'Industrial Dispute', and the Individual Dispute
Chapter Eighteen
Syllabus topic 2.1. MU heads Module II "INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES", so the expression the module is named after is defined here, beside 'industry'.
Pages 150 to 156 of 439
In one line
An industrial dispute is a real quarrel about employment, or its terms, or working conditions, between employers and workers or between either group among themselves, and it now also covers a single worker's own dispute about being dismissed, discharged, retrenched or terminated.
In exam wording: section 2(q) of the Industrial Relations Code 2020 defines "industrial dispute" as any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workers, or between workers and workers, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person, and includes any dispute or difference between an individual worker and an employer connected with, or arising out of, the discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of such worker.
Why the law has this at all
The last chapter decided where the Code applies. This one decides what it applies to.
Almost every machine in the Code is switched on by an industrial dispute. Conciliation under section 43 is conciliation of an industrial dispute. The Tribunal under section 44 adjudicates industrial disputes. The immunity in section 16, which Module I worked, protects acts done in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute. A strike is defined by reference to the industrial context. So a quarrel that is not an industrial dispute cannot be taken to any of the Code's forums, and the parties are left to the ordinary law.
Two opposite dangers had to be met.
If the definition is too narrow, the Act misses its own purpose. A dispute is industrial in substance even where the individual affected is not the person raising it, because a union exists precisely to take up its members' causes collectively.
If it is too wide, it swallows everything. The old section 2(k) spoke of a dispute connected with the employment of "any person". Taken literally, workmen could raise an industrial dispute about a complete stranger, and the employer would be dragged before a Tribunal over somebody he had nothing to do with.
Section 2(q) meets the first danger by covering disputes between all three combinations of parties. The second is met by the courts, which read "any person" down, and by the Code, which added a second limb so that the commonest individual case does not have to be squeezed through the first.
Some words this chapter uses
Dispute or difference is a real, existing disagreement. It is not a grievance nobody has raised, and not a mere demand that has never been rejected.
Employment or non-employment covers both the terms on which a person is employed and the fact of his not being employed, which is how a dismissal comes within the definition.
'Industrial Dispute', and the Individual Dispute
Conditions of labour are the circumstances in which work is done: hours, safety, shifts, amenities.
Espousal means the taking up of an individual's cause by a body of workmen or by a union, so that his grievance becomes their dispute.
Direct or substantial interest is the test Dimakuchi laid down for whether a dispute about a particular person can be an industrial dispute.
Trade Union dispute, section 2(zm), is a different animal: a dispute relating to a Trade Union between two or more Trade Unions, or between members of a Trade Union among themselves. It is not an industrial dispute and it goes elsewhere.
The definition, taken apart
The first limb: who is quarrelling, and about what
There must be a dispute or difference, and it must be between one of three pairs:
- employers and employers;
- employers and workers;
- workers and workers.
And it must be connected with:
- the employment of any person; or
- the non-employment of any person; or
- the terms of employment of any person; or
- the conditions of labour of any person.
Two features of that structure are examinable.
The parties and the subject are separate questions. The dispute must be between the listed parties, but the person about whom it is raised need not be a party to it at all. That is what makes espousal possible: the workmen quarrel with the employer about somebody else's employment.
A dispute between workers and workers counts. A demarcation dispute between two groups of workers about which of them is entitled to do a particular job is an industrial dispute even though the employer is not on either side.
The second limb: the individual dispute
The definition includes any dispute or difference between an individual worker and an employer connected with, or arising out of, the discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of such worker.
This limb is new to the definition and it matters a great deal. Under the repealed Act the same result was reached by a separate section, section 2A, inserted years after the Act was passed precisely because the courts had held that an individual's dispute was not an industrial dispute unless a body of workmen or a union espoused it. The Code has folded that provision into the definition itself.
What follows practically. A dismissed worker no longer needs anybody to take up his cause. He is within the definition on his own, provided his dispute is about one of the four listed events: discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination.
And notice the limit of the second limb. It covers only those four events. An individual worker's dispute about, say, his wage rate or his transfer is not within the second limb, and has to come within the first, which in practice means it must be espoused.
'Industrial Dispute', and the Individual Dispute
The case that reads "any person" down
Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, AIR 1958 SC 353, (1958) SCR 1156, Das CJ and S.K. Das J, Sarkar J dissenting.
Facts. Dr. K.P. Banerjee, an Assistant Medical Officer at the Dimakuchi Tea Estate, was dismissed unheard with a month's salary in lieu of notice. He accepted the payment and left the garden. The workmen of the estate espoused his cause, and the Government referred the dispute for adjudication under section 10 of the Act. Both the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal held that, Dr. Banerjee not being a workman within the Act, the dispute was not an industrial dispute within section 2(k).
Held. The expression "any person" in section 2(k) cannot be given its ordinary wide meaning and must be read and understood in the context of the Act and the object the legislature had in view; nor can it be equated with the word "workman" or "employee". Two tests follow:
- the dispute must be a real dispute, capable of being settled by relief given by one party to the other; and
- the person in respect of whom the dispute is raised must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest.
Dr. Banerjee not being a workman, the workmen had no such interest in him, and the dispute was not an industrial dispute.
Sarkar J dissented, and this book records that rather than presenting the decision as unanimous.
Why it matters. It is the leading authority on the outer edge of the definition, and it supplies the phrase every answer turns on. It also shows the method: where a statutory definition is drafted so widely that it defeats the statute's own purpose, the court reads it in the light of that purpose rather than literally.
How to cite it now. It was decided under section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, repealed by section 104(1)(c) of the Code on 21 November 2025. Section 2(q) of the Code reproduces the same governing words, including "of any person", so the reading down survives unchanged. What the Code adds is the second limb, which does not disturb the case: Dr. Banerjee was not a worker, and the second limb speaks of a dispute between an individual worker and an employer.
Distinctions
| Industrial dispute, section 2(q) | Trade Union dispute, section 2(zm) | |
|---|---|---|
| Between whom | employers and employers, employers and workers, or workers and workers; or an individual worker and an employer on the four listed events | two or more Trade Unions, or members of a Trade Union among themselves |
| About what | employment, non-employment, terms of employment, conditions of labour | the union: its registration, administration, management, election of office-bearers, admission of members |
| Where it goes | conciliation and adjudication under Chapters VI and VII | application to the Tribunal under section 22, and no other civil court, section 22(2) |
| Example | a dismissal, a wage demand, a demarcation quarrel between two groups of workers | two unions each claiming to represent the same workers |
'Industrial Dispute', and the Individual Dispute
| First limb of section 2(q) | Second limb of section 2(q) | |
|---|---|---|
| Parties | employers and employers, employers and workers, workers and workers | an individual worker and an employer |
| Subject | employment, non-employment, terms of employment, conditions of labour of any person | discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of that worker |
| Espousal needed | in practice yes, where one individual is affected | no |
| Ancestry | section 2(k) of the repealed Act | section 2A of the repealed Act, now folded into the definition |
A worked example
The facts. At a packaging plant in Wada, five things happen in one month.
One: the union demands a wage increase for all 1,200 workers and the employer refuses. An industrial dispute on the first limb. It is a dispute between an employer and workers connected with the terms of employment.
Two: Meera, a worker, is dismissed for alleged misconduct. No union takes up her case. An industrial dispute on the second limb, because it is a dispute between an individual worker and an employer connected with her dismissal. She does not need espousal. Under the repealed Act she would have needed section 2A to say the same thing.
Three: Rakesh, a worker, is transferred to another shift and objects. No union takes up his case. Not within the second limb, which covers only discharge, dismissal, retrenchment and termination. He must bring himself within the first limb, and on Dimakuchi the question will be whether the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest in his terms of employment. In practice that means the union or a body of workers must espouse his case, and if they do, the dispute is industrial because fellow workers plainly have a direct interest in the shift arrangements of their colleague.
Four: the workmen raise a dispute about the dismissal of the plant's General Manager, who is employed mainly in a managerial capacity. On Dimakuchi this fails. He is not a worker, being excluded by section 2(zr)(iii), and the workmen have no direct or substantial interest in his employment. The words "any person" cannot be read literally.
Five: the fitters and the electricians quarrel about which of them is entitled to do a particular repair. An industrial dispute on the first limb: it is a dispute between workers and workers connected with the terms of employment or the conditions of labour. The employer is not on either side and that does not matter.
'Industrial Dispute', and the Individual Dispute
Now a sixth, to catch the other error. Two rival unions each claim to be entitled to represent the plant's workers and one sues the other. That is not an industrial dispute. It is a Trade Union dispute under section 2(zm), an application lies to the Tribunal under section 22(1)(a), and section 22(2) bars every other civil court.
What this does NOT mean
It does not mean any dispute in a workplace is an industrial dispute. It must be between the listed parties and connected with employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour, and on Dimakuchi it must be a real dispute capable of being settled by relief given by one party to the other.
It does not mean "any person" means anybody. Dimakuchi reads the words down, and the test is direct or substantial interest.
It does not mean an individual worker can always go alone. The second limb covers four events only. Outside them, the first limb applies with all its requirements.
It does not mean a Trade Union dispute is an industrial dispute. They are separately defined and go to different places.
It does not mean the person concerned must be a worker in every case. The definition speaks of the employment of "any person", and Dimakuchi requires only that the parties have a direct or substantial interest in that person's employment. What Dimakuchi decided is that on those facts, a non-workman's dismissal, they did not.
Limits, criticism and amendments
Folding section 2A into the definition is a real simplification, and it removes a trap that used to catch dismissed workers who could find nobody to espouse their cause.
But the second limb is narrow. Confining it to discharge, dismissal, retrenchment and termination leaves every other individual grievance dependent on espousal, which is precisely the difficulty an unorganised worker has. The Code's own partial answer is the Grievance Redressal Committee in section 4, which an individual can approach.
"Any person" is still in the section, so the reading down in Dimakuchi is still needed. Parliament could have written the test into the definition and did not.
And Dimakuchi is not a unanimous decision. Sarkar J dissented, and the majority's method, reading plain words down by reference to the object of the Act, is the kind of reasoning that is always open to argument.
Quick revision
- Section 2(q), first limb: a dispute or difference between employers and employers, employers and workers, or workers and workers, connected with the employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person.
- Second limb: includes a dispute between an individual worker and an employer connected with or arising out of his discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination. This is section 2A of the repealed Act, folded in, and it removes the need for espousal in those four cases.
- Dimakuchi, AIR 1958 SC 353: "any person" cannot bear its ordinary meaning and is not the same as "workman" or "employee". Two tests: a real dispute capable of being settled by relief given by one party to the other; and the parties must have a direct or substantial interest in that person's employment. Dr. Banerjee, an Assistant Medical Officer, was not a workman, so the dispute failed. Sarkar J dissented.
- Distinguish a Trade Union dispute, section 2(zm), which goes to the Tribunal under section 22 with civil courts barred by section 22(2).
'Industrial Dispute', and the Individual Dispute
Test yourself
1. Define "industrial dispute" under the Code. Section 2(q) defines it as any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workers, or between workers and workers, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person, and as including any dispute or difference between an individual worker and an employer connected with, or arising out of, the discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of such worker.
2. What is the significance of the second limb? It makes an individual worker's dispute about his own discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination an industrial dispute in its own right, without any need for a union or a body of workers to espouse his cause. Under the repealed Industrial Disputes Act 1947 that result was achieved by a separate provision, section 2A, which had to be inserted after the courts held that an individual dispute was not an industrial dispute unless espoused. The Code has folded that provision into the definition. Its limit is that it covers only those four events.
3. How have the courts read the words "any person"? In Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, AIR 1958 SC 353, the Supreme Court held that the expression cannot be given its ordinary meaning and must be read in the context of the Act and the object the legislature had in view, and that it cannot be equated with "workman" or "employee". Two tests follow: the dispute must be a real dispute, capable of being settled by relief given by one party to the other; and the person in respect of whom it is raised must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest. Sarkar J dissented.
'Industrial Dispute', and the Individual Dispute
4. The workmen of a factory raise a dispute about the dismissal of its General Manager. Advise. The dispute is unlikely to be an industrial dispute. A person employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity is excluded from the definition of "worker" by section 2(zr)(iii), so the second limb of section 2(q), which requires an individual worker, does not apply. Under the first limb the question is the Dimakuchi test, and on facts materially like these the Supreme Court held that the workmen had no direct or substantial interest in the employment of a non-workman, so the dispute was not an industrial dispute.
5. Two groups of workers quarrel about which of them may do a particular job. Is that an industrial dispute? Yes. Section 2(q) expressly covers a dispute or difference between workers and workers connected with the terms of employment or the conditions of labour of any person. The employer need not be on either side.
6. Distinguish an industrial dispute from a Trade Union dispute. An industrial dispute, section 2(q), is a dispute connected with employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour, between employers and employers, employers and workers, or workers and workers, or between an individual worker and an employer on the four listed events; it travels the conciliation and adjudication machinery. A Trade Union dispute, section 2(zm), is a dispute relating to a Trade Union arising between two or more Trade Unions or between the members of a Trade Union among themselves, typically about registration, administration, management or the election of office-bearers; an application lies to the Tribunal under section 22(1), and section 22(2) provides that no civil court other than the Tribunal may entertain any suit or other proceedings in relation to it.
The rest of this subject
These notes are cut from the University's printed syllabus. Open the syllabus itself, or the past papers, for the same subject.