Max Weber's Classification of Authority
Chapter Sixteen
Syllabus topic 1.2.2, "Max Webber's Classification of Authority"
Pages 74 to 77 of 506
In one line
Weber said there are exactly three pure ways in which people come to accept that somebody is entitled to command them: because it has always been so, because of the extraordinary personal quality of the commander, and because a rule made the commander competent.
In the wording a student can write in an exam: Weber classified legitimate authority into three pure types according to the ground on which its claim to legitimacy rests: traditional authority, resting on the everyday belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those called to authority by them; charismatic authority, resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of a person and of the order they reveal or create; and legal or rational authority, resting on belief in the legality of enacted rules and in the right to command of those raised to authority under them.
Weber's own statement
Weber writes, in the part of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft dealing with the types of domination, that there are three pure types of legitimate domination, and that their claim to legitimacy may rest primarily on one of three characters.
Rational in character, resting on the belief in the legality of enacted orders and in the right to give directions of those called to exercise authority under them. Weber's own bracket for this is legale Herrschaft, legal domination.
Traditional in character, resting on the everyday belief in the sanctity of traditions valid from time immemorial and in the legitimacy of those called to authority by them: traditionale Herrschaft.
Charismatic in character, resting on the extraordinary devotion to the sanctity, or the heroic force, or the exemplary quality of a person and of the order revealed or created by that person: charismatische Herrschaft.
He then adds a second passage that students almost never quote and that is worth more than the first, because it says in each case what is being obeyed.
Under legal domination, obedience is given to the legally established impersonal order, and to the superior determined by it, by virtue of the formal legality of the directions and within their scope.
Under traditional domination, obedience is given to the person of the master who is called by tradition and himself bound by it, out of Pietät, a word meaning reverence or dutiful respect, and only within the circle of what is customary.
Under charismatic domination, obedience is given to the charismatically qualified leader as such, out of personal trust in revelation, heroism or exemplary quality, and only so far as the belief in that charisma holds.
Read the three together and the classification stops being a list. In one the rule is obeyed, in another the person as heir of a custom, in the third the person as an extraordinary individual. That is the whole of Weber's answer to the question of why people obey.
Max Weber's Classification of Authority
Two things to fix before the three chapters that follow
Weber is classifying legitimacy, not government. He is not saying there are three kinds of state. He is saying there are three grounds on which a claim to be obeyed is accepted. A single state contains all three at once.
These are ideal types. An ideal type, in Weber's method, is a deliberately purified mental construct: it exaggerates the essential features of a phenomenon so that real cases can be compared against it. No actual regime is a pure type, and pointing out that a real government is a mixture is not an objection to Weber but an application of him. "Ideal" here does not mean desirable. It means conceptual.
The classification at a glance
| Traditional | Charismatic | Legal rational | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legitimacy rests on | The sanctity of immemorial custom | Devotion to an extraordinary person | Belief in the legality of enacted rules |
| What is obeyed | The person of the master, as heir to custom | The person of the leader, as such | The impersonal order, and the office under it |
| Weber's word for the ground of obedience | Piety, reverence for what has always been | Personal trust in revelation, heroism or example | Formal legality |
| Limit on the command | What custom permits | The follower's continued belief | The scope the rule confers |
| Staff | Personal retainers, kin, favourites | Disciples, chosen for their devotion | Officials, appointed for qualification |
| Succession | Inheritance or custom | The crisis of the type; solved by routinisation | Provided for by rule in advance |
| Stability | High, but rigid | Very low | High, and adaptable |
| Example | A monarch, a hereditary head, a caste elder | A prophet, a revolutionary, a founder | A judge, a Collector, a returning officer |
A worked example
A village faces a dispute about the use of a common pond.
The traditional claim. The head of the oldest family says that the pond has always been used in a certain order and that his family has always settled such matters. He is obeyed by those who accept that this is how it has always been. His authority stops where custom stops: if he ordered the pond filled in, the same villagers would refuse, and the refusal would not feel like disobedience.
The charismatic claim. A young man who led the drought relief two years ago and who is believed to have unusual judgment proposes a completely new arrangement. Those who follow him do so because of him, not because of any office. If the arrangement fails, his authority does not diminish; it disappears.
Max Weber's Classification of Authority
The legal rational claim. The Gram Panchayat passes a resolution under the powers conferred on it by statute, and the Secretary issues a notice. It binds everybody in the village, including those who dislike it and those who never heard of the head of the oldest family. It binds because a rule says the Panchayat may decide such matters, and it lasts after every present member has gone.
Three claims to command, in one village, on one afternoon. That is why Weber's classification is still taught.
What this classification is NOT
It is not a historical sequence. Weber is not saying that societies pass from traditional to charismatic to legal rational. All three appear in ancient societies and all three appear now.
It is not a ranking. Legal rational authority is not "better"; Weber was, if anything, gloomy about it, because he thought bureaucratic rationality would trap people in what he called an iron cage.
It is not a classification of governments. It classifies grounds of legitimacy, and any government rests on more than one.
It is not a classification of power. Weber is explicit that this is Herrschaft, authority, the chance of finding obedience to a command, which is the narrower concept. Power in his wider sense need not be legitimate at all.
Quick revision
- Three pure types of legitimate domination: traditional, charismatic, legal rational.
- Traditional: the sanctity of immemorial custom; the person of the master is obeyed, out of piety, within the circle of the customary.
- Charismatic: devotion to the sanctity, heroism or exemplary quality of a person; the leader as such is obeyed, out of personal trust, so long as the belief lasts.
- Legal rational: belief in the legality of enacted rules; the impersonal order and the office are obeyed, by virtue of formal legality, within the scope conferred.
- They are ideal types: purified constructs for comparison, not descriptions of real regimes, and "ideal" does not mean desirable.
- Every real state contains all three at once.
Test yourself
1. State Weber's three types of legitimate authority. Traditional authority, resting on the everyday belief in the sanctity of traditions valid from time immemorial and in the legitimacy of those whom those traditions call to authority. Charismatic authority, resting on extraordinary devotion to the sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of a person and of the order that person reveals or creates. And legal or rational authority, resting on belief in the legality of enacted rules and in the right to command of those raised to office under them.
2. In each type, what exactly is being obeyed? Under legal authority, the legally established impersonal order and the superior determined by it, by virtue of the formal legality of the direction and only within its scope. Under traditional authority, the person of the master who is called by tradition and is himself bound by it, out of reverence, and only within the circle of what is customary. Under charismatic authority, the charismatically qualified leader as such, out of personal trust in revelation, heroism or exemplary quality, and only so long as the belief in that charisma holds.
Max Weber's Classification of Authority
3. What is an ideal type, and why does it matter here? A deliberately purified mental construct that exaggerates the essential features of a phenomenon so that real cases can be measured against it. It matters because Weber's three types are ideal types, so no actual regime is any of them in pure form, and observing that a real government mixes all three is not a criticism of the classification but the intended use of it. "Ideal" here means conceptual, not desirable.
4. Is Weber's classification a historical sequence? Give reasons. No. All three types are found in ancient and in modern societies, and a modern legal rational state contains traditional elements, such as ceremonial monarchy or customary practices, and charismatic ones, such as a leader followed for personal qualities rather than for the office held. Weber is classifying the grounds on which claims to obedience are accepted, and those grounds coexist rather than succeed one another.
5. Distinguish what Weber classifies here from power in his wider sense. Here he classifies Herrschaft, authority or domination, which he defines as the chance of finding obedience to a command of a given content among specifiable persons, and the classification is of the grounds on which such obedience is thought legitimate. Power, Macht, is the wider concept: every chance of carrying through one's own will within a social relationship even against resistance, whatever it rests on. Power need not be legitimate at all, and this classification has nothing to say about it.
The rest of this subject
These notes are cut from the University's printed syllabus. Open the syllabus itself, or the past papers, for the same subject.