due diligence expected of an endorser, including that the endorser must have actually used the product or service.