What Is Wrong With the Machinery, and What Was Proposed
Chapter Thirteen
Syllabus topic 1, "Water"
Pages 51 to 54 of 885
In one line
The machinery works, slowly, and its five faults are all faults of timing, data, standing and institutional memory.
In the wording a student can write in an exam: the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 has been criticised for the delay before a Tribunal is constituted, the delay before it reports, the absence of a common data base, the want of standing in anybody but a State Government, and the loss of institutional memory caused by dissolving each Tribunal under section 12; the Inter-State River Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill, 2019 proposed a single standing Tribunal with benches and a Disputes Resolution Committee to attempt settlement first, and it lapsed.
The record, which is the argument
A criticism of machinery is worth nothing without the record. These are the facts a student should be able to state.
| Tribunal | Constituted | Final award |
|---|---|---|
| Krishna (first) | 1969 | 1973 |
| Godavari | 1969 | 1980 |
| Narmada | 1969 | 1979 |
| Ravi and Beas | 1986 | no final award |
| Cauvery | 1990 | 2007, modified by the Supreme Court in 2018 |
| Krishna (second) | 2004 | 2010, further proceedings continuing |
| Vansadhara | 2010 | 2017 |
| Mahadayi | 2010 | 2018 |
| Mahanadi | 2018 | pending |
Read the second column against the third. Three tribunals of 1969 reported within four to eleven years. The Ravi and Beas Tribunal has sat since 1986 without a final award. The Cauvery took seventeen years to an award and another eleven to a decree.
The five faults
1. The gate before the clock. Section 4(1) obliges the Central Government to constitute a Tribunal within one year, but only once it is of opinion that the dispute cannot be settled by negotiations. There is no time limit on forming that opinion. Odisha's Mahanadi request of November 2016 produced a Tribunal in March 2018, and only after litigation.
2. The three-plus-two years is not observed. Section 5(2) gives three years, extendable by two. In practice the notification is amended and time is extended again, and no consequence follows from breach. A time limit with no consequence is not a time limit.
3. There is no common data base. Section 9A requires the Central Government to maintain a basin-wise data bank and to verify what the States supply, and it was inserted for exactly this reason. Where the data bank is incomplete, each State produces its own figures, each set is challenged, and the Tribunal spends years on measurement rather than on apportionment.
4. Only a State may complain, and only a State is a party. Section 3 confines the complaint to a State Government. The farmer whose crop failed, the city whose supply was cut, the fisher whose estuary went saline: none has standing before the Tribunal, and section 11 shuts them out of court as well. This is the deepest criticism of the Act, because it converts a resource question into a contest between two political executives.
What Is Wrong With the Machinery, and What Was Proposed
5. Every Tribunal starts from nothing and is then destroyed. Section 12 requires dissolution once the report is forwarded. Its registry, its assessors, its data and its accumulated understanding of a basin go with it. Nine tribunals have been constituted since 1969 and there is no continuing institution.
Two further criticisms worth stating
The award depends on publication, and publication is the Union's act. Section 6(1) makes publication the trigger. The Cauvery award of February 2007 was not notified until February 2013.
And the political incentive runs the wrong way. A State Government that accepts a reduced share pays for it electorally, so the incentive is to litigate rather than to settle. Nothing in the Act addresses that, and it is why a mediation stage was proposed.
What the 2019 Bill proposed
The Inter-State River Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill, 2019, was passed by the Lok Sabha and lapsed. Its scheme is examinable because MU's 2024 paper asks what reforms would help.
A single standing Inter-State River Water Disputes Tribunal, with a Chairperson, a Vice-Chairperson, and judicial and expert members, and with benches constituted for each dispute. A standing body keeps its registry, its data and its expertise between disputes.
A Disputes Resolution Committee first. On a request under section 3 the Central Government would refer the dispute to a committee of experts to attempt settlement within one year, extendable by six months, and only on its failure would the matter go to a bench of the Tribunal.
Tighter timetables. The bench to give its decision in two years, extendable by one.
No requirement of publication for the award to take effect, the decision becoming binding without a further Gazette step.
And a central data bank agency to maintain the basin-wise data section 9A already requires.
Worked example
A student is asked MU's 2024 question 1: how does the framework address equitable resource sharing, and what reforms can enhance conflict resolution?
The first half is the machinery, and it is described in the four preceding chapters. Article 262; the definition in section 2(c); the complaint under section 3; constitution under section 4 within a year; adjudication under section 5 within three years plus two; the award under section 6, final, binding and with the force of an order of the Supreme Court; a scheme under section 6A; the bar in section 11.
Then say what "equitable" means, because the question uses the word. A Tribunal applies equitable apportionment, which does not mean equal shares. It weighs the drainage area contributed by each State, the population dependent on the river, the existing utilisation and the investment already made, the availability of alternative sources, the efficiency of use, and the damage to an existing use against the benefit to a new one. Drinking water comes first, and the Supreme Court said so in 2018 when it modified the Cauvery award, increasing Karnataka's share by 14.75 thousand million cubic feet: 10 on account of ground water available in Tamil Nadu that the Tribunal had not accounted for, and 4.75 for drinking and domestic needs including those of Bengaluru.
What Is Wrong With the Machinery, and What Was Proposed
The second half is the five faults and the 2019 Bill. Then add two of your own, and say which fault each reform answers.
That is a full answer, and the marks are in the pairing. A criticism with no proposed cure, or a proposal that answers no stated fault, is half an answer.
Distinctions
| Fault | The provision it lives in | What the 2019 Bill proposed |
|---|---|---|
| Delay before constitution | Section 4(1), the opinion on negotiation | A Disputes Resolution Committee with a one-year limit, then a bench |
| Delay before the award | Section 5(2), three years plus two | Two years plus one before a bench of a standing Tribunal |
| No common data | Section 9A, imperfectly implemented | A central data bank agency |
| No institutional memory | Section 12, dissolution | A permanent Tribunal with benches |
| Publication as a gate | Section 6(1) | The decision to bind without a further notification |
| No standing for a citizen | Section 3 | Not addressed |
What it does NOT mean
It does not mean the Act has failed. Six basins have been apportioned by award, and the Krishna, Godavari and Narmada awards have held for more than four decades. A machinery that settles a river for forty years is not a failure.
It does not mean a standing tribunal solves the political problem. A State that will not accept a share will not accept it from a permanent body either. What a permanent body removes is delay and repetition, not resistance.
And it does not mean the 2019 Bill is law. It lapsed. Saying that it was enacted is a straightforward error of fact and an examiner will notice it.
Quick revision
Five faults: the opinion gate before the one-year clock; three-plus-two years unobserved and unenforceable; no common data base although section 9A requires one; no standing for anybody but a State Government; and dissolution of each Tribunal under section 12, so no institutional memory.
Two more: publication under section 6(1) is a gate the Union controls; and the political incentive is to litigate rather than settle.
The 2019 Bill: one standing Tribunal with benches, a Disputes Resolution Committee first, two years plus one, no separate publication requirement, and a data bank agency. It lapsed.
What Is Wrong With the Machinery, and What Was Proposed
Equitable apportionment weighs drainage area, dependent population, existing use and investment, alternative sources, efficiency, and harm against benefit, with drinking water first.
Test yourself
1. Why is the one-year period in section 4(1) less effective than it looks? Because it begins only when the Central Government is of opinion that the dispute cannot be settled by negotiations, and no time limit is placed on forming that opinion.
2. Which section requires a data bank, and why does it matter? Section 9A, inserted in 2002. Without a common, verified, basin-wise data base each State argues from its own figures and the Tribunal spends years on measurement instead of apportionment.
3. Name the two central proposals of the 2019 Bill. A single standing Inter-State River Water Disputes Tribunal with benches, and a Disputes Resolution Committee to attempt settlement before adjudication.
4. What is meant by equitable apportionment? Allocation according to a set of factors rather than in equal shares: drainage area contributed, dependent population, existing utilisation and investment, alternative sources, efficiency of use, and the harm to existing uses weighed against the benefit of new ones, with drinking water treated as the first priority.
The rest of this subject
These notes are cut from the University's printed syllabus. Open the syllabus itself, or the past papers, for the same subject.