Practice for Module II

3. Define vyāpti and say why its direction matters.

The invariable concomitance of the mark with what is to be established: there is no case of the mark without the conclusion. Direction matters because the mark must be the narrower term. Smoke is never without fire, so fire may be inferred from smoke; fire is often without smoke, as in a red-hot iron ball, so smoke may not be inferred from fire. A single case of the mark without the conclusion destroys the connection.

4. Give the five members with the Sūtra's own illustration and say which does the real work.

Proposition, this hill is fiery. Reason, because it is smoky. Example, whatever is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen. Application, so is this hill, smoky. Conclusion, therefore this hill is fiery. The example does the real work: it states the general connection as an explicit step and anchors it in a case where the connection is known to hold, where an ordinary argument leaves the general premise unstated and therefore unexamined.

5. Compare the Nyāya form with the Aristotelian syllogism.

The Aristotelian form has three statements, a major premise, a minor premise and a conclusion, and is valid in virtue of its form alone. The Nyāya form has five. Its example carries the major premise, its application the minor, and its conclusion the conclusion, so the logical content is the same. The differences are that Nyāya states the claim at the start as well as the end and that its example must carry a familiar instance. So the two answer different questions: whether the conclusion follows, and whether the claim has been established.

6. Name the five fallacies of the reason with a test for each.

Erratic, at 1.2.5: could the reason give the opposite conclusion too? Contradictory, 1.2.6: does it prove the opposite? Equal to the question, 1.2.7: is it the claim reworded? Unproved, 1.2.8: is the reason itself in dispute? Mistimed, 1.2.9: does it hold at the moment it must? The Sūtra's own example of the erratic proves sound both eternal and non-eternal from the same reason, intangibility.

7. Distinguish vāda, jalpa and vitaṇḍā.

Vāda, 1.2.1, is discussion aiming at truth, stated in five members, defended by the means of right knowledge and confutation, without deviating from established tenets. Jalpa, 1.2.2, is wrangling aiming at victory, permitting quibbles and futilities. Vitaṇḍā, 1.2.3, is cavil: wrangling that only attacks and advances no position of its own. The tradition licenses the latter two to guard the truth against an opponent not arguing in good faith.

8. Name the six padārthas and give two modern counterparts.

Substance, attribute, action, genus, species and combination, with non-existence added by the later tradition. Viśeṣa, particularity, corresponds to object identity: it explains what makes two otherwise identical substances two, which is the same problem as two records with identical fields. Abhāva, non-existence, corresponds to an explicitly recorded absence, which is different from an unrecorded value and from a thing not represented at all.

9. State the tridoṣa framework and the problem in Kaviratna's text.

Charaka Sūtrasthāna I.56 gives wind, bile and phlegm as the causes of all bodily diseases, and I.58 to I.60 give seven named attributes for each, with I.61 directing treatment by objects of adverse attributes according to place, measure and time. The printed list for bile contains both "cold" and "hot", which cannot both characterise one thing; and "cold" appears in all three lists, so on that reading it would distinguish nothing. The contradiction is reported rather than silently resolved.

10. Explain how the tridoṣa scheme becomes a classification problem.

The union of the three attribute lists is eighteen attributes, so each doṣa is a binary vector of eighteen components and a description is another. Classification compares the description with the three by counting shared attributes. Sixteen of the eighteen attributes belong to one doṣa only, so most single observations decide. A tie is not an error: a case showing the qualities of two doṣa is a case in which two predominate, which is one of the scheme's own labels.

11. State exactly what the Arthaśāstra says about secret writing.

It names it four times: twice in Book I Chapter XII, once in Book I Chapter XVI, and once in Book XIII Chapter I. The terms are saṃjñā, signs; saṃjñālipi, writing by signs; and gūḍhalekhya, rendered cipher-writing. Agents both write and read such writings. The text supplies no method, no key and no key distribution, which are the three things a cipher system consists of. What it does supply is a threat model: hostile territory, a searchable and untrusted carrier, and a recipient who must read it without conversing.

12. Read the royal writs chapter as a message format specification.

Arthaśāstra Book II, Chapter X prescribes who may compose a writ, what it must contain according to the addressee's rank, six necessary qualities, arrangement, relevancy, completeness, sweetness, dignity and lucidity, and five named faults, clumsiness, contradiction, repetition, bad grammar and misarrangement, each defined. The five faults are a validator running from the medium to the meaning: can it be read, is it well formed, is its structure correct, do its parts agree, is anything said twice. It supplies format and validation and not integrity, authentication or confidentiality.

The one-line facts a viva asks for

• Nyāya Sūtra: five books of two chapters each, attributed to Gotama. Translation quoted: Vidyabhusana, 1913.
• 1.1.1 sixteen categories. 1.1.3 four pramāṇas. 1.1.5 inference, three kinds. 1.1.6 comparison. 1.1.7 verbal testimony. 1.1.32 the five members. 1.2.4 the five fallacies. 1.2.10 quibble. 1.2.18 futility.
• Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 1.1.5: the nine substances. Translation quoted: Nandalal Sinha, 1923.
• Charaka Saṃhitā: Sūtrasthāna for general principles, Vimānasthāna for method. Translation quoted: Kaviratna, from 1890.
• Arthaśāstra: fifteen books. Translation quoted: Shamasastry, 1915. The cipher passages are I.12 twice, I.16, and XIII.1. The writs chapter is II.10.
• Confidentiality, integrity, availability, plus authentication, authorisation, non-repudiation.
• A seal is integrity. Encipherment is confidentiality. They are not the same property.

Quick revision

• Q.2 sets four alternatives on Module 2 and asks for two, so an answer is worth five marks, the same length as a Module 1 answer.
• The sūtra numbers to know: Nyāya 1.1.1, 1.1.3, 1.1.5, 1.1.6, 1.1.32, 1.2.4, 1.2.10, 1.2.18; Vaiśeṣika 1.1.5.
• The passages to know: Charaka Sūtrasthāna I.56 to I.61 and Vimānasthāna IV; Arthaśāstra I.12, I.16, II.10 and XIII.1.
• The translations quoted: Vidyabhusana 1913, Nandalal Sinha 1923, Kaviratna from 1890, Shamasastry 1915.
• The fact most often got wrong: a seal supplies integrity, not confidentiality.

Test yourself

1. Which one classical text supplies the largest number of Module 2's labels, and how many?

The Nyāya Sūtra. Four of MU's six labels under her Nyāya block are items in the list of sixteen categories at 1.1.1: members, which is her five-member syllogism; the means of right knowledge, which carries her anumāna structure; wrangling, cavil, fallacy, quibble, futility and occasion for rebuke, which are her debate methodology; and padārtha, which she takes from the sister school.

2. Which two answers above would serve a question on validation, and why?

The one on the five fallacies and the one on the three kinds of dispute. Together they give the detectable defects and the win conditions, which with the five members and the four pramāṇas are the five parts of a validation protocol.

3. Which fact in this chapter is most often got wrong?

That a seal supplies integrity and not confidentiality. It makes tampering evident and hides nothing from anyone willing to break it.