The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919
Chapter Nine
Syllabus topic 1, "Development of Concept of Human Rights"
Pages 37 to 41 of 594
In one line
Japan proposed at the Paris Peace Conference that the Covenant affirm the equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals without distinction of race or nationality, the proposal obtained a majority of the votes cast in the commission, and the chair declared it not carried on the ground that a matter of that importance required unanimity.
What was proposed
At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, in the commission drafting the Covenant of the League, the Japanese delegation proposed an amendment on racial equality.
The final form was modest. It sought an endorsement of the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals, to be inserted in the preamble rather than in an operative article.
Note how little it asked. Not a right of individuals, not a prohibition on discrimination, not a procedure. A statement of principle, in a preamble.
What happened
The vote in the commission: a majority of those voting supported it.
The ruling of the chair, who presided as chairman of the commission, was that a matter of such importance required unanimous support and that the amendment was therefore not carried.
The objection did not come only from one quarter. The opposition included the British Empire delegation, pressed by dominions whose immigration policies were expressly racial, and the position of the United States delegation was shaped by domestic politics in which the amendment would have been unusable.
And that is the point about the ruling. A unanimity requirement was applied to defeat a proposal that had won a vote, which tells you the question was not procedural.
Why it matters to this book, in four ways
One: it dates the exclusion. The framework's critics say the international order was built by and for a small number of States. The answer usually given is the drafting record of 1948, which is genuinely plural. The answer has to concede 1919, which is neither, and which is documented.
Two: it explains what the Covenant does and does not contain. A Covenant that could not carry a preambular statement about race was never going to contain a human rights clause, and [The League of Nations and the Minorities Treaties] shows what it contained instead: protection for named minorities in named States.
Three: it is the direct ancestor of the Charter's four grounds. Article 1(3) of the Charter of 1945 makes it a Purpose to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. That is the clause 1919 refused, in the operative text of the successor organisation, twenty-six years later.
Four: it explains the order in which the post-war framework moved. The first of the core treaties was not on torture, or on fair trial, or on economic rights. It was the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted in 1965, a year before the Covenants and in force seven years before them. The subject that was refused first was addressed first.
The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919
The line from 1919 to 1965
| Year | Step |
|---|---|
| 1919 | The proposal obtains a majority and is declared not carried |
| 1945 | Charter article 1(3): without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion |
| 1948 | UDHR article 2: without distinction of any kind, on ten named grounds plus other status, and, in its second sentence, no distinction on the status of the territory |
| 1960 | The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples |
| 1963 | The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination |
| 1965 | The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, in force 1969 |
| 1993 | Vienna, by consensus, with 171 States participating |
Read the 1948 entry carefully. Article 2's first sentence widens the grounds from four to ten and adds an open phrase. Its second sentence says no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. In 1948 that reached most of the world's population, and it is the sentence that answers 1919 most directly.
How to use it in an answer
It is the strongest single fact available for two different questions.
On the development of the concept, it marks the moment the interwar order refused a standard and shows what the post-war order was correcting.
On the charge that the framework is a Western imposition, it is the fact a candidate should concede before answering, because conceding it makes the rest of the answer credible. The framework's authorship in 1948 was plural; its exclusions in 1919 were not; and both are true.
What it does not support is the claim that the framework is therefore illegitimate. The States excluded in 1919 pressed the successor framework hard from 1945 onwards, wrote the Racial Discrimination Convention, and ratified in large numbers, which is not how an illegitimate order is treated by those it excluded.
Worked example
A State argues that international human rights law reflects the values of the powers that wrote it and cannot bind others.
Concede 1919 immediately and precisely. A preambular statement of the equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals obtained a majority and was ruled not carried, with a unanimity requirement applied to a proposal that had won a vote.
The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919
Then give what changed. Charter article 1(3) contains the clause 1919 refused. Declaration article 2 widens it and extends it to non-self-governing territories. The first core treaty of the post-war framework, in 1965, is on racial discrimination.
Then give the authorship. The Declaration's rapporteur was Lebanese, its vice-chair Chinese, and the amendment changing article 1 to "all human beings" came from India.
Then give the conduct. The States excluded in 1919 pressed for, drafted and ratified the successor instruments, which is evidence about how they regarded them.
Close on the distinction that does the work: 1919 is a fact about who decided, and it is not evidence about whose values the resulting text expresses. Conflating the two is the commonest error on this topic.
What it does NOT mean
It does not mean the proposal was radical. It was a preambular statement of principle, and that is what makes the refusal significant.
It does not mean the opposition was uniform. It came from several delegations for several reasons, and the domestic politics behind each is documented.
And it does not mean the League was uniquely bad. It means the interwar order refused a standard that the post-war order adopted, which is exactly the kind of change the development of a concept consists of.
Quick revision
- 1919, Paris Peace Conference: Japan proposes an endorsement of the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals, for the preamble of the Covenant.
- It obtains a majority of the votes cast and the chair declares it not carried, on the ground that a matter of such importance required unanimity.
- Four consequences: it dates the exclusion; it explains why the Covenant has no human rights clause; it is the direct ancestor of Charter article 1(3)'s "without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"; and it explains why the first core treaty, in 1965, was on racial discrimination.
- The line: 1919 refused, 1945 article 1(3), 1948 article 2 with ten grounds, other status and the territory sentence, 1960 decolonisation, 1963 Declaration, 1965 Convention, 1993 Vienna by consensus.
- The distinction to close on: 1919 is evidence about who decided, not about whose values the text expresses.
Test yourself
1. What exactly was proposed in 1919, and what happened to it? The Japanese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference proposed, in the commission drafting the Covenant of the League of Nations, an amendment on racial equality. In its final and most modest form it sought an endorsement of the principle of the equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals, to be placed in the preamble rather than in an operative article: not a right held by individuals, not a prohibition on discrimination, not a procedure, but a statement of principle. A majority of those voting in the commission supported it. The chairman ruled that a matter of such importance required unanimous support and that the amendment was accordingly not carried. The opposition was not confined to one delegation: it included the British Empire delegation, under pressure from dominions whose immigration policies were expressly racial, and the position of the United States delegation reflected domestic politics in which such a clause would have been unusable. That a unanimity requirement was applied to defeat a proposal which had won a vote is what shows the question was not procedural.
The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919
2. Why does this episode matter to a paper about international order? In four ways. It dates the exclusion: critics say the order was built by and for a small group of States, the usual answer is the plural drafting record of 1948, and that answer has to concede 1919, which is documented and is not plural. It explains the Covenant's contents: an instrument that could not carry a preambular statement about race was never going to contain a general human rights clause, which is why the League protected named minorities in named States instead. It is the direct ancestor of Charter article 1(3), which makes it a Purpose of the United Nations to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, so the clause refused in 1919 appears in the operative text of the successor organisation twenty-six years later. And it explains the sequence of the post-war framework, in which the first core treaty was not on torture or fair trial but the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1965, a year before the Covenants.
3. Trace the line from 1919 to 1965. In 1919 the proposal obtains a majority and is declared not carried. In 1945 Charter article 1(3) makes international co-operation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, a Purpose of the Organization. In 1948 article 2 of the Universal Declaration widens the grounds from four to ten and adds the open phrase other status, and its second sentence provides that no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty, which in 1948 reached most of the world's population. In 1960 the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples declares that subjection to alien domination is a denial of fundamental human rights. In 1963 the General Assembly adopts a Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and in 1965 the Convention, in force from 1969. And in 1993 Vienna restates universality by consensus with 171 States participating.
The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919
4. How should the episode be used against the claim that the framework is a Western imposition? By conceding it first and precisely, because conceding a documented fact is what makes the rest of the answer credible. Then by giving what changed: the clause refused in 1919 is in Charter article 1(3); the Declaration's article 2 widens it and extends it expressly to trust and non-self-governing territories; and the first core treaty of the post-war framework was on racial discrimination. Then by giving the authorship of 1948: an American chair, a Lebanese rapporteur, a Chinese vice-chair whose intervention kept the text free of any single philosophical foundation, and the Indian amendment that changed article 1 from all men to all human beings. Then by giving the conduct of the excluded States themselves, who pressed for, drafted and ratified the successor instruments in large numbers, which is not how an illegitimate order is treated by those it excluded. The distinction to close on is that 1919 is evidence about who decided and not about whose values the resulting text expresses, and conflating those two is the commonest error on this topic.
The rest of this subject
These notes are cut from the University's printed syllabus. Open the syllabus itself, or the past papers, for the same subject.