Legal Disability

Section 6(3), death during disability: where the disability continues up to the death of that person, his legal representative may sue within the same period after the death as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified.

Section 6(4): where that legal representative is himself, at the date of the death, affected by any such disability, sub-sections (1) and (2) apply to him.

Section 6(5): where a person under disability dies after the disability ceases but within the period allowed to him, his legal representative may sue within the same period after the death as would have been available to that person had he not died.

Read sub-sections (3) to (5) as a set. They answer the three obvious deaths: death during disability, death of a disabled representative, and death after the disability has ceased but within the extended period.

Section 7: one of several persons under disability

Section 7: where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for execution is under such a disability, and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against them all; but where no such discharge can be given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such a discharge without the concurrence of the others, or until the disability has ceased.

The test, then, is who can give a valid discharge. If the others can settle the claim without the disabled person's concurrence, the disability of one does not hold up the clock for everybody. If they cannot, time waits.

Explanation I: the section applies to a discharge from every kind of liability, including a liability in respect of any immovable property.

Explanation II: for the purposes of the section, the Manager of a Hindu undivided family governed by Mitakshara law shall be deemed capable of giving a discharge without the concurrence of the other members only if he is in management of the joint family property.

Explanation II is a favourite in examinations because it is concrete: the karta's capacity to give a discharge depends on his actually being in management.

Section 8: the cap, and the limb candidates omit

Section 8: nothing in section 6 or section 7 applies to suits to enforce rights of pre-emption, or shall be deemed to extend, for more than three years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person affected thereby, the period within which any suit must be instituted or application made.

Two separate limits in one section, and both must be given:

Pre-emption is excluded altogether. Sections 6 and 7 do not apply to a suit to enforce a right of pre-emption.

The extension can never exceed THREE YEARS from the cessation of the disability, or from the death of the person affected by it.

That cap is what stops the protection running away. If the Schedule allowed twelve years for a suit, a minor does not get twelve years after attaining majority; he gets at most three years from that date. Where the ordinary period is shorter than three years, he gets that shorter period, because section 8 is a ceiling and not a grant.

The safe formulation for an answer is this: after the disability ceases, the person has the period allowed by the Schedule or three years, whichever is less, counted from the cessation.

Section 9: once time has begun, it does not stop

Section 9: where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it. The proviso excepts the case where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, in which case the running of the period for a suit to recover the debt is suspended while the administration continues.

Section 9 is the counterweight to section 6 and the two must always be given together. Section 6 protects a disability existing at the outset. Section 9 says that a disability arising afterwards is irrelevant. That is why the timing condition in section 6(1) matters so much.

Section 10: no limitation against an express trust

Section 10: notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions, no suit against a person in whom property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose, or against his legal representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration), for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property, or the proceeds thereof, or for an account of such property or proceeds, shall be barred by any length of time.

So a beneficiary suing an express trustee to follow trust property faces no period of limitation at all. The exception in the section is the assign for valuable consideration, who is protected because he bought.

The Explanation provides that for the purposes of the section, any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be property vested in trust for a specific purpose, and the manager of the property shall be deemed the trustee.

Section 10 sits in this group because it is the other case where the ordinary running of time is displaced, and it is a natural pairing with disability in an essay on this topic.

A worked example

Rohit's father dies in 2015 leaving him property. Rohit is eight years old, and a relative takes possession.

Does time run against him? No. Section 6(1): he was a minor at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, so he may sue within the same period after the disability ceases.

When does his disability cease? On attaining majority, in 2027.

How long does he then have? Here section 8 does the work. Suppose the Schedule allows twelve years for the suit. He does not get twelve years from 2027. Section 8 caps the extension at three years from the cessation of the disability, so he must sue by 2030.

Suppose he becomes insane at fifteen, while still a minor. Section 6(2): the further disability arose before the first ceased, so he may sue within the period after both have ceased, still subject to the section 8 cap.

Suppose instead he was of full age and sound mind in 2015 and became insane in 2018. Section 9: once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability stops it. He gets nothing.

Suppose he dies in 2026, still a minor. Section 6(3): his legal representative may sue within the same period after his death, subject to section 8.

Suppose he attains majority in 2027 and dies in 2028. Section 6(5): his legal representative may sue within the same period after the death as would have been available to Rohit had he lived.

Change the claim. Suppose the suit is to enforce a right of pre-emption. Section 8: sections 6 and 7 do not apply at all, and no protection is available.

Change the parties. Suppose Rohit and his adult brother are jointly entitled, and the brother can give a valid discharge without Rohit's concurrence. Section 7: time runs against them both. If no discharge could be given without Rohit, time waits until one of them can give it or the disability ceases.

Change the defendant. Suppose the property had been vested in an express trustee for Rohit's benefit and the trustee misapplied it. Section 10: a suit to follow the trust property in the trustee's hands is not barred by any length of time, unless the property has reached an assign for valuable consideration.

What it does not mean

A disability arising after time begins does not help. Section 9.

The protection is not indefinite. Section 8 caps it at three years from cessation of the disability or the death of the person affected.

Section 6 does not cover appeals. It speaks of suits and applications for execution of a decree.

The list of disabilities is closed. Minority, insanity and idiocy. Illness, absence abroad and poverty are not disabilities under these sections.

The disability of one joint claimant does not always stop the clock. Section 7 turns on whether a discharge can be given without him.

Pre-emption gets no protection at all. Section 8.

Quick revision

Section 6(1): a minor, insane person or idiot entitled to sue or to apply for execution, at the time from which the period is reckoned, may sue within the same period after the disability ceases. Explanation: "minor" includes a child in the womb. 6(2): two disabilities together, or a second arriving before the first ceases, means the period runs from when both cease. 6(3) to (5): death during disability, a disabled legal representative, and death after cessation but within the period.

Section 7: where one of several jointly entitled persons is under disability, time runs against all if a discharge can be given without him; otherwise it does not run until it can be, or the disability ceases. Explanation II: the Mitakshara karta can give a discharge only if he is in management of the joint family property.

Section 8: sections 6 and 7 do not apply to pre-emption, and never extend the period by more than three years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person affected.

Section 9: once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability stops it. Proviso: suspension where letters of administration to a creditor's estate are granted to his debtor.

Section 10: no limitation for a suit against an express trustee to follow trust property or for an account, except against an assign for valuable consideration; religious and charitable endowments deemed trusts.

Test yourself

1. What is legal disability under the Limitation Act? Being a minor, insane, or an idiot at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned. Under section 6 such a person may institute the suit or make the application for execution within the same period after the disability has ceased as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified in the third column of the Schedule.

2. Does a disability arising after time has begun to run help the plaintiff? No. Section 9 provides that where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it. The only exception is the proviso, where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor are granted to his debtor, during which the running of the period is suspended.

3. For how long can the period be extended on account of disability? Not by more than three years from the cessation of the disability, or from the death of the person affected by it: section 8. Where the ordinary period is shorter than three years, that shorter period applies, since section 8 is a ceiling.

4. To what suits do sections 6 and 7 not apply at all? Suits to enforce rights of pre-emption: section 8.

5. One of several persons jointly entitled to sue is a minor. Does time run? It depends on whether a discharge can be given without his concurrence. Under section 7, where such a discharge can be given, time runs against them all; where it cannot, time does not run against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such a discharge without the concurrence of the others, or until the disability ceases.

6. When is the karta of a Mitakshara joint family capable of giving a discharge? Only if he is in management of the joint family property: Explanation II to section 7.

7. Is there any suit to which no period of limitation applies? Yes. Under section 10 no suit against a person in whom property has become vested in trust for a specific purpose, or against his legal representatives or assigns not being assigns for valuable consideration, to follow the property or its proceeds in their hands or for an account, shall be barred by any length of time.