Knowledge
Chapter Twenty-Six
Syllabus topic 3, "Doctrine of Mens Rea and Exceptions"
Pages 90 to 92 of 711
In one line
Knowledge is awareness that a fact exists or that a consequence will or may follow, without any purpose that it should.
In the wording a student can write in an exam: knowledge is the mental element of awareness, and the Sanhita uses it in two ways, as awareness of a circumstance, for example that property is stolen or that a person is a public servant, and as awareness that a consequence is likely or certain to follow from an act; it is a lower state than intention because it involves no purpose, and it is a higher state than rashness because it involves actual awareness rather than a risk merely run; and where a section states intention and knowledge as alternative limbs, proof of either suffices.
The two uses
Knowledge of a circumstance. Many offences require the accused to have known a fact. That the goods were stolen. That the person he obstructed was a public servant discharging his duty. That the woman was under a particular age, though several such provisions expressly dispense with the requirement.
Knowledge of a consequence. The graver use, and the one that decides homicide. A person may know a consequence is likely without wanting it at all.
The Sanhita's own illustration to section 2(33) is exactly this case. A man sets fire at night to an inhabited house in a large town to facilitate a robbery, and causes a death. He may not have intended to cause death and may even be sorry that it was caused. Yet if he knew he was likely to cause death, he has caused death voluntarily.
The grades of knowledge in the Sanhita
The statute uses three levels of likelihood, and telling them apart is where marks are won.
"Likely to cause death." The lowest. Awareness of a real risk. This is the knowledge that makes an act culpable homicide.
"So imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death." The highest, and it is the knowledge limb of murder. The words "must in all probability" set a far higher bar than "likely".
"Reason to believe." Section 2(29) provides that a person is said to have reason to believe a thing if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise. This is not knowledge; it is a state in which the person has enough before him to believe the fact, whether or not he drew the conclusion. It is the standard used in the offences of receiving stolen property, and it exists so that a person cannot escape by declining to reach the obvious conclusion.
Knowledge and wilful blindness
A person who suspects a fact and deliberately avoids confirming it presents a recurring problem. The law's answer in India is largely handled by "reason to believe": where the standard is reason to believe, a person who had sufficient cause to believe is caught whether or not he actually believed.
Knowledge
Where the standard is knowledge proper, an Indian court will ordinarily infer knowledge from the same circumstances that establish sufficient cause, which produces the same result by a different route. An answer should say both.
Knowledge against intention, in a table
| Intention | Knowledge | |
|---|---|---|
| What it is | Purpose to bring the consequence about | Awareness that it will or may follow |
| Is the consequence wanted | Yes | Not necessarily, and often not |
| Statutory language | "with the intention of", "intentionally" | "knowingly", "knowing", "with the knowledge that" |
| In homicide | The intention limbs | "likely to cause death"; "so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death" |
| Grade | Higher | Lower, but higher than rashness |
Worked example
Sameer, a contractor, removes the barricades around an open trench on a public road at night so that his lorries can pass, intending to replace them in the morning. A cyclist falls in and dies.
Did he intend the death? Plainly not. The death served no purpose of his and he would have prevented it if he could.
Did he know death was likely? That is the question, and it is answered from the circumstances: the depth of the trench, the darkness, the fact that it is a public road, the traffic he could expect, and whether he left any warning. A man who removes barricades from a deep trench on a used road at night is a long way towards knowledge that a death is likely.
Was the danger imminent, so that death must in all probability follow? Probably not, on these facts. A cyclist might pass safely; many did. So the higher grade is not reached, and the case falls in the lower one.
And if he had left a lamp and a watchman? Then even the lower grade fails, and the question becomes rashness or negligence, which is the next chapter.
What has changed across those versions? Only the mental element. The trench, the removal and the death are constant. That is why knowledge is worth a chapter.
What it does NOT mean
Knowledge is not intention. A person who knows a consequence is likely and proceeds is not thereby shown to have wanted it, and the Sanhita's own illustration says so.
Knowledge is not certainty. The statute's own language is "likely", and "must in all probability", neither of which is certainty.
"Reason to believe" is not knowledge. Section 2(29) sets a standard of sufficient cause to believe, which a person may satisfy without having believed at all.
Knowledge
And knowledge is not to be equated with what a reasonable person would have known. That is negligence. Knowledge is actual awareness, though it is proved by inference from what a person in his position must have been aware of.
Quick revision
- Knowledge is awareness of a circumstance or of a consequence, without purpose.
- Three statutory levels: likely to cause death; so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death; and reason to believe, defined by section 2(29) as having sufficient cause to believe a thing but not otherwise.
- The illustration to section 2(33): the man who fires an inhabited house to facilitate a robbery causes death voluntarily if he knew it was likely, though he did not intend it and is sorry for it.
- Where a section states intention or knowledge, either limb suffices.
- Wilful blindness is caught in India mainly through "reason to believe", and otherwise by inferring knowledge from the same facts.
Test yourself
1. Give the two ways the Sanhita uses knowledge. As awareness of a circumstance, such as that goods are stolen, and as awareness that a consequence is likely or almost certain to follow from an act.
2. Distinguish "likely to cause death" from "so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death". The first requires awareness of a real risk. The second requires awareness of a danger so immediate that death is the probable outcome, which is a materially higher bar and is the knowledge limb of the graver offence.
3. What does section 2(29) provide, and why does it exist? That a person has reason to believe a thing if he has sufficient cause to believe it but not otherwise. It exists so that a person who has enough before him cannot escape by declining to draw the obvious conclusion.
4. Does knowledge that a consequence is likely establish that the accused wanted it? No. The illustration to section 2(33) says in terms that a person may cause an effect voluntarily through knowledge while not intending it and even regretting it.
The rest of this subject
These notes are cut from the University's printed syllabus. Open the syllabus itself, or the past papers, for the same subject.