The Central Vigilance Commission

• Section 5: terms and other conditions of service.
• Section 6: removal of the Central Vigilance Commissioner or a Vigilance Commissioner, which is deliberately difficult and is the second independence safeguard.
• Section 7: power of the Central Government to make rules for the staff.

Functions and powers, sections 8, 8A, 8B and 11

Section 8 is the central provision. The functions and powers of the Commission are:

1. To exercise superintendence over the functioning of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, which is the Central Bureau of Investigation, in so far as it relates to the investigation of offences alleged to have been committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988.
2. To give directions to the Delhi Special Police Establishment for the purpose of discharging that responsibility.
3. To inquire or cause an inquiry or investigation to be made on a reference by the Central Government into an offence alleged under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 against specified categories of public servants.
4. To inquire or cause inquiries into complaints against specified officials.
5. To review the progress of investigations conducted by the Delhi Special Police Establishment.
6. To review the progress of applications pending for sanction of prosecution.
7. To tender advice to the Central Government, corporations, government companies, societies and local authorities owned or controlled by the Central Government on vigilance matters.
8. To exercise superintendence over the vigilance administration of the ministries of the Central Government and of such corporations and companies.

Sections 8A and 8B, inserted later, provide for action on a preliminary inquiry and on an investigation in relation to public servants, and dovetail with the scheme of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act 2013.

Section 11 gives the Commission, while conducting an inquiry, the powers of a civil court trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in respect of summoning and enforcing attendance, requiring the discovery and production of documents, receiving evidence on affidavit, requisitioning public records and issuing commissions. Section 11A provides for a Director of Inquiry for making a preliminary inquiry. Section 12 makes proceedings before the Commission judicial proceedings.

Independence and accountability, sections 13, 14 and 17 to 19

• Section 13: the expenses of the Commission are charged on the Consolidated Fund of India, which is the financial independence guarantee, matching section 13 of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act 2013 and Article 148 for the Comptroller and Auditor General.
• Section 14: annual report on the work done by the Commission, which is laid before each House of Parliament.
• Section 15: protection for action taken in good faith. Section 16: the Commissioner, Commissioners and staff.
• Section 17: report of an inquiry made on a reference by the Commission to be forwarded to it.
• Section 18: power to call for information.
• Section 19: consultation with the Commission in certain matters, which is the provision that makes departmental disciplinary practice run through the Commission.

Miscellaneous, sections 20 to 27

Rules and regulations, laying before Parliament, removal of difficulties, provisions relating to the existing Vigilance Commission, appointments in the Directorate of Enforcement, amendment of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946, and repeal and saving.

Its actual role in the system

Three things it does, in practical order, and this is what distinguishes a good answer.

1. It is an advisory body in disciplinary cases. The great bulk of its work is tendering advice to departments on whether a vigilance case should be pursued and what penalty is appropriate. Its advice is not binding, and a department departing from it must record its reasons, which is a control by transparency rather than by command.

2. It superintends the Central Bureau of Investigation's corruption work. Section 8(1)(a) and (b) is what insulates the anti-corruption investigation from the department under investigation.

3. It is the designated agency for whistleblower complaints. Under the Public Interest Disclosure and Protection of Informers Resolution 2004, the Commission receives written complaints or disclosures of corruption or misuse of office by employees of the Central Government and of corporations, companies, societies and local authorities owned or controlled by it. This is the point at which this chapter connects to [Whistleblowers' Protection: the Act of 2014 and the PIDPI Resolution], and the connection is important: because the Whistle Blowers Protection Act has never been brought into force, the PIDPI Resolution administered by this Commission is the whole of the whistleblower protection machinery that actually operates in India.

Its limitations

1. Its advice is not binding. A department may reject it, recording reasons.
2. It has no investigative machinery of its own for most purposes and relies on the Central Bureau of Investigation and departmental vigilance officers.
3. Its jurisdiction is the central government and bodies owned or controlled by it; State employees are outside it.
4. It cannot prosecute. Sanction and prosecution remain with the competent authority, though it reviews pending sanction applications under section 8.
5. Overlap with the Lokpal. Since 2014 there are two central anti-corruption bodies with intersecting jurisdictions, which sections 8A and 8B attempt to reconcile.

A worked example

An anonymous complaint alleges that a General Manager in a central public sector undertaking took money to award a contract.

1. Route one, PIDPI. The complainant may write to the Commission under the Public Interest Disclosure and Protection of Informers Resolution 2004, and the Commission as designated agency will conceal his identity and cause the complaint to be looked into. This is the route that actually exists, since the Whistle Blowers Protection Act is not in force.
2. Inquiry. The Commission may cause an inquiry under section 8, exercising civil court powers under section 11 to summon witnesses and require documents.
3. Investigation. If an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 appears, the Delhi Special Police Establishment investigates, under the Commission's superintendence and directions under section 8(1)(a) and (b), with progress reviewed under section 8.
4. Sanction. The Commission reviews the progress of the application for sanction of prosecution.
5. Departmental action. In parallel, the undertaking initiates disciplinary proceedings, consulting the Commission under section 19, and if it departs from the Commission's advice it must record its reasons.
6. Reporting. The matter appears in the Commission's annual report under section 14, which is laid before each House of Parliament.

What it does NOT mean

It does not mean the Commission prosecutes. It advises, superintends, inquires and reviews.

It does not mean its advice binds a department. It does not, though a departure must be reasoned.

It does not mean it covers the States. Its jurisdiction is the central government and bodies it owns or controls; the States have their own vigilance commissions and Lokayuktas.

It does not mean the Whistle Blowers Protection Act is what protects whistleblowers. That Act is not in force; the PIDPI Resolution administered by this Commission is.

Quick revision

1. Recommended by the Santhanam Committee 1964; set up by government resolution in 1964; given statutory status by the Central Vigilance Commission Act 2003 following directions of the Supreme Court.
2. Section 3: a Central Vigilance Commissioner as Chairperson and not more than two Vigilance Commissioners.
3. Section 4: appointed by the President on the recommendation of a committee of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Home Affairs and the Leader of the Opposition in the House of the People. Section 6: difficult removal.
4. Section 8: superintendence over the Delhi Special Police Establishment in Prevention of Corruption Act investigations, power to give it directions, inquiry into offences against specified public servants on a reference, review of investigations and of pending sanction applications, advice to the Central Government and bodies it owns or controls, and superintendence over their vigilance administration. Sections 8A and 8B: action on preliminary inquiry and investigation.
5. Section 11: powers of a civil court. Section 11A: Director of Inquiry. Section 12: judicial proceedings.
6. Section 13: expenses charged on the Consolidated Fund of India. Section 14: annual report laid before Parliament. Section 19: consultation with the Commission in certain matters.
7. It is the designated agency under the Public Interest Disclosure and Protection of Informers Resolution 2004, which is the operative whistleblower machinery because the Whistle Blowers Protection Act has never been brought into force.
8. Limitations: advice not binding, no investigative machinery of its own, central jurisdiction only, no power to prosecute, and overlap with the Lokpal.

Test yourself

1. Trace the origin and status of the Central Vigilance Commission. The Santhanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption recommended in 1964 a central body to advise and guide government agencies in vigilance matters, and the Commission was constituted in that year by a resolution of the Government of India. For more than three decades it functioned as an executive body without statutory backing, which limited both its powers and its independence. It was given statutory status by the Central Vigilance Commission Act 2003, following directions of the Supreme Court that it be placed on a statutory footing and that the Central Bureau of Investigation be insulated from executive interference in the investigation of corruption.

2. State the composition and functions of the Commission. Section 3 of the Central Vigilance Commission Act 2003 provides for a Central Vigilance Commissioner as Chairperson and not more than two Vigilance Commissioners as Members, appointed under section 4 by the President on the recommendation of a committee consisting of the Prime Minister as Chairperson, the Minister of Home Affairs and the Leader of the Opposition in the House of the People. Section 8 sets out its functions: to exercise superintendence over the functioning of the Delhi Special Police Establishment in so far as it investigates offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 and to give it directions for that purpose; to inquire or cause inquiries or investigations into offences alleged under that Act against specified categories of public servants, on a reference by the Central Government; to review the progress of such investigations and of pending applications for sanction of prosecution; to tender advice on vigilance matters to the Central Government and to corporations, companies, societies and local authorities owned or controlled by it; and to exercise superintendence over their vigilance administration.

3. How is the independence of the Commission secured? By three provisions in particular. Appointment under section 4 is by the President on the recommendation of a committee which includes the Leader of the Opposition in the House of the People, so that the Government of the day does not appoint alone. Removal under section 6 is made deliberately difficult. And section 13 charges the expenses of the Commission, including salaries and allowances, on the Consolidated Fund of India, so that its funding does not depend on an annual vote. Accountability is provided by section 14, which requires an annual report on its work to be laid before each House of Parliament.

4. What is the connection between the Commission and whistleblower protection in India? The Commission is the designated agency under the Public Interest Disclosure and Protection of Informers Resolution 2004, under which it receives written complaints or disclosures alleging corruption or the misuse of office by employees of the Central Government and of corporations, companies, societies and local authorities owned or controlled by it, and takes steps to conceal the identity of the complainant. That connection is critical because the Whistle Blowers Protection Act, which received assent in 2014, has never been brought into force for want of a notification under its section 1(3). The PIDPI Resolution administered by this Commission is therefore the whole of the whistleblower machinery that actually operates in India.

5. What are the limitations of the Central Vigilance Commission? Its advice in disciplinary matters is not binding, though a department departing from it must record reasons, so its control operates by transparency rather than by command. It has no investigative machinery of its own for most purposes, relying on the Delhi Special Police Establishment and on departmental vigilance officers. Its jurisdiction extends only to the central government and to bodies owned or controlled by it, so State employees are outside it. It cannot itself prosecute, sanction and prosecution remaining with the competent authority, although it reviews pending sanction applications. And since 2014 its jurisdiction overlaps with that of the Lokpal, an overlap which sections 8A and 8B of the Act attempt to reconcile.