Modern Definitions: the Kinds
Chapter Fifty-Seven
Syllabus topic 4.3, "Modern Definitions - Kinds - Methods and purpose."
Pages 268 to 272 of 334
In one line
Modern logic classifies definitions by what they are trying to do: report a usage, create one, sharpen one, express a theory, or change an attitude.
In the wording a student can write in an examination: modern logic distinguishes five kinds of definition. A stipulative definition assigns a meaning by declaration; a lexical definition reports an existing usage; a précising definition reduces the vagueness of an existing usage for a particular purpose; a theoretical definition proposes an account of the nature of the thing; and a persuasive definition is framed so as to influence attitude.
Why the classification is by purpose
Because the traditional account had only one kind, and judged every definition by one set of rules. That produced a difficulty at once: a definition that creates a usage cannot be criticised for departing from usage, and a definition that reports one cannot be criticised for failing to sharpen it. A single standard cannot be applied to five different jobs.
So the modern account asks first what the definition is for, and the rules that apply follow from the answer. That is the same move made at sequence 540 and it is the whole basis of the classification.
Stipulative definitions
What it does. Assigns a meaning to a term by declaration, either to a newly coined word or to an existing word given a new sense for a stated context.
How it is judged. Not by truth. A stipulative definition is neither true nor false, because it reports nothing; it makes something so by declaring it. What it can be is useful or useless, convenient or clumsy, clear or unclear.
Where the law uses it. Constantly, and in a specific place: the opening words of a definition clause. "In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, 'appropriate Government' means..." is a stipulation. It is not a claim about how anybody uses the expression, and it cannot be answered by showing that the expression is used differently elsewhere.
The reason this matters. An argument that a statutory definition is "wrong" because it departs from the ordinary meaning of the word is an argument that misunderstands what the clause is doing. What can be argued is that a person or thing falls outside the stipulated words, or that the context otherwise requires, which is what the standard opening formula expressly allows.
Lexical definitions
What it does. Reports how a term is in fact used in a language or in a community.
How it is judged. By truth. A lexical definition can be right or wrong, because it makes a claim about usage, and it is refuted by producing uses it fails to cover or wrongly covers. This is the one kind of definition to which the "too wide or too narrow" fallacies of sequence 560 apply in their full strength.
Modern Definitions: the Kinds
Where the law uses it. Whenever a court asks what a word means in ordinary English, because the statute has not defined it. A dictionary is being used as evidence of a lexical definition, and it is evidence and not authority: a court is not bound by a dictionary and frequently says so.
A caution. Ordinary usage is often several usages, and a lexical definition that reports one and suppresses the others is not thereby true. That is why a court asking after ordinary meaning usually asks after meaning in this context, which is already a step towards the next kind.
Précising definitions
What it does. Takes a term whose ordinary usage is vague, keeps that usage where it is settled, and draws a sharp line where it is not.
How it is judged. By fidelity plus utility. It must not conflict with the settled part of the usage, so a précising definition of "vehicle" that excluded cars would be bad. And within the unsettled range it must draw the line where the purpose requires.
Why it is not stipulative and not lexical. Not lexical, because it goes beyond what usage settles; not stipulative, because it is not free to say anything it likes. It is bound at one end and free at the other, which is exactly what makes it interesting and exactly what makes statutory interpretation possible.
Where the law uses it. Everywhere, and it is the subject of sequence 590 and of MU's topic 4.4.
Theoretical definitions
What it does. Proposes an account of the nature of the thing, which carries with it a whole way of dealing with it.
How it is judged. By whether the theory it embodies is a good one. A theoretical definition is accepted or rejected along with the theory, and arguing about the definition is arguing about the theory.
Where the law uses it. In the great definitions that carry a doctrine: negligence as breach of a duty of care, which brings duty, breach and damage with it; a contract as an agreement enforceable by law, which brings the whole apparatus of offer, acceptance, consideration and capacity; possession as control with an intention to exclude, which decides a hundred questions at once.
Why it matters in an examination. Because a question asking a student to "define" one of these terms is asking for the theory, and an answer that gives only a form of words has given the least valuable part of it.
Persuasive definitions
What it does. Frames a definition so as to attach approval or disapproval, while appearing to report a meaning.
Modern Definitions: the Kinds
How it is judged. It is not a fault in itself, and it is a fault when it is concealed. A definition that carries an evaluation and admits it is an argument; one that carries an evaluation and passes as a report of usage is a trick.
Examples. "Taxation is legalised theft." "Abortion is the taking of an innocent life." "A strike is an organised refusal to honour a bargain." Each looks like a definition and each is an argument compressed into one.
Where the law meets it. In advocacy constantly, and it is one of the things sequence 50 taught a reader to look for under the head of language. It also appears in legislation, where a term is defined in words that carry their own justification, and the definition then does rhetorical work in every section that uses it.
A worked example
Take the term "consumer" and see the same word defined in five ways.
Stipulative. "In this policy document, 'consumer' means any person who has purchased a product from the company in the last twelve months." A declaration, made for one document, true of nothing outside it.
Lexical. "A consumer is a person who buys goods or services for use rather than for resale." A report of how the word is used in English, and refutable by showing that people use it otherwise.
Précising. A statutory definition that keeps the ordinary sense and then settles the hard cases: whether a person who buys for a livelihood is included, whether a beneficiary of a service who did not pay is included, whether a purchase for commercial purpose is excluded. Every one of those is a case ordinary usage does not settle, and a précising definition has to settle them because a forum needs to know whether it has jurisdiction.
Theoretical. "A consumer is the party to a transaction whose bargaining position is structurally weaker, and who therefore requires protection the general law of contract does not supply." That is a definition carrying an entire theory of consumer law, and the theory is what is being asserted.
Persuasive. "A consumer is a person the market exists to serve." Or, from the other side, "a consumer is anyone who can be persuaded to complain." Both look like definitions and both are positions.
What the exercise shows. Five definitions of one word, and the rules that apply to each are different. Criticising the stipulative one for departing from ordinary usage misses the point; criticising the lexical one for failing to settle hard cases misses it too. Naming the kind is the first step in assessing any definition, which is why MU sets kinds before methods.
Modern Definitions: the Kinds
Distinctions that carry marks
| Kind | What it does | Judged by | Can it be true or false |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stipulative | Assigns a meaning by declaration | Usefulness and clarity | No |
| Lexical | Reports an existing usage | Truth about usage | Yes |
| Précising | Sharpens a vague usage for a purpose | Fidelity to settled usage plus utility | Only in part |
| Theoretical | Proposes an account of the thing | The merits of the theory | With the theory |
| Persuasive | Attaches approval or disapproval | Honesty about what it is doing | No |
| Stipulative | Lexical | Précising | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bound by existing usage | No | Entirely | In its settled part only |
| Free to draw the line | Completely | Not at all | Within the unsettled range |
| Legal home | The opening of a definition clause | The court's resort to ordinary meaning | The whole of statutory interpretation |
What this does not mean
The kinds are not mutually exclusive in practice. A statutory definition clause frequently stipulates in one limb, précises in another and carries a theory in a third.
"Persuasive" is not a synonym for dishonest. A definition may argue openly. It becomes a fault when the evaluation is smuggled in under the appearance of a report.
A stipulative definition cannot be false, but it can be badly chosen, and it can be defeated by the very words that introduce it: "unless the context otherwise requires" is an instruction that the stipulation yields where it produces nonsense.
Quick revision
Five kinds: stipulative, lexical, précising, theoretical, persuasive.
Stipulative: assigns a meaning by declaration; neither true nor false; judged by usefulness. The opening of a definition clause.
Lexical: reports usage; can be true or false; the "too wide, too narrow" fallacies bite hardest here. A dictionary is evidence, not authority.
Précising: keeps settled usage, draws a line in the unsettled range for a purpose. Bound at one end and free at the other.
Theoretical: carries a theory, and is accepted or rejected with it. Negligence, contract, possession.
Persuasive: attaches an evaluation while looking like a report. A fault when concealed.
Name the kind before assessing the definition, since a different standard applies to each.
Test yourself
1. Name the five kinds of definition and say what each does.
A stipulative definition assigns a meaning to a term by declaration, either to a new word or to an old word in a new sense. A lexical definition reports how a term is in fact used. A précising definition keeps the settled part of an existing usage and draws a sharp line where usage is vague. A theoretical definition proposes an account of the nature of the thing. A persuasive definition frames the meaning so as to attach approval or disapproval.
2. Why can a stipulative definition not be true or false?
Modern Definitions: the Kinds
Because it reports nothing. It does not claim that anybody uses the term in the way stated; it declares that the term shall be used that way in a stated context. There is therefore nothing for it to correspond to, and it cannot be refuted by producing contrary usage. It can be criticised only as useless, clumsy or unclear, and in a statute it yields where the context otherwise requires.
3. Which kind of definition do the fallacies of too wide and too narrow bite hardest on, and why?
Lexical definitions, because they alone make a claim about existing usage and can therefore be measured against it. A lexical definition that covers uses the term does not cover is too wide, and one that misses uses it does cover is too narrow. A stipulative definition cannot be too wide or too narrow in this sense, since there is no independent usage for it to fail to match.
4. Why is a précising definition neither stipulative nor lexical?
Because it is bound at one end and free at the other. It is not lexical, because it goes beyond what ordinary usage settles and decides cases usage leaves open. It is not stipulative, because it is not free to say anything at all: a précising definition of "vehicle" that excluded cars would be rejected, since it conflicts with the settled part of the usage. It keeps what usage fixes and chooses where usage is silent.
5. What is a theoretical definition, and why does it matter in an examination?
One that proposes an account of the nature of the thing and carries a whole way of dealing with it: negligence as breach of a duty of care brings duty, breach and damage with it, and a contract as an agreement enforceable by law brings offer, acceptance, consideration and capacity. It matters because a question asking a student to define such a term is asking for the theory, and an answer giving only a form of words has supplied the least valuable part of the definition.
6. When does a persuasive definition become a fault?
When the evaluation is concealed. A definition that openly argues, and is presented as an argument, is a legitimate move. A definition that attaches approval or disapproval while appearing to report what a word means has smuggled a conclusion into what looks like a neutral statement, and the reader who accepts the definition has accepted the position without noticing.
The rest of this subject
These notes are cut from the University's printed syllabus. Open the syllabus itself, or the past papers, for the same subject.