Why the New International Economic Order Failed

In one line

The programme failed because it produced no binding obligations, because the leverage that made it seem enforceable evaporated, because the coalition advancing it split on its members' own interests, because the debt crisis moved the negotiation into forums where the majority did not count, and because an alternative order with binding rules and real enforcement was built while the demands were being repeated.

Reason one: no obligation

Everything was a resolution. The Declaration, the Programme of Action and the Charter are all General Assembly resolutions, and article 10 of the Charter of the United Nations gives the Assembly power to recommend.

And the operative demands were drafted in "should". Articles 8, 11, 13, 17, 18 and 19 of the 1974 Charter, which cover structural change, institutional reform, technology, assistance and preferences, all use it. [The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: Articles 6 to 19].

There was no implementation machinery. Article 34 provides for an agenda item every fifth session. There was no reporting obligation, no expert body, no complaint procedure and no consequence, at a time when the human rights system already had all four.

A programme whose central demands are recommendations addressed to States that voted against them has no mechanism by which failure can even be recorded.

Reason two: the leverage disappeared

The strategic assumption was that raw material producers could combine. Principle (t) asks that producers' associations be facilitated; article 5 makes association a right with a corresponding duty of non-interference.

It did not hold, because oil was exceptional. For most commodities supply is dispersed among many producers in many States, substitutes exist, storage is cheap and demand responds to price. Cartels in tin, coffee, cocoa, rubber and sugar were attempted and failed.

And the oil leverage itself weakened, as consumption fell, non-cartel production rose and prices collapsed in the mid-1980s.

The demands had been formulated in a moment of apparent producer power and were still being made when the power had gone.

Reason three: the coalition split

Unity of grievance is not unity of interest, and the fractures are traceable to specific interests. [The Role of the Developing Countries: the Group of 77].

Oil exporters against oil importers, from 1973 onwards, acknowledged in section X of the Programme of Action on the day of adoption.

Commodity exporters against exporters of manufactures. A State exporting manufactures wants cheap inputs and market access for finished goods; a State exporting commodities wants high commodity prices. A single coalition cannot demand both.

Least developed against middle income, recognised in principle (c) and article 25.

And debtors negotiating individually, which is reason four.