Reasoned Decisions

Held. The requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions, irrespective of whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. The reasons need not be as elaborate as those in the decision of a court of law; their extent and nature depend on the particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons be clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording reasons is greater where the order is passed at the original stage, and an appellate or revisional authority which affirms such an order need not give separate reasons if it agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge. Except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision. On the statutory scheme, however, the provisions of the Army Act 1950 and the Army Rules 1954 negative any requirement that a court martial give reasons for its findings and sentence, and reasons are not required where the court martial makes a recommendation to mercy.

Why it matters. Three points, and the third is the one students miss.

1. It states the general rule: reasons are required of a quasi-judicial administrative authority.
2. It settles that the duty does not depend on the existence of an appeal. The older view had been that reasons mattered only because an appellate body needed them; this holds that they are required anyway.
3. It shows the duty being displaced. On the actual facts the Court held that the Army Act scheme negatived the requirement. So the case is authority both for the rule and for its limits, and an answer that cites it only for the rule has read half of it.

What reasons must contain

The standard is proportionate, not perfectionist.

The last row is worth emphasising. Reasons supplied for the first time in a counter affidavit filed after a challenge are not the reasons for the order; they are an explanation constructed afterwards, and courts treat them with suspicion.

Where reasons are not required

1. Where a statute expressly dispenses with them.
2. Where the statutory scheme necessarily implies that none are required, as the Army Act was held to do in S.N. Mukherjee.
3. In legislative functions. A rule maker does not give reasons for a rule, because rule making is not a determination of an individual case: [Classification of Administrative Functions].
4. Where the affirming authority agrees with the order below. S.N. Mukherjee holds expressly that an appellate or revisional authority need not give separate reasons if it agrees with the reasons in the order under challenge.
5. In some ministerial acts, where there is no discretion and so nothing to explain.

Note what is not on this list: the absence of an appeal. That is precisely what S.N. Mukherjee rejected.

The statutory reinforcement

Two provisions are worth knowing because they show the duty spreading beyond the case law.

Section 5(3) of the Passports Act 1967 requires the Passport Authority, where it refuses to issue a passport or to make an endorsement, to record in writing a brief statement of its reasons. That provision is part of the background to Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597, where the Government impounded a passport and then declined to give reasons.

Section 4(1)(d) of the Right to Information Act 2005 obliges every public authority to provide reasons for its administrative or quasi-judicial decisions to affected persons. That is a general statutory duty to give reasons, running alongside the common law one, and it is treated in [Obligations of Public Authorities and How a Request Is Made].

A worked example

The Charity Commissioner rejects an application by a trust to sell a plot of land. Consider four possible orders.

Order 1. "Application rejected." Bad. No reasons at all. Nobody can tell whether the Commissioner considered the valuation, the objections, or anything.

Order 2. "Having considered the material on record and the submissions of the parties, and in the interest of the trust, the application is rejected." Still bad. This recites that reasons exist without giving any. Formulaic recitals are the commonest defect in practice, and they fail the test that the order be clear and explicit as to the points in controversy.

Order 3. "The trust seeks permission to sell at Rs.40 lakh. The Government valuation is Rs.72 lakh. The trust's explanation that the plot is landlocked is not supported by the survey plan, which shows a nine metre access road on the eastern boundary. The sale is therefore not in the interest of the trust and permission is refused." Good. It states the point in controversy, the material, the reasoning and the conclusion, and it is short.

Order 4. Order 1 is passed, the trust challenges it, and the Commissioner files an affidavit in the High Court setting out the reasoning in Order 3. Not a cure. The reasons must be contemporaneous with the order; reasons constructed after a challenge are not the reasons on which the order was made.

Notice that Order 3 is barely longer than Order 2. Giving reasons is not a matter of length.

Distinctions worth having straight

What it does NOT mean

It does not mean an authority must write a judgment. Reasons proportionate to the matter suffice, and S.N. Mukherjee says so expressly.

It does not mean every order needs reasons. Legislative acts, ministerial acts and statutorily exempted decisions do not.

It does not mean the duty depends on there being an appeal. S.N. Mukherjee holds that it does not.

It does not mean an appellate authority must repeat the reasoning below. If it agrees, it may say so.

Quick revision

1. A speaking order discloses its reasons on its face.
2. Four purposes: to discipline the decision maker, to make review possible, to satisfy the person affected, and to exclude arbitrariness under Article 14.
3. S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984: reasons are required of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of whether an appeal, revision or judicial review lies; they need not be as elaborate as a court's but must be clear and explicit enough to show due consideration of the points in controversy; the need is greater at the original stage; an affirming appellate authority need not give separate reasons; and the requirement may be dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, as the Army Act 1950 and Army Rules 1954 were held to do.
4. Reasons must be contemporaneous; those supplied later by affidavit do not cure a non-speaking order.
5. Not required for legislative acts, ministerial acts, or where the statute excludes them.
6. Statutory reinforcement: section 5(3) of the Passports Act 1967, and section 4(1)(d) of the Right to Information Act 2005.

Test yourself

1. Is an administrative authority bound to give reasons for its decision? Yes, as a general rule. S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984, held that except where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision, and that this is so irrespective of whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. The reasons need not be as elaborate as those of a court; what is necessary is that they be clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy, and their extent depends on the facts of the case.

2. Why is the requirement of reasons treated as a principle of natural justice? Because it serves the same purpose as the other two. It disciplines the decision maker, who must work out his reasoning in order to record it; it makes review effective, since without reasons a court cannot tell whether relevant considerations were taken into account; it satisfies the person affected, who can then accept or answer the decision; and it excludes arbitrariness, which Article 14 forbids, since an unexplained order cannot be distinguished from a whim. Indian law therefore treats it as a third principle alongside nemo judex in causa sua and audi alteram partem.

3. When are reasons not required? Where a statute expressly dispenses with them; where the statutory scheme necessarily implies that none are required, as the Supreme Court held of the Army Act 1950 and the Army Rules 1954 in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984; for legislative functions such as rule making, which do not determine an individual case; for ministerial acts, where there is no discretion; and, in the case of an appellate or revisional authority, where it affirms the order below and agrees with the reasons already given in it.

4. Can reasons be supplied later in an affidavit before the court? No. Reasons must be contemporaneous with the order, because they are the justification on which the order was in fact made. Reasons produced for the first time in a counter affidavit after the order is challenged are an explanation constructed afterwards, and they do not convert a non-speaking order into a speaking one.

5. Does the duty to give reasons depend on there being a right of appeal? No. The older view was that reasons mattered chiefly because an appellate authority needed them, so that where there was no appeal there was no need. S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984, rejected that, holding that the requirement governs the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review.