KSLU Solved Question Papers
Administrative Law
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
B.A. LL.B. (Five Years) · Sem 5
2017 Dec Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
KSLU Solved Question Papers
Administrative Law
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
B.A. LL.B. (Five Years) · Sem 5
2017 Dec Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
First published on munotes.in on 21 October 2026.
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Model answers written and edited by the munotes.in editorial desk.
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The question paper reproduced here is the paper as set by Karnataka State Law University at the 2017 Dec examination.
The questions below are the paper as Karnataka State Law University set it at the 2017 Dec examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
MarksPage
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2017 Dec examination, reproduced as Karnataka State Law University set them, in the order it set them. Long reading passages are shortened to their first and last lines and our summary; the original paper prints them in full. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 3 hours · Total marks 100 · 13 questions answered
How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
Answer
For full marks, cover: the meaning of the doctrine and Montesquieu's three limbs; why it matters to administrative law; the United States and England in brief; India: where the Constitution departs from the doctrine and where it insists on it (with Articles); the decided cases (Ram Jawaya Kapur, Delhi Laws Act, Kesavananda, Indira Nehru Gandhi, Asif Hameed, L. Chandra Kumar); a comparison table; an evaluation.
Every government does three kinds of work. It makes laws (legislative), carries them out (executive) and decides disputes under them (judicial). The doctrine of separation of powers says these three powers should be in different hands. Then no single body holds the whole power of the State.
The classical statement is by the French writer Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws (1748). He argued that liberty is lost if the same body makes a law, enforces it and judges breaches of it. Such a body could make a harsh law and enforce it harshly with no check. His idea has three limbs:
Administrative law lives in the space the strict doctrine forbids. When an officer makes rules, the executive is legislating. When a tribunal decides a dispute, the executive is judging. On a strict view, delegated legislation and administrative adjudication would both be bad. So every country has had to decide how much separation it will insist on.
The United States Constitution of 1787 follows the doctrine closely. Article I gives legislative power to Congress, Article II executive power to the President, and Article III judicial power to the courts. Ministers cannot sit in Congress. But even there the organs check each other: the President can veto a Bill, the Senate confirms appointments, and the courts review laws.
England has almost no formal separation. Ministers must sit in Parliament, and the Government depends on the confidence of the House of Commons. Parliament is sovereign, so courts cannot strike down an Act. Only the judiciary is kept separate, and the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 created a separate Supreme Court.
The Indian Constitution does not adopt the doctrine rigidly. The organs share functions in many places:
| Departure | Provision |
|---|---|
| Ministers must be members of the legislature within six months | Articles 75(5) and 164(4) |
| The Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the legislature | Articles 75(3) and 164(2) |
| The President and Governors legislate by ordinance | Articles 123 and 213 |
| The legislature punishes for breach of privilege | Articles 105 and 194 |
| The legislature takes part in removing judges | Articles 124(4) and 217 |
| The Supreme Court makes rules of court | Article 145 |
| Departure | Provision |
|---|---|
| The Supreme Court advises the President | Article 143 |
| Tribunals decide disputes outside the ordinary courts | Articles 323A and 323B |
The executive also makes a large body of delegated legislation under Acts of the legislature.
So the Indian model is a separation of functions with checks and balances, not a rigid separation of organs.
Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549. The Punjab Education Department took over the printing and sale of school text books by executive order. Private publishers said this needed a law. Mukherjea CJ held that the Constitution "has not indeed recognised the doctrine of separation of powers in its absolute rigidity". But the functions of the branches "have been sufficiently differentiated". So one organ cannot take over the functions that essentially belong to another. The petitions were dismissed. This is the classic statement of the Indian position.
In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, AIR 1951 SC 332. The President asked the Supreme Court whether laws letting the Government extend other enactments to Delhi and other areas were valid. The majority upheld most of them, because a rigid separation is impossible in a modern State. But the part allowing the executive to repeal or amend laws already in force in a Part C State was struck down. Kania CJ said the essential legislative function, deciding the policy and making it a rule of conduct, cannot be handed over. This is how India fits delegated legislation into the doctrine.
Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461. The head of a mutt in Kerala challenged constitutional amendments that protected land reform laws from review. The Supreme Court held that Parliament's power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 cannot destroy its basic structure. An amendment may change the Constitution but not abolish its identity. This gave the courts a check even on constitutional amendments, and later cases used it to protect the division of powers.
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299. The Allahabad High Court set aside the Prime Minister's election, and her appeal was pending. Parliament then inserted Article 329A, whose clause (4) declared that judgment void and put the election beyond any court. The Supreme Court struck down clauses (4) and (5) as destroying the basic structure. Deciding an individual dispute is judicial work, and the amending power cannot be used to do it. This case shows exactly what the doctrine forbids: a legislature deciding a case about a named person.
Asif Hameed v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1989 SC 1899. The High Court had issued directions on how the State should select students for medical colleges. The Supreme Court held that each organ must work within its own sphere. Judicial review can strike down unconstitutional action, but the only check on the courts is their own self-restraint. A court cannot direct the executive or the legislature on matters of policy. So the doctrine binds the judiciary as well.
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1125. The Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 had taken service disputes away from the High Courts. A seven-judge Bench held that the High Courts' power under Articles 226 and 227 is part of the basic structure and cannot be excluded. Tribunals may act only as a supplement, and their decisions go to a Division Bench of the High Court. This protects judicial power from being transferred away.
| Point | United States | England | India |
|---|---|---|---|
| Basis | Written, strict separation | No written constitution | Written, functions differentiated |
| Ministers in the legislature | Not allowed | Required by convention | Required by Articles 75 and 164 |
| Point | United States | England | India |
|---|---|---|---|
| Delegation of legislative power | Limited | Unlimited in principle | Allowed, but not of essential functions |
| Courts review laws | Yes | No | Yes, including amendments |
The Indian approach is practical. A rigid separation would make delegated legislation and tribunals impossible, and a welfare State cannot work without them. At the same time, the core of the doctrine is protected. The legislature cannot decide cases, the executive cannot override judicial decisions, and the courts cannot make policy. Judicial review of all three is the main safeguard.
The weakness is that the line is drawn case by case. Wide delegation and frequent ordinances still give the executive great power.
Conclusion. India does not follow separation of powers in its rigid American form. As Ram Jawaya Kapur held, the functions of the three organs are differentiated, and none may take over what essentially belongs to another. The Delhi Laws Act case allows delegation but not of essential legislative functions. Indira Nehru Gandhi and L. Chandra Kumar protect judicial power as part of the basic structure. Asif Hameed holds the courts to their own limits.
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