No-Confidence and Censure

Which is why the motion is procedurally simple and politically total. No grounds, no finding, no appeal; a single vote, and the Council of Ministers must go.

The constitutional basis

Article 75(3): The Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People.

Article 164(2): The Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the State.

Two consequences follow from the words, and they decide examination questions.

Only the popular House can do it. Article 75(3) names the House of the People. A resolution of the Council of States expressing no confidence has no constitutional effect, because the Council is not the body to which the Ministers are responsible. In a State, article 164(2) names the Legislative Assembly, so a Legislative Council cannot bring a Government down: chapter 1280.

And the obligation is to resign, not to be dismissed. The Constitution does not say what happens when a motion is carried. What it says is that the Council is responsible to the House; the consequence, that a Council which has lost the House's confidence must resign, is the convention that gives the article its content. Article 75(2), that Ministers hold office during the pleasure of the President, supplies the formal mechanism if resignation is not offered.

The third occasion: the motion of thanks

Article 87(1): at the commencement of the first session after each general election to the House of the People, and at the commencement of the first session of each year, the President shall address both Houses of Parliament assembled together and inform Parliament of the causes of its summons. Article 87(2): provision shall be made by the rules for the allotment of time for discussion of the matters referred to in such address.

Article 176 makes corresponding provision for a Governor and a State Legislature.

Why this is an instrument of control and not a ceremony.

The address is the Government's. It is written by the Council of Ministers and read by the President, and it sets out what the Government has done and proposes to do.

The motion of thanks is debated, and the debate ranges over the whole of the Government's policy and administration. It is the one occasion in the year on which everything is in order at once.

And amendments may be moved to the motion. An amendment to the motion of thanks that is carried against the Government is a defeat of the first order, because it is a formal recording, on a Government document, that the House does not accept what the Government says it has done. In substance it is a censure.

So the year has three general reckonings: the motion of thanks at the start, the Budget and the Demands for Grants in the financial business, chapter 1200, and whatever motions the Opposition can obtain in between.

What actually decides these motions

The honest chapter is 1270, but the point must be made here or the description misleads.

A motion of no-confidence is decided by arithmetic, not by argument. A Government with a majority wins it; a Government without one does not survive to face it. The debate changes no votes, because of the Tenth Schedule: a member of a political party who votes contrary to a direction issued by that party, without its prior permission and without condonation within fifteen days, is disqualified.

So the Tenth Schedule has an ambivalent place in this label, and a good answer says so. It stabilises government by preventing defections that once brought Governments down for money. And it removes the individual conscience that a motion of no-confidence was designed to consult, so that the ultimate instrument of legislative control is exercised by parties and not by members.

Which turns the criticism into its sharpest form. The devices of legislative control assume a House that can decide against its own Government, and the Tenth Schedule assumes it cannot.

A worked example

A Minister is shown to have misled the House in an answer, and a scheme in his charge has failed with heavy loss.

Route one, a censure motion against the Minister. It must state the grounds, namely that he misled the House and mismanaged the scheme. It may be moved in either House. If carried it does not remove him in law, article 75(2) placing his office at the President's pleasure, but it is a political reverse of the first order and resignation ordinarily follows.

Route two, a motion of no-confidence. It lies only against the Council of Ministers, only in the House of the People, and needs no grounds. If carried the Council must resign.

Which route fits? If the complaint is against one Minister, censure. If the complaint is that the Government as a whole no longer commands confidence, no-confidence. Choosing the wrong instrument is the commonest error in an examination answer on this topic.

Route three, without a motion at all. At the debate on the motion of thanks on the President's address, an amendment may be moved regretting that the address makes no mention of the failure. An amendment carried against the Government is a censure in substance.

And what will actually happen? If the Government has a majority, all three fail, because the Tenth Schedule disqualifies a member who votes against his party's direction. The value of moving them is the debate and the record, which is the sanction this whole paper turns on.

What beginners get wrong

That a censure motion removes a Minister. It does not in law. Article 75(2): office during the pleasure of the President.

That no-confidence can be moved against a Minister. Article 75(3) makes the responsibility collective; the motion lies against the Council of Ministers.

That either House may pass a motion of no-confidence. Only the House of the People, and in a State only the Legislative Assembly.

That a motion of no-confidence must state reasons. It need not. Confidence is not a finding of fact.

That the motion of thanks is a formality. The debate ranges over the whole of the Government's policy and administration, and an amendment carried on it is a censure in substance.

Quick revision

No-confidence: no grounds stated; against the Council of Ministers only; in the popular House only; if carried, the Council must resign. Basis: art 75(3), art 164(2); mechanism if resignation is refused, art 75(2) and art 164(1), office during pleasure.

Censure: grounds must be stated; against an individual Minister or the Council; in either House; if carried, does not by itself end the Government, though in practice a grave reverse.

Why no grounds are needed: a censure asserts a finding; no-confidence asserts only the withdrawal of support, and the House need not justify withdrawing what it need not have justified giving.

The third occasion: the motion of thanks on the President's address under art 87, or the Governor's under art 176; the address is the Government's own document; the debate covers the whole of policy and administration; an amendment carried against the Government is a censure in substance.

What decides them: arithmetic, not argument, because the Tenth Schedule disqualifies a member who votes against his party's direction without prior permission or condonation within fifteen days. It stabilises government and removes the conscience the instrument was designed to consult.

Test yourself

1. Distinguish a motion of no-confidence from a censure motion. A motion of no-confidence need state no grounds, lies only against the Council of Ministers as a body and not against an individual Minister, may be moved only in the popular House, that is the House of the People or a Legislative Assembly, and if carried obliges the Council to resign. A censure motion must state the grounds on which it is moved, may be directed against an individual Minister or against the Council, may be moved in either House, and if carried does not by itself terminate the Government, since Ministers hold office during the pleasure of the President under article 75(2) or of the Governor under article 164(1), though in practice it is treated as a reverse of the first order. The reason no-confidence needs no grounds is that a censure asserts a finding of fact which must be made out, while no-confidence asserts only that the House no longer supports the Government, which requires no justification.

2. Why can only the popular House pass a motion of no-confidence? Because of the words of the articles that create the responsibility. Article 75(3) provides that the Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People, and article 164(2) that a State Council shall be collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the State. Responsibility runs to the named body and to no other, so a resolution of the Council of States, or of a Legislative Council in a State that has one, expressing want of confidence has no constitutional effect. It also follows that the motion is against the Council collectively, since that is the form the responsibility takes.

3. How is the motion of thanks an instrument of control? Because the address on which it is moved is the Government's own document. Article 87(1) requires the President to address both Houses assembled together at the commencement of the first session after each general election and at the commencement of the first session of each year, and to inform Parliament of the causes of its summons; article 87(2) requires provision by rules for the allotment of time to discuss the matters referred to in the address; and article 176 makes corresponding provision for a Governor. The address is drafted by the Council of Ministers and sets out what the Government has done and proposes to do, and the debate on the motion of thanks accordingly ranges over the whole of its policy and administration, which no other occasion in the year permits. Amendments may be moved, and an amendment carried against the Government is a formal recording on the Government's own document that the House does not accept its account of itself, which is a censure in substance.

4. What actually determines the fate of these motions? Arithmetic rather than argument, because of the Tenth Schedule. A member of a political party who votes or abstains contrary to a direction issued by that party, without obtaining its prior permission and without the vote being condoned within fifteen days, incurs disqualification. The consequence is that the debate on a motion of no-confidence changes no votes: a Government with a majority wins, and a Government without one does not ordinarily survive to face the motion. The Tenth Schedule therefore has an ambivalent place in this label. It stabilises government by preventing the defections that once brought Governments down for money, and it removes the individual conscience which the motion of no-confidence was designed to consult, so that the ultimate instrument of legislative control is exercised by parties rather than by members. That tension is the sharpest form of the criticism that the devices of legislative control assume a House capable of deciding against its own Government.