B.A. LL.B. (Five Years) Sem 9 Competition Law 2023 Mar (100 marks) Question Paper with Solutions

For full marks, cover: the source of the statement (the Raghavan Committee: policy the genus, law the species, law the "teeth" of policy); the aims of competition policy; how the Competition Act, 2002 turns each aim into enforceable rules, an institution and sanctions (Builders Association of India v. Cement Manufacturers' Association, In Re: Umar Javeed v. Google LLC, Competition Commission of India v. Thomas Cook (India) Ltd.); why it is only one instrument (section 49, Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel Ltd., section 54); the limits of the instrument (Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Competition Commission of India); then the critical examination: where the statement holds, where it is incomplete (no adopted national policy; law also shapes policy; delay in enforcement; conflicting policies; due process, Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., Rajasthan Cylinders and Containers Ltd. v. Union of India); a verdict.

1. A duty written into law. Section 18 makes it the Commission's duty to "eliminate practices having adverse effect on competition, promote and sustain competition, protect the interests of consumers and ensure freedom of trade". These are the policy's aims, now binding on a statutory body.

2. Prohibitions on private conduct.

• Against collusion (section 3). Price fixing, output limits, market sharing and bid rigging are presumed harmful. In Builders Association of India v. Cement Manufacturers' Association, decided on 20 June 2012, the Commission found that cement makers had coordinated prices and held back output. It imposed heavy penalties. The policy aim of efficient allocation was enforced against a cartel.
• Against abuse (section 4). A dominant firm may not exclude rivals or exploit buyers. In In Re: Umar Javeed v. Google LLC, decided on 20 October 2022, Google's terms for Android phone makers were held to be an abuse. The penalty was Rs 1,337.76 crore, upheld by the NCLAT on 29 March 2023. The aims of technical progress and consumer choice were protected in a digital market.

1. State-made barriers. Many restraints come from licences, quotas or statutory monopolies. The Act cannot strike them down. Section 49 instead lets governments ask the Commission's opinion on a policy's effect on competition. That opinion "shall not be binding".
2. Sector regulators. In Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel Ltd., (2019) 2 SCC 521, decided on 5 December 2018, the Supreme Court held that TRAI must first decide the telecom interconnection questions. Only then could the Commission act. Competition law works alongside other instruments of policy.
3. Exemptions. The Central Government may exempt enterprises for security or public interest, or under treaty obligations (section 54). Policy may thus decide where the law does not apply.

The instrument has its own limits

Because it is law, it must be applied according to its terms. In Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Competition Commission of India, 2026 INSC 576, decided on 27 May 2026, the Commission had kept an approval of Amazon's investment "in abeyance". The Supreme Court held that the Act does not contemplate such an order. A policy goal cannot enlarge the powers the statute grants.

1. There is no adopted policy to implement. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs published a draft National Competition Policy in 2011 for comment. It has never been adopted. The law therefore implements a policy found mainly in the 1991 reforms, the Act's preamble and section 18. Without a declared policy, other ministries are not bound to consider competition.
2. Law also shapes policy. The relation runs both ways. Under section 49, governments may seek the Commission's opinion on any policy, and the Commission must promote competition advocacy. Its market study on e-commerce, released on 8 January 2020, recommended greater transparency in search ranking and platform terms. Here the enforcer informed the policy maker, not the reverse.
3. Delay blunts the instrument. The cement cartel order of 2012 was reaffirmed in 2016 and upheld by the NCLAT in 2018. The Supreme Court admitted appeals in October 2018, and they remain pending. The Google appeals are also pending in the Supreme Court. A penalty that is not collected for years gives weak "teeth".

Verdict

The statement is broadly correct. Competition law is the principal binding instrument by which competition policy reaches private conduct. But it is not the only instrument, and it is not a passive one. It needs a declared policy, timely enforcement and harmony with other policies to work fully. It also feeds back into policy through advocacy, and it is bound by its own terms and by due process.

Conclusion. The statement restates the Raghavan Committee's view that policy is the genus and law the species, giving policy its "teeth". The 2002 Act does turn policy aims into duties, prohibitions, merger control and penalties, as the cement, Google and Thomas Cook cases show. Critically examined, the statement is incomplete. India has no adopted national competition policy, and enforcement is slowed by long appeals. Other policies and sector regulators limit the law's reach, as Bharti Airtel shows. The law is also bound by its own terms, as SAIL and Amazon hold. Competition law is the main instrument of competition policy, but one among several, and it shapes that policy in return.