The Theory of Force

It explains a lot of behaviour. People do obey out of fear, and a government's ability to compel is one reason it is not defied.

Why it fails as a theory of obligation

Might does not make right. The oldest objection and still the best. From the fact that somebody can compel you, nothing follows about what you ought to do. If it did, then every gain in strength would be a gain in entitlement, and a successful robber would acquire a right to what he took.

Rousseau's argument, which is the classic statement. If force created right, then the moment a people is strong enough to shake off the yoke and does so, it does still better, since it regains its liberty by the very same right by which the liberty was taken away. An obligation that lasts only as long as the strength behind it, and that transfers to whoever is stronger, is not an obligation at all; it is a description of who is winning.

It cannot distinguish a state from a gang. This is Hart's gunman objection again, and here it is fatal, because the force theory has nothing to add beyond superior strength.

It cannot explain why force is not enough in practice. No state governs by force alone, because force is expensive and self limiting. That was the whole argument of Module I: authority is cheap and power is dear. A theory that says force is the basis of the state cannot explain why every state works so hard to be believed in.

It confuses origin with justification, which is the genetic fallacy. How a thing began does not settle what it is entitled to now. Many respectable institutions have disreputable origins, and many worthless ones have noble ones.

It cannot survive its own success. A regime that says obedience is owed to the strongest has told its opponents exactly what to do: become stronger. Force theory is the only theory of obligation that arms the opposition.

What survives of it

The theory is not simply discarded, and three things it draws attention to are permanent.

Force is a necessary condition of a state, though not a sufficient one. A body that cannot enforce anything is not a state, whatever else it is.

Effectiveness matters to recognition. In international practice a government that actually controls a territory is dealt with, whatever its title, which is the de facto recognition discussed at topic 1.2.1.

Hobbes's rule stands. Obedience lasts as long as protection, and no longer. Hobbes is not a force theorist, but he concedes the practical core of it: an authority that cannot protect has no claim.

A worked example

A territory is annexed by a neighbouring country after a short war. The new administration begins issuing orders.

The force theory's account. The new administration has the power to compel; obedience is therefore owed; the question is closed.

Why that is unsatisfactory. Every inhabitant knows the difference between complying because a soldier is present and thinking that one ought to comply. The theory has no way to express that difference, and the difference is what the whole vocabulary of obligation exists for.

What the new administration actually does, and this is the practical refutation. It does not rely on force. It proclaims that existing laws continue. It keeps the courts sitting. It pays the salaries of the same officials. It announces a referendum. It seeks recognition from other states. Every one of those steps is an attempt to acquire something force cannot supply, and the administration's own behaviour shows it knows that superior strength is not enough.

And the test of the theory arrives later. Suppose the annexing power is defeated ten years afterwards and withdraws. On the force theory, obedience was owed to it while it was strong and is now owed to whoever replaced it, and nothing that happened in between was wrong. That conclusion is one almost nobody will accept, and rejecting it is rejecting the theory.

Distinctions that carry marks

What the force theory is NOT

It is not Hobbes. Hobbes's sovereign is created by covenant, not by conquest, and his subjects have an obligation because they authorised the sovereign. A conqueror in Hobbes acquires a title by providing protection, which is still a covenant of a kind.

It is not Machiavelli either, though he is often listed here. Machiavelli advises a ruler on how to keep power; he is not arguing that the ruled have a duty to obey.

It is not a defence of tyranny by its nineteenth century exponents. Gumplowicz and Oppenheimer were offering a sociological account of how states arose, not a justification of the states that arose.

It is not refuted by showing that states also rest on consent. The historical claim can be true and the normative claim false at the same time, which is exactly the position this chapter takes.

Quick revision

1. Two claims: a historical one, that states arose by conquest, which is largely true; and a normative one, that force creates the duty to obey, which fails.
2. Named: Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic; Gumplowicz and Oppenheimer in the nineteenth century; and anarchists, who accept the premise and reject the conclusion.
3. What is right: most states did arise by force; force is part of the definition of a state (Weber's monopoly of legitimate physical force); and it corrects the sentimentality of contract theory.
4. Rousseau's refutation: if force made right, a people that grows strong enough to throw off the yoke does still better, regaining liberty by the same right by which it was taken. So the obligation is not an obligation at all.
5. Other objections: it cannot distinguish a state from a gang; it cannot explain why no state governs by force alone; it confuses origin with justification; and it tells the opposition to become stronger.
6. What survives: force is necessary but not sufficient; effectiveness matters to recognition; and Hobbes's rule that obedience lasts as long as protection.

Test yourself

1. State the theory of force and identify the two claims within it. It holds that the state originated in the subjugation of the weak by the strong, that its essential character is coercive power, and that obedience is owed to whoever can compel it. The two claims must be separated. The historical claim, that states arose by conquest, is largely true and is well supported by the way boundaries were actually drawn. The normative claim, that force creates the duty to obey, is almost universally rejected, and confusing the two is the commonest error in answering this topic.

2. Give Rousseau's refutation. Rousseau argues that if force created right then the moment a people becomes strong enough to shake off the yoke and does so, it acts still better, because it regains its liberty by exactly the same right by which its liberty was taken from it. An obligation that lasts only while the strength behind it lasts, and that transfers automatically to whoever becomes stronger, is not an obligation at all but a description of who happens to be winning.

3. What is right in the force theory? Its history: very few states were founded by agreement, and conquest, annexation, partition and revolution made the political map. Its recognition that force is part of what a state is, since Weber defines the state by its successful claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in a territory. Its correction of the sentimentality of contract theory, which can make the state sound like a club people joined. And its explanation of a real cause of compliance, since people do obey out of fear.

4. Why can the force theory not distinguish a state from a gang? Because superior strength is the only thing it appeals to, and a gang has that within its reach. Hart's gunman objection therefore applies in its sharpest form: the victim of an armed robber is obliged to hand over the money but is not under an obligation to do so, and the force theory has no resource for marking that difference. Every other theory can point to consent, divine appointment, long settlement or class analysis; this one has nothing but the fact of power.

5. Explain the genetic fallacy as it applies here. It is the mistake of inferring what an institution is entitled to now from how it began. Even if every state began in conquest, nothing follows about whether today's government has a claim to be obeyed, any more than the disreputable origins of a university settle the worth of its degrees. This is why the historical claim in the force theory can be conceded in full while its normative claim is rejected, and it is the cleanest way to keep the two apart in an answer.