KSLU Solved Question Papers
Family Law I (Hindu Law)
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
B.A. LL.B. (Five Years) · Sem 5
2012 Jun Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
KSLU Solved Question Papers
Family Law I (Hindu Law)
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
B.A. LL.B. (Five Years) · Sem 5
2012 Jun Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
First published on munotes.in on 21 October 2026.
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The questions below are the paper as Karnataka State Law University set it at the 2012 Jun examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
MarksPage
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2012 Jun examination, reproduced as Karnataka State Law University set them, in the order it set them. Long reading passages are shortened to their first and last lines and our summary; the original paper prints them in full. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 3 hours · Total marks 100 · 20 questions answered
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How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
Unit I
Answer
For full marks, cover: the two principal schools (Mitakshara and Dayabhaga) with their authors, works and areas, and the Mitakshara sub-schools in brief (Sukhram on one difference between them); the root of the difference, two theories of ownership: janmasvatvavada (ownership by birth) and uparamasvatvavada (ownership on the death of the last owner); the fundamental differences that follow, each with its consequence: the son's right (Sushil Kumar), the coparcenary, the nature of a member's interest, partition (Puttrangamma), alienation, devolution on death, the widow's place, the principle of inheritance, the father's power, and factum valet; what the Acts of 1955 and 1956 and the 2005 amendment have left of the differences (Vineeta Sharma); a table; a conclusion.
Hindu law has two principal schools.
The Mitakshara has sub-schools: Benares, Mithila, Maharashtra (Bombay), Dravida (Madras) and, for some writers, the Punjab. They share the Mitakshara's principles and differ in detail. Sukhram v. Gauri Shankar, AIR 1968 SC 365, records one such detail. Under the Benares school a coparcener cannot sell his undivided share without the others' consent. Under the Maharashtra and Madras schools he may sell it for value.
The Dayabhaga has no sub-schools of its own. It differs from the Mitakshara as a whole.
The schools disagree first about when a son becomes an owner of ancestral property.
Almost every other difference follows from this one.
Mitakshara. The son has an interest by birth, equal to his father's. Sushil Kumar v. Ram Prakash, AIR 1988 SC 576, states the rule. Ram Prakash, the karta, agreed to sell the family house, and his three sons sued to stop him. The Supreme Court affirmed that a son acquires by birth an interest equal to his father's in ancestral property. It held only that the sons' remedy was to set the sale aside afterwards.
Dayabhaga. The son has no right while the father lives.
Mitakshara. Father and sons form a coparcenary from the sons' birth. Dayabhaga. There is no coparcenary between father and sons. Brothers form one only after the father's death, as his heirs.
Mitakshara. The interest is undefined and fluctuating. It shrinks on a birth and grows on a death until partition. Dayabhaga. Each brother's share is definite from the moment he inherits, even if the brothers live together.
Mitakshara. Partition means, first, severance of joint status. Any coparcener can bring it about by a clear and communicated declaration. Puttrangamma v. M.S. Ranganna, AIR 1968 SC 1018. Savoy Ranganna sent notices declaring his intention to separate, and the others came to know of them. He later sought to withdraw them. The Supreme Court held that his status was divided once his intention was communicated, without anyone's consent.
Dayabhaga. Partition is only the physical division of shares already fixed. Sons cannot demand partition from their father.
Mitakshara. A coparcener's power to dispose of his undivided interest is restricted. He cannot gift it, and in the Benares school cannot even sell it without consent, as Sukhram records. Dayabhaga. Each member may sell, mortgage or gift his defined share freely.
Mitakshara (classical). A deceased coparcener's interest passed by survivorship to the surviving coparceners. Dayabhaga. It passed by succession to his heirs, as his separate share.
Mitakshara (classical). A coparcener's widow took nothing of the coparcenary property. Survivorship carried it to the other males. She had only a right to maintenance, later improved by the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act 1937. Dayabhaga. A widow without a son inherited her husband's share, even though he had lived jointly with his brothers.
Mitakshara. Heirs were ranked by consanguinity, nearness of blood. Dayabhaga. Heirs were ranked by religious efficacy, the capacity to offer pinda for the deceased's spiritual benefit. This led to different lists and orders of heirs.
Mitakshara. The father, like any karta, can alienate ancestral property only for necessity, benefit or antecedent debt. Dayabhaga. The father is absolute owner of all the property while he lives and may dispose of it as he likes.
Dayabhaga. It applies the doctrine of factum valet fully. An act done against a text that is only a moral rule remains valid once done. Mitakshara. It accepts the doctrine only to a limited extent.
A family is governed by the school of the region it comes from. A family that migrates is presumed to carry its own school with it. The presumption is displaced only by proof that the family adopted the law of its new home. So a Bengali family settled in Bengaluru may still be a Dayabhaga family. Likewise, a Karnataka family settled in Kolkata may still be a Mitakshara one.
The Dayabhaga treated property more as individual ownership, and so gave the father, and later each brother, more freedom. It also gave a sonless widow a share. The Mitakshara protected the family against a wasteful father, but its survivorship rule left widows and daughters with little. Much of modern reform moved the Mitakshara towards the Dayabhaga's results. It gave women heirship in 1956 and ended survivorship in 2005. Yet it kept the Mitakshara idea of ownership by birth.
1. Succession. The Hindu Succession Act 1956 laid down one scheme of intestate succession for both schools. Consanguinity and religious efficacy no longer decide who inherits property under the Act.
2. Marriage, adoption, guardianship and maintenance. The Acts of 1955 and 1956 apply uniformly to both schools.
3. The joint family. Here the difference survives. Section 6 governs the Mitakshara coparcenary. As amended in 2005, it makes daughters coparceners by birth and replaces survivorship with succession for deaths after 9 September 2005. The Dayabhaga family keeps its own structure.
Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1. Two-judge Benches had disagreed on whether a daughter could claim as a coparcener if her father died before 2005. A three-judge Bench held that her right arises by birth. So the Mitakshara rule of ownership by birth still lives, now extended to daughters, while its rule of survivorship is gone.
| Point | Mitakshara | Dayabhaga |
|---|---|---|
| Theory of ownership | By birth | On the last owner's death |
| Son's right while father lives | Equal to father's (Sushil Kumar) | None |
| Coparcenary | Father and sons from birth | Only among heirs after father's death |
| Member's interest | Fluctuating | Definite |
| Partition | Severance of status (Puttrangamma) | Division of fixed shares |
| Alienation of own interest | Restricted (Sukhram) | Free |
| On a member's death | Survivorship, now succession | Succession |
| Widow of a member | Maintenance only (classical) | Inherits his share if sonless |
| Basis of inheritance | Consanguinity | Religious efficacy |
| Father's power | Limited | Absolute |
| Factum valet | Limited | Full |
Conclusion. The two principal schools are the Mitakshara, with its sub-schools, and the Dayabhaga. They part at the root. The Mitakshara gives ownership by birth, and the Dayabhaga only on the last owner's death. From that follow the differences in the son's right, as Sushil Kumar states, and in the coparcenary, the member's interest and partition, as Puttrangamma shows. Alienation, devolution, the widow's place and the basis of inheritance differ too. The 1955 and 1956 Acts made most of the law uniform. The Mitakshara coparcenary survives in section 6, now with daughters and without survivorship, as Vineeta Sharma confirms.
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