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Interpretation of Statutes and Principles of Legislation
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
B.A. LL.B. (Five Years) · Sem 9
2017 Dec Examination
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B.A. LL.B. (Five Years) Sem 9 Interpretation of Statutes and Principles of Legislation 2017 Dec Question Paper with Solutions
First published on munotes.in on 21 October 2026.
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Contents
The questions below are the paper as Karnataka State Law University set it at the 2017 Dec examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
MarksPage
The Paper as Set
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2017 Dec examination, reproduced as Karnataka State Law University set them, in the order it set them. Long reading passages are shortened to their first and last lines and our summary; the original paper prints them in full. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 3 hours · Total marks 100 · 13 questions answered
How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
Q1"Interpretation of statute means finding out the intention of the legislature". Explain.[16]
Answer
For full marks, cover: what interpretation is and what "intention of the legislature" means (meaning and purpose; an objective, not a personal, intention); why it is the object of interpretation (separation of powers, democracy, certainty); where intention is found: (1) in the words (Nelson Motis), (2) in the whole Act and its context (Peerless), (3) in the purpose and the mischief (Kanwar Singh; Sodra Devi), (4) in external aids (K.P. Varghese); how each rule of interpretation serves intention (literal, golden with Tirath Singh, mischief, harmonious, the presumptions); the modern purposive approach (Abhiram Singh); the limits (Magor and St. Mellons); criticism; a worked example; a table; conclusion.
What interpretation is
Interpretation of statutes is the process by which a court finds the meaning of the words a legislature has enacted. It does so in order to apply them to a case. The statement that interpretation "means finding out the intention of the legislature" describes its object. Every rule of interpretation is a means to that one end.
What "intention of the legislature" means
Two parts. The intention of the legislature has two parts.
- Meaning: what the words enacted convey.
- Purpose: what the legislature wanted to achieve by them.
An objective intention. A legislature has hundreds of members. Many may never have thought about the point that later comes before the court. So "intention" does not mean the private thoughts of members. It means the intention that the enacted words, read in their context and with their purpose, objectively express.
Why intention is the object
- Separation of powers. The legislature makes the law, and the court applies it. A judge who followed his own view instead of the legislature's intention would be making law.
- Democracy. The elected legislature has chosen the words. The court must respect that choice.
- Certainty. If courts aim at the legislature's intention, citizens can predict the law from the text it enacted.
Where intention is found
1. In the words. The words are the best evidence of intention. Where they are clear, the court gives effect to them. In Nelson Motis v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1981, rule 10(4) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 "deemed" a servant to be under suspension after his removal was set aside. He asked the Court to read the rule down. The Supreme Court refused. Clear words "reasonably susceptible to only one meaning" must be applied "irrespective of consequences". The different wording of the neighbouring rule showed a deliberate choice.
2. In the whole Act and its context. In Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., AIR 1987 SC 1023, the Court read the definition of "prize chit" in a banning Act of 1978. It said interpretation "must depend on the text and the context". If the text is the texture, "context is what gives the colour". The statute is read first as a whole and then section by section.
3. In the purpose and the mischief.
- In Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1965 SC 871, section 418(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 1957 allowed "abandoned" cattle to be impounded. The owners of stray cattle said their cattle were not "ownerless". The Supreme Court held that "abandoned" meant "let loose" or "left unattended". It said it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the legislature. Even in a penal statute, a literal meaning that defeats the object of suppressing a mischief may be departed from.
- In Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madhya Pradesh and Bhopal v. Sodra Devi, AIR 1957 SC 832, section 16(3) of the Income-tax Act 1922 added to the income "of any individual" a wife's or minor child's partnership income. By two to one, the Court found the word ambiguous. The Income-Tax Enquiry Report of 1936 showed the mischief: nominal partnerships by husbands and fathers. So "individual" meant only a male.
4. In external aids. Where the words are doubtful, the court may look at the legislative history. In K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam, AIR 1981 SC 1922, the Supreme Court used the Finance Minister's speech moving section 52(2) of the Income Tax Act 1961. It confined the provision to cases where the sale price was in fact understated.
How each rule serves intention
- The literal rule looks for intention in the plain words.
- The golden rule assumes the legislature did not intend an absurd result. In Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 830, a proviso required notice before a person was named as guilty of a corrupt practice. Read literally, it covered parties who had already been heard. The Court modified the meaning, since the literal reading contradicted "the apparent purpose of the enactment".
- The mischief rule finds intention in the evil the Act was meant to cure.
- Harmonious construction assumes the legislature did not intend its provisions to destroy each other.
- The presumptions, such as those against retrospectivity and against ousting the courts, state what the legislature is taken to intend unless it says otherwise.
The modern purposive approach
In Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen, AIR 2017 SC 401, seven judges divided four to three on the word "his" in section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act 1951. The majority read it broadly and purposively, together with provisions enacted at the same time to curb communal appeals. It recorded that "the shift towards purposive interpretation is not in doubt". The minority held to the literal reading. Both sides were seeking the legislature's intention by different routes.
The limits
The search for intention does not let a court fill gaps or rewrite the Act. In Magor and St. Mellons v. Newport Corporation, (1951) 2 All ER 839, the House of Lords disapproved Denning L.J.'s view that judges should fill in gaps to carry out what Parliament would have wanted. If the legislature has not provided for a case, only the legislature can supply the omission.
Criticism
- A fiction. Some writers say a body of many members has no single intention. The answer is that the phrase refers to the objective meaning of the enacted words.
- A cover for judicial choice. Judges may present their own preferences as the legislature's intention. That is why the courts insist on starting with the words.
- Unforeseen cases. For situations the legislature never imagined, there is no actual intention. The court can only ask what the words, read with their purpose, fairly cover.
A worked example
A municipal law requires owners to "fence" open wells. An owner covers his well with a strong steel grille. The municipality fines him, saying that a grille over the well is not a fence around it.
- The words. "Fence" usually means to enclose with a barrier.
- The purpose. The mischief is people and animals falling into open wells.
- The intention. A secure grille meets that purpose fully. The court would read "fence" to include any secure barrier, because that is what the legislature intended. It would not read "fence" so narrowly as to punish a better form of protection, so the fine fails.
Summary
| Source of intention | How it is used | Case |
|---|---|---|
| Clear words | Applied as they stand | Nelson Motis |
| Context of the whole Act | Text read with context | Peerless |
| Mischief and purpose | Reading that cures the evil | Kanwar Singh; Sodra Devi |
| Legislative history | Used where words are doubtful | K.P. Varghese |
| Avoiding absurdity | Meaning modified | Tirath Singh |
| Purposive approach | Broad reading to serve purpose | Abhiram Singh |
| Limit | No gap-filling | Magor and St. Mellons |
Conclusion. Interpretation of statutes means finding out the intention of the legislature as expressed in the words it enacted, read in context and with their purpose. The courts find it first in clear words (Nelson Motis), then in context and purpose (Peerless; Kanwar Singh; Sodra Devi). Where needed, they use external aids (K.P. Varghese). Every rule of interpretation serves that end. But the search for intention never allows the court to legislate in place of the legislature (Magor and St. Mellons).
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