Handcuffs: Prem Shankar Shukla

In one line

An undertrial sent a telegram about being handcuffed on his way to court, and the Supreme Court abolished the rule that a prisoner's class decided whether he was manacled.

Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 3 SCC 526. Decided 29 April 1980. Judgment of Krishna Iyer J.

The facts

The petitioner was an undertrial prisoner, handcuffed while being taken between the prison and the courts. The practice rested on a police standing order and on the older prisoners' rules, which distinguished between classes of prisoner: a person of a "better class" was not to be handcuffed, while an ordinary undertrial routinely was.

He complained by telegram to a judge of the Supreme Court. As in Sunil Batra (II), the communication was treated as invoking the Court's jurisdiction, which is itself worth noting as the practical answer to the problem that a person in custody cannot easily file a petition.

The holdings

Six, and they build on each other.

One: handcuffing is prima facie inhuman. It is unreasonable, over harsh, and at first blush arbitrary. Absent fair procedure and objective monitoring, to inflict irons offends Article 21.

Two: the competing claims must be harmonised. Preventing the escape of an undertrial is in the public interest, is reasonable, and cannot by itself be criticised. But to bind a person hand and foot, move him through the streets and stand him for hours in the courts is to torture him and defile his dignity.

Three: insurance against escape does not require handcuffing. There are other measures by which an escort can keep safe custody without the indignity implicit in irons. Binding the hands or feet has not merely a preventive effect but a punitive one, so restraint used for security is in fact inflicting punishment nobody has awarded.

Four: the rule. Since other ways of ensuring safety exist, handcuffs or other fetters shall not ordinarily be forced on the person of an undertrial prisoner.

Five: the constitutional grounds. Where there is no compulsive need to fetter a person's limbs, doing so is arbitrary and slaps Article 14 in the face. And the freedom of movement which even a detained person retains under Article 19 cannot be cut down by the application of handcuffs; to do so is unreasonable unless the State is able to make out that no other practical way of forbidding escape is available, the prisoner being so dangerous and desperate and the circumstances so hostile to safe keeping.

Six: class distinctions become obsolete. Once it is a constitutional mandate that no prisoner shall be handcuffed or fettered routinely, or merely for the convenience of the custodian or escort, the distinction between classes of prisoner becomes constitutionally obsolete. Economic and social importance cannot be the basis for classifying prisoners for the purpose of handcuffs: a rich accused is in no way different from a poor one in the matter of security risk, an affluent prisoner may be as dangerous or desperate as an indigent one, and he may be more likely to be rescued.