Tolerance and Compromise
Chapter Sixty-Four
Syllabus topic 3.1, "Social Processes- ... tolerance, compromise"
Pages 285 to 288 of 451
In one line
Compromise ends a dispute by each side surrendering part of its claim; tolerance ends it by each side leaving the other's claim alone.
In the wording a student can write in an exam: compromise is the form of accommodation in which parties of roughly comparable strength each abandon a part of their demand in order to reach a settlement, so that neither prevails entirely and both accept the result. Tolerance, or toleration, is the form in which no party abandons anything: the parties simply permit one another to hold and practise their differing beliefs and ways of life, agreeing to coexist without resolving the difference at all.
Compromise
Its conditions
Roughly equal strength. This is the essential condition and the one to state first. A party able to win outright has no reason to concede anything, so compromise appears where neither side can impose its will. It follows that compromise is evidence of a balance of power, and its absence is evidence of the opposite.
A shared interest in ending the dispute, usually because continuing is costly to both.
Divisibility. The thing in dispute must be capable of being divided or traded. Money is; a claim to be recognised as the rightful heir is not, which is why some disputes settle easily and others cannot.
Willingness to accept less than the whole, which requires that each party value settlement above total victory.
Its characteristics
- Mutual concession. Both give up something, which distinguishes it from conversion and from coercion.
- Nobody is satisfied, and this is normal rather than a failure. A compromise that fully satisfies one party was not a compromise.
- The difference is not resolved, only set aside.
- It is deliberate and conscious, unlike much accommodation.
- It is provisional. A shift in the balance of strength invites reopening.
Where it appears in law
Compromise is the ordinary way disputes actually end. Settlement of a suit, compounding of an offence where the law permits it, a consent decree, a negotiated contract term, a conciliated industrial dispute, and the entire practice of Lok Adalat proceed on it. The Code of Civil Procedure's provision for recording a compromise and passing a decree in its terms is compromise given legal force, and the preference for settlement in family and commercial matters exists because those parties must continue dealing with each other, as [Accommodation] explains.
Its limits
Not everything should be compromised, and this is the point that lifts an answer. A claim to a legal right is not automatically a suitable subject: a person entitled to a statutory minimum wage who settles for less has compromised, and the reason the law makes some rights non-waivable is precisely that compromise between unequal parties reproduces the inequality. Where bargaining power is unequal, compromise is coercion wearing a better name.
Tolerance and Compromise
Tolerance
What it is
Tolerance is the deliberate permitting of what one disapproves of or disagrees with. Three elements are usually identified and all three are necessary.
- A real disagreement or disapproval. One does not tolerate what one likes; approval is not tolerance.
- The power to interfere, at least to some degree. A person unable to interfere is not tolerating; they are merely enduring.
- A deliberate decision not to interfere.
The second element is what makes the concept interesting and is the one students miss: tolerance is exercised by those in a position to suppress, which is why it is a virtue of majorities more than of minorities.
Its characteristics
- Nothing is conceded. Unlike compromise, no party gives up any part of its position.
- The difference is fully preserved, and is not even set aside; it simply ceases to be a ground for action.
- It is negative in form, consisting in abstention rather than in doing anything.
- It permits contact, and is therefore the precondition of assimilation, as [Assimilation] notes.
- It is a matter of degree, from grudging endurance to positive respect for difference.
Tolerance in India
The clearest institutional expression is constitutional: freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion; the freedom to manage religious affairs; the protection of the interests of minorities and their right to conserve their distinct language, script and culture; and the right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. Personal laws are themselves an institutional form of toleration, since the state permits communities to be governed by their own family law rather than imposing one, which is [Legal Pluralism].
The limits of tolerance are also constitutional and are the interesting part. The freedoms are subject to public order, morality and health, and the state may make law for social welfare and reform. Every society draws a line beyond which it will not tolerate a practice, and the drawing of that line is what most contested public argument consists of. The prohibition of untouchability, of sati and of child marriage are instances of a society declining to tolerate practices its members regarded as their own.
The paradox of tolerance
Worth naming, because it is the standard objection and it is a serious one. A society that tolerates everything must tolerate those who would abolish tolerance, and so undermines itself. The usual resolution is that tolerance extends to belief and expression widely, and not to conduct that harms others or destroys the conditions of tolerance itself, which is broadly the shape of the constitutional restrictions above.
Tolerance and Compromise
The comparison
| Compromise | Tolerance | |
|---|---|---|
| What each party does | Gives up part of its claim | Gives up nothing |
| The difference | Set aside, not resolved | Fully preserved |
| Requires | Roughly equal strength | The power to interfere, and a decision not to |
| Form | Positive: an agreement is made | Negative: abstention from acting |
| Result | A settlement | Coexistence |
| Typical setting | A dispute over a divisible thing | A difference of belief or way of life |
| Legal counterpart | Settlement, consent decree, conciliation, Lok Adalat | Freedom of religion and conscience; minority rights; personal laws |
| Failure mode | Compromise between unequals reproduces the inequality | Tolerance of the intolerant undermines itself |
A worked example
Two communities in a town both hold processions along the same road on dates that occasionally coincide.
Coercion would be one community preventing the other, and the arrangement would last only while it could be enforced.
Compromise: the route is divided, or the timings are staggered, each giving up part of what it wanted. It requires that neither be strong enough to exclude the other, and neither is content.
Tolerance: each accepts the other's right to the road and neither seeks to stop it, giving up nothing of its own belief or practice. Nothing has been conceded and the difference is untouched, which is precisely why tolerance can settle disputes that compromise cannot: a community may be unable to concede a point of belief and perfectly able to leave another's alone.
The law's role is visible in both. It supplies the machinery of compromise, a magistrate's order regulating routes and timings, and it supplies the framework of tolerance, the constitutional right of each to practise its religion, subject to public order. A student who can say which of the two a given legal provision is doing has understood this chapter.
Quick revision
- Compromise: mutual concession; requires roughly equal strength, a shared interest in ending the dispute, and a divisible subject matter. Nobody is satisfied, and that is normal.
- Its legal forms: settlement, consent decree, compounding, conciliation, Lok Adalat.
- Compromise between unequal parties reproduces the inequality, which is why some statutory rights are made non-waivable.
- Tolerance: three elements, a real disagreement, the power to interfere, and a decision not to. Approval is not tolerance and inability is not tolerance.
- Nothing is conceded in tolerance; the difference is fully preserved. It is the precondition of contact and therefore of assimilation.
- In India: freedom of conscience and religion, minority rights to conserve language, script and culture and to run institutions, and personal laws as institutional toleration, all subject to public order, morality, health and social reform.
- The paradox of tolerance: a society tolerating everything must tolerate those who would end tolerance; the usual answer is wide tolerance of belief and narrower tolerance of harmful conduct.
Tolerance and Compromise
Test yourself
1. Define compromise and state its conditions. The form of accommodation in which each party abandons part of its demand so that a settlement is reached and neither prevails entirely. Its conditions are roughly comparable strength, since a party able to win outright has no reason to concede; a shared interest in ending the dispute, usually because continuing is costly to both; a subject matter capable of division or trade; and a willingness on both sides to accept less than the whole.
2. Why is a compromise between unequal parties objectionable? Because the terms will reflect the inequality rather than the merits. A party who cannot afford to continue will accept whatever is offered, so the settlement records their weakness and calls it agreement. That is why the law makes certain rights non-waivable and scrutinises settlements in fields marked by unequal bargaining power: without such protection, compromise between unequals is coercion under a better name.
3. What are the three elements of tolerance? A genuine disagreement with or disapproval of what is tolerated, since one does not tolerate what one approves; the power to interfere, at least to some degree, because a person unable to interfere is enduring rather than tolerating; and a deliberate decision not to interfere. The second element is the significant one: tolerance is exercised by those in a position to suppress, which makes it primarily a virtue of majorities.
4. Distinguish tolerance from compromise. In compromise each party surrenders part of its claim and a settlement is reached, so the process is positive and requires roughly equal strength. In tolerance no party surrenders anything: each simply permits the other's differing belief or practice, so the process is negative, consisting in abstention, and the difference is preserved entire. Tolerance can therefore settle disputes about belief, which cannot be divided, where compromise cannot.
5. What is the paradox of tolerance and how is it usually resolved? That a society which tolerates everything must also tolerate those who intend to abolish tolerance, and so provides the means of its own destruction. The usual resolution is to distinguish belief and expression, which are tolerated widely, from conduct that harms others or destroys the conditions of tolerance itself, which is not. This is broadly the shape of the constitutional position, where the freedoms of conscience, religion and expression are guaranteed subject to public order, morality and health.
The rest of this subject
These notes are cut from the University's printed syllabus. Open the syllabus itself, or the past papers, for the same subject.